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ABSTRACT 
W.N. BARNES: Socio-economic Influences on Distribution Levels in 
Western Europe 
Most international marketing research reports are based on a skeleton 
of currently available international socio-economic, demographic and 
social indicators. These currently available indicators used by 
marketing analysts are in many cases inadequate for, or irrelevant to, 
the requirements of marketing. This project has as its objective the 
development of more useful indicators and the prediction of the different 
levels of retail distribution in Western Europe in terms of hypermarket 
and supermarket development. The limitations of available international 
- , ' 
indicators are analysed and alternatives proposed. - Some of these 
required-new research, others ,the restructuring of existing data. 
Prototype indicators are constructed and used in modelling and prediction. 
The main analyses are made at the level of the sub-national region and 
at national levels. The regional analysis is a basic pre-requisite-for 
international marketing analysis. 
_/ 
Subsequent analysis is by correlation, regression and Automatic 
Interactor Detection (AID). The usefulness and validity of AID, in 
respect of aggregate data,using a comparatively limited number of 
observations is demonstrated.: The end product is a set of'~evised 
hypotheses more refined than the original generally-accepted "naive" 
'" 
hypotheses. The project investigates the relationship between the 
hypermarket and the various size categories of supermarket and their 
environments more precisely than has hitherto been possible. The 
methodology is of more general applicability to marketing problems. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. During the 
programme of research I have not been a registered candidate for 
another award of the CNAA or a University. For a period during the 
research I was assisted by a research assistant. His work as 
affecting this thesis was confined to making direct contact with retail 
firms in the Republic of Ireland and in Ulster in order to obtain the 
distribution data in respect of these countries and to assist~;-:-,,,,in 
',G~,~~J 
aggre~ating. the minor region data in order to produce major region 
data. 
Work towards the ~ubject of this thesis was supported by an SSRC 
Project Grant. The Final Report (HR 3217) was submitted and accepted 
in November 1978. 
During the research period,.1 have published and addressed conferences 
on the subject of this thesis as follows: 
"Hypermarket Prediction in Western Europe" - paper delive~ed to Planning 
" 
and Transport Research and Computation (PTRC) Annual Conference, / 
Warwick University July 1975: published in Retailing - Procedures of the' 
1975 University of Warwick Seminar PTRC 1976 
"The Urgent Need for Specific and Realistic International Marketing and 
Distribution Indicators" - paper delivered to European Institute of 
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Advanced Studies in Management (EIASM) International Symposium on: 
Distribution - Structure and Management Brussels 29th and 30th ~ 
May 1978: published in Proceedings.- -
Socio-Economic Influences on Distribution Levels in Western Europe 
SSRC Final Report 1978 
"The Proposal of a Marketing Indicators Working Party" Journal of the 
Market Research Society Volume 21 No.3 1979 
Monograph International Marketing Indicators published as European 
Journal of Marketing Vol.14 No.2 1980 
As a consequence of these published papers, a European Marketing 
Indicators Working Party is currently being established. In this, 
marketing academics throughout.Europe will work to produ~e realistic 
/ 
indicators of marketing factors and hypothesised causative socio-
economic, demographic etc factors. Eight universities in seven 
European countries wish to date to participate in this project. 
Some have agreed to appoint research assistants specifically for this 
purpose. Luigi Bocconi University, Milan, has nominated a research 
"' team to research the Italian data. The Office of PopulatiOn Censuses 
and Surveys (OPCS), A C Nielsen Company and The Market Research Society 
will appoint representatives to the working party. Outside (unding is 
being sought by Research Bureau Ltd (Research International). 
Additionally to the European representation, Dr K H Lee of the Chinese 
. University of Hong Kong is in the U.K ln order to apply the methodology 
of the project to the Far East. Details of the working party are 
contained in Appendix 3. 
-2-
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During the programme of.research the work and the problems involved 
have been discussed with most relevant European authorities. 
This includes discussions at the ESOMAR seminar Management Information 
for Retail Organisations, Luzern, 3 - 6 April 1974, and at the 
SSRC/EIASM seminar on Marketing and Public Policy at the University of 
Strathclyde 1978. There have been detailed discussions with: 
Dr J B Jefferys, Director General of the International Association of 
Department Stores (lADS) Paris" and chairman of the Distribution Trades 
Economic Development Committee.Common Market Working Party (contact 
has been frequent) • 
. Mr M Norton, ,Vice President, tarry Smith Consulting, Paris 
(frequent contact) • 
. Dr R Linda, Directorate General IV, Commission of the European 
Communities, Brussels (who has circulated cppies of my EIASM paper 
to all member 'countries) c 
. , ~ -
Mr J Besnard, Directorate General 'Ill, Commission of the European 
Communities, Brussels. 
Professor Or A G Heirman, Economische Hogeschool, Llmburg, 
(frequent contact) 
Professor A S C Ehrenberg, London Graduate School of Business. 
, -
Mr J Chahine, European Research Director, A C Nielsen Co., Paris. 
Hr C Wallis, Public Relations Director, A C Nielsen Co., Oxford. 
Mr T E Robert~, Research & Development Controller, ASDA Stores Ltd, 
Leeds. 
Mr I Cooffians, Counsellor, Comite BeIge De La Distribution, Brussels. 
",', " 
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Mr A Vandoren, Economic Consultant, Association Des Grandes Entreprises 
De Distribution En Belgique (AGED) Brussels. 
Mr F C Treidell, Vice-President & Director General, Comite International 
Des Entreprises A Succursales (CIES) Paris. 
Ms.D Larking-Coste, Research Officer, CIES, Paris. (frequent contact) 
Dr H K Locker, Directorate B, Statistical Office of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg. 
Mr .R Kuhner, Directorate F, Statistical Office of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg. 
Mr J R Blanc, Secretary General, La Confederation Generale Des 
Petites Et Moyennes Entreprises (CGMPE) Paris •. 
Mr E Thil, Marketing Director, Carrefour, Paris. 
Mr B Anglade, Redacteur En Chef, Revue Francaise Du Marketing, Paris 
and Ms C Duchemin, Redactrice Adjoute. 
Mr D Le Marchand, Secretary General, Federation Internationale Des 
Grandes Entreprises De Distribution (FIGED), Brussels. 
Dr F Kempchen, Secretary General, Groupement Europeen" Des Maisons 
D'Alimentation Et D'Approvisionnement A Succursales (GEMAS), Brussels 
Mr R Schiller, Research Director, Hillier Parker May & Rowden, London 
Mr E R S Whitefield, Managing Director, Management Horizons (UK) Ltd, 
Richmond. 
Dr E Bell, DECD (Social Indicators) Paris. , I 
Dr E Ezra, DECD (Regional Studies) Paris. 
Dr S Blades, DECD (Economic and Financial Indicators) Paris. 
Ms.D Le Coultre DECD (Female Labour Studies) Paris. 
Ms B Ballard, Senior Research Officer, Office of Population Censuses 
& Surveys (QPCS) London. 
-4-
Mr N Ahmed, Marketing Research Manager, Tesco Stores Ltd, Cheshunt. 
Mr T fisher, ISCED Studies, UNESCO, Paris 
Mr B Pyemont, Managing Director, Research Bureau Ltd (Research 
In~ernational) London. 
In addition this research has involved extensive and in many cases 
protracted correspondence with trade and professional organisations 
and national statistical offices. in all the Western European countries 
studied. 
/ 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: METHOD AND AIMS 
What may be called "marketing mythology" has absorbed numerous theories 
or hypotheses about the incidence and the causes of the incidence of 
supermarketing, and hypermarketing in Europe, and the reasons for the 
disparities observed internationally in Europe. In the main these are 
based on catchment area studies and on, usually inadequate, national 
data or national environmental and trading ster~otypes. The starting 
point in this research is the evaluation of these generalised hypotheses, 
and,the construction of precise hypotheses that it might be possible to 
validate using aggregate data. 
Since it is argued that the use of national data for this purpose is 
grossly insensitive, the main focus of the research is the analysis of 
aggregate data for the sub-national regions of Europe. The compilation 
of relevant indicators at regional level that are comparative is, however, 
a very considerable task. Therefore, an alternative analysis of the 
aggregate data at national level is also made, both to refine the initial 
hypotheses of the regional analysis and to suggest the indicators that 
might ,be explanatory of these hypotheses in a regional anal~sis, and 
subsequently to illustrate, explain and support, if this is applicable, 
the conclusions of the regional analysis. 
The main focus of the research is on an explanation ,of the environmental 
factors affecting hypermarket development. Supermarketing is studied 
\ 
as a parallel or prior phenomenon affecting this development. The degree 
-6-
of incidence of both these methods of retailing is argued as being 
indicative of the level of sophistication of retailing in general. 
The regional data are subjected to correlation, regression and Automatic 
Interactor Detection (AID) analysis. The initial "naive" hypotheses are 
then revised in the light of these analyses to produce revised and 
precise hypotheses that are supported by empirical data. ' 
The process, therefore, is the process that RILEY (1964) has character-
ised as working back and forth between theory and data (1). It is a 
process that Sonquist has summarised: "As explanatory research uncovers 
empirical regularities, one can look for clues to new ideas and 
explanations that might account for these findings" (2). 
The final two chapters renew the discussion under topic heads and 
re-examine the initial hypotheses. The final research product is a 
series of revised and more precise hypotheses than have hitherto been 
proposed. 
References: Chapter 1 
(1)' RILEY, M.W., "Sources and types of sociological data" in Faris, R.E.' 
(ed), Handbook of Modern Sociology, Rand-McNally, Chicago, 1964. { 
(2) ,SONQUIST, J.A., Multivariate Model Building, Institute for Social 
Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1970. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND TO METHODOLOGY IN 
COMPARATIVE MARKETING 
2.1 Comparative marketing as a formal discipline is little more than 
fifteen years old - with a literature that is as yet largely spasmodic. 
and arbitrarily focussed. 
The classic statement of the true aims of comparative marketing is 
Bartels' (1963) (1) "not merely a description of foreign marketing 
experience, but an interpretation of it in terms of the socio-economic 
environment of foreign markets". He concluded at that time that no 
such studies existed and that, moreover, none was likely to be produced 
in the near future. With perhaps three exceptions he has not yet been 
,proved wrong. To Bartels, "comparative marketing involves three types 
of interpretation: (a) of the relation between social conditions in a 
country and the manner in which marketing is practised there; 
(b) of the character and operation of the marketing mechanism itself; 
(c) of the patterns of personal behaviour and interaction in the socio-
marketing activity" • 
. , . 
Most analysts~have so far been concerned with the second factor, the 
operation of the marketing mechanism only. Comparative studies of 
course exist. In the main they are descriptive. 
, .1'" ;":'.., , 
What work there has been has mainly consisted of commentafor's '~J as 
. Cundi ff has complained, "Generalising from their own systems" -( 2) -- ---
- in particular simple predictions that country X is, for example, 
-8-
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ten years behind America, so that its marketing institutions will be 
the same as America's in ten years' time. This basically, to Cundiff, 
is what Jefferys and Knee are doing in their Retailing in Europe (3) 
and according to Bartels, this is also what nearly every American 
commentator on international marketing is doing - tending "to judge 
business elsewhere from our own standpoint, without appreciating that 
our practice~ are as indigenous to our environment as those of other 
people are to theirs". (1) 
r It is the relationships between the relevant environment and marketing 
practice and institutions that are significant; and, if these variables 
are able to be comparatively quantified, one might then deal more 
precisely in "ratios" rather than "relationships". 
Buxton (4), following the logic of Bartels, has produced the diagram 
in Figure 2.1. In this, comparative analys~s is suggested by the 
equation A:C = B:D, "as A:B and C: D are merely descriptive studies or 
marketing systems, and A:C and B:D are simply statements concerning 
the environment". 
L,,' ~'. , 
The statistical precision of the comparisons made implied :i~'such a' 
", 
" formula is absent from almost every comparative study that has been 
produced to date. Studies exist, of course, that relate environmental 
factors to marketing practice; but almost entir,ely they are not of the 
kind that could result in any operational equation. In the main in 
such studies the comparisons made are (1) qualitative only and 
unsupported by comparative data (2) fragmented and random (3) simplistic 
-9-
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Figure 2.1 Comparison of the relationhsips between marketing 
and environment. 
"A" 
HOME MARKETING 
PROCESS 
A:C 
" 
V 
"c" 
HOME 
ENVIRONMENT 
v' -
I" 
!/,;-, 
1:"-..' 
~ A:B .....,---/~ 
C:D ' 
" / 
,/ 
"B" 
,fOREIGN MARKETING 
PROCESS 
B:O 
\. V-
' "0" 
FOREIGN' 
ENVIRONMENT 
in that the concentration tends to be on co'ntrasting'third world 
countries with western industrialised nations. It can be argued that 
these features characterise the "standard text", the "comparative 
systems approach", of Carson (5). 
Crucially Sherbini has commented in this context: 
J 
! 
"Very little attention has been given 'in 'the past to the 
comparative approach in the field of international marketing. 
Most of the existing literature represents individual and 
fragmented efforts, providing brief accounts that'highlight 
certain aspects of marketing in individual countries. The 
absence of a derived analytical framework within which these 
contributions can be positioned makes meaningful comparisons 
extremely difficult". (6) ~~.~~ 
, -10-
The formation of hypotheses as to relevant factors, the precise measurement 
of these factors, comparability and inclusivity within clearly defined 
boundaries - these are the prime requirements of an operationally 
useful comparative analysis. As yet such a methodological approach 
has been attempted by only a handful of researchers - these with 
, varying degrees of ambition. 
2.2 Approaches to quantified analysis 
The genesis of quantified comparative analysis in marketing was a 
short article by Cundiff in the Journal of Marketing in 1965. (2) 
Here Cundiff advocated the 'investigation of comparative retailing by 
the method of development of hypotheses and the generation of inputs 
against which these hypotheses can be tested. Cundiff's concern in his 
study is the prerequisites of innovation in retailing and, as his main 
dependent variable measuring this, he chose the extent of provision of 
/' 
self-service., Cundiff complains that "paucity of information on 
marketing in other nations limits the comparison that can be made" -
and, in fact, his inputs for independent variabies are in the main, 
subjective and selective choices. ,For example: 
"Hypothesis 1. The development of self-service supports 
"\ 
the hypothesis that retailing innovations evolve onlYln 
highly developed marketing systems". 
His main input against which this can be tested is: 
"On a purely a priori basis, the America marketing system 
is widely accepted as the most advanced in the world today, 
and was, at least among the most advanced in the 1920's when 
self-service was first introduced". 
-11-
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However, in testing the hypothesis that "the ability to adopt 
innovations is related directly to the level of economic development of 
a system" the dependent and independent variables chosen are as given 
in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 A Gomearative Rankinq of Selected Nations with Reseect to 
Economic Indices and Percent of Self-Service Stores 
Index of Telephones Self-service 
Production in use stores 
Country Per capita Rank Per capita Rank 0' of Rank ,0 
total 
United States 7.7 1 .42 ·1 ·10.0 1 
U.K. 6.8 2 .16 7 1.3 8 
Switzerland 6.7 3 .32 3 2.4 5 
Canada 5.6 4 .315 4 6.0 2 
Germany 5.3 5 .12 11 3.6 4 
Sweden 4.4 6 .36 2 5.35 3 
Denmark 4.3 7 .245 5 1.4 6 
/ 
Australia 4.1 .'8 .215 6 1.0 10 
Belgium 3.7 9 .133 10 0.13 12 
France 3.2 10 .101 12 0.24 11 
Netherlands 3.0 11 .1495 8 1.35 7 
Venezuala 2.8 12 .0285 16 0.005 '16 
.. 
Italy 1.9 13 .0805 13 : 0'.02 13 
Finland 1.6 14 .1464 9 1.1 9 
, 
.... 
Spain 1.05 15 .062 15 0.Ot4 14 , 
(N/A) / Japan 1.0 16 .065 14 -
Mexico' 0.7 17 .016 17 0.1 15 
Phillippines 0.05 18 .004 18 (N/A) 
India 0.03 19 .001 19 ,None 19 
U.S.S.R. 0.1 
-12-
The dependent variable "ability to adapt to innovation" is measured by 
"self-service stores as percentage of total stores" •. "Level of 
economic development" is measured by the independent variables "Indices 
of production" (per capita) and "telephones in use" (per capita). The 
factor "index per capita industrial productivity" is derived from: 
percentage of value added in world industry divided by percentage of 
world population. The factor "telephones in use (per capita)" is 
proposed as "a measure of a non-essential semi-luxury good". 
, , 
Cundiff then gives a rank order to each of the twenty nations studied 
in respect of each variable and compares the ranking as confirming or 
not confirming the hypothesis. He concludes: "a comparison of the 
data on production and consumption with self-service in the 20 
countries shows a relationship between these factors. For example, 
, 5 of the 6 leading nations in production are also lead~rs in penetration 
of self-service, or, to move further down the list, 11 of the top 12 
are leaders in both". 
We are not concerned with the validity of the variables, which Cundiff 
offers only '~i;' the best readily available (and one would presuppose 
.the action of confounded variables) or with the method of rank-
ordering, but with the method of compilation of at least designedly J 
objective indicators and their subsequent comparison - notwithstanding 
the starkness of the indicators. It is symptomatic of , the scarcity 
'of quantified comparative studies that Cundiff's prototypical and, 
in retrospect, simple exercise was still being anthologised in 1971 (7) 
and continues to be ci-ted. 
-13-
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-The important and influential study of this concept of comparative 
. analysis, however, is the monumental Comparative Analysis for Inter-
national Marketing produced under the direction of liander for the 
Management Science Institute of Philadelphia (8) - and one says this 
despite the methodological objections to this study raised by Sethi 
and Holton (9) •. 
The first step for M.S.I. "involved examining a multitude of variables 
which may be used to describe any given society and determining those 
strategic to our purposes •.• " - in this case, those explanatory of 
marketing phenomena. The variables chosen were those considered 
indicative of the "socioeconomic landscape"; and multiple variables 
rather than single variables were chosen - in which respect, referring 
back to the Cundiff Study (Table 2.1) we could obviously be highly 
dubious about the use of "telephones per capita" as the unique 
indicator of consumption. 
The following indices were chosen by the M~S.I. researchers as 
explanatory of marketing conditions: 
Environmental' 
1. .Total population 
2. PopUlation density 
3. Annual percentage rate of increase in population 
4. % of population of working age (15-64) , 
5. Agriculture population as % of total population 
6. Urbanization. % population in cities over 20,000 population 
7. Primacy. Population of the primate city as % of the total 
popUlation of the four largest cities. 
8. literacy (% literate of the population, aged 15 and over) 
-14-
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Societal 
9. Ethnographic Diversity. Number of ethnographic groups 
comprising one per cent of population. 
10. Religious Homogeneity and Identification. 
Homogeneous: (one religion at least 75% predominant) 
11. Racial homogeneity and identification. 
Homogeneous: (one major social stock at least 90% predominant) 
12. Linguistic homogeneity: % of adult population which speaks 
a common language. 
Within these characteristici countries were classified as Very High, 
High, Medium, Low, Very Low - and clusters were then identified 
according to number of attributes shared by countries. In the same 
way, but for a separate purpose, Economic, Health/Hygiene, 
Educational Level, Communications and Transport indicators were also 
de~ised. 
The importance of the M.S.I. study is its insistance on-the selection 
of sufficiently wide-ranging, international indices. In the same way, 
, .' 
the attempt of objectivity is the virtue of that section of the Cundiff 
study utilized above. 
The astonishingly almost virgin concept of comparative marketing that 
thus begins to emerge is: 
1. the generation of hypotheses 
2. the compilation of inputs against which'these hypotheses can 
be tested. 
-15-
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3. the use, for international comparison, of the indicators so 
compiled, once these are proved to be relevant. 
In the case of the M.S.I. study, the validation of the relevance of 
the variable is not one of its concerns. The underlying hypotheses 
are unstated - the indicators being selected for relevance by Delphi 
methods; so that the researchers are then concerned with classifying 
countries by means of variables that by wide consent. are relevant. 
Cundiff, however, states his hypotheses explicitly, and, in the instance 
quoted, uses the method of testing these against "objective" data. 
One urges it as axiomatic that at least the approach of Cundiff in 
which indicator data ~~e generated to illustrate specific hypotheses, 
is the methodologically sound one. The M.S.I. alternative, in which 
"expert" opinion is canvassed to identify socioeconomic and cultural 
areas that are relevantly discriptive of all marketing environments, 
contains the challengeable assumption that "marketing" is a homogeneous 
activity - that a factor which is relevant for one marketing activity 
will be relevant for another:·that "relevant to retailing" = "relevant 
to advertising" = "relevant to the export of capital goods". 
Additionally, the implicit argument of the M.S.I. study is that all 
. ~ 
factors carry equal weight: countries can therefore be clustered ! 
according to the number of attributes they have in common. This again 
seems simplistic. In this context. in her s,tudy Selecting European 
Markets, which, in effect, can be seen as a follow-up study to the 
work of the M.S.I. PUJ.'nell, using cluster analysis, reaches the 
conclusion that to consider the characteristics of a market without 
-16-
relating those to the characteristics of the proposed product and the 
producing company is unprofitable (10). In the terms Qf-the present 
study the approach will be that no indicator will be adopted simply 
on the grounds that it "describes the market"; we take as starting 
point precise hypotheses as to factors influential in the adoption 
of retailing innovation. We attempt the construction of indicators 
to illustrate these factors. ' 
As regards distribution analysis consequent on the work of the M.S.I. 
Heirman's 1976-1977 study (11) is I believe, the only one published 
to date, exempting such prototype studies as Cundiff to attempt 
formalised statistical relation of socio-economic and distribution 
variables on an international scale (volume 3 with reference to the 
EEC). Heirman uses the process of factor analysis."'This is valuable 
in the generation of hypotheses (although, of course, the act of 
selecting an indicator for inclusion impli~s an hypothesis). If, for 
example, as in the Heirman study, the factors of concentration on 
agriculture~ high unemployment and excess retail capacity cluster 
together, then conceivably one could from this form an hypothesis that 
levels of agricultural employment and le'vels of unemployment might, 
predict retail capacity. Heirman also essays sub-national analysis, 
using available EEC Commission data (12). 
2.3 Subjective Analysis via "expert opinion" 
In comparative analysis properly quantified statistical analyses ~re 
few. The alternative is to analyse or weight the analysis via the 
medium of subjective opinion. 
-17-
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In any collection of variables, some variables are logically more 
significant in prediction than others. When "l:h'ese yardsticks are 
put together in some sort of combination, the question arises as to 
what weight to give what factor" (13). This has been said to be the 
most intractable problem in comparative analysis (14). Regression can 
assign the weights, assuming'the relevant variables are included in 
.; , 
the regression programme. AID can help determine the form' of the 
relationships. A simpler and simplistic course is to let "expert 
opinion" weight the factors, in addition to selecting the factors as in 
the "M" S. I":- approach". 
If this is the procedure adopted, then there is no need to quantify 
the variables." N~bulous concepts such as "labour organisations 
and attitudes" (Langeard) can be weighted.for importance by "experts" 
and each country given by them a score. The weighted scores of all 
such factors can be added to produce a total score. This can comprise 
the whole of the analysis. It is a quick method. 
Such a method is· used by Business International S.A. Brussels, in 
assessing the future risk and opportunities for business in seventy 
countries. Since the future cannot be quantified it is a,justifiable 
" 
~, , 
, . 
procedure. Business International pro~oses 55 environmental factors. 
The 55 factors, some of them such as "scenarios for social stability" 
inherently unquantifiable, are separated into three categories: 
those considered to generate risk, those considered to create 
opportunity, and those considered to affect on-going operations in a 
direct manner. Business International reports that 
-18-
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"It is at this point that the temptation to transform the . 
qualitafive data into quantitative dati,becomes irresistible. 
Weights are assigned-to each factor to express the significance 
of its impact on business and, as has been seen, scores are 
assigned to the predicted scenario for each year. Weighted 
averages can then be calculated to produce for each country 
a risk index, an opportunity index, and an operating conditions 
index. 
The weights used are the averages of weights actually assigned 
to these factors by 100 international companies. This is not 
only scientific but intelligent as the results therefore 
reflect the judgement of the business community at large". (14) 
The company warns, however, that there can be "no absolute comparability. 
no statistical signi~icance". As a qualifying input to the assessment 
of future markets the procedure is valid. In an analysis of existing 
markets as a guide to a~tion, which is the main concern of comparative 
marketing, subjective _weighting as a proxy for statistical weighting 
of "hard fact" is obviously sub-optimal. 
Langeard (15) with a more precisely focussed objective, that of 
~ 
identifying countries with a potential for hypermarket development,. 
-selects the variables. These variables were then weighted "based on 
their experience, information and beliefs of a ;grOUP of Europeal) 
retail managers". Countries were then scored out_of 120 and marked 
accordingly. It is, he admits "a minimum of comparative analysis". 
.... -
I 
l 
. Meida~ 1976 (16) similarly concentrates his focus - on the international 
marketing' of woollens and worsted fabrics; 'and proposes 13 relevant 
non-controllable variables. These were classified as to influential 
importance by a sample of 22 senior executives in the industry -
each being asked to grade the influence of each variable on a fiv~-
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point scale. The end result is the rank ordering of the variables by 
degree of estimated probable importance, after a process of multi- ' 
dimensional scaling (though this, one would argue, is not essential 
to the exercise). The "variables", however, are composed of catch-
all categories which cannot be operationalised as stated - categorics 
such as "change in demand due to economic factors like "inflation, 
decline in income etc", "cultural differences due to differences in 
religion, social environment etc", and "political disturbances". 
Meidan has identified those broad areas of influence that a sample of 
"expert opinion" considers most influential. This has a value as a 
preliminary analytical step. Meidan has tested, in effect, if his 
generalised hypotheses are in accordance with the hypotheses generally 
current in the trade. 
The next step would be to attempt to operationalise these non-
controllable variables by the construction pf quantified and comparative 
indicators'that are able to substantiate such concepts; then to relafe 
these statistically to constructed indicators of export success,in 
the woollens and worsted fabrics industry. The construction of valid 
indicators,of, in many cases, very nebulous concepts, is of cours~ 
the problematic step - and the difficulties in many areas are enormous. 
:'-' ~ , ~ ,=.. '< ' ~ • 
This is the direction, however; 'i~ which useful research results ,'f' 
inevitably lie. ,By definition, the assessing. of average practitioner 
opinion cannot produce any new insight. It is useful 'to know what ; " 
opinions are generally held: it is a limited research objective. 
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2.4 HYPERMARKET MICRO STUDIES 
2.4.1 The above studies have been concerned with analysis (statistical 
or otherwise) using aggregate data. An alternative is to use 
disaggregate data. The main focus of this present research is on the 
factors conducive to hypermarket development in Europe. In the main, 
in fact, both practitioners and researchers derive their conclusions 
as to> these factors from the micro-analysis of the characteristic, 
patronage of individual existing stores, and, to a limited extent, 
of the environmental factors peculiar to successful and unsuccessful 
stores. This is obviously a logical and, to the firm concerned, an 
essential operational exercise. In each case, however, the conclusions 
are particular to those stores and to those specific locations. Such 
studies have been almost entirely retail impact studios. A by-product 
has been' the production of customer profiles • 
./ 
Obviously, however, at least theoretically, if enough consumer profiles 
are established in respect of a sufficient member of differently 
located hypermarkets, and this is done trans-nationally, and the 
environmental factors relevant to these hypermarkets are coded or. ,',' 
quantified, then generalisations supported by data could b~ attempted 
about hypermarkets in general. This, after all, is basically the 
approach adopted in Applebaum's analog model of retail site location 
for individual firms (17), which approach was developed, though 
subsequently criticised, in the UK by Gallup Poll (18, 19). 
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These location studies, however, are, as stated, in the main each 
concerned with one particular store operated by one particular company 
in one particular region of one country. The problems of __ ~eneralisation 
derive essentially from this fact, and from the varying value of the 
t , 
different· catchment area reports. 
The difficulties of interpreting and generalising from catchment area 
studies can be illustrated by reference to the principal reports to 
date on British hypermarkets. These are: 
(1) Carrefour hypermarket, Caerphilly: study by Thorpe and McGoldrick 
for the Retail Outlets Research Unit (RORU), Manchester Business' 
School. Final publication 1974. (20) 
(2) Carrefour hypermarket, Caerphilly: study by Lee, 'Jones and 
Leach for the Surveyors Donaldson and Sons. Published 1973 (21) 
(3) Carrefour hypermarket, Eastleigh: study by Wood for the 
Department of the Environment. Published 1976 (22) 
(4) Carrefour hypermarket, Eastleigh: study by Wood for the 
Departments of Environment and Transport. Published 1978 (23) 
(5) Asda superstores in North Manchester: ,study by Thorpe and 
McGoldrick for the Retail Outlets Research Unit (RORU) Manchester 
'\ 
.... 
Business School. Published 1974 (24) 
(6) Fine Fare superstore, St Ninians, Stirling: 'study by Malcolm and' 
Aitken for the University of Glasgow. Published 1977 (25) 
(7) Asda superstores in general: survey by Gordon Simmons Research 
Ltd in 1972. Published 1974. (26) 
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These and other catchment area studies are referred to elsewhere in this 
thesis under particular hypothesis heads; They are not all equally 
useful as information sources. Wood's studies for the Department of 
the Environment are valuable inputs to retailing research. This 
section focusses in particular, however, on the studies by Thorpe and 
McGoldrick for the Retail Outlets Research Unit (RORU), a unit which 
was commissioned by The Institute of Grocery" Distribution to monitor 
and research new hy.permarket openings as a continuing series. 
The concern in this chapter is with method, interpretation and 
reportage, and the possibility of generalisation from the combined 
findings of such studies •. Though catchment area reports are not 
equal in scope and value, they all face initially the same methodological 
problems. The usefulness of the data they contain is affected by the 
research design, the sample size, the format of analysis,and the 
presentation. The first two of these factors are a function, to some 
extent, of the research budget. 
2.4.2 The problem of research design in catchment area studies 
The basic question of "whom to question where?" is critical to validity. 
" -... 
Shopping behaviour can be examined by interviewing consumers (1) at the! 
store or shopping centre ~ as was·,done by the Donaldson researchers 
at Caerphilly, by Malcolm and Aitken at St Ninians, and on behalf of 
Asda superstores by Gordon Simmons Research (2) in their homes - as 
was done in the Retail Outlets Research Unit Caerphilly Study (3) 
by conducting both th~se exercises as an integral part of the same 
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research - as was done by Wood at Eastleigh and RORU in North 
Manchester. The first two approaches are inherently problematic. 
In a comparative analysis based on catchment area surveys, the 
performance and levels of patronage at anyone store need to be 
considered in relation to the environment of that store. This 
environment is bound to be particular to that area and idiosyncratic 
• jP' -: I 
to greater or less extent. In-store interviewing is concerned' to answer 
the question "What are the characteristics of the customers of this 
hypermarket?" This by itself tells us nothing about preferential 
attraction. If, for example, all the hypermarket's customers are found 
to be of A, B or Cl social class one cannot deduce from this that the 
hypermarket has no attraction for lower so cia-economic groups: there 
may be none or few of these living in the catchment area. If sixty 
per cent of customers are observed to be working wives, one cannot say 
that the hypermarket particularly attracts workihg wives: The average 
statistic for that area might be sixty per cent, in ~hich case the 
hypermarket is only averagely attractive to that group. Rousseau (27) 
juxtaposes the figures for eight French hypermarkets of percentage 
patronage according to the socio-professional category of the 
customer's head of family. The eight distributions differ widely~ 
"-
. '-
He subjectively concludes that the ambient populations concerned must , 
.' 
respectively also differ widely. The comparative analyst is concerned 
with the plus or minus variations from the ambient averages. 
Most st~dies based solely on in-store interviewing attempt an 
environmental comparison of some sort. 
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St Ninians study (25) do not. They simply present us with "shopper 
characteristics". The Donaldson researchers at Caerphilly (21) relate 
each shopper characteristic to the average of that characteristic for 
the whole of Wales. One would assume, however, that the Cardiff area 
differs significantly from, for example, central rural Wales. The 
Gordon Simmons Survey (26)of approximately two thirds of all Asda 
stores compares the 'characteristics of Asda shoppers with parallel 
characteristics of all housewives nationwide. Since Asda operates 
nationwide. (tnough certainly' in 1972 concentrated in the north) this 
can be argued as being justified as indicating approximate preferential 
patronage of that particular store group over the limited number of 
consumer characteristics covered by the survey. In general, however, 
for our purposes in-store interviewing produces the least useful data. 
An alternative approach is to question people in their homes and thereby 
attempt to discover in what ways those who shop at the hypermarket differ 
from those who do not. This in theory produces valid answers to the 
questions that the comparative analyst is concerned to ask. Used as the 
sole analytical approach, however, it encounters very considerable problems: 
in particular, ·the catchment area is only subjectively identified, and 
sample sizes need to be large if sufficient user~ and non-~sers are to 
be identified. It is the method adopted by the Retail Research Unit 
at Caerphilly (20), which piece of research and the problems generated 
are discussed at length below.> 
. The optimum method is to conduct bottl an in-store survey and a house-
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hold survey. The in-store survey identifies the realistic catchment 
area. The household survey provides the environmental comparison. Both 
sets of figures can be compared. It is, in particular, the method 
adopted in the methodologically rigorous Eastleigh hypermarket study 
made by Wood.for the Department of the Environment (23) and the method 
attempted by the Retail Outlets Research Unit at North Manchester (24). 
2.4.3 Study by the Retail Outlets Research Unit (RORU) of the 
Caerphilly hypermarket, as illustrating the problems 
. involved in accepting catchment area studies. 
In the production of useful data on consumer characteristics the 
essential element is the in-home survey. The "in-home" study conducted 
by The Retail Outlets Research Unit (RORU) at Caerphilly (20), a 
study based entirely on door-step interviews, can usefully be examined 
in some detail. It is not precisely true t~ say that it is typical of 
all such catchment area studies: methodologically and analytically 
it verges on the incoherent. Neverless, it has received very 
considerable publicity, and highlights many of the problems involved 
in interpreting~ and accepting catchment area statistics. 
'" The Caerphilly hypermarket opened in Autumn 1972. ~n August and 
------- . September 1973 the RORU researchers surveyedQIO households~n_t~elve 
, 
, 
J 
. ~-------------
selected parts of the store's hypothesised catchment area. This resea~ch 
was the subject of a conference held very rapidly after completion of 
the survey, and reportage of the conference was published as early as 
November 1973, two months after the fieldwork (28). 
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As published, this conference was given overall catchment area stati~tics 
It was noted that the survey showed that, as to the type of consumer 
attracted to the hypermarket, "the image of the young ASCI housewife 
with her own car and 2.5 children is not confirmed •. Admittedly the 
survey does show that more ~egular hypermarket shoppers do belong to 
upper income groups, but there is an even spread through all socio-
economic class divisions and a similar even spread through age groups". 
The conference was told that this corresponded with the similar findings 
of the slightly earlier RORU study of superstores in Manchester: "So 
this is not purely a South Wales phenomenon". The validity of this 
observation as regards the Manchester study is discussed below. The 
figures published in general supported fhis conclusion as regards 
Caerphilly in all respects except perhaps that of age.* 
A year later, in December 1974, the Retail Outlets Research Unit 
,/ 
published its report (20). In this it warned specifically on three 
matters of interpretation: 
(1) All cross-tabulation other than by age refer only to those shoppers 
, 
.') 
under fi fty, since "generally speaking those age~~i below 50 and 
I . c 
those aged ahove 
" 
. 50, and particularly above 60, react in a I 
different way". It can be noted thai, for better or worse, this is 
. I I ~ j , , 
a novel method of ~reseAting catchment'area statistics; and is a 
qualification to the data ignored in almost every published summary 
of the research report. Approximately 20 per cent of all the 
Carrefour's regular customers are aged 50 or over. 
*As regards age, the published statistics suggest-that the hypermarket 
appeals most strongly to the housewife under 40 pnd progressively loses 
its attraction after this age - though the fact that the 40-49 age 
dissection cross adds to only 92 per cent and, less seriously, the 30-39 
dissection Sl!m'" } to 103 per cent does not assist interpretation. 
'. ' ' 
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(2) As a result of cross tabulations some figures may relate to very 
small numbers of individuals. In the RORU table reproduced here 
as Table 2.2 a figure in brackets "means that it relates to 
between 3 and 9 shoppers only"; even on this evidence, it is 
logical to suppose that in some- of the unbracketed c,e~.l~·, '. 
!, 
the percentages,4l1uted are percentages of nurnbers only inar,qinally. larger 
(3) The sample relates to twelve separate areas. It is not known if 
these are representative of the total catchment area, "whatever 
that might be". In contradistinction to their conference 
presentation, the researchers warn that to amalgamate the data from 
those twelve areas to produce a claimed global picture of patronage 
is dangerous. To study differential impact eleven of the twelve 
, 
areas are statistically grouped into four zones: -Caerphilly, Inner 
Valleys, Cardiff, Outer Valleys - and in the main the analyses are 
made in respect of these four zones. It is the comparisons between 
, .. ( ' ... \-
behaviour in each of~hesefour zones that are of interest • 
. ' , 
These warnings by the RORU researchers as to the interpretation of their 
, analyses illustrate the difficulties of using catchment area data -
certainly so in attempting to make, any well-foundeQ generalisation. 
The factors of this problem as epitomised above are consid~~ed in the i 
1 
, 1 . 
sub-sections following. 
2.4.4 Catchment studies: the problems of analysis and interpretation 
The RORU Caerphilly report refers almost entirely to shoppers under 
the age of fity. Survey data are in most cases capable of various 
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Table 2.2 Retail Outlets Research Unit Table of Fortnightly Users of 
Caerphilly Carrefour: Socio-demographic characteristics of 
Customer Profile 
Caerphilly Inner Cardiff Outer 
Valle~s Valle~s 
01 01 0' 01 
10 10 10 10 
30 23 21 10 29 
30-39 35 29 40 26 
AGE 40-49 34 21 40 29 
50-59 11 21 10 9 
60+ 8 10 0 8. 
CAR No c~r 15 3 (D) 9 
OWNERSHIP 1 car 70 89 (75) . 87 
2+ cars 15 8 . (13) 4 
AB 19 16 (71) 9 ; 
Cl 20 9 (0) 20 
CLASS C2 34 43 (29) 37 
DE 21 30 (0) 33 
£1000 0 0 6 
INCOME £1000-1499 7 13 24 
£1500-'1999 29 51 N/A 48 
£2000-2999 50' 31 18 
£3000+ 13 5 4 
YOUNG Yes 39 44 13 35 
FMHLY No 61 56 .88 65 
JOB Yes 40 36 56 36 
STATUS No 59 64 44 64 
" 
NO.SHOPPED 2 9 11 (0) 4 
FOR 3 33 48 (44) 44 
4 36 27 (22) 29 
5+ 23 14 (33) 18 
MAIN SOURCE Carrefour 85 91 56 74 
OF Co-op 6 0 11 9 
. GROCERIES Multiple 6 9 33 13 
Independent 3 0 0 4 
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interpretations and levels and methods of analysis. Interpretation of 
such reports for any specific purpose requires detailed study of the 
supportive data and research peculiarities. This is rarely done in 
references to these reports. Gresham's law of the diffusion of 
information applies: the simple slogan will crowd out the complex 
message (29). There. are three importantly different sources in the 
process of diffusion of catchment area information: 
(1) The peripheral source - reportage in trade and marketing 
journals and the press. This is the main source by means 
of which generalisations on hypermarketing enter what has 
been called "marketing mythology" • .In the main such 
reportage concentrates on the "Summary Conclusions" 
contained in the research reports. 
(2) The intermediate source - the research report "Conclusions". 
The research conclusions that the researchers derive from their 
data that are considered by them important are made explicit 
in the report, usually in a three or four page section of 
"Summary Conclusions". 
(3)' The primary source - the data. This is the actual data contained 
- --
in the body of·the report. The quality of data varies greatly 
.~..: .. ~ -. ~ 
between reports. 
In many cases the information that can be derived from each of these 
sources is alarmingly different in respect of the same piece of 
research. A usual' practice in reportage is to quote out-of context 
any sentence from the "General Conclusions" that seems to make a . 
positive statement. A prime example is the out-of-context mis-reportage 
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by Cox (30) of a finding in the "Summary and Major Conclusions" 
section of the RORU Caerphilly report that is itself a mis-reportage of 
the evidence of the data in the body of the report. Several statements 
in the RORU Caerphilly report conclusions are directly at variance with 
the body of data presented. And, in most of the reports quoted, 
generalised statements in the "Summary Conclusions" can be shown to be 
in need of modification when the supportive data are consulted. The 
.ECrupulous Department of Environment Eastleigh report prepared over two 
years is an exception. Significantly it is the only one to be heavily 
criticised in reportage - for the lack of strong generalisation in its 
conclusions ("DOE hypermarket report - waste of planners' time" (31» 
Most catchment area reports are low-budget operations, hastily 
produced in many cases with an eye to topicality. 
2.4.5 Catchment Studies the problems of sample size 
Of financial necessity, sample sizes are usually small. The RORU 
Caerphilly study illustrates the problems. A sample of 1200 is ample 
for a homogeneous population. But if this 1200 is sub-divided, for 
example, geographically (in the RORU case divided here by twelve 
for data collection - these twelve divisions then aggregated to four 
. ...., 
for the analysis, one of the twelve, the Gaer-Newport area, being 
, 
; 
discarded),and each sub-division is then divided into those aged 
under fifty and those over fifty, and the under-fifty segment is 
then divided into "shoppers" and "non-shoppers", and the "shoppers" 
segment is then divided into regular shoppers or not, and the regular 
shoppers are then divided by socio-economic trait (in the_BQRU case 
~ 
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divided at this stage by up to five" even in the summary tables) 
then many of the resultant statistical cells are going to contain very 
few observations. 
The RORU study is avowedly punctilious in identifying these cells in 
which the percentages are calculated on a total population of less 
than ten. Nevertheless, all we know from this is that, if a percentage 
of twenty is quoted and if it is not in brackets, this represents at 
least two persons, and not one, having that particular attribute. It 
can, for example, be calculated through from the base pe~centages* 
that in Table 2.2 the percentage division by age group of customers 
from the Cardiff area is the expression in percentages of a sample of 
only ten ~ in which case the actual numbers involved would obviously be: 
~ No ~ 
, Age 30 10 / 1 
30-39 ~ 4 
40-49 40 4 
50-59 10 1 
60+ '0 0 
----
100 10 
This distribution has obviously little statistical significance. Its 
expression in percentages tends to conceal that fact. And the 
subsequent dissections of the under-fifty age group in Cardiff in Table 
2.2 are apparently based on a sample of nine. Although the 
* The report provides an appendix giving for each of the twelve areas the 
number of persons interviewed. It would therefore be theoretically possible 
to calculate the base figures for each cell of each table by successive 
steps through the report - except that no dissections are made of the sample 
siz~ of the under-fifty age group, and it is on the basis of this that almost 
all the tables in the report are compiled. 
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actual numbers involved in the other columns of that table are 
considerably higher, it is quite clear that in general one should 
not read too much into any percentage difference between cells 
unless this is substantial. Lacking the base figures in each cell, 
we cannot know how substantial the difference needs to be. 
In considerable contrast, the Department of the Environment Eastleigh 
Survey exercise undertook 7,439 in~home interviews, in addition to 
the 1987 interviews in-store. In the analysis presentation, in 
addition to the percentages in each consumer-attribute cell, the 
absolute numbers are quoted in each instance, and are substantial. 
An, in-store exercise conducted in isolation does not require such a 
massive number of observations as does the in-home survey, though 
as stated' it faces the problem of relating shopper-attribute 
percentages to the parallel environmental percentages. Nevertheless 
one would consider the 343 in-store interviews conducted by the 
Donaldson researchers at the Caerphilly Carrefour to be approaching 
the minimum. 
Malcolm and Aitken present a two-part report on their survey at the 
Fine Fare superstore at St Ninians without giving any details at all 
of sample size. 
In this context, reference can be made to the RORU 1972 and 1973 
study of the patronage of the Asda superstores at Castle ton and 
Chadderton in the North Manchester area (24). ,The Kwik Save discount 
/ 
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store at Rochdale and the Arndale centre at Middleton were also 
studied, but the findings here are not specific to a study of 
hypermarkets and superstores. 
In-store interviews were conducted at Asda, Chadderton (340 
interviews) and Asda, Castleton (456 interviews). Supporting inter-
views were made to homes in "selected residential areas" (879 inter-
views in twelve areas): probably only half these home interviews, 
however, were relevant to the Asda stores. 
In the "Summary" conclusions it is stated that "housewives with 
a job most normally use a small shop for their main grocery shopping. 
Asda also achieves a higher level of patronage from this type of 
shopper than from those without a job". The supportive data in the 
body of the report are of patronage levels compared with levels for 
all shoppers below the age of fifty, and ~re data collected by the 
in-house survey only. 
Small shops + l3~~ 
Asda + 301 10 
Arndale - 201 10 
Town Centres 801 " ID ""-
Kwik Save 901 ID 
The general ,conclusion that the working housewife will prefer to use 
small shops is contrary to most hypotheses, and, if valid on the 
basis of the in-home count, is almost certainly location - specific 
("When examining Greater Manchester as a whole, there are ••••• 
surprisingly few large supermarkets" page 12 of the report).' The 3 
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per cent above norm of working wives shopping at Asda is almost 
certainly not statistically significant on the basis of the probable 
sample size of housewives in the two Asda catchment areas. 
If commentators concentrate on the "Summary Conclusions", as they 
almost invariably tend to do, undue emphasis may be put on minor 
variation·in customer profiles derived from limited or comparatively 
limited samples. 
2.4.6 Catchment studies: the problem of micro-studies' being 
location-specific 
A report is obviously as good as its methodology. Of financial 
necessity the RORU Caerphilly researchers surveyed consumers "at 
home" only in selected parts of an assumed catchment area. The 
choice of these twelve localities was apparently entirely subjective, 
wi thin the constraint that they should represent "localities at ... ,~-
varying distances and directions from the store". In the event, 
one of these localities, Gaer-Newport, was found not to be in the 
catchment area. (Virtually no-one used the hypermarket: 85 per cent 
had not even visited it (28». More importantly the survey sample 
bore no relation to population size in the different localities. 
As a result the Cardiff households are heavily under~represented. 
What was measured in the RORU survey was "penetration" in a 100 
households in each of twelve randomly - chosen localities. 
"Penetration" in the two Cardiff areas was extremely light. 
"Penetration x population" was probably significant. The global 
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picture is not representative, and the attempt to produce one was 
abandoned by the researchers subsequent to their initial conference.* 
The analysis thereafter was concentrated, as it was forced to be, on 
inter-area difference within the catchment area - which differences 
are nevertheless of interest. Ab initio, however, it is clear that the 
more the researchers try to make the neighbourhoods chosen for' study 
representative of the different segments (differentiated on whatever 
basis) of the total catchment area population, the more will the inter-
segment differences be more significant than the sum of the findings -
and the more elusive is any possibly transferable conclusion. If the 
extent and nature of patronage is as location-specific within the 
catchment area as the RORU researchers suggest it is, then it is 
logical to suppose that different catchment area reports in respect of 
different localities in Europe will be even more location-specific. 
The RORU researchers at Caerphilly also note-that their previous 
hypermarket surveys in the North West had shown that trade was lost 
to new hypermarkets initially by the small shops, whereas the Caerphilly 
survey showed that trade was lost to the hypermarket mainly by the large 
r 
supermarkets already in the area. They propose that this was inevitable 
in that hypermarkets were developing in South Wales from a base of 
~ 
f 
I existing supermarket provision; whereas in the North West of England 
there had not been a tradition of supermarkets, and the region had 
; 
progressed dramatically direct from the small shop to the hypermarket. 
The evidence of these localised surveys on the important question of 
the retail infrastructure conducive to hypermarket development is there-
fore conflicting - except, of course, to suggest that it is not an 
*In methodological contrast, in Wood's research for the Department of 
the Environment, the initial sample of 5000 addresses was drawn 
randomly from the electoral registers for an area within the 20 minute 
driving time isochrone of the Eastleigh Carrefour. 
-36-
important factor. To suggest this, however, would be to generalise 
from a small number.of observations in two regions. The importance in 
hypermarket development of the existing retail infrastructure is 
discussed at length in Chapter 8. 
/ 
In the context of this section, specific reference can again be made 
to this earlier RORU study, the study of the Asda'Castleton and 
. Chadderton stores in the Manchester area (24). On the question of 
patronage of these stores according to socio-economic class, the 
"summary" conclusion to this report states: "The home survey evidence 
suggests that, when location is allowed for, the appeal of the stores 
is approximately the same for all social classes. This is an important 
conclusion, for it is often supposed that superstorep are liable to be 
class selective". 
The supportive data in the body of the reporf are the following 
figures derived from the in-home survey: 
Relative patronage levels of different socio-economic groups. 
ARNDALE ASDA ASDA KWIK SAVE 
CENTRE CHADDERTON CASTLETON CENTRE 
, 
AB +40 +28 +5 +40 ...... 
I 
l 
Cl -10 +45 +16 ·-32 
C2 +17 -5 +57 +26 
DE :+67 +2 -2 +16 
- ~ 
RETIRED 
-20 ... 47 -41 +8 / 
"Figures indicate ~~ (+ the average for a particular zone) of customers 
from each group attracted to the store". 
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The methodology of the RORU researchers is obviously correct: we are 
concerned with the plus or minus deviations from the ambient averages. 
The conclusions drawn from the figures produced by applying the method 
need comment, however. 
Taki~the whole span of the data across all four retail centres the 
conclusion of an appeal to all classes except the retired is 
substantiated. The Arndale shopping centre and the Kwik-Save 
.. ' 
discount centre, however, are operations di fferent in kind to the bm full-
range and free-standing superstores. This therefore is not a useful 
generalisation to make. Considering only the two Asda superstores, 
therefore, if both are considered together then the generalisation 
largely stands: the one or the other has an above average 
attraction to socio-economic classes A, B, Cl and C2 and is of 
average attraction to classes D and E. If each superstore is considered 
separately, however, and this in context is the crucial point, then 
two diametnically different profiles eme~ge of Asda superstore customers. 
On the evidence of these figures, at Chadderton the Asda store particularly 
attracts the "upper" socio-economic groups (Groups A and B, the upper 
middle and middle classes, ~nd group Cl, non-manual workers) and is 
not preferentially attractive at all to group C2, fue skilled manual 
worker. But the patronage figures for the Asda store at Castle ton / 
similarly adjusted to take account of social class representation in 
the ambient population, draw an exactly opposite customer profile. 
Asda here, these figures state, attracts this latter group, the 
C2 skilled manual worker~dramatically more strongly than any other 
socio-economic group. 
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Had only the Asda store at Chadderton been investigated in this 
study, then the profile of an Asda customer (or the profile of a 
"superstore" customer, depending on how far one wishes to generalise 
from the particular) would have appeared very differently indeed from 
the profile obtained from the Castleton Asda data. In addition, Asda 
operated another superstore in that same North Manchester .area, the 
33,000 square feet ~uperstore at Bolton~ Now if the patronage of that 
third superstore had been also studied, that might, one does not know, 
have weighted the findings on.attraction specific to socio-economic 
class to one or other of the two extremes recorded. One does not 
know; and that is the point to be made. But one can say almost 
categorically that the effect of a third set of observations would be 
highly unlikely to have been neutral. 
Most hypermarket or superstore catchment area sb..idies are studies of 
customers and environment at one store only./ In this example, 
diametrically different customer profiles (by socio-economic 
classification) were obtained in two stores operated by the same 
company in the same urban agglomeration and under four miles apa~t. 
There is little need, therefore, to emphasise the difficulties inherent 
in attem'pting to generalise from micro-study data trans-na~ionally 
in Europe. 
2.4.7 The questioned possibility of trans-national generalisation 
from catchment area data 
Entering a plea for more catchment area studies, Malcolm and Aitken 
, 
(25) also note "a surprising lack of detail in many of the so-called 
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'impact'studies, while the methodology employed is either highly 
suspect or simply not stated". If there existed a,data bank 
quantifying the information of a great number of catchment area studies 
from every part of Europe - and if these studies were as methodologically 
rigorous as the DOE Eastleigh study - the possibility of international 
generalisation might exist, at least as regards customer characteristics 
and previous ambient trade structure. Such a data bank does not exist 
and will not exist in the future. A measure of this is the prolonged 
and' repeated attention paid in the literature and trade press to every 
new publication of a micro-level report. 
These reports are few - contrary. to the claim of Thorpe, who iisted 
definitively in 1978 (32) 41 references concerning 27 UK "superstores, 
hypermarkets and other developments" the catchment areas of which had' 
been the subject of study up to that date. If one excludes the "other 
developments" and studies purely of price, traffic or impact on other 
shops, he has identified twelve reports appearing over a period of 
seven years. The most publicised of these have been noted above. 
The main reason for the fund~ng of hypermarket micro-studies is to 
discover their impact on existing retail structure as a guide in the 
gran~ing of planning permission. Customer data are a by-product, of 
the research, useful if they help explain impact. In monitoring 
relevant micro-studies"therefore, we are in effect monitoring impact 
studies. In 1975 the Grocers' Gazette and Grocery Management was 
writing: 
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"unfortunately, the number of completed independent 
~urveys on the effect superstores and hypermarkets have 
on UK town centre retailers can be counted': on one hand. 
The number which specifically refer to food outlets - which, 
after all, is who the superstores/hypermarkets are most 
likely to hit - is nil. (There are, of course, many available 
from the States and the continent but different trading 
conditions make fair comparisons difficult, if not impossible~'). (33) 
Three years later Lee (34) maintained that "there is now a wide range 
of studies on hypermarket operations and ·impact". He quotes' in example 
four of the studies discussed above and two others and comments: "the 
. findings are consistent with studies in other parts of the world 
ranging from Paris to Johannesburg". The reference is to the 
consistency of impact. 
Both these commentators, differing though they do as to the extent 
of UK provision, imply a wide range of relevant impact studies 
existing. elsewhere in Europe. This is not the case. Germany, for 
example has by a considerable extent in absolute terms the greatest 
number of hypermarkets in Europe. Nevertheless "despite the existence 
of very large numbers of hypermarkets and superstores in a wide variety 
of locations, but par·ticularly outside established 'shopping centres, 
there are few studies available that .attempt to assess the impact of 
such stores". (35) 
France is traditionally regarded as the home of the hypermarket. 
In the early 1970s in Great Britain potential hypermarket operators 
and the planning authorities looked to France for precedents. 
However, few French hypermarket studies have been recognised in this 
" \ \ ' 
country as being of value. There are the three very specialised 
Taboulet and Oesplanques reports on the impact of hypermarkets on 
clothing shops and on· department stores in Province (36, 37, 38). There 
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is the hypermarket customer report compiled for the Chambre De 
Commerce De L'Industrie De L'Oise in 1971 (39). A 1970 hypermarket 
impact study in Lyon was the sole continental input to the first 
,British hypermarket planning enquiry, the Chandlers Ford enquiry of 
1971 (40). Reference has already been made to the juxtapositioning 
by Rousseau of the percentage patronage by occupational status in 
eight French hypermarkets (27). Even such limited quantified 
comparisons are few. The Comite International Des Entreprises A 
Succursales (C.LE.S.) in Paris" which is always assiduous in 
responding to such requests, was not able to recommend positively any 
French hypermarket catchment area study. The private Paris-based 
research company, Marketing Office, currently analyses the patronage 
and image of twelve hypermarket chains and eight supermarket 
chains throughout all the regions of France. This information is 
presented by region. It derives its data' from a total sample of 
3000 households - so that, even allowing for overlap between 
catchment areas, the observations in respect of any one 'hypermarket 
are obviously necessarily small. The cost of the report in 1980 
I . 
was £2000 (41). The cost is a measure of the scarcity of this type of 
- information. 
. . 
The value of hypermarket and superstore micro-studies is in'the 
generation of hypotheses. Sherbini's observations on eXlsting 
international marketing literature in general are applicable to 
catchment area studies. These represent "individual and fragmented 
efforts". There is an important need ,for an "analytical framework 
within which these contributions can be positioned" (6). This is 
the aim of this study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE VALIDITY OF THE DEVELOPMENTS OF SELF-SERVICE AS MEASURING 
THE LEVEL OF DISTRIBUTION DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 This chapter proposes that the degree of development of self-
service, as manifested in the supermarket and importantly in the 
hypermarket, in a region is the current optimum indicator of the level 
of sophistication of general retailing in that region. A twin concept 
of "problem-full" and "problem free" retailing is proposed. The 
concept of "problem-full" and "problem-free" products has been 
suggested by G.Gross. Pilditch made reference to it in 1969. 
"Problem-free products require no personal selling. The 
packaging can tell the story and the customer can judge 
for himself. These are ideal for self-service. Problem-
full products, on the other hand, require more information; 
they require personal selling, sometimes by experts. 
A question to ask is to what extent c~n packaging convert 
a problem-full product, depending on the disappearing 
salesman, into a problem-free product requiring none. A 
successful solution to this question could have an obvious 
impact on the sales of many products." (l). 
Perhaps more importantly, however, a solution to this. question over 
an increasing range of products improves the ability of the large-
-., 
scale retail operator to expand the sections of the market in which 
he is able to operate to advantage. A concept of problem-free . 
operation is proposed. The recent history of the growth of the 
large retail organisation can be generalised as reflecting the 
changing of what were formerly "problem-full" retail operations 
into "problem-free" operations. In the latter instance, the 
organisation is able to employ mass-merchandising techniques, head-
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office and specialist managerial efficiency, it's capital intensive-
ness, without the operation ,being negated by many bottlenecks at the 
point of sale and success resting ultimately on the ability of junior 
local staff to match the expertise of the smaller "career" operator. 
It could be said that the unstated objective of the large firm is to 
have the efficiency of a machine, using "efficiency" in the technical 
meaning as measuring the ratio of a machine's output of energy to 
input. It could also be said ,journalistically that the only 
justification for the large capital-intensive organisation is that 
such an organisation can run a "machine" much more efficiently and 
economically than a small man can run himself. This does not 
necessarily imply a cold operation - "cool but not cold" Lumsden 
phrased it (2). The "machine" can be "programmed" to cater for 
such "human" aspects of distribution as play centres for children 
(as with Carrefour) conscious friendliness on the part of check-out 
staff (as, at least designedly by Fine Fare). The "machine" (Le. 
the systematised firm), having computed these to be desirable, 
computes how they may be provided "problem-free" as far as ,the smooth 
working of the system is concerned. Hol~ander says, in justification 
of multinational retailing: "They thus reinforce the innovative 
firm's basic role in creating supply systems that deliver-greater 
value to the consumer for less money" (3). This, of course, is the 
justification for large-scale operation in retailing in general. 
The attainment of "efficiency", in the sense described here, is 
proposed in this study as a desired objective of distribution. 
Jefferys wrote in the 1950's, of "the need to develop both among 
management and working people --- an appreciation that retailing' 
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is not a 'mystery''': it is an "essential and practical function" that 
needs to be performed efficiently. It is with this taking of the 
'mystery' out of distribution that this chapter is basically concerned 
(i.e. the movement to efficiency); it is when this 'mystery' - flair, 
craftsman's expertise at the point of sale --ceases to be supremely 
important that systematic operation can function. 
A hundred years ago, almost every product sold retail was a "problem-
full" product: 
"Like craftsmen they served an apprenticeship, and in all 
the leading trades there was much to learn. Where to buy 
from wholesalers or manufacturers or individual craftsmen, 
how to bargain \'1i th them for the right purchase and mix. 
Goods were not of standard quality, not even textiles. 
Every consignment had to be expertly valued and priced, 
both for buying and for selling again in the shop. A 
typical butcher had to judge and bargain for his meat 'on 
the hoof' and know how to slaughter and dress it in his own 
shed --- Grocers had to understand how to choose, blend and 
grind as well as weigh and package much of their stock. 
Even haberdashers bought cotton and thread by the pound 
and disentangled it and folded it into-hanks for sale. 
Every trade needed its own knowledg~and skill" (4). 
The difference between conditions existing today in most of Western 
-Europe and those described above can be summarised as: the substit-
ution of uniformity for variance, and systematic management for 
intuitive management. This concept of transition in the direction 
of "problem-free" retailing is, of course, not limited to point-of-
sale. Rationalisation (the introduction of uniformity and system 
in what were previously "skill" and "craft" operations in the sense 
described above) is observable in most sections of the modern, e.g. 
British, distribution system. As an example in what was previously 
a highly problem-charged operation, in Britain today as opposed to most 
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of Europe the market for made-to-measure suits is such that multiples 
such as Burtons and United Drapery Stores are able to buy cloth in 
bulk and pre-cut it; the suits are put together "like pieces of a 
jig~saw puzzle"(5).when the customer's measurements are known. An 
equivalent rationalisation is evidenced in W.H. Smith's establishment 
of a computerised depot as a solution to the problem of matching 
central stocks to very fluctuating regional demand across a range 
of 50,000 book titles, many of them held in shallow depth. 
As a-generalised hypothesis, therefore, it is proposed that the state 
, of retail development in a country can be measured by the extent to 
which its retailing has moved from- being a problem-full operation to 
being a problem-free one, in the broad sense described - and so 
amenable to "scienti fic method". 
for thi~ generalised hypothesis to be useful, some precise measure is 
needed by which the degree of this transition can be assessed. As 
measures of this transition, the following are adopted: 
(1) the extent of self-service provision 
(2) the extent of supermarket provision 
(3) the extent of hypermarket provision 
these to be measured by indicators listed in chapter 4. 
The basis for this choice of dependent variables is the growing 
evidence that it is these innovations, self-service and its 
subsequent developments, that have created and continue to create 
the greatest pressures for change in distribution. 
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Basically, conditions conducive to "problem-free" retailing are 
created by standardisation - standardisation firstly of the 
manufacturer's product; then standardisation of selling procedures, 
merchandising and display; standardisation of control systems; 
standardisation of staff (i.e. division of labour). 
It is proposed that the prime agents for standardisation in distrib-
ution have been, and are, self-service and the developments of self-
service. 
3.2 SELF-SERVICE AND THE STANDARDISATION OF THE RECEIVED PRODUCT 
Just as Dorothy Davis comments, above that, for most of the last 
century, goods, including textiles, were not of standard quality -
that "each consignment had to be expertly valued and priced" at the 
retail level - so a prerequisite of standardisation of the retail 
operation is standardisation of the manufacturer's product coming 
/ 
into the system. The last century also, however, saw the emergence 
of widespread manufacturer branding, whereby the manufacturer, 
avowedly or tacitly, accepted responsibility for quality and 
standardisation - the retailer's buying task being in this case to 
choose a quality level and manufacturers geared to supply this level 
at an acceptable price (or, where this is not possible, ", to--intggrate I 
~ backwards, either formally or informally). 
Given the ability of manufacturers to produce consistent quality, 
Gross and Pilditch (1) are obviously correct: the key to trouble-free 
retail operation is packaging - and 'hence the perennial "chicken 
and egtl" controversy: Who owes most to whom - self-service or 
packaging? 
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Certainly, the fact that the great bulk of grocery products had for 
a long time been pre-packed, and were expected by the customer to be 
pre-packed enabled the self-service pioneers to begin operation: 
. food-canning with tin-plate as an industry' is a hundred years old. 
The use of glass and paper package is obviously older. The first high-
coloured plastic, however, was not seen in Britain before the Wembley 
exhibition in 1926. Polythene, PVC, polystyrene appeard in the 1930's. 
The Packaging Revolution - "the great period when unpackaged goods 
started to be packaged" - was a phenomenon of the fifties. It came to 
life coincident with self-service and because of it; and forty per 
cent of all packaging in Britain and probably Europe is still used by 
the food industry. The packaging industry today is not recognisable 
as the industry of thirty years ago, when European self-service was 
embryonic. 
As expounded by Gross (1), the task of packaging is to change problem-
full products into problem-free. In this ~t has transformed the 
methods of selling over a vast range of foods and non-foods, and 
turns its attention to a steadily widening range of non-food products, 
thus stimulating the development of the hypermarket: any product so 
made problem-free is usable by the mass-merchandiser. 
3.3 SELF-SERVICE AND THE STANDARDISATION OF SELLING, MERCHANDISING 
AND DISPLAY 
It is possible to identify three stages in the transition of food 
retailing from being a "problem-full" craft, 
the most "problem-full" retailing operation, 
free" that it now provides the context for 
traditionally perhaps ~.--­
to being __ so __ '_'pr~ 
the most vigorous 
expansion of organised retailing that has yet occured: 
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Stage 1: the retailer as craftsman 
Stage 2: the retailer as entrepreneur - innovator 
Stage 3: the retailer as "manager" 
As illustration it will be useful to isolate exemplary figures 
associated with the respective stages of this development. In 
Britain, for example, such archetypes can be seen in John Sainsbury, 
Sir John Cohen, James Gulliver - despite the fact that the organis-
ations they represent, Sainsbury's, Tesco, Fine Fare, have all now 
progressed into the third ("management") phase. 
3.3.1 Stage 1: The food retailer as craftsman - specialist 
In 1969, sober photographs were published in many journals of the 
early Sainsbury shops. The occasion was the Sainsbury centenary. 
For it was in 1869 that John Sainsbury opened a shop and styled 
himself "John Sainsbury, Dairyman. Drury Lane." He was one dairyman 
among many, offering, however, a novel product, cleanliness. By 
1875 he had become "J. Sainsbury, Provision Merchant",with a 
growing number of shops serviced by "J. Sainsbury" horse-drawn' vans. 
These shops served outwards onto the street - almost obliterated 
(in one picture) by a rich profusion of hanging fowl. . Hanged in , 
front of the shop (in this picture) stand the staff, immac~late in 
'-
aprons, with high white collars, black bow-ties. In such pictures 
as these nobody smiles: they are craftsmen in front of the evidence '--~ __ .~ 
---------
of their craft. A craft indeed it was in 1882, when John Sainsbury 
opened the first of his new-style grocery branches, at Croydon 
"a double-fronted shop that had room for shelves, two counters and 
space for customers to push a pram the whole length of the shop"(6). 
What really impressed, though, were the tiled - mosaic walls and 
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floor, the marble-topped mahogany counters, the po~ished teak in the 
office - the combination of the opulent and the clinical "in an age 
of sawdust, wood and canvas". Other such shops followed: the 
Sainsbury legend became established. John died in 1928, the first 
only in a line of Grocer-Sainsburys (His last words: "Keep the shops 
well lit" ). He was 84. He left 185 grocery shops in a radius round 
London - and a family eager to continue the business. 
Extant also is a photograph of one of these early "new-style" 
Sainsbury Shops (either Blackfriars or Croydon); it is printed in 
the homely brown colour that photographs of that time had.· In 
perspective, the marble and mahogany counters, from right and left 
foreground, converge on the solid, polished· wood cash and accounts 
office; in a window in this a moustached head shows. The entire 
right hand counter and the unbroken shelving behind are laden with· 
meats: sides of bacon, hams, sausages; hams hang from the ceiling; 
turkeys are advertised in symmetrical stickers on the wall. The 
left-hand counter supports a mountain of whole and half and 
quarter cheeses: Chedda~, Camembert, Gorgon~ola, "The Stilton". 
On this side only, the wall steadies its lining of packets and tins; 
notices say "Tea". In this world of perishables the grocer worked. 
Here, to qote The Sunday Times (6) "sugar was weighed into .,gritty, 
" 
thick, blue paper bags; vinegar poured from wooden casks; and 
mustard pickle from earthenware' pots into containers that customers 
brought along themselves". In such a world, tangy with bacon, the 
good grocer learned his skills over many years (and many hours per 
- day) of pupilage; the long hours being, in part, dicatated by the 
highly perishable nature of his stock. 
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Such the type of'pre-Retailing Revolution/pre Packaging - Revolution' 
craftsman food-retailer. He exists today in parts of the trade in 
France, is predominant perhaps in Portugal, Spain and Italy. 
In Italy in the 1950's such a grocer was so universally found that 
some observers considered that the traditional demands made on him 
were such as to preclude the possibility of establishing self-service 
at all: 
"The same ham has to be cut in a different way for each customer; 
one only wants lean, another wants a tiny bit of fat and a third 
as much fat as lean, so that the salesman has to incline his knife 
at different angles for each special case " (7). 
By the time of the First W6rld war, however, the marketing conditions 
that fostered the existence of this type of craftsman food-retailer 
had in many developed countries undergone,-change - particularly in 
the United' States. At that time in the U.S.A. the folloWing 
marketing factors were observed by some independent food-retailers 
under economic pressure: 
(1) economic pressure generally on shops 
(2) the success of Frank Woolworth in selling mainly non-foods by ! 
open display, on the basis of low prices and high volume allied 
to a policy of no-credit and no-delivery and the minimum of 
service thus keeping prices low. ~ 
/" 
------(3) tf)e boost to impulse sales that resulted from this "getting~-
the customer amongst the stock" 
(4) the steady growth of pre-packed pre-processed food as a prop-
ortion of grocer's stock 
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(5) the growth of national advertising of branded food products by 
manufacturers, so that the leading grocery products no_longer 
needed "selling". 
They drew what we now accept to be the right conclusions as affecting 
their trade. After 'Jnsuccessful experiments in "self-service" by 
retailers in California, Clarence Saunders of Tennessee devised in 
1916 a method of operating in such a way that the business was 
profitable. His utilisation of one only entry point, free access 
on the part of the customer to price-marked goods, a controlled exit 
and pay-point is established as thebasis of "self-service". 
Lt will be useful in the later construction of hypotheses to list 
here the generally accepted advantages of self-service. 
(a) 
(1) 
(2) 
Accepted advantages of Self-Service to the customer 
/ 
She can shop at her-own speed - either quickly or slowly. 
She can examine and handle all the stock in the store, and 
compare the prices of different lines: she does not need a 
shopping list. 
(3) She can examine unfamiliar lines at her leisure. 
(4) Prices will prpbably be cheaper, since the shop-keep~.r is 
saving on staff. 
(5) She can compare prices of one store against another. 
(6) She is not antagonised by u~helpful staff. 
(7) The appearance ishyqieni~: the entire store is open for 
inspection. 
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(b} Accepted advantages of Self-Service to the Store operator 
(1) In a time of rising staff costs he reduces these. 
(2) He is not dependent on trained assistants, who are scarce, for 
most of the work; he can employ untrained staff. 
(3) Much of the staff working time can be planned without reference 
to customer flow. 
(4) He can make use of maximum floor space as selling area. 
(5) . The fact that customers are exposed to the full range of his 
stock and handle the stock increases impulse sales 
(6) His displays and sales aids are selling for him all the time. 
(7) He can pass on staff economies to the customer in t,he form of 
lower prices' - a~though the popularity of self-service with 
the'customer has been found not to depend on a price advantage. 
In the United States the adoption of self-service as the medium 
through which to sell food and general groceries has been almost 
universal. By 1976. self-service accounted 'for virtually a hundred 
per cent of total U.S. grocery sales (8). Additionally, it is the 
selling medium in many non-food stores, including specialist 
stores. 
Only recently since the late 1950's has self-service proved itself 
... 
tQ be a phenomenon in Europe with the same dynamic that 
self-service has had in America. In 1948, according to one estim-
ation, (9), there were only 164 self-service stores in Europe 
~isposed as follows: 
Belgium 3, Ireland 1, Netherlands 1, Norway 2, 
Sweden 22, Switzerland 5, UK 130. 
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the lead in the United Kingdom being provided by the Cooperative 
Societies. 
As late as 1954 1 when the number of self-service stores had,grown to 
an estimated 603,6. Jefferys could write that the approach of 
European retailers to self-service was "cautious" even "hesitant"(7). 
The great growth in self-service in Europe, however, since 1957 has 
been variously documented. In 1961 the number of such units had 
grown to 46,480, and by 1971 to approximately 190,000 (10). By, 
1976 counter-service for groceries had virtually disappeared in 
Sweden, and by 1978 self-service sales as per cent of total grocery 
sales was over 90 per cent in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany 
and France (8). 
This rapid expansion of self-service, however, cannot be considered 
unrelated to the growth of the supermarket. 
/ 
3.3.2 Self-service and the development of the supermarket 
In 1930, fvlichael Cullen, a former executive of the Kroger Grocery 
,and Baking Company of San Fransico, introduced into the United 
States the first "supermarket", as now in retrospect considered. 
He had proposed to the Kroger management that stores be opened 
; 
in off-centre locations in which 300 items would be sold at cost, " 
200 items at 5% above cost, 300 items at 15% above cost, and 300 
items at 2m~ above cost (11): a concept of low price to generate 
volume. Cons~quent upon Kroger's emphatic lack of interest, 
Cullen opened his own store in Jamaica, New York; with instant 
success. When CUllen died six years later he owned fifteen such 
enterprises trading under the name of "King Cullen". His methods 
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can be summarised as follows: 
(1) to take the largest, most inexpensive premises that could be 
got, preferably in outlying districts where rents were cheap 
e.g. abandoned factories; 
(2) to use the cheapest possible fittings; 
(3) to buy in the largest possible c:uantit'ies and sell at "rock-
bottom prices"; 
(4) . operate by self-service with the mihimum staff •. 
The King Cullen stores and the successful followers of these such 
as Big Bear Market of New Jersey were rough and ready operations 
geared to the needs of the Great Depression. Catchment areas of 
up to a hundred miles were reported for these stores at· this time. 
Their success, however, was based on a correct analysis of the logic 
of selling pre-packaged goods and proved to be independent of 
depression conditions. Appel (12) has categorised the period 
1936-1941 as the period of "acceptance and growth" for the U.S. 
supermarket: at the end of this period supermarkets in the U.S.A. 
were estimated to a number over 9,000, accounting·for 25% of industry 
sales. In this period and subsequently the U.S. supermarket as an 
institution has consistently traded-up, in location, fittings, range 
of stock and price levels without any loss of impetus. IrrJ978 the 
supermarket industry accounted for 74 per cent by turnover of total 
grocery sales in the USA (8). 
As a consequenc~~of the late development here of self-service, in 
Europe the dynamic increase in supermarket growth has been comparat-
ively recent. In 1961, as measured by the 400 m2 c~iterion 
there were 483 supermarkets in Europe. In 1971 there were more 
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than 10,545 (10). At the end of 1973 free-standing supermarkets in 
Europe numbered 13,075 (13). The most vigorous in the development 
of this large self-service unit has been Germany. 
The advantages of self-service (the advantages of a particular method 
of selling) are by now almost inextricably confused - in the public 
mind and in statistics - with the advantages of supermarketing (the 
advantages of the large-scale self-service operation). The generally 
accepted advantages accruing from the increased scale of supermarket 
operations can be summarised as follows: 
(a) Accepted benefits to the customer deriving from the scale of . 
operations of a supermarket 
(1) The range of goods is increased to include fresh meat, fruit 
and vegetables - so that "one-stop shopping" for food can be 
achieved, if the customer wishes. The range of grocery items 
is increased. 
(2) Prices can be cheaper, since the higher turnover enables the 
operator to buy in greater bulk or have larger ex-manufacturer 
deliveries, and because his rate of stockturn is greater. 
(3) Prices can be cheaper, since productivity of staff increases 
with the size of establishment. 
(4) Owing to better-paid ·management the efficiency, attractiveness-
and hygiene of the store are increased. 
(5) Owing to the increased size of establishment, more money per 
unit is able to be invested profitably in equipment (e.g. 
refrigeration) • 
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(b) Accepted benefits to the operator deriving from the scale of 
operations of a supermarket 
(1) Customers are able to concentrate their food purchases in one 
establishment, increasing the amount of sales per customer 
transaction. 
(2) An increasingly motorised public will increasingly demand the 
facilities of "one-stop·shopping". 
(3) With the mass. displays possible, impulse buying is increased. 
(4) If the store image permits it, this impulse buying can be 
increasingly extended to include higher profit-margin non-food 
lines. 
(5) Bulk-buying, or maximum ex-manufacturer drop, enables favourable 
terms to be negotiated with suppliers. This enables lower 
prices to be passed on to the customer. 
(6) Cost of delivery from own-warehouses is less. 
(7) Staff-productivity is higher, and staff expenses as a proportion 
of turnover lower - again permitting a low-price policy. 
/' 
(8) The quality of unit management is increased.' (At store manage~_ 
level and above, management can be recruited from outside the 
grocery trade.) 
(9) Direct head-office control over a comparatively small number 
of large supermarkets is more effective than over a large number 
. 
" 
of small outlets. 
. ----. ---
, 
, 
/ (10) In particular, computerisation of stock control is more effective. 
(11) High turnover enables -more capital to be invested profitably 
in fixed plant. 
The logic of these arguments impelling towards the larger unit has 
only recently been accepted without major reservations in Europe. 
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t1any of the pre-1970's supermarkets are now referred to as the 
"first generation" of supermarkets~ They grew up in the "fight for 
sites" in the 1960's when the major chains fought for national 
dominance. In general terms the majority of them were by the 1970's 
considered to be (1) too small (2) badly sited (3) without car-parking 
(4) of inadequate structural and environmental quality. It was 
"quite ridiculous", according to Michael Brook of Key Markets, to 
expect the badly-planned ones to survive. 
This entrepreneurial surge of self-service arid supermarket develop-
ment in the 1950's and 1960's in Europe, however, marked the end of 
the dominance of the "craftsman - food-retailer" in most countries 
of Europe. 
3.3.3 Stage 2. The food retailer as entrepreneur - innovator 
To the extent that food retailing, via the processes of pre-packaging, 
self-service and supermarketing, mo~ed fro~ consisting of a problem-
full customer interface involving problem-full products to being an 
impersonal and systematic operation, so it attracted to it men of a 
very different type from the specialist craftsman-grocer. The 
craftsman-grocer was providing, and charging for, a service that 
was no longer required in conditions of pre-packaging and,ere-advert-
ising; this stimulated the emergence in Europe in the 1950's of a 
new dominant type of food retailer: the innovator-entrepreneur. So 
"craft divorced" now appeared the requirements of modern food-
retailing that such entrepreneurs were attracted to it from diverse 
fields. 
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In France in 1949 Edouard Leclerc quit a training for the priesthood 
in order to open his first rough discount store in his home town of 
Landerneau near Brest, so, in effect, starting the first of the 
extensive French Centres E. Leclerc: his intention was to break a 
"wicked system" of commerce that kept food prices to the public high. 
The most important of Leclerc's dogmas as regards methods of retailing 
is that "commerce must give way to the notion of 'distribution'. The 
tradesman exists simply to put goods on the market at the minimum 
extra cost to the public, concentrating on large, rapid turnover and 
allotting himself a fee for his services" (14). Ignoring the 
socialist message, .the dogma is the dogma of the supermarket •. It 
appears that this message was often the more easily understood by 
"outsiders" not brought up in food retailing. When, for example, 
in 1958, Leclerc moved his operation to Grenoble, his chief imitator. 
and competitor was an engineer. 
The same point has been made by Abbott in 1963 (15): 
"Initiative has come in Britain mainly from --- a Canadian 
biscuit and bread manufacturer, a large milk chain, and a 
department store group. In Italy, three-quarters of the new 
supermarkets have been set up by retail chains like Rinascente-
Upim and Standa which were already experienced in the organis-
ation of mass distribution but not previously very active in 
the food trade. The biggest supermarkets firm in FraQce is 
controlled by the Brussels department store L'Innovation. 
In Spain, the first 50 supermarkets were set up by the 
Government." 
The point of view is valid despite the somewhat selective nature 
of the examples quoted by Abbott. Lewis comments: "This situation 
presents an interesting parallel to the development of supermarkets 
in the United States. The first supermarkets here were opened by 
new entrepreneurs rather than by est9blished food chains" (16). 
-62-
i 
In Britain, the archetype figure of the food-retailer as innovator-
entrepreneur is, perhaps, Sir John Cohen. He was indeed a grocer 
prior to the advent of self-service - but a grocer significantly 
removed from the type of specialist craftsman. 
In 1919, an ex-R.A.F. mechanic and out of a job, Cohen was selling 
rather battered ex-NAAFI stock in Hammersmith market ("1 put them on 
someone else's stall"). Ten years later he had prospered enough 
to open six small shops under a company name "Tesco". By the outbreak 
of war in 1939 these six had grown to ninety, still run like market 
stalls, many of them little more than "shutter-fronted holes in the 
ground - with a pitcher shouting the odds outside"(17). At the end 
of the war Tesco went public, and experimented in self-service, in 1947. 
Despite an initial failure, all Cohen's stores were converted to 
self-service in· the next ten years, and the first four Tesco super-
markets were opened. Thereafter, both geographically and in terms of 
business done, Tesco grew rapidly year by year, by means of both new 
openings and the acquisition of other companies less dynamic. Any 
grocery business that Tesco took over was converted to self-service 
as a matter of urgency: the 200 stores of the John Irwin grocery chain 
were all running as self-service outlets within two years of takeover 
in 1960. There was by the late 1950's no question in the ·~ind of 
Tesco management as to what business they were in: the self-service 
business was a better description of intent in the case of Tesco 
than "grocery business", fifteen per cent of Tesco's self-service 
. trade is currently done outside of food and groceries. 
By 1968 Tesco ranked number two in Management Today's "British 
Business Growth League 1968" (18). By 1972 it was by turnover the 
largest retail "grocery" company in the United Kingdom. 
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Cohen, however, had a greater influence on the development of self-
service in Britain than even the growth of Tesco suggests (19).· His 
nephew Mossy Vanger, initially working for Cohen, started his own 
Elmo supermarkets (later sold to O.K. Bazaars, and finally to Tesco 
itself, to complete a circle); another nephew, Sidney Ingram, 
foundp.d Anthony Jackson and controlled over thirty Foodfare super-
markets, before selling out to Fine Fare; his brother-in-law Michael 
Kaye, backed by Cohen, started the successful Pricerite supermarket 
chain, by the 1970's rated as the tenth largest food-retailing 
operation in Britain, and subsequently bought by British American 
Tobacco. 
With Hilliam Cohen & Co's Victor Value Supermarkets (there is no 
family connection) these were outsiders "making the running" in the 
early days (and Tesco later bought up Victor Value). They were 
almost unknown men competing against the established retail chains 
/' 
with an aggression and an approach to retailing alien to the 
craftsman. Cohen, like Leclerc, has made no secret of his contempt 
for the small retailer-craftsman: "1 have millions of customers", 
he said in 1967, "and I don't know one of them" (20).· 
The entrepreneurial nature of Cohen's management of Tesco -Qas been 
suggested by Foster, who was stating in 1968 that at top level Tesco 
"still functions like a small firm", that it thrives on "constant, 
spot decisions" about what to buy and where to build. Foster quotes 
Cohen's "Something exiting must happen every day" (21). By 1969, 
however, the dominant importance of this quality of innovative-
entrepreneurism had receded in large-scale food-retailing in the 
U.K. During the financial year ended February 1970, the Board of 
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Tesco "instructed' r~cKinsey & Company, Management Consultants, to 
advise on the group's management structure and administration at all 
levels, bearing in mind the rapid expansion that has taken place in 
the past, and which the Board intends to continue during the 1970's". 
(22). As one result of McKinsey's report, Cohen relinquished his 
office of Joint Chairman. - The report also recommended the central-
isation of administrative departments, "Including, in particular, 
the buying, computer and data processing functions in a new 100,000 
sq. ft. office block". The presentation of the McKinsey report in 
March 1970 marks, as it were, the end of this entrepreneurial phase 
in Tesco's development: future growth was to be designedly systematised, 
less instinctive. 
3.3.4 Stage 3. The Food Retailer as Manager 
One view of the supermarket scene as at 1972, when the 'supermarket 
was.no longer an advancing phenomenon but an accepted method of 
retailing in many countries" is that of W.S. Mitchell, president in 
the U.S.A. of Safeway: "One supermarket is very much the same as 
another supermarket - they all have Campbell's soup on their shelves 
and sell it at about the same price" (23). To the extent that this 
applies so success comes to depend on the maximising of the effic-
iency of each aspec~ of the operation, which is the sense. in which 
" 
Mitchell intended his comment. In 1962, for example, the U.K. 
supermarket chain Fine Fare was making a loss of £2 million; and in 
1965, when it was the largest supermarket chain in Europe, its 
pre-tax profits were only £85,000. In that year Garfield Weston 
called in James Gulliver to manage the company. 
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Gulliver's experience of large-scale food-retailing was small. At the 
time he was chairman of Weston's building and shopfitting subsidiary. 
Previously he had been with management consultant's Urwick Orr, and 
before that, for two years, had attended the Harvard Business School. 
His consultancy work had moved from production problems (such as work 
in shipyards on cranes to "the whole relation of a company towards its 
market and profit requirements". Gulliver is, to quote Nanagement 
Today, "a relatively new kind of top manager for retailing, a professed 
(and nearly professorial)expert in business techniques" (24). He 
is an argument in favour of the proposition that, at a certain stage 
of developinent, general management skills become more important than 
retailing expertise - for the transformation in Fine Fare's 
performance was immediate and progressive; thus: 
Pre-tax profits 1964 £211,000 
(Source: Fine Fare 1965 £ 85,000 
reports) 
1966 £673,000 
1967 £2.6 million 
1968 £3.6 " 
1969 £4'.5 " 
1970 £4.9 " 
" 
1971 £4.2 " 
.1972 £5.2 " 
1973 £5.9 " 
1974 £7.4 " 
At the beginning of 1967, after roughly a year in office, Gulliver 
circulated an internal paper listing ten management techniques that 
were being employed in the recovery. These were: 
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Organisational planning; management by objectives; budgetary planning 
and control; manpower audit; management development; operational 
research (stock control); work-measured incentive scheme (warehouse); 
long-range planning; marketing; computer. 
"It was", Andrew Lum3den has commented, "the fullarmoury of modern 
management practice '" none of it avant garde" (24). He concludes ' 
that "the recovery itself --- was a cool but not a cold operation: 
the application of business logic to problems that had defied attempts 
to apply retailing mystique". 
In 1973 Gulliver left Fine Fare to found his own conglomerate, Argyll 
Foods.· By general admission, he left behind him an organisation far 
better equipped to face a competitive future than when he joined it ' 
Associated British Foods in accepting his resignation, defensively 
wrote in a clause that he was not to engage in competitive retailing 
for at least a year. 
As has been said, the companies represented by the above three 
British archetypical figures have all now progressed into this 
tertiary "management" phase, - and perhaps also into the "phase 
of the future" hypothesised by Orucker, that of the "entr'epreneurial 
management team" (25). 
As in most European countries, food-retailing in Britain has shed 
most of the "mystery" criticised by Jefferys, and has proven to 
be susceptible to logical analysis and ~tandardisation. The agent 
that gave the impetus to and made possible this rationalisation of 
an industry was self-service. 
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3.4 SELF-SERVICE AND THE STANDARDISATION OF CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Drucker has called the fifty years up to the outbreak of World War 
I the "Age of the Entrepreneur". In the fifty years subsequent to 
this, he maintains the premium has been on "management". In this 
latter period "the great need has been for the productive organisation 
of large numbers of people to do what could already be planned, 
projected and laid out, that is, for doing something that was already 
reasonable well-known"(25). This description is applicable to the 
state of supermarketing in Europe. It has been proposed above that 
the need for "management" emerged here as a dominant priority during 
the late 1960's. The fact that the selling operation is able, in 
fact, to be "planned, projected and laid out" and so susceptible 
to "management" is inherent in the nature of self-service. 
With minimum "interference" from the local personality of a 
particular store or its' staff, a self-service chain is able to 
compute the profitability of any line of merchandise on the basis 
of the following information: location in the store, with reference 
to customer flow and height from ground; amount of shelf-space 
occupied; space occupied by each unit; gross profit per unit; rate 
of purchase (which is, in turn, partly a function of the first two 
factors). With this information, optimum stock levels, shelf-
space and even optimum location within the store can be computed 
for each line of merchandise. The impersonality of self-service 
ensures that this computation is applicable to all stores of similar 
design within the group. The computer, given correct information, 
can check the sales rate in the store against minimum stock levels 
and reorder automatically as these are reached. In this case quite 
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simply "the retailer's computer talks to the manufacturer's computer" 
(26). When point-of-sale computerisation is generally introduced 
the above calculations will be automatic. 
Computerisation is advanced in retailing generally. A survey by the 
National Computing Centre in the early days of computerisation in 
1967 found the retail function to be outstanding in its development 
of computer usage for stock control and sales forecasting, and that 
computers were even then being used by major retailing firms. for at 
least 17 different types of operation (27)~ In supermarketing 
and hypermarketing, however, if one excepts Carrefour, computerisation 
has increasingly meant that the store manager is ceasing to have 
any authority at all over his range of stock or stock levels. With 
the advent. of point-of-sale computerisation his lack of authority 
in these areas will be total. To the extent that economic ways are 
found to enable current information to be received by the computer 
this centralisation of control increases. / 
The self-service field, in which personal salesmanship factors are 
of minimal importance, has logically been the field in which the 
mathematical assessment of retail site potential has made important· 
progress. In the U. S. A. in 1971 the f-1innesota voluntary Q,roup Super 
" 
Valu, by computerising data in respect of 97 factors hypothesised 
as affecting self-service grocery sales, produced a model which was 
claimed to be able to predict actual sales volume to an accuracy 
of five per cent (28). In the U.K. in the 1960's, Tesco could 
claim with some pride that it assessed potential sites by instinct: 
"1 have five chaps who can assess sites. We know how much money 
there is in a town. We can assess hOl"1 much we can take ---, " (29). 
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Currently, however, Sainsbury is using its own adaptation of the 
Gallup Poll model for site location and for assessing store perform-
ance, a model based on analogue techniques and using step-wise 
regression, with reported good results. 
3.5 SELF-SERVICE AND THE STANDARDI3ATION OF STAFF (i.e. Division 
of Labour) 
Traditionally in retailing the store manager has been "craftsman 
and generalist", responsible for all aspects of the operation of 
his store. In May 1971, however, when James Gulliver, chairman of 
Fine Fare (Holdings) Ltd., looking at the increasing size of new 
supermarkets and looking forward to the coming hypermarkets of up 
to 150,000 sq. ft. commented on the increased responsibilities of 
the modern supermarket manager, he also said that this, however, 
would be within the context of increasing control and direction 
from head office. / 
"His role will therefore tend more and more to be that of an 
administrator, carrying out hiQhly defined company policies 
through a larger and increasingly specialist staff ---
Indeed, he is likely to have little control over sales and 
gross profit in the traditional sense and can only influence 
these in the negative way of not adhering to company policy"(30). 
The principal independent duties of a supermarket manager today, in 
conditions of increasing computerisation, are not concerned with 
selling, ordering or merchandising. As outlined by Gulliver, they 
can be summarised as: 
(1) Implementing company policy 
(2) Recruitment, training and motivation of staff 
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(3) Industrial relations 
(4) Attending to government and local authority legislation on 
consumer-protection 
(5) Combating. pilferage 
(6) Management of perishable goods 
(7) Control of local advertising (perhaps). 
Similarly, Gulliver foresees a changed role for the stores supervisor, 
again traditionally a generalist, "a travelling super-manager": 
'~e is likely to become one of a team of specialist supervis~r/ 
merchandisers with responsibility for one- major area of the stores 
that he visits, to ensure with the store manager that the company's 
policies are being adhered to with regard to pricing, space 
allocation and the like". 
At the centre of the supermarket organisation there will be an 
increasing number of head office specialists and an increasingly 
specialist and professional top management. In this way, the main 
selling responsibility has moved from the craftsman - specialist 
at store level to the "management" specialist and specialist in 
management techniques at head-office level. As outlined above, 
increasingly the main duty of those below head-office leve~ is to 
carry out in detail instructions emanating from head-office. 
Henksmeier wrote in 1960 that "self-service is neither more nor less 
than the application to distribution of the basic principles of the 
division of labour, and as such it is a product of the industrial-
isation of economic life"{9). Hedid not envisage the situation 
described here, but the comment is now more precisely applicable. 
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This is not necessarily to say that this concentration on the 
principle of division of labour is conducive to greater job satis-
faction on the part of the lower orders of staff. Table 3.1 possibly 
indicates this dimension - whilst at the same time indicating the 
increased possibility of the use of unskilled, partly-skilled and 
part-time labour, as the rate of adoption of self-service and the 
average size of retail unit increase. 
Table 3.1. U.K. Grocery Shop Staff: Interchangeabili~y of Staff 
on Jobs, by Type of Outlet 
All Small Large 
Counter Self Self Self Super-
Service Service Service Service markets 
Staff interchangeable 92~~ 69?~ 84~~ 7~~ 63~~ 
Staff on one job only 8°' ,0 3l?~ 16?~ 21% 37?~ 
/' 
SOURCE: DEP Sample Enqutry 1965 (31) • 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on "management" as opposed to "craft" and 
the de-emphasis of the customer-interface as a consequence of self-
service have been factors in the raising of the status of retailing 
as a management career. "It would be next to impossible"> it was 
said in 1843, '~~o apply to a well-dressed man in the street a more 
offensive appeletion than 'shopman'''(32). And as late as 1969 
Sir Roy Harrod, in a letter to The Times, could say that in his 
boyhood he was looked down on in some quarters because he was in 
"the trade" (Le. Harrods). In 1971, however, Gulliver noted that: 
"The intellectual and business challenges of being involved in 
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running large food-chains can now attract high quali.ty management 
which hitherto tended to look down on retailing and made' its career 
I 
with food manufacturers. In fact over the last ten years the more 
interesting innovations have taken place in food retailing rather 
than in manufacturing, and this has contributed to the desire of 
many good men to get top retailing experience" (30). 
3.6 SELF-SERVICE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-SERVICE AS A MEASURE 
OF RETAIL DEVELOPMENT: VALIDATION BY COMPUTATION OF PRODUCTIVITY 
INCREASE 
The above validation of the selection of self-service and the develop-
ments of self-service as measures of the state of retailing 
development and innovation is supported by research by George for the 
Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge (as 
commissioned by the Economic Development Committee for the Distributive 
Trades) into productivity and capital expenditure in retailing - in 
particular, his analysis "Productivity and Technical Change" .(33). ~-
The part-findings of this section are summarised in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Productivity and Technical Change 1961-66: by kind of business 
Annual cumulative percentages 
Changes in Co-ops Dept. Grocers CTN Other Mail 'All 
Stores Order Firms' 
Output 0.14 2.47 7.64 5.09 6.52 5.37 
Labour input 1.66 .99 4.29 3.93 2.66 2.25 
Labour 
productivity: 1.80 1.48 3.35 1.16 3.86 3.46 3.12 
of which, due 
to changes in 
Capital per head 1.89 0.80 1.12 0.70 3.02 1.00 1.86 
Technical and 
organisational 0.09 0.68 2.23 0.56 0.84 2.46 1.26 
knowledge 
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The procedure adopted to derive these figures was "to estimate the 
contributions made to the growth in output by increases in labour 
and capital over a period". This was done by multiplying the observed 
increases in these inputs by "observed factor prices". When the 
result is deducted from the overall growth in output, the "residual" 
is then attributed to technical progress - i.e. it is progress as 
measured by increase in output (turnover) over and above that 
attributable to increases in thelabour or capital employed. 
George comments that, looking along the bottom row of the table, 
"there is a striking. difference between the grocers and the mail 
order forms on the one hand and the remaining categories of firms 
on the other with regard to the absolute importance of technical 
and organisational knowledge. The high rate of "progress" for 
grocers is undoubtedly a reflection on the importance of the growth 
of self-service in this area of retailing". 
/' 
The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that profitable innovation 
as·such is best studied, at least in Britain, in grocery and mail 
order firms. As regards grocers, George links their high "technical 
and organisational knowledge" contribution to output with the 
growth of self-service. 
Table 3.2, incidentally, indicates that "mail order" could be a 
fruitful alternative field of study. This would be so, however, 
strictly in its own right. Its techniques are particular, not 
pervasive, and have had little impact on general retail method. 
'-
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The later Cambridge researcher Ward (34) specifically identifies 
the importance of the productivity increase attributable to self-
service (defining productivity as labour productivity measured in 
"turnover per person engaged"). The basis of his calculations 
here is summarised in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 Self-Service Trading in U.K. Grocery Stores as related, 
to labour productivity 1957-1966 
0' change in real terms to 
1957 1961 1966 1957-1966 
Self-Service Sales 
as % of total 8.9 21.2 44.9 
Turnover per person 
engaged (£) , -
Self-Service 5672 6200 8413 + 24.1 
Other Shops 4073 4634 5657 + 16.2 
All Shops 4179 4896 6631 + 32.8 
SOURCE: Board of Trade Journal, 20 December 1963 and Report on the 
Census of Distribution 1966. Volume 2 
It can be seen that the proportion of grocery sales sold by self-
service method increased from nine per cent in 1957 to 45 per cent 
in 1966. During this time labour productivity in self-service stores 
increased by 24 per cent as compared with 16 per cent in other shops. 
That the overall productivity increase is greater, than either of 
these figures is due to the fact of the greatly increased share of 
trade taken by the self-service sector. Ward calculates that "If 
the same proportion of grocery sales had been sold on a self-
productivity basis in 1966 as in 1957, the overal productivity increase 
would have been reduced from 33 per cent to less than 17 per cent" -
and that, taking only the period 1961 to 1966, this type of conject.ur:al 
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calculation gives a productivity increase in the grocery trade 
of only six per cent as opposed to an actual 18 per cent over this 
period. Much of the overall gain in grocery sector productivity 
can therefore be attributed to the growth in the porportion of sales 
that are taking place in self-service stores. 
Ward. then observes that this increase in the productivity of the 
UK grocery sector resulting from the adoption .of self-service has 
had a noticable impact on the productivity of UK retailing in general: 
"Essentially we ask the question how many people would 
have been employed in retailing in 1966, had the proportion 
of self-service sales been. the same in 1966 as in 1961 
and had the rise in productivity been identical in self-
service stores to that in counte~service shops. On this 
basis, we calculate that an additional 50,995 'full-time 
equivalent' persons would have been required to retail 
the amount of grocery sales in 1966, which represents 
an increase of 12 per cent over those that were actually 
employed. This is equivalent to a rise of 2.4 per cent 
in the total persons engaged in retailing as a whole, 
which implies that the productivity growth of the retail 
trades over this period would have been reduced from 
10.0 per cent to 7.4 per cent. In other words, of the 
total increase in productivity that occurred over the 
period 1961 to 1966, 26 per cent can be attributed to 
the growth of the sel f -service method of selling ••••• " (34). 
Ward makes the additional point (a point to be emphasised in the 
context of this present study) that the adoption of sel f -~'erv ice is, 
on current data, only statistically measurable in the grocery trade 
- but that self-service techniques or modified forms of these 
techniques have been adopted to a considerable extent in other 
retailing sectors. If one could calculate tbe extent of this more 
widespread adoption, then the gain in overall retail productivity 
attributable to self-service would inevitably be even more 
pronounced. 
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Within the self-service grocery sector itself there is continuing 
evidence that the larger the selling unit the higher the productivity. 
Management Horizons (35) has produced the figures tabulated here in 
Table 3.4. "The figures in the report make it clear that the most 
successful operators must be those who have superstores" - that is 
to say, those whose superstores predominate in their stores mix. 
This applies to the top performing companies. Tesco has a fleet of 
small shops in addition to superstores and performs below the average. 
Table 3.4 The productivity of large-scale self-service operations. 
U.K. 1978 
- Sales per Sales per 
employee sq. ft. 
£ £ 
KwiK Save 81,425 
Cartiers Superfoods_ 52,942 
Carrefour ) ) / 
ASDA ) ) 36,000-41,000 235 
Wil li am Morrison) ) 
Safeway ) 
Sainsbury 35,627 314 
Tesco 30,900 173 
" 
'-----, 
, 
Multiple grocery 
-----------
sector average 34,700 ,200 --------~ 
The figures need qualification, however, in that the numerator in 
both calculations should'optimally be gross profit and not sales. 
This would improve the recorded performance of, in particular, 
Carrefour, ASDA and Tesco - companies for whom high margin non-food 
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sales are an important ingredient in total sales. This is to say 
that the hypermarket proper selling significantly non-foods is even 
more labour and space productive than the figures in Table 3.4 
indicate. 
These studies support an hypothesis of self-service and its consequent 
large-scale developments as the dominant mid-century and current 
agents of retail change. 
3.7 "SELF -SERVICE AND THE DEVELOPMENTS OF SELF -SERVICE" AS A f-1EASURE 
OF RETAIL DEVELOPMENT: VALIDATION BY' GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
Support for this selection of self~service and its developments as , 
the current preeminent measure of retailing advance is to be found 
also in the support (direct and indirect) given to self-service and 
supermarketing development by governments as the prime means of 
increasing efficiency in the food distributions systems of those 
countries. 
(1) In France, despite political opposition from the small shop-
keepers and from the established chains, at crucial moments 
(August 1953, 1958 and 1960) the gov~rnment supported the 
self-service and supermarket innovators (e.g. Lecler~'" in 
,their fight against Resale Price Maintenance and the 
stoppage of supply by manufacturers - as of course, other 
countries have done; but not, perhaps, in the face of such 
violent and effective opposition. 
(2) In Spain, self-service has become "an instrument of economic 
policy" in order to bring down retail food prices and to 
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increase the efficiency of the retail trade by strengthening 
effective competition: the initiative in introducing self-
service was taken first by the state, and not by private 
enterprise. The first self-service shops were opened in 
1957 within the semi-official cooperative Conauta (National 
Self-Service Cooperative). The first supermarkets were set 
up by a state agency, the government-owned CAT (Comisaria De 
Abastecimientos Y Transportes - Office of Supplies and Transport) 
in 1958). (How many supermarkets CAT has opened, or stimulated 
to open since this date is a matter of choice between statistics: 
Henksmeier, writing in 1960, (9) gives the state the credit 
for the existence then of fifty supermarkets - averaging 700-
800 square metres; in 1971, however The International Self-
Service Organisation reports the existence in 1961 of only 
twenty-four supermarkets in Italy - using the normal European 
definition of a supermarket: 400 square metres minimum selling 
spac.e; (1» - and the Department De Aut'oservicio, Cajas 
L"" Registradoras National S.A., noted 44 supermarkets only (400 m 
criterion) at the end of 1962 (36). Modern Retailing (27) 
(German version:1966) credits CAT with having stimulated the 
opening of 300 supermarkets in Spain, "with a further 300 
expected to be opened in the near future": The International 
" Self-Service Organisation, however, credits Spain with 138 
supermarkets only as at 1971 (10). This reflects how 
extremely blurred distributional statistics were until very 
recently indeed. That they remain idiosyncratic to particular 
countries and observers is noted in Chapter 4 and 5). 
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The Spanish government, additionally, set aside 50 million 
pesetas in loans for retailers willing to convert their shops 
into self-service units, and gave privately owned supermarkets, 
on conditions, substantial advantages including tax incentives: 
Henksmeier reports that an additional aim of the State in 
taking the sbove initiative was to develop the industries that 
supply supermarkets with goods or equipment, such as manu fact-
urers of shopfittings, packing material, frozen foods etc.(9). 
- that is, stimulating a "retailing revolution" in order to 
promote a "packaging revolution." 
Parenthetically one can note that this strong participation by 
the Spanish government in self-service and especially supermarket 
development initially hastened what whould otherwise be the 
normal proportion of self-service new openings that were of 
supermarket size. By 1961 the supermarket share of the total, 
number of self-service outlets was higher in Spain, at 12.2 
per cent, than anywhere else in Europe. In 1971, this percent-
age figure had shrunk to 0.2 as a result of Spain becoming 
well-equipped in smaller units (well-equipped, that is, in 
the context of economic standing .-=-and better equipped in 
relation to population than, fot example~ Italy) (38). 
", 
(3) In Italy it was in part similar motivations that impelled the 
state-owned financial corporation IRI to acquire the seven 
stores of Romana Supermarkets S.P.A. in 1967 (39). 
(4) Currently as from 1980 Argentina is opening up its food and 
drink market to overseas supermarket operators. It is 
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offering 80 per cent loans pn the cost of building and equipping 
supermarkets in the country. The first two years of the loan 
will be interest free (40). 
The promotion of self-service and sapermarketing, by governments as 
indicated above, as a prime means of increasing the efficiency of 
their distribution systems, endorses the selection of self-service 
developments as the major indicators of retailing change. 
3~8, HYPERMARKET PROVISION AS THE PRIME MEASURE OF DISTRIBUTION 
DEVELOPMENT 
The hypermarket is the logical and, to date, ultimate development of 
self-service operation. By most, but not all, definitions of 
"hypermarket", hypermarketing is synonymous with low prices to the 
public, both for foods and non-foods. As John Fairclough, managing 
director of Hypermarket Holdings, the join~ company set up by 
Carrefour and Wheatsheaf to develop hypermarkets in Britain, says: 
"The method of operating a hypermarket results in much greater' 
efficiency in storage and handling of goods, and this reduces 
prices for the customer" (41). 
, 
"', 
A price advantage is not, however, the only attraction of the 
hypermarket. T. Grinnel, the general manager of Savacentre, the 
Sainsbury - British Homes Stores subsidiary, has noted that "the 
most important advantages of hypermarkets are cheaper prices, the 
convenience of ground level car parking, and late shopping hours. 
Furthermore their size enables shoppers to satisfy a considerable 
proportion of their shopping needs in one trip"(41). 
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In that the hypermarket offers one-stop shopping at low prices over and 
extended and continually extending range of foods and non-foods with 
the convenience of adjacent car parking, its provision is proposed as 
the prime single indicator of general retailing efficiency on a 
progressive continuum self-service - supermarket - hypermarket. 
"Hypermarkets and superstores are in many ways only an extension of 
the shopping revolution that the supermarkets ushered in during the 
1960's. The concept of self-service, cheaper prices, a wider range 
of goods and brighter shops was resisted by the old-fashioned retailers 
but quickly accepted by the public" (41). The argument that trading 
economics and customer acclimatisation logically propel the self-
service operator progressively towards the larger unit is contained 
in Chapter 6. 
As a consequence of the expanding size of store and consequent 
progressively extending range of foods supplied by multiple grocers, 
the gorcery sector is making deep inroads into what were formerly 
specialist businesses. The extent of their impact as at 1979 on the 
sale of specialist perishable foods is shown in Table 3.5, as 
compiled· by Stockbrokers W. Greenwell and Co. (42). 
Table 3.5 Fresh food sales through U.K. grocers - market 'spares 
Retailer Meat Fruit & Veg. Eggs Total 
Grocer 28~~ 25~~ 40~~ 28~~ 
Butcher 60 4 31 
Greengrocer/Street Trader 70 4 27 
Other .12. 5 . 52. Iq .. 
lOU~~ IOO?~ lOO~~ lOm~ 
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in - which respect George Cattell, a former director-general of the 
National Farmers Union, told a meeting of farmers in 1979 that he 
predicted that the grocers' 28 per cent share of the meat trade shown 
in Table 3.5 would rise to 43 per cent by 1985. ~'The wholesale meat 
trade is one in which marketing and modern management techniques are 
relative strangers', and he forecast that the multiple grocers, in 
theirsearch for overall operating efficiency, . would set up their own 
slaughterhouses in the 1980's (43). 
In the same way grocers are taking an increasing share of the off-
licence 1iquour trade. In 1977 that share was 41.2 per cent (44}. 
Currently it is approaching 50 per cent. 
Progressively these shares of all-food trade are being captured by 
the superstores. 
Additionally, the range of non-foods carried by the hypermarket, in 
the main at discounted prices, is continually increasing. Any non-
food item made problem-free at-the sales point by packaging or the 
minimal need for explanation is usable by the self-service mass 
merchandiser. Associated Dairies' ASDA superstores, for example' 
currently carry 27,000 lines, of which only 6000 are edible (45)~ 
'-
A.C. Nielsen Company (46) listed in 1977 the range of merchandise 
then stocked by "grocery" superstores. The list is given as 
Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6 Ranqe of merchandise stocked by qrocery superstores, 
Great Britain. 1977 
Proportion stocking-: Groceries, Meat &-Poultry, 
Fruit & Green Groceries, 
Confectionery, Alcoholic drinks, 
Tobacco, Toiletries, 
Household Hardware ••• 100~o 
Stationery/Toys/Games 99.1~o 
Garden Tools- '"97 :4~o 
Decorating Supplies 95. 7~o 
Car Accessories 95. 7~o 
Clothing 94. O~o 
D.I.Y. Hand Tools 93. 2~o 
Soft Furnishings 92.3?o 
. Records/Cassettes 91.5?o 
Minor Electrical goods 86. 3~o 
T. V. sets 77. 8~o 
Major electrical appliances 76.1~o 
D.I~Y.materials 70.1?o 
Proprietary medicines 68.4?o 
Delicatessen 59.8?o 
Footwear 
Jewellery 38. 5~o 
Furniture 36. 8~o 
Photographic equipment 36.8?o 
Goods from ~ bakery 32.5?o 
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The importance of non-foods logically increases with the size of 
unit. The stockbrokers W.S. Greenwell and Co., have calculated that 
for a typical 35,000 square feet superstore non-foods account for 
20 per cent of sales but 33 per cent of profit; and for large 
hypermarkets of, for example, 90,000 square feet for a probable 45 
per cent of sales and 60 per cent 9f profit (47). Greenwell's 
breakdown of the figures for the superstore category is given as 
table 3.7. 
Table 3.7 Typical Superstore Non-Food Sales 
Health and Beauty Aids 
Clothing 
Toys 
D.I.Y. & Leisure 
(electrical, decor, motor 
accessories, garden) 
Durables (brown & white 
Goods, Furniture) 
Non-Food Sales 
~~ of Store 
'Turnover 
3. O?~ 
5.1~~ 
2.5 
/ 
5.1 
2.6 
Gross 
Profit, 
Margin. 
28 
30 
20 
20 
Contribution 
to Store 
Profit 
5. 8~~ 
9. 3~~ 
4. 9~~ 
6. 7~o 
3. 4~~ 
The gross profit margins are low compared with those in the 
specialist trade, but high in comparison with discounted grocery 
margins. This compounds the need of the operator for the larger 
unit where non-foods can be merchandised. Ian MacLaurin, Tesco's 
managing director, commented in 1978 that "supermarkets who are 
staying just with food will have a hell of ,a time of it without 
the cushion of non-foods" (49). As a general observation this 
remains valid, despite Tesco's subsequent temporary contraction of 
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its non-food operations in 1980 as a consequence of recession. The 
escalating size of the store unit mirrors the escalating thrust for 
non-food sales. 
The impact of superstores and hypermarkets in a country or region is 
disproportionate tolheir numbers. In the UK Fine Fare, for example, 
has 684 stores, but among these 35 per cent of its total business is 
done through its 33 superstores (49). Progressively throughout 
Europe hypermarkets and superstores have become or are becoming the 
dominant components in the stores mix of what were once grocery-only 
firms. Hoare Govett and Company, in fact, predicted in 1980 that:' 
by 1990 the traditional High Street supermarket will have disappeared 
and that only the superstores and hypermarkets and the limited-range 
discount. stores will remain as supply sources for everyday purch- I 
ases (50). And the maximum economic size of the self-service hyper-
market has not yet been established : the Carrefour hypermarket 
opened at Toulouse in 1972 has 260,000' squa'~e feet of selling space;' 
in Germany, the four ~~ertkauf "Self-Service discount department stores" 
are each over 400,000 square feet (51). 
3.9 THEY HYPERMARKET AS'AN AGENT FOR THE NATIONALISATION OF 
RETAILING AS AN INDUSTRY 
'". 
" '-
The "hypermarket" can be seen as the ultimate manifestation to date 
of a rationalisation of retailing that has followed the widespread 
adoption of self-service. As epitomised in Table 3.6, the hyper-
market has been instrumental in breaking down the barriers between 
retail sectors. This includes the retailing of intangibles. 
Tesco's superstore at Pitsea includes a travel agent. In this it 
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follows the now well-established lead of hypermarkets in France and 
Belguim, where travel and tourism are sold as an actual self-service 
operation. Tesco in 1980 was considering entering the market for 
insurance selling low-premium insurance in a mass-merchandising 
operation. It also sees itself in the future as possibly selling 
shares through the medium of stockbroker concessionaires~ When 
t~anwaring of Midland Bank said in 1979 "Banking is the right 
environment for selling insurance - it does not sell well across 
the bacon counter" (52), there is an element of defence noticable 
in the remark. 
In that the hypermarket is concerned to sell both foods and non-
foods and now noticably intangibles, with the proportion of food-
stuffs sold decreasing logically with increase in size of building, 
it is attracting to it both food~retailers and non-food retailers, 
and also non-retailers. Tanburn has described the situation in 
Germany in which nearly every conventional type of retailer is 
concerned in the development of the "hypermarket": 
"The Plaza outlets have been developed by the ~ 
co-operatives; wholesaler sponsored groups have 
developed them to protect their business from 
competition in particular 8reas; and the multiples 
have moved in too. The department store operators, 
besides developing their more conventional sites 
are also developing out of town, with self-service 
discount department store operations --- The 
operators of the highly successful Wertkaufs ---
moved into this type of business from the 
furniture trade; while Massa-Markte is r~n by 
developers who saw an investment opportunity but 
had no previous operational experience in the 
retail field". (51) 
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The chief innovator in hypermarketing in France and Europe is 
Marcel Fournier, chairman of Carrefour, who is a former Annecy draper. 
The spread of hypermarketing in Europe is an important contributor to 
the continuing breaking down of the divisions between different 
branches of retailing that was previously evidenced, in the development 
'-' 
of the supermarket. The department stores are particularly affected. 
I~ Europe generally department store management is still in the process 
of appraising_ its position in the future development ~f distribution. 
'--. 
Whereas in 1968 Donald B. Smiley, executive vice-president of Ma'cy's 
of New York, could say "From a- financial point of view give me Marks 
and Spencer any day, but we're just not in that kind of business", 
(53), this attitude is : being progressively abandoned in Europe-
today. In 1972, the U.K. department store group Debenhams opened its 
first Scan superstore at Nottingham and made the decision to develop 
a chain of such superstor~s. At the same time it acquired Caters, 
the supermarket chain. On these developments Sir Anthony Burney, 
Debenham's chairman commented: "We're no longer just department store 
operators, we're retailers" (54). The fact that neither of these 
ventures was a success does not affect the philosophy. 
Commenting on the data given in Table 3.6 on superstore ex~ansion 
into non-food areas, A.C. Nielsen Company gives its opinion that 
this illustrates "just why superstores are regarded as the modern 
leaders of the retail revolution" (46). This continuing rational-
isation of retailing as a total industry is directly related, it 
has been proposed above, to the progressive development of self-
service to hypermarket level. 
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3.10 SYSTEMS EFFICIENCY AS A DESIRED OBJECTIVE OF DISTRIBUTION 
This chapter has traced the progressive introduction of management 
science and systems efficiency i~to the process of retailing that 
were made possible by the degree of standardisation and routinisation 
that successive developments of basic self-service method made 
possible. The benefits to the operators and to the public are 
measurable. 
• 
There are counter-arguments to an emphasis on systems efficiency. 
These arguments concentrate on the ease or otherwise of ,entry by 
newcomers and innovators, on the provision of variety, on retailing 
as a social activity. Small retailers and conservationists in 
particular have urged these as important factors at public enquiries , 
throughout Europe - and not in many cases without some justification. 
The stance taken in this study is similar to that adopted by Reavis 
Cox: 
"Do we really want efficiency in this sense? There also 
are those who maintain that a society constructed to an 
engineer's technocratic blueprint, even it it worked out 
as planned, would be a nightmare for human beings. It 
might reduce costs substantially, the argument runs, but 
only by doIng violence to other fundamental principles 
upon which our culture has been constructed. These ", 
include a belief in the need to rely upon individual ' 
initiative and inventiveness to keep our economy advancing 
and a fear that binding people into an efficient system 
would endanger these qualities by imposing rigidities of 
various sorts. 
In response to such arguments we can only agree that they 
have merit, but their importance should not be exaggerated. 
In this country, we do not seem to be in any serious danger 
of stifling humanity by overemphasis upon engineering 
concepts in distribution. It seems better to accept the 
conclusion that while efficiency in marketing has increased 
over the last century, it has lagged behind other sectors 
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of the economy - and more especially behind agriculture ~ 
in its rate of improvement. Much stronger evidence than 
any we now have available will be necessary if we are to 
treat this fact as anything more than a challenge to the 
ingenuity and energy of those whose business it is to make 
marketing work as well as we know how"(55). 
/ 
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CHAPTER 4 
INDICATOR CONSTRUCTION AND PROPOSED RESEARCH 
IN INDICATOR CONSTRUCTION 
4.1 International demographic, economic and social indicators available 
to the marketer are chronically blunt for marketing purposes. This is 
the premise of this chapter. They nevertheless form the statistical 
skeleton upon which nearly every international marketing research report 
is built, despite the fact that many of these indicators are fallible as 
regards international comparability and relevance· to marketing to an 
extent that makes them not just irrelevant but positively misleading. 
They are data that are readily available: therefore they are used. 
There is an urgent need.for a programme to:produce realistic and comparative. 
international indIcators specifically· constructed to aid the comparative 
analysis of markets. 
·In the study. of marketing and public policy interaction~attention has 
focused almost entirely on the extent to which political action can, 
. and should, limit marketing actio~. Very'little attention has been 
'paid to the dependency of the process of marketing analysis itself on 
'. current political goals •. Yet these goals decide th~ statistics t~at 
governments command statistical offices to ~~oduce- and these' 
statistics profoundly influence mar'keting action~ Th~s is especially 
so in international marketing.' 'It is difiicult for a marketer to ..... , 
·have an "instinctive feel" for a foreign market. His assessments are, 
to a large extent, based on available "comparative" data. It is' 
argued in this chapter, however, that the international indicators 
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most quoted in marketing circles have little comparative value. They 
are incidental statistics compiled for other purposes. 
It would be idle to pretend that the correction of this is an easy task. 
In some cases the production of data usable in marketing requires only 
the restructuring of existing data to produce a new and relevant 
synthesis or presentation. In other cases specific basic research is 
necessary. "First generation" work, however, can obviously be done by 
co-ordinated international private group research •. 
The argument here~therefore, is for the establishment of a Marketing 
Indicators Working Party, optimally eventually within the authorities 
of EEC and DECD. It \odll be argued in this paper that "marketing" is 
not a homogeneous activity and that such a working party should consist 
. of a "distribution" sub-section, an "advertising" sub-section and so on. 
The working party would (1) propose optimal marketing ·indicators, (2) 
liaise with other indicator constructors (e.g~,of economic, demographic, 
social, etc. indicators) as regards communal ground and practicability, 
and work towards the construction of specific marketing indicators. The 
first sub-committee of such a working party, one oriented towards 
indicators relevant to distribution, is currently in process of 
" formation. The generative factor has been the writer's pUblished papers·. 
j 
The list of participant representatives of European countries as at the 
time of writing is given in Appendix 3. 
This chapter deals with problematic areas in indicator construction 
accordingly as they have been encountered in a project in comparative 
distribution analysis. The argument, however, is applicable to all 
aspects of marketing. 
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4.1.2 Time Factor 
Given that the lack of a programme as proposed is important ( and this, 
as we have said, will be argued below), the time for effective remedy 
is short, if this is to involve "official" participation. A process of 
revaluation of statistical need is currently taking place generally in 
Europe - with impetus from EEC, OECD and nationall~' (in which respect 
subsequent and relevant reference is made to the OECD and EEC Social 
Indicators Programmes). Once this reorientation has been achieved it 
will be difficult to propose an alternative dimension or modification to 
then agreed international indicator series. 
4.2 THE BASIS OF INDICATOR CONSTRUCTION: THE HYPOTHESIS 
A distribution sub-committee of a Marketing Indicators Working Party 
would, it is suggested, postulate no indicator simply on the grounds that 
it "describes the market" but would take as starting point precise 
/' 
hypotheses as to factors influential specifically in the adoption of, 
for example, retailing innovation and would do this having considered 
how, in this instance, "retailing innovation" is best currently measured, 
and how it is likely to be best measured in the future. 
The steps in the process of comparative marketing analysis',are, therefor,e, 
proposed to be as follows: 
(1) The specification of the marketing aspect to be measured. In this 
, ' 
case, we mean the state of retail development = (first approximation), 
the level of "systematised" retailing =(second approximation) level 
of self-service, supermarket and hypermarket provision. The 
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argument is the argument of Chapter 3. Or simply we can state that 
we are measuring these last factors. Then follows the attempted 
construction of internationally comparable indicators of self-
service, supermarketing and hypermarketing. 
(2) Tne specification of the socio-economic etc. factors hypothesised 
as affecting the marketing aspect. In the illustrative study, for 
example, our analysis is based on the following hypothesis: the 
level of distribution in a Western European country or sub-national 
region is positively related to: 
(a) the degree of concentration of population in that country or 
regiQn, 
(b) the extent of·car-ownership and provision for that car-
ownership, 
(c) the level of individual prosperity, 
(d) the level of "feJT1ale emancipation", 
(e) the shortage of labour and cost of labour, 
(r) the level of industrialisation, 
(g) the level of retail integration, 
and, in relation to hypermarketing only 
(h) the level of existing supermarket provision. 
which hypothesis are briefly amplified below and further discussed and/ 
or revised in Chapters 8 and 9. 
The hypotheses may be generated by various means. They are not 
, 
, 
, 
hypotheses necessarily relevant to any generalised concept of "marketing". 
It is argued this has little meaning. In our instance, they relate 
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specifically to self service, supermarket and hypermarket development. 
Each hypothesis, needs to be operationalised by indicators - probably 
by several. Each indicator will be an approximation. 
An "t~SI Approach" (the term is not used derogatively) as noted in 
section 2.2, is to see what indicators are available generally intern-
ationally, then to ask of each: "Is it .relevant?". A discipline of the 
\ 
prior hypothesis demands the proposal of "ideal" indicators to 
illustrate specific factors: then the sonstruction of indicators as 
nearly embodying each factqr as possible. The difference can be crucial. 
Additionally, starting from the hypothesis one is concerned to confirm 
an assumption (refute the null hypothesis) statistically. In this case 
one is vitally concerned with the precision and comparability of the 
data. If one is on what Ehrenberg Cl) has called the "fishing trip" 
of factor or cluster analysis without prior hypothesis, there is no 
similar compulsion. 
Additionally, attempting to confirm an hypothesis highlights national 
and regional distinctions and leads to a search for the aberrations 
from observed general trends, hypothesised and otherwise supported by 
the data. 
The generality of national statistics, however, is inadequate for 
marketing analysis of this attempted precision or, it is argued, any 
precision. 
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4.3 THE ANALOGY OF SOCIAL INDICATOR PROGRAMMES 
The marketing problem, in this respect, is similar to that of those 
attempting to measure comparative social welfare and social provision. 
It is generally agreed that the national statistics normally produced 
to date are inadequate to represent this factor. (In fact, to Cazes 
(2) the whole question of the search for social indicators "can be 
boiled down, with a good deal of simplification, to an attempt to 
correct the concept of GNP".) Neither are national statistics designed 
to measure market potential. The social welfare lobby, however, is 
effective. Both OECD and the EEC.have Social Indicators Programmes 
. . 
and working parties (3). Eventually participant member countries of 
these organisations will be producing statistics on a national and 
ultimately regional basis specifically to measure welfare level and 
these statistics will be, at least eventually, comparative. 
" . 
The OECD has been concerned to develop specific social indicators 
since a ministerial declaration of intent in 1970, the EEC since its 
Social Action Programme was approved by resolution of Council in 1975. 
EEC has produced its first volume of social indicators at the national 
level (4). 
OECD has defined the characteristics and objectives of its programme~~ 
of action. 
(a) Comparative indicators are to be produced more descriptive of 
overall welfare of individuals than GNP, income-based etc. data. 
The aim is not a single weighted index of well-being but "rather 
a minimal number of separate indicators which could yield a 
meaningful although not a complete picture of 'measurable welfare'''. 
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(b) Ag:eement has been sought and achieved among representatives of 
member countries as to what aspects of well-being need to-be 
measured as a basis for indicator construction. 
(c) Internationally comparable indicators are sought at national and 
also sub-national level. 
(d) A Working Party for social indicator development was formed mainly 
of those concerned with social indicators from each member country, 
with working party decisions ratified at ministerial level. 
(e) The decision has been made to concentrate initially on what is 
"most helpful now": that is, on a "perhaps elementary 'first 
generation' set of indicators", to be modified late'r by specific 
research and more sophisticated indicators. 
The DEeD sequence of working party procedure therefore was, and' 
is, in respect of each aspect of "social welfare", to: 
(a) specify the concept to be measured; 
(b) 
(c) 
./ 
specify the ideal indicators n~eded to measure this conceBt; 
concentrate initially, but only initially, on currently 
available data = (in many cases) the use of "less than ideal" 
proxy indicators, e.g., as derived from the System of National 
Accounts. Such a programme and such a sequence are proposed 
as an urgent marketing requirement. 
Hard or Soft Data 
The requirement is for usable basic data. If one classifies data as 
either "hard" (= factual/behaviour) or "soft" (= attitude) then it is 
strongly urged that the current need is for meaningful and relevant 
"hard" marketing data. Once this has been achieved, the insights of 
behavioural economics may put flesh on that skeleton. First one needs 
a skeleton. 
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4.4 LEVEL OF MEASUREMENT: THE CRITICAL FACTOR 
The critical factor in aggregate research is that of establishing 
boundaries. Comparative marketing research has previously normally 
accepted the nation as unit of analysis. The basic assumption of 
those who analyse by nation (who do so for reasons other than avail-
ability of statistics) is that the nation is~more homogenous than it 
is disparate - that, for example, Northern Italy is more akin to 
Southern Italy than it is to Southern France. Obviously this is not 
necessarily so. 
The Italian example is well-known. The position however deserves 
restatement. Although the Mezzorgiorno's "centuries old: isolation" 
has been broken down somewhat now by the construction of highways, 
airports and telecommunications, it remains one of the poorest areas 
in Europe, and is, in effect a separate nation compared to the 
/ 
prosperous north of Italy. To quote the more readily available 
statistics: average incomes in Southern Italy in 1978 were just over 
60 per cent of the national average. In Calabria, Italy's poorest 
region, they fall to 40 per cent of the national average. The 
unemployment rate in the Mezzorgiorno as a whole is well above that 
of the richer north - 10 per cent as compared with 6 per cent (5). '. 
National averages of these factors have therefore little operational 
meaning. The fact is notorious in the Italian example, but the same~ 
applies in varying degrees to every country in Europe. The regional 
disparities in Spain, though less discussed than those of Italy, are 
as pronounced. Spain is divided statistically into fifty provinces. 
In the four richest provinces the income per capita is double the 
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national average and almost three times greater than that ,of the five 
most depressed provinces. In such circumstances the computation of 
national average income, for example, is, to say the least, a grossly 
insensitive exercise. Such national averages are not operational 
instruments. 
The inhabitants of a "frontier" region may be, in fact, more oriented 
as consumers towards a nearby magnet town in a neighbouring country than 
they are oriented inwards inside the national boundary. The simple 
geography of straight line distance determines this. "Holland is a 
small country, the Dutch never tire of saying. But it still encompasses 
striking regional variations and for people living in the most south-
easterly province of Limburg the bright lights of Dusseldorf and 
Brussels are nearer than Amsterdam and the Hague" (6). Examples could 
be picked from frontier regions in almost every European mainland 
country. 
,/ 
Switzerland, bordering onto four Gauntries, is the prime example of 
inward migration both for work and leisure. The frontier towns recruit 
"frontalier" workers from the neighbouring countries into industries 
often specifically located for this purpose. Vast numbers of French 
workers, for example, "commute across the borders from the eastern 
regions of France reporting for work either in Basel or Geneva, whilst 
nearly 20,000 Italians, half of whom originated in Southern 'Italy, have 
taken up residence in Northern Italy to be able-to:work in Chiasso" 
, 
I , 
in Southern Switzerland (7). Figure 4.1 shows the main commuting routes 
into Switzerland, and graphically illustrates the limitations of the 
concept of "nation" for other than political purposes. Geneva has more 
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Figure 4.1 Main Commuting Routes into Switzerland 
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in common as regards consumer behaviour with Lyon and Chambery than it 
has with German-speaking Zurich - and her prosperity is to a large extent 
linked to the strength of the French economy. 
The insensitivity of national statistics is especially misleading where 
the subject of study is retailing, a localised activity •. The urgent 
need in comparative marketing studies in general, however, is for the 
production of internationally comparable marketing data at sub-national 
level - and the crucial factor which decides the validity of the 
analysis is what precisely that level of measurement should be. 
.,.> 
The minimum level possible must obviously be the lowest. level at which 
socio-economic and demographic statistics are produced by governments, 
the Basic Administrative Unit (the UAB in EEC abbreviation). For the' 
countries studied this lowest level is shown in Table 4.1, column 2. 
On average we have socio-economic statistics for each parcel of 200,000 
/ 
inhabitants in Norway and Switzerland. The UK, on the other hand, in~_ 
general recognises statistically only 11 regions, and most-aggregate 
analyses can be no more sensitive than is possible with five-million 
inhabitant groupings. 
n For most marketing purposes the relative size of the regio~'-is not the 
; 
, 
most important factor within broad upper and lower limits (too small 
and "boundary corssing" makes some of the data meaningless; too large 
and an average is untypical). Inter-relationships are not meaningful 
between regions that each subsume disparate populations. The essential 
requirement is that the unit chosen or finally formed is homogeneous 
and preferably, at least in a retailing study, also nodal. Regional 
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Table 4.1 Sub-National Regions in Europe as Relevant to Marketing Analysis 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK 
1 
Approximate 
population 
(millons) 
19731 
8 
10 
5 
62 
52 
3 
55 
13 
4 
8 
6 
56 
2 
Smallest territorial unit for 
general statistical prOV1Slon 
No. of such units per country and 
national population divided by 
number of units 
No. Pop. 
9 0.9 
9 1.1 
16 0.3 
342 1.8 
22 2.4 
31 0.1 
20 2.7 
11 1.2 
20 0.2 
25 0.3 
253 0.2 11 5.1 
(1) "Target-date" of research proj,e'ct. 
3 
Larger regional territorial 
units (if any) for general 
statistical provision. No. 
of such units per country 
3 
3 
11' 
8 
4 
11 
5 
(2) Research project analysis not made at this level: 11 Lander not homogeneous. 
(3) Considered not homogeneous. 
4 
Tentative suggested divisions of 
countries into "regions" most nearly 
"homogeneous". Numbers of such' "regions" 
per country and national populationdivid 
by no. of such "regions',' 
No.. Pop. Basis 
2 4.0 Nielsen as basis 
3(?) 3.3 Approximately the two 
"language" areas + Brabal 
3 1.7 EEC Classification 
8 6.5 ZEAT 
2 1.5 Eastern Planning Region 
rest of Ireland 
11 5.0 Community Regions 
5 2.6 Landsdelen 
4 1.0 Trade Regions 
5 1.6 Nielsen (Approx.) 
5 1.2 See text 
boundaries are historical; but where these "basic administrativ~ units" 
are small in size, they can be grouped into economically homogeneous 
blocks and these then are viable units for analysis. The smaller the 
'''basic administrative units", therefore, the more useful in many respects 
'as "building blocks" in the construction of regions relevant to the 
analysis. (An alternative advertising study, for example, might group 
such "building blocks" into approximate TV regions) •. 
This construction of regions relevant to marketing (or for that matter, 
with a different synthesis, to any form of planning) is, however, not 
an easy task. We have noted that Spain has no less than 'fifty provinces. 
These "are too many for effective inter-regional planning. Some 
aggregation is needed. Yet, over the past two decades or so, Spanish 
economists and planners have suggested literally scores of alternative 
delimitations, ranging from about five to fifty.Tegions " (8). At 
least in Spain, however, the analyst does hgve the option open to him, 
/ 
to the extent that regional statistics are'provided, of being able to' 
group these small regions into larger regional units in a way that seems, 
10gic31 to his particular analysis. In the UK, on the other hand, he 
has, in general, as we have noted, no such choice. Few complete sets 
of regional statistics are compiled below the level of the UK Standard 
"\, 
Region. (One says this despite the disaggregation rece'ntly of some, 
however only some, indicators to county or broadly eqivalent area level 
(9)). The 56 million popUlation is thus divided for most statistical 
purposes into only eleven regions, and no further manipulation of much 
of the regional data is possible, unless it is by further aggregation 
of these regions. 
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This would not matter if those regions were usably homogeneous •. How-
ever, they are not. Richard Webber and John Craig have, for the UK 
. Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, attempted to draw a map of 
Great Britain based on the similarity or dissimilarity of socio-economic 
and demographic factors in the different local authority areas (10). 
A version of this map is given in Figure 4.2. Although the variables 
chosen as inputs to the model can perhaps be challenged (11), the 
exercise is jnstructive. It can be seen, even without an explanation 
9f the six basic types of area postulated (an explanation not central 
to this thesis) that the demarcation by Webber and Craig of socio-
economically "homogeneous" areas has little correspondence with the 
boundaries of the Standard Regions. If, however, 'all regional statistics 
were in fact provided in respect of territorial units smaller than the 
Standard Region, one' might be able to isolate, for example, industrial-
ised South Wales from the rest of Wales, and approach nearer the 
concept of the "homogeneous" region. The present position of UK 
/ 
regional statistics is unsatisfactory to'the analyst or planner, 
especially so to the marketing analyst, and is out of line with the 
rest of Europe. That it is Qut.oflin3 with the rest of the EEC has been 
emphasised by the Statistical Office of the European Communities (12). 
In contradistinction, in some, in fact in many, other European countries 
i ! • 
(Switzerland, Norw?y, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, Spain) the regional 
statistical unit is too small to be used as the unit of marketing 
analysis. In some ca~es, for example, such regions do not even 
subsume hypermarket catchment areas. Also, of course, information 
based on sample surveys cannot be reliably disaggregated to this extent. 
Nevertheless, as we have said, where reliable information exists for 
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Figure 4.2 Socio-economic Classification of Local Authority 
Areas in Great Britain. 
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these regions, these units can be used as "building blocks" and 
aggregated to form larger and more relevant regions by the analyst 
himself, pr~vided he has access to the raw data behind the current 
regional statistics. 
In EurJpe generally regional boundaries are arbitrary as regards 
contemporary relevance, but in some countries these historic regions 
have been grouped statistically and for planning purposes into more 
relevant and larger regions. Thus in thefolliwng countries the 
territorial units mentioned might theoretically be meaningful in a 
regional analysis: France (the 8 ZEAT); Italy (the 11 Community Regions); 
The Netherlands (the 5 Landsdelen); UK (the 11 Standard Regions); 
Ireland (the 8 Planning Regions: these, however, since they divide by 
eight a population of only three million, are more u~~ful as "building 
blocks"). Intra-regional homogeneity, however, varies as between 
these countries. With the exception of Ireland the regions noted are 
/' 
all EEC Community Regions (RCE), and the EEC has commented that "the 
delimitation of these areas proved difficult and the solutions applied 
today do not respond adequately to the objectives pursued. The RCE do 
not always obey socio-economic criteria .•. " (13). 
Nevertheless we have employed these statistical units of these 
, 
" , 
countries as the basis of our main regional analysis forthes~-countriesl-
except in the case of Ireland where it was considered that the logical 
grouping of planning regions would be: 
(1) the Eastern region (Dublin and surrounding territory, 
(2) the rest of Ireland. 
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In other countries the analyst must make his own grouping of "building 
blocks" aggregating UAB-level data in the most logical way relevant to 
the analysis. In respect of countries not listed above, the following 
"regions", made or adopted, seem to us at least usably homogeneous. 
Norway:, The 4 trade regions. 
Sweden: Approximately the 5 Nielsen regions. 
Austria: Two groupings (East and West) based on Nielsen regions~ 
but subsuming Vienna into the Eastern region because of its 
high population density within strictly limited boundaries. 
Switzerland: Cantons grouped in 5 "regions" on the basis of 
hypothesised urban-magnets and communication links (not language). 
These "regions" are based on the following centres: (1) Geneva/ 
Lausanne, (2) Bern/Basel, (3) Zurich/Luzern, (4) St. Gallen, 
(5) Graubunden/Ticino. 
Denmark: Three regions as distinguished by EEC i.e., (1) Greater 
Copenhagen, (2) land east of the Great Belt excluding Greater 
. "', ' Copenhagen, (3) land west of the Great Belt. (Alternative 
groupings based on the islands are also possible and viable). 
Germany: Distribution data was only obtained at Lander level -
therefore the Regierungsbezirke "building blocks" were not 
usable by us, and not researched for groupings more optimal than 
the Lander. As regards the Lander, EEC notes adversely their 
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"heterogeneity and institutional character". Work carried 
out in the Federal Republic of Germany as part of the 
regional development programme aims to divide the land into 
37 functional territorial units. These could, it is thought, 
perhaps form a better basis of statistics than do the existing 
Regierungsbezirke. There is a research requirement in Germany 
to determine the grouping optimal to marketing of Regierungsbezirke 
or of the new functional units ,if and when these are adopted as 
the basis of regional statistics. 
Belgium: The regionalisation in this project of Belgium into 
- approximately the two "language" areas + Brabant is not 
considered entirely satisfactory. 
Finland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Luxembourg~ The first two of 
these countries were analysed only nationally.-The final three 
were not included in the research. ' For the_,purposes of regional--
analysis Luxembourg is a "region". 
Emphasis and Proposed Research Requirement 
The validity of comparative marketing analysis depends on, the homogen-
'- .. , ....... 
eity and relevance to marketing of the regional statistical unit (the 
Trade Region concept of Norway). Statistical series produced in respect 
of regional units that have been researched and agreed as distinctive 
and homogeneous are a main marketing priority. Aggregation of "minor 
region" statistics and do-it-yourself construction of viable market 
territories should not be a necessary pre-requisite of analysis. 
-lll-
• 
4.4 INDICATORS OF~THE MARKET ASPECT: THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
. Since it is argued that indicator construction starts with the precise 
specification of the dependent (e.g. marketing) aspect to be evaluated, 
the availability and comparability of distribution data are considered 
first. The concern is with the comparative measurement of self-service, 
supermarket and hypermarket provision in Europe. Subsequent sections 
have important general marketing relevance. Even in this section, 
however, the types of comparability problems noted are not specific to 
retail distribution. 
4.5.1 The Indicators of Retail Development: Self-Service, Supermarket 
and Hypermarket Provision 
There are problems both of definition and data. 
(1) Self-Service Provision 
The accepted indicator is: "inhabitants per"'-self-service food store". 
These data are obtainable for most West European countries nationally. 
TO.include also non-food self-service stores raises problems of 
definition and measurement. The indicator, however, has historical 
interest only. After approximately 1964, with the growth of the 
larger self-service unit and .the parallel closure of a la~ger number 
of smaller units, it progressively loses its usefulness as a measure 
, , 
of advance. This research has used these data as at 1962 only'~. At 
the intra-national regional level, a similar indicator could no doubt 
be constructed across a range of countries. ,But it is currently 
insensitive. 
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The viable current indicator would be: "self-service food sales as per 
cent of total food sales". This is independent of the ratio of size 
and number but presents considerable problems of comparability and 
measurement. Therefore, a proxy indicator is sometimes attempted: 
"self-service grocery store trade as per cent of total grocery trade". 
Such was computed for 1973 and 1976 by A.C. Nielsen Company'(14), 
but Nielsen's definition of "grocery trade" varies from country to 
country (15) ." The 'areas' cif incompadhility are detailed by Nielsen with 
characteristic thoroughness. It is the starting point for a more 
precise, if difficult to assemble, indicator. We have not attempted to 
construct it. We have accepted that the' supermarket and hypermarket 
indicators are the more significant now. 
(2) Supermarket Provision 
Talking on retailing in general, Jefferys ~as warned: "Many published 
statements pointing to similarities or dissimilarities in retailing ~' 
trends between countries are ~heer, rubbish, as like-is-not being 
compared with like by the authors" (16). This is true of supermarket 
studies. 
" ..... 
The international comparison of supermarket provision raises inter- , 
, 
.' 
related problems of definition and measurement. These concern (1) size" 
(2) assortment and (3) location. 
Size., The "?ccepted" continental minimum size for a supermarket below 
which significant economies of scale, for example, are not likely to 
operate, is 400 square metres selling space. Whether 400 square metres 
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is the optimal minimum current "cut .off" level is arguable. Four 
hundred square metres, it can be maintained, is probably now too low 
and the interesting unit of analysis starts perhaps above this figure 
" 
already in 1982. In a few years' time a 400 square metres criterion 
may no longer generate statistics of interest. But at this moment an 
indicator "inhabitants per supermarket" based on a 400 square metres 
minimum remains, it is generally considered, meaningful. 
Categorising by this basic statistical requirement, however, presents 
problems, at least at regional level, and: ~n some, ,count'ries :.at national 
level. At the national level, however, one can, without access to 
raw data, compare the summary statistics of different international 
and national organisations and investigate differences. (In some cases 
these are substantial). This type of investigation is not assisted by 
the "fine tuning" to suit 'local conditions of national definitions of 
"supermarket", which results in summary statistics produced nationally 
being incomparable. In Denmark and Norway "supermarket" is define<:!-. 
on the basis of assortment range and a minimum turnover requirement 
as in Sweden up to 1975. Generally in the Netherlands the categcr-
isation is a function of assortment only. In the UK and Ireland 
statistics are still compiled based on a 2,000 square feet minimum. 
'" 
" 
The serious problems of data search arise when this analysis is 
attempted at the level of the sub-national region. We have established 
"supermarket" data by region as at January 1973 based on a "400 square 
metres minimum" criterion for all countries of study except 
Switzerland, as is shown in row 1 of Table 4.2. Switzerland presents 
particular problems. 
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Mosi countries stipulate an upper size limit of 2,500 square metres 
beyond which a "supermarket" becomes a unit identifiably different: 
"hypermarket", "superstore", "self-service multiple store", etc. 
German statistics do not recognise a change of status at this particular 
level. 
Assortment. The universe of "supermarkets" from which we will 
eliminate, if by national definition this has not already been done, 
those units of under 400 square metres selling space, is decided in 
most countries on the basis of food assortment offered (with or without 
an additional space or turnover criterion). Most countries stipulate' 
"full range of provisions". Some, for example France, include 
speci fically "fresh meat". Whether such distinctions produce signi fic-
antly different statistics to those based purely on space depends in ' 
the main on the extent of the operations of limited-range discounters. 
In the UK and Ireland the distinction was not important in 1973- and 
/" 
not emphasised in the trade. In Belgium, where both sets of statistics 
are available summarised nationally, the distinction 1S shown as 
significant, and it is significant also in Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland. 
Additionally some countries stipulate specifically that a rtsupermarket" 
be predominantly a food store - with "predominantly" quantified in 
terms of food as per cent of total sales (e.g.,in Austria this minimum 
percentage is 70; in Denmark 80). Although these precentages are 
obviously guidelines only, the approach can be queried. For example, 
the Austrian 1975 operational definitions of the "self-se'rvice" study 
group of OIV include (in summary): 
-.: 
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Supermarket. Self-service. Sales area minimum 400 squa~e metres (no 
maximum limits). Proportion of turnover .of groceries including perish-
abIes, more than 70 per cent. 
Self-Service Centre. Predominantly self-service. Sales area 
1,000-2,500 square metres. Proportion of turnover of groceries less 
than 70 per cent (17). 
German definitions also distinguish at 1,000 square metres. The 
definitions of both countries are influenced by the extent of the 
operations of limited-range discounters. Nevertheless, to take the 
Austrian example, from the "supermarket" universe stores with a full 
range of foods but more than 30 per cent turnover in non-foods have 
"dropped out" as compared with some other European countries. Yet.a' 
store of.·900 square metres with 60 per cent of its turnover in food 
may, probably.will, offer a wider food range than a store of 400 square 
./ 
metres \,/ith a 70 per cent food turnover ratio (60~~ x 900 > 709~ x 400). 
On the other hand many stores in the "self-service centre" category 
would qualify as "supermarkets" in most other countries. The German 
case is similar. 
One can argue with these eliminating definitions (in the previous 
context, both Jefferys and lCA, Sweden, for instance, are, in personal 
discussion of this topic, baffled by the particular significance of 
"fresh" as applied to meat) but the point to be strongly made is that 
our "universe" for indicator construction is bounded, at least in 
national intention, by these definitions.' 
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Row 6 and row 7 in Table 4.2 distinguish between data obtained at the 
regional level where a "full assortment" criterion, however worded, 
has been applied and data obtained based on a size criterion only. 
As regards UK and Ireland, since large-scale limited-assortment 
discount-grocery operations are exceptional, the regional observations 
can probably be compared, without statistical violence, to the regional 
data of.other countries, with the proviso that in this respect they will 
be if anything overstated. 
Location.-- Supermarket provision can yet again be calculated 'in 
alternative ways: 
(1) "free-standing" supermarkets; 
(2) "Free-standing" supermarkets plus supermarkets 400 square 
metres +) in variety and department stores. 
Depending on the aims of the analysis either one of these sets of data 
may be the more useful. In some countries fhe statistical increase 
produced by the more'inclusive concept is considerable. In Italy, for 
example, ·a "free-standing" absolute national total of 550 supermarkets 
(January 1974) is increased by 37 per cent to 756 in the second 
calculation: in the UK, on theother hand, the parallel increase is 
only 2 per cent (18). For most countries the difference is.. significant., 
Ideally we would produce both sets of figures for each country. At 
the obviously more difficult regional level, the extent to'which we 
have been able to do this can be seen in rows 2 and 3 of Table ~~2.' '.' 
~1l7-
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Calculation by selling area. To the extent that, in each country, 
the smaller supermarkets are being closed and replaced by a~l~sser 
number of larger units, so absolute numbers of supermarkets per country 
or region will start to lose significance, and indicators such as 
. "inhabitants per ••• " that are based on absolute numbers in broad 
categories will become obsolescent at lower size levels. 
Therefore the future crucial data will be based on sales area - e.g., 
"inhabitants per supermarket of selling space 800 square metres and 
over" (or 1,000 square metres and over, etc.). Alternatively, with the 
400 square metres minimum. cut off point retained, the calculation can 
become: "Supermarket selling space: square metres per 1,000 inhabitants". 
Countries where we have· been able to calculate these statistics at the 
sub-national level are indicated in rows 4 and 5 of Table 4.2. 
(3) Hypermarket Provision 
The "hypermarket" definition adopted is the International Self-Service 
Organisation OSSO) definition, minus the "car parking" requirement. 
(There is the problem of specifying minimum car park size. Does an· 
adjacent public car park qualify? If so, what is the definition of 
"adjacent "?), Minimum size for inclusion is 2,500 square "metres (UK 
; 
and Ireland 25,000 square feet). We have not distinguished units at .I 
higher levels of space provision. Nor have we specified out-of-town 
• 
or fringe location. The argument for this as part of the criterion 
was never valid. Location is a means to an end (= low cost operation, 
accessibility, parking space). As such it has no necessary place in 
the criterion. Few argue today that it does. (Currently,for instance, 
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Table 4.2 Project: "Socio-economic Influences on Distribution Levels in Western Europe" 
Supermarket and Hypermarket Calculations at Sub-National Region Level 
Austria Belg. Den. Germ. Franc Ire. Italy Neth. Nor. Swede Switz. UK 
, .' 
l. Regional supermarket data 
based on 400 square metres 
minimum calculated + + + + ,+ '+ + + + + + 2. Calculations made exclusive 
of SMS in variety and 
department stores + + + + + + + 
3. Calculations made inclusive N 
of SMS in variety and Ireland 
department stores + + + + + + + + + only 
4. Regional totals of SM 
selling space calculated + + + + + 
5. No. 9f SMs and selling 
I space dissected into size 
.... categories (e.g.800-2,500 
.... 
~ square metres) + + + + + I 
6. Calculations made based on 
SM definition that requires 
"full range" + "minimum 
size" (400 square metres) + + + + + + + + + 
7. Calculations made based on 
"minimum size" (400 square 
metres)' definition only + + + 
8. No. of hypermarkets 
(2,500 square metres+) 
calculated + + + + + + + + + + + 
9. Total selling space of / hypermarkets (2,500 square 
metres+) calculated + .+ + +. + + + + + 
the UK government is encouraging, on the recommendation of the UK 
Distributive Trades Economic Development Committee, the development of 
hypermarkets in in-town derelict areas.) 
"Inhabitants per hypermarket", thus defined, is a meaningful indicator. 
Since average hypermarket size, however, is also relevant, where 
possible we have also calculated: "Hypermarket selling space: square 
metres per 1,000 inhabitants". Countries where at the sub-national level, 
we have been able to provide these two indicators are noted in rows 8 
and 9 of Table 4.2. 
Total hypermarket selling area in a territory combines the factors of 
number and average size - but measures only by ~mplication the extent 
of consumer use. Theoretically, a more precise measure would therefore 
be "sales. in hypermarkets as per cent of total retail sales" - but 
the problems of measurement in constructing such an indicator to be 
internationally comparative (in some countries, in constructing any 
such indicator) are considerable on a national level, and not possible 
by regions, since this latter involves disclosure by companies of sales 
at individual outlets. 
Supermarket . and hypermarket data can obviously be combined'to measure -, 
J 
provision of the self-service unit 400 square metres· and over with no 
top limit. 
Distribution Indicators 
In summary, therefore, at the ~plorative regional level, we have 
attempted to construct for each country the following comparative 
indicators: 
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Group A - Supermarkets (and supermarkets and. hypermarkets) exclusive of 
supermarkets in variety and department stores. 
~(l) Inhabitants per supermarket of: 
(2) Inhabitants per supermarket of: 
(3) Inhabitants per supermarket of: 
(4» Inhabitants per self-service unit 
) 
(5» (supermarket or hypermarkei)of: 
) 
(6» 
(7» Selling space (square metre~)per 
) 
(8» 1,000. inhabitants in supermarkets 
) 
(9» of: 
(10» Selling space (square metres)per 
) 
(11» inhabitants in self~service units 
) 
(12» (supermarket or hypermarket)of: 
400-2,500 square metres: 
800-2,500 square metres 
1,000-2,500 square metres 
( 400 square metres and over 
(-: 
{ 800 square metres and over 
( 
( 1,000 square metres and'over 
( 400-2,500 square metres 
( 
( 800-2,500 square metres 
( 
( 1,000-2,500 square metres 
( 400 square metres and over 
( 
( 800 square metres and over 
( 
r( 1,000 square metres and over 
Group B - Supermarkets (and supermarkets and hypermarkets) inclusive of 
supermarkets in variety and department stores. 
(13) to (24): Dissections as above. 
Group C - Hypermarkets (2,500 square metres - infinity) 
(25) Inhabitants per hypermarket 
<.. 
(26) Hypermarket selling space (square metres) per 1,000 inhabitants. 
Success to date in computing these can be judged from Table 4.2. Full 
analysis needs a full range of indicators, and this can be demonstrated 
by the ~lmost complete reversal of rank-ordering of regions in some 
countries when a different criterion is applied. 
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Emphasis and proposed requirement. Constructing the above regional-
level indicators has necessitated in some countries comprehensive research 
at the most basic level possible - the individual firm or retail unit -
and e.g., for Great Britain, a re-run of 1971 Census of Distribution data 
to produce regional "4,000 square feet minimum" figures as starting-base 
for ,a later-year analysis. Standardisation of basic retailing statistics 
is a pre-requisite of distribution research and comparative analysis. 
Given agreed definitions and resultant comparative statistics, data "fine-
tuned" to local conditions can be provided as supplementary information. 
In this one aspect of its work, the embryonic working party will, if this 
is agreed, attempt to lay the basis for the production of the above 
listed retail statistics (with the addition of others that may <be 
proposed), importantly b y sub-national region, as a comparative yearly 
series. 
4.6 ?OCIO-ECONOMIC, ETC., INDICATORS: THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The problems here are of general marketing relevance. 
Concept: Concentration of Population 
Summary of Hypothesis. The degree of concentration of popuJation and 
urbanisation is an accepted central concern of marketing. The retailing 
argument is that the mass merchandiser needs a mass market: therefore, 
population concentration will stimulate growth of the large retail unit. 
The effect may not be linear: at some point of population concentration, 
the civic problems of such congestion may impose restrictions on retail 
growth, but the working hypothesis of this research was of a linear 
relationship. 
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Measurement 
'(1) Population Density. The accepted measure is: "inhabitants per 
square kilometre of total territory". This is information for specific 
geographical purposes. In marketing it is a more or less meaningless 
statistic. In an extreme example, demographic conditions in England -
, (916 persons per square mile) and Japan (712 persons per square mile) 
appear comparable, thus computed, with less congestion in Japan. The 
realistic picture in Japan is, of course, one of the'most extreme 
congestion, (Tokyo-Osaka) and mountainous areas of extreme emptiness. 
In the less dramatic context of a European study, it is however equally 
meaningless to note, for example, that Switzerland has an overall 
population density of 150 inhabitants per square kilometre. There are 
vast differences between Swiss regions, with some having a negligible 
,population, whilst the extensive Mitteland area (including the cities 
of Zurich, Winterthur, Basel, Biel and Bern) has a density of 325 per 
square kilometre, which is higher than the overall density of the 
populous Netherlands - and with a similar high density around Geneva. 
The demographer Kingsley Davies (19) may maintain regarding overall 
density statistics: "They constitute a part of the basic demographic 
picture in each country; even the deserts of Egypt have significance for 
that country" - but they have no marketing significance. If Libya 
annexed Egypt's share of the Libyan desert tomorrow, population density 
figures would change overnight dramatically: marketing conditions would 
remain precisely the same. 
The arbitrariness of the calculation is obviously reduced at a regional 
level, but still lacks any precision and remains dependent on probably 
historic and probably irrelevant boundaries. 
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The problem is conceptualising an "ideal" alternative. "Inhabitants 
per square kilometre of used land" is a possibility, but the validity 
of the concept and how it should be measured, if accepted, are 
problematic. It is quite clear, however, what the llfi'rst generation" 
indicator should be: this is "inhabitants per square kilometre of 
\ 
inhabitable land". From the total area of "territory" one obviously 
deducts the total area of lakes, forests, mountains, fiords, and other 
i1ninhabitable areas. In Switzerland, 25 per cent of the territory is 
accounted "unproductive" (lakes, mountains); an additional 24 per cent 
is forest. On a conservative definition of "inhabitable" land, the 
quoted population density figure for Switzerland would be approximately 
doubled. The statistic would then begin to have marketing significance -
this is more nearly the density at which the population lives. We have 
constructed indicators for almost all countries both nationally and 
regionally deducting from the denominator "forested areas". Norway 
produces statistics by county both of forested areas and also of areas 
above the tree-line - factors of relevance in Norway. Population 
density and related statistics produced deducting these areas are very 
different to the customary figures - and a step nearer usability. 
Alternatively, on currently available data, we have constructed· 
indicators "inhabitants per square kilometre of agricultur1tl land". 
These can be seen as being very approximate indicators of "used land" 
on the grounds that the land area devoted to urban use is not 
significant in proportion to the total land of a territory of regional 
or national size - given that in structuring our regions for analysis 
we have, as discussed above, amalgamated those statistical units too 
small to be by themselves properly meaningful in an aggregate analysis 
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(that we have, for example, amalgamated the city of Vienna at least into 
Niederosterreich; and are not, for example, considering Basel-Stadt in 
isolation as a usable region). 
All these approaches are only very tentative steps towards the desired 
measurement of "inhabitable land". Given specific research, indicators. 
based on "inhabitable land" could, however, be constructed. Areas of 
water and forest are easily measurable (and currently measured) and 
conceptually without major problem, if "forest" is acceptable as 
"uninhabitable". Mountains are more problematic: specific height above 
sea-level is not self-evidently relevant (not, for example, in 
Switzerland) • 
Arguably the relevant factor is gradient. Aspects of_ "uninhabitability" 
additional to these might be considered relevant to a particular country 
or region and included to produce an accepted statistic. 
There are no inherently major difficulties. EEC, for purposes of 
regional aid, calculate a highly complicated statistic "poor farming 
areas" (zones defavorisees) - calculated separately by each country 
within the boundaries of principal criteria which include: 
; 
I 
- altitude higher than 600-800 metres (according to latitude) ! 
and gradients over 20 per cent for mountain areas. 
- poor land, density of population less than 50 per cent of the 
national average and not exceeding 75 inhabitants per square 
kilometre for agricultural areas threatened with. depopulation (20). 
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\Hthin these broad criteria (and "poor ~and" has a complex set of 
alternative methods of measurement, any or all of which may be applied) 
each member country has submitted its own specifications for and 
locations of its "zones defavorisees". This agriculturally-based 
statistic is not of general marketing significance, but a similar 
formula could be constructed for more general application - and 
disaggregated calculations of height and gradient have already been 
made by EE.c member countries to support recommendations for "zones 
defavorisees". Detailed sets of maps depicting average gradient per 
square kilometre have forinstance been published in 1975 by the 
Commission in respect of the regions of Italy, France, Belgium and 
Luxembourg (21). Similar work on Germany has previously been done in 
1965 by Richter (22). Calculations as precise as in these studies, 
however, are not essential in order to produce usable delimitations of 
areas of "unacceptable" gradient. For other, in particular non-EEC, 
countries a greater degree of approximation would obviously be 
acceptable. 
The research requirement, therefore, is to calculate, and deduct from 
the total territory areas of water,areas of forest, areas with an 
adverse combination of height and gradient, areas of uninh~bitability 
"-due to climatic extremes (as, for example, in part of the north of 
Scandinavia. When, as regards this particular factor, not so to deduct 
becomes ridiculous, this is, of course, already done: no-one has seen a 
population density figure for Denmark that took into account the 
mammoth and uninhabitable former Province of Greenland which dwarfed 
the mother country 51 to one), areas of agreed barren land. One then 
has a base for a population density statistic that has marketing 
relevance. 
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(2) Urbanisation. In addition to population density, marketing 
(obviously retailing) is concerned with the extent of local concentration 
of that population; urbanisation. 
The customary "urban/rural" statistical population split has litte 
significance in Europe -'or certainly not contemporary significance. 
The objections -are two-fold. The first is of measurement, the second 
of concept. 
(a) Measurement 
National definitions of "urban" are idiosyncratic: "urban" is a relative 
term. The United Nations Demographic Yearbook (UNDY) gives statistics 
of "percentage of populations living in urban localities". These are 
based on the following varying definitions: 
Belgium, Austria - communes of 5,000 inhabitants or more. 
France, Denmark, Germany - towns of 2,000 inhabitants +. 
Netherlands - towns of 2,000 inhabitants + (mainly). 
Switzerland - communes of 10,000 inhabitants + 
England and Wales - "urban areas" • 
. Finland - ·"urban communes" . 
. Norway - "town municipalities". 
Spain - towns of 10,000 inhabitants +. 
Sweden - towns of 200 inhabitants +. 
Kingsley Davis (1969) in his production of "urban" versus "rural" 
population figures for all countries cites the national definitions of 
"urban" he has respectively used. Three are quoted here simply as an 
example of the differences that exist. Thus: 
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Italy. Urban definition: communes with less than 50 per cent of 
the economically active population engaged in agriculture. (The 
smallest was estimated as having 27,800 inhabitants in 1960). 
Netherlands. Urban definition: municipalities with a cluster 
of 5,000 inhabitants +, and municipalities with no more than 
20 per cent of the economically active males engaged in 
agriculture. 
Ireland. Urban definition: cities and towns, including suburbs, 
of 1,500 inhabitants +. 
Davis justifies well the comparisons he has made on a world wide basis 
using such disparate data, but, when comparing countries of approximately 
similar economic development such as in Europe, such statistics have 
limited comparative value. 
(b) Concept. The attempt to measure "urban" versus IIrural" habitation 
in mid-century Europe can be strongly criticised on conceptual grounds, 
in conditions of ever-expanding average commuter distance. The trend is 
shown in Figure 4~3 as regards the major UK conurbations, and could be 
replicated in most countries in Europe. 
On such grounds Evers1ey (23) surmised in 1975 that the "rural" 
population of England and Wales might rise by the year 2001 to 28 per 
cent of total population as compared with a figure then of 23 per cent. 
Much of this population, however, will not be rural in the sense that 
its behaviour patterns are rural. The bulk of that 28 per cent will be 
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Figure 4.3 Where People Live in Comparison with their Workplaces: 
Connurbations in England. 
% Change 1966-71 living in ~ and outside Conurbation ~ 
Working in 
Conurbations 
! 
GREATER LONDON 
WEST MIDLANDS 
SE. LANCASHIRE 
MERSEYSiDE 
WEST YORKSHIRE 
TYNESIDE 
15 
• ~ Decrease .: Increase--.. 
_1+ I . 
.10 5 o 5 10 
Source: Population Trends 1976 
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"urban-oriented" - and conceptually this is the factor to be currently 
measure~, certainly so in a marketing analysis. A United Nations report 
(24) has aid: 
"Ruralism as either life style or source of livelihood is still 
a substantial component of Europe's social scene but the time 
when it will give way almost entirely to urban-type systems 
appears not far distant ••• Europe as a whole and all its major 
regions are rapidly approaching a stage of almost total urban-
isation, if not in residential patterns as such, then at least 
in socio-economic functional terms". 
The basic measurement of the factor urban-oriented - or, as the UN report 
phrases it, of urbanism 'hot' in residential patterns as such" but "in socio-
economic functional terms" - is proposed in our study to be the proxy 
negative measurement "employment in agriculture, forestry and fishing 
as a percentage of total employment", which is constructable without 
great difficulty both at national and regional level. In some countries, 
as we have seen in the examples above, the lowness of the level of 
agricultural employment provides, in fact, the criterion for the category 
"urban", or part of the cirterion; and if, as Kinglsey Davis argues, the 
definition "urban" necessarily varies as between nations that are 
primarily agricultural and those that are primarily industrial, then it 
seems more logical to measure that level of agricultural employment, 
"-
directly. And such statistics are then comparative. Additionally today. 
they more accurately indicate consumer behaviour patterns than does the 
attempted measurement of place of habitation. Additionally they do not 
give rise to the yet further objection levied agains "urban/rural" 
statistics, an objection that Davis never properly counters, that they 
force into a dichotomy what is essentially a continuum. 
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Howeyer, the indicator above, conceptually preferable though it is, 
subsumes the element of unpaid family employment. This weights in 
~artic(Jlar the "employed in agriculture" part of the calculation. 
This is unsatisfactory in the indication of relative life style. (The-
question is further discussed in the "female emancipation" context below). 
Additionally, therefore, we have constructed "percentage of wage earners 
-, 
and salaried employees employed in agriculture- etc.". Ob~iously, however, 
such an indicator, useful for specific purposes, discounts self-employment. 
Methodologically the best all-round indicator of this factor therefore 
is "percentage heads of households employed in agriculture etc.". This 
we have been able to compile at regioQal level, but with some gaps in 
the data. All these indicators, however, we have found predictive in a 
way that attempted "urban/rural" measures are not. An alternative 
approach by calculating-"percentage of GDP derived from agriculture" is 
also satisfactory. 
The relative size of the concentrations of population remains, 'howev~r, 
important. Therefore the following indicators of local concentration 
must be attempted: "percentage ~f total population living in towns of 
(indicator 1) 10,000, (2) 20,000, (3) 30,000, (4) 40,000, (5) 50,000, 
(6) 100,000, (7) 250,000 inhabitants or more". The precentages thus 
produced are only crudely indicative. The problems are: 
(a) The necessary use of discrete intervals. At the higher end of 
the scale, where candidate towns are comparatively few, a small 
increase in population can project a town from, e.g., the 
"50,000 +" category to the "100,000 +" category, and dramatically 
affect the top percentage (as, for example, in Belgium, circa 
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1970). Using the whole range .of the scale, however, comparisons 
can be made. But: 
(b) "Towns" are defined on the basis of historic civic boundaries: 
these boundaries usually no longer represent the urban reality. 
The desirable measurement is "urban agglomeration". This can be, 
and is, assessed in various ways. (For example, the Larry Smith 
Consulting 1961-62 estimates of metropolitan areas in Europe, 
based mainly on catchment area studies, are remarkably predictive 
of Kingsley Davis' "urban agglomeration" estimates for 1970). It 
is possible, in respect of some countries, to produce usefully 
comparative figures of percentage habitation by "agglomeration" 
regionally and nationally. UNDY gives partial coverage of base 
data. Essentially one is trying to construct the following 
comparative indicators: "percentage of population living in urban 
agglomerations of (indicator l} 100,000, (indicator 2) 250,000 
/ 
inhabitants or more" or at higher or lower-levels as appropriate-. 
The need is for definitional agreement on, and measurement of, 
"urban agglomeration" regardless of civic boundary. 
Urban concentrations can be further distinguished. As regards "green-
" . "'-field" retailing, for example, Smith has emphasised that: "A factor of 
the utmost importance in relation to the growth of out-of-town shopping 
faciIi ties in France is the physical fabric of existing urban settlements. 
In general, French towns are compact, nucleated settlements in which 
urban sprawl, characteristic of inter-war Britain, is largely absent"(25). 
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The following proposition is perhaps crucial. There is a vast 
difference in, e.g., shopping behaviour and retail site location between 
"walled cities" (cities that come to an abrupt boundary end, character-
ised by flat accommodation and high density living, such as are 
characteristic of Southern European countries) and "house and garden" 
cities diffused over large areas, as for example, in the United Kingdom. 
The debt for the concept as such, as far as this project was concerned, 
is to Mark Norton, Vice President Larry Smith Consulting, who, in 
discussing this topic, emphatically insisted always on the importance 
of this distinction. A range of indicators to express the factor 
"density of population in urban agglomerations" should be central to 
comparative marketing analysis. The calculation would be: 
Populations in urban agglomerations 
Area of urban agglomeration 
/ 
to produce (e.g.), the indicator: '~nhabitants per square kilometre 
of urban agglomerations of 100,000 inhabitants or more". This can be 
related statistically to percentage of total population in the 
agglomeration category (by regression, AID, etc.) to produce, for 
example, a proposition such as the following: given that ~O per cent 
" 
live in agglomerations of 100,000 inhabitants, then the crucial factor / 
is perhaps density of population in those agglomeration areas - and 
the subjective and unquantified opinion of Mark Norton is that it 
almost certainly is. 
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Emphasis and Proposed Requirement 
Production of agreed definitions of the following base data is essential 
to enable the construction of commercially useful demographic indicators: 
(a)· area of "uninhabitable territory", 
(iJ) number of inhabitants in defined "urban agglomerations" 
(not "towns"), 
(c) area of each "agglomeration". 
4.7 CONCEPT: CAR·'OWNERSHIP AND ROAD CONGESTION 
Summary of hypothesis 
(1) The car ownership hypothesis is uncomplicated: one-stop shopping 
depends on car ownership. The relationship is hypothesised as positive 
and linear in respect of the supermarket and hypermarket. (2) The 
road congestion hypothesis is that town centre congestion is a factor in 
out-of-town or "fringe" retail location, therefore a stimulant to e.g._, 
hypermarket growth, and that development of the hypermarket and large 
off-centre supermarket unit is most likely in conditions of high in-town 
congestion. The proposition has unquantified support. It is not 
proposed that road congestion affects "self-service" adoption or the 
development of the smaller supermarkets. 
Measurement 
(1) Car ownership presents few problems. Car/road indicator 1 "cars 
per 1,000 inhabitants" is construct able without difficulty both 
nationally and regionally. The dating of the indicator requires thought. 
As regards hypermarketing, it takes time to build a hypermarket. A 
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car provision indicator dated concurrently with the hypermarket 
indicator might not therefore be optimal. In the regional analyses 
three dates for the "cars per 1,000 inhabitants" indicators were used: 
1966, 1970 and 1973. 
An alternative indicator "Percentage of households owning at least one 
car" might appear preferable. One such indicator is constructed in the 
national analysis for comparison pruposes. Reference, however, can be 
made to the British case in Table 4.3. The pattern of this table can 
be paralleled in all other European countries. 
Table 4.3 
Type of household Ordinary Old* 
Two Adults 4+ children 61 
" " 3 children 73 
/ , 
" " 2 children 77 
" " 1 child 72 
Two Adults only 66 30 
One Man 41 19 
All 54 
'-
*Over 65 or 60. 
SOURCE: Family Expenditure Survey Table 56. 
The overall national figure of 54 per cent for households owning a car 
seriously understates the percentage of the population on behalf of whom 
car-shopping is conducted. The predominant disadvantaged groups as 
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regards car-ownership are the single-person households and in particular, 
the old./,'a "fac~r w!licD is reflected in the low patronage figures for 
these groups in every hypermarket study. A "cars per 1,000 inhabitants" , 
statistic more accurately reflects the weight of shopping as related to 
car-ownership. For households accounting for the bulk of total retail 
sales, certainly the bulk of food sales, the realiBtic car-ownership per 
household figure is over 70 per cent. 'A "cars per 1,000 inhabitants" 
figure does, of course, double-count, or treble-count, households with 
more than one car. Only 9 per cent of households were, however, in this 
category in 1973 (26). Any overstatement in this respect is considerably 
less than the effective understatement inherent in the adoption of a 
"household" basis for this range of indicators. And, of course, if 
housewives: who have themselves the exclusive use of a car are, in actual' 
fact, more prone to shop by car than housewives in single-car households, 
then there is no overstatement, or minimal overstatement', in the use of 
a "cars per 1,000 inhabitants" indicator to quantify the concept of 
,/ 
car-ownership as affecting retail potential. 
(2) Precise and generally applicable indicators of road congestion 
are difficult to construct. ,The road congestion calculation suggested 
as optimal above is virtually impossible on currently available 
statistics. It requires (a) urban traffic volume, (b) n~n-uLban 
traffic volume. Where, as in UK, indicative national figures for these 
factors are produced they are based on occasional sample counts and 
the statisticians concerned give them nil comparative value. 
As proxy, we can attempt to measure the overall car/road/inhabitant 
relationship. :q-he hypothesis above is lost. 
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At national level, comparative figures of total traffic volume are 
obtainable. Experimental indicators would be: 
Car/Road indicator 2 (proposed): 
Total traffic volume 
Road density (kilometres of road per square kilometres of inhabitable land) 
or: Car/Road indicator 3 (proposed): 
Road density (definition as above) 
Traffic per kilometre of road 
These have been calculated at national level, using "total territory" 
in place of "inhabitable land". As such they appear useful where 
overall population densities are similar. Comparative use depends on 
the realistic definition and measurement of "inhabitable land". At 
regional level "traffic volume" is not obtainable. 
"Motor vehicles per kilometre of road" is inferior to these sub-optimal 
calculations to the extent that the ratio of vehicle-usage to vehicle-
ownership differs between regions. However,/the guality of the road 
networks also differs obviously between areas. If_at a point in time 
"motor vehicles per kilometre of road" over a mile of motorway 
equalled 100, t~at could represent traffic moving with freedom. The 
similar figure produced in respect of a country lane would indicate 
absolute road congestion. In the context of supermarket dev~lopment, 
Gosling and Maitland describe the comparative development of motorways 
in Europe particularly since the war, noting that by 1974, for example, 
Germany had a Reichsautobahnen network of 2,500 miles, a quarter 
of the European total, and conclude: 
<. . ~ \ 
, ; ~ ; :, . 
, :' ,'" 
".:' \, ; , 
"The implications of these intensifying nets .of national 
and regional highways for the urban structure and in 
particular for its retailing element were enormous. At 
the same time as car-ownership made the concentration 
points on the old routes increasingly congested, large 
cheap sites on the outside of the cities were made highly 
accessible" (27). 
The statistic generally quoted in international comparisons of road 
provision, "motor vehicles per kilometre of road", is irrelevant as 
indicating this aspect. The provision of highways designed to produce 
traffic mobility outside the congested cities and towns is proposed in 
this thesis as a significant factor specifically in hypermarket 
development. Indicators based purely on road provision are obviously 
inadequate. A relevant range of indicators is constructed in the 
regional analysis by including in this all the "national" and "regional" 
roads (the trunk roads and principal roads in UK terminology) in the ' 
different regions. Using this base the following regional indicators 
were constructed: 
/ 
"Kilometres of road (minus minor roads) per kilometre 
of territory 1973". 
"Motor vehicles per kilometre of road (minus minor roads) 
1973" • 
"Kilometres of road (minus minor roads) per 1,000 
population, 1973". 
The most indicative indicator is the first of these. For comparative 
purposes, similar indicators were constructed on an "all roads" basis. 
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The limitations of the usefulness of these indicators need to be 
emphasised. All these indicators are affected by the fact, discussed 
in section 4.6, that total land area cannot ,necessarily indicate land 
in general use by the population. In Northern Scandinavia (Norway, 
Finland and Sweden) as a prime example, such road provision statistics 
are "uilrepresentative" in the context of this thesis in those parts of 
these countries where the majority of road is only for long-haul use 
and traverses countryside that is not "in general use". A calculation 
based on "inhabitable land" would improve their statistical relevance. 
One based on "generally used .land" would produce comparative road 
provision statistics that are properly usable for marketing purposes 
other than transport calculations. 
The lack of usable measurements of "land in use" obviously affects 
directly the indicators of "kilometres of road per kilometre of 
territory". Indirectly, however, it affects the other two sets of 
-/ 
indicators. Even in the most isolated sub-regions of a coontry, a 
minimum level of road provision is required. Where there are extensive 
areas of largely uninhabited land, road provision proportionate to 
popUlation will be greater than normal, as also will road provision 
proportionate to vehicle ownership. This is illustrated in columns 
" 1, 2,4 and 5 of Table 4.4 in'the case of the "trade regions" of 
Norway. 
For climatic reasons Norway becomes distinctly less inhabitable and less 
inhabited going from south to north. Where, progressively towards the 
north, the land is progressively unused road provision is disproportionate 
to population and therefore also vehicle ownership. This is to say, as 
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Table 4.4 Comparative Road Provision in the Trade Regions of Norway 
MVS per km Road Kms Road per 1,000 population· 
Norway All Major Hard- All Major Hard-
roads roads surfaced roads roads surfaced 
--
North 7 13 112 32 16 2 
Central 11 22 85 24 12 3 
S.W. 13 36 72 17 6 3 
S.E. 24 42 70 15 7 4 
SOURCE: calculated from Trade Region -data. 
a statistic of the provision of roads that are used in everyday life 
it is overstated. The Swedish case is similar; and, ·though Finland is 
not studied in· the regional analysis, the same relationship would be 
found there also. 
In this context, the definition of "road" is itself not beyond argument. 
Statistical comparability is problematic. Some statistics are 
irreconcilable (International Road Federation versus EEC versus 
national). The problem is the definitional inclusivity ~f "road". 
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 4.4 indicate this. When a "hard-surfaced" 
./ 
criterion is applied in the measurement of the roads, the rank-ordering 
of the Norwegian regions is exactly reversed. Hard-surfaced roads are 
exceptional in Norway - particulary so, however, towards the north. 
This definitional problem affects ir. particular all three Northern 
Scandinavian countries, but also, to a lesser degree, many of the other 
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countries. In the countries studied the percentage of all roads that 
were hard-surfaced was as follows in 1973 (28) (the figure for France 
was not obtainable): 
100 per cent: Austria, Great Britain, Netherlands 
90-95 per cent: Denmark (94), Italy (93) 
85 per cent: Germany, Ireland 
80 per cent: Belgium (82), Spain (79) 
50 per cent: Sweden 
Below 50 per cent: Finland (40), Norway (20) 
In all of the last three countries the percentage of hard-surfaced roads 
decreases in the less habitable north. It was therefore considered 
whether a "hard-surfaced" criterion would be a preferable one. It 
might, it was thought, represent road provision as related to land in 
use more realistically. On investigation it was not thought logical 
./ 
to apply such a criterion. It would seriously distort the statistics, 
in particular those of these three countries, in the opposite direction 
to the bias already noted. 
Emphasis and proposed requirement 
", 
Debate on concept and optimal versus practical comparative measurement ! 
of road congestion is required. 
4.8 CONCEPT: PROSPERITY 
The hypothesis that the level of individual "prosperity in a nation 
is related to marketing advance is almost universally accepted. 
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In the M.S.l study, the indicator "Gross national product per capita" 
was chosen by more "experts on comparative marketing" than any other 
indicator as having "the most direct and significant bearing on the 
marketing system in a given country" (29). Duncan has itemised 
"expansion in total personal income and in disposable income and, the 
redistribution of income" as important forces affecting distribution (30). 
Cundiff has related economic advance to the rate of development of 
self-service (31). On the specific issure of the growth of supermarkets, 
both Carvat (32) and Markin (33) have listed changes in personal 
disposable income as a factor affecting growth despite the fact that 
the obverse of what is implied in that statement was what led to the 
original introduction of the supermarket in the USA in the form of 
the "cheapies" in the depression years. The paradox inherent in this 
is discussed in Chapter 9 in the context of the hypermarket. Gosling 
and Maitland (27) have related hypermarket growth to the growth in 
personal incomes. In this respect, in personal discussion in Paris 
/' 
in 1975, a Carrefour director gave high disposable income as the 
decisive factor in the selection of sites for overseas and internal 
expansion - in which respect, he stated at that time, they would 
quite happily have moved out of Spain. And it can be noted, as regards 
this policy, that in 1978 Carrefour, in fact, demolished a store in 
the low-income Paris suburb of Creteil. 
Measurement 
The factor to be measured is the "average relative prosperity of, 
individuals". Conventionally accepted indicators are: 
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Prosperity indicator 1: "Gross National Product per capita" - considered 
by the MS! as the best indicator for marketing 
comparison. 
Prosperity indicator 2: "Gross Domestic Product per capita" - or j.-:since 
GDP per intra-national region is a virtually 
impossible calculation: "Gross Value Added 
per capita". 
Prosperity indicator 3: "Gross Disposable Income of Households per 
- -capita". 
Prosperity indicator 4: "Final Consumption of Households per capita". 
The concern of this paper is not with any inherent incomparability in 
alternative methods of compiling these statistics, though these 
- incomparabilities exi~t even in so-called comparati ve._ statistics. 
"Consumption of households", for instance, can mean consumption anywhere 
by households resident in the territory or it can mean consumption,in 
./ 
the territory of households resident anywhere. Even EEC countries a~~ 
calculated differently in this respect in the SOEC regional analyses; 
and the difference in a regional analysis can be significant. Nor is 
the concern with the difficulties of deriving a realistic figure of, 
for example, "Gross disposable income per capita" in conditions of an 
"underground economy" running in the UK at an estimated 7~'·per cent of 
Gross Domestic Product (or something over £11 billion in the 1978-79 
financial year), and in Italy, where significantly it is known as the 
"parallel economy", at nothing less than an estimated astronomical 
20 per cent of GNP(34). These are distorting factors. The objection 
that invalidates this entire range of prosperity statistics for trans-
national comparisons of any precision at all is that at present these 
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statistics, if used comparatively, are calculated on the basis of 
exchange rates (= to a large extent, "the political prices of currencies"). 
The real value of a nation's currency is what that currency can actually 
buy within national boundaries. There is invariably a difference between 
. this real value and the value computed on an exchange-rate basis - as 
the plane loads in recent years (up to the strengthening of the pound) 
of continental shoppers bound for London testified. 
This difference is in many cases far from marginal. A report by the 
United National/World Bank (35) has shown that the real GDP of develop-
ing countries in particular is grossly understated if calculated on the 
basis of exchange rates. The real GDP of Kenya, for example, (i.e., 
GDP expressed in terms of internal purchasing power) is three times the 
value shown in an exchange-rate conversion. The report further notes: 
"The unsatisfactory nature of exchange-rate conversions has 
become even clearer in thepast few years under the new regime 
of managed-floating rates. Changes in exchange rates of as 
much as 20 per cent within the space of a year have not been 
unusual even among major currencies. Exchange-rate conversions 
--- thus sometimes show substantial changes in relative gross 
- domestic products between pairs of countries when no such real 
change has actually occurred". 
Customary spasmodic or periodic "shopping basket" comparisons are of 
little value in amending, even subjectively~ basic prosperity statistics? 
in view of the arbitrary goods-and-service content of different 
"shopping baskets". There is little relationship between such 
comparisons produced by different sources - not, for example, between 
the surveys for 1974 conducted by the US State Department, Business 
Week, the Union Bank of Switzerland (mid-1973) and The Financial Times. 
Figures from these surveys where they can be compared are gi~en" 
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Table 4.5 International "Indicators" of Cost of Living: 1974 
(Exclusive of Housing and Education Costs) 
Source: Source: A. Business Week Survey 1974 
US State B. The Financial Times Survey 
Department' 2 C. 3Union Bank of ~witzerland - m~d-1973 1974 Food Clothing Car use Hotel 
Total l A B C A B A A B C Index $ $ Index $ $ $ $ $ Index 
Stockholm. 163 100 50 110 256 221 32 38 37 90 
Tokyo 159 130 31 99 303 474 40 40 39.5 95 
Paris 140 95 26 83 297 280 34 60 65 116 
Moscow 139 130 36 311 30 50 50 
Brussels 133 83 39 73 283 359 27 48 50 112 
Milan 120 115 78 260 - 25 30 120 
Madrid 116 163 66 215 27 33 56 
Sao Paul0 115 110 221 30 45 
London 107 100 26 60 330 181 31 46 53 131 
Washington 100 25 248 46 
New York 80 26 78 258 293 21 50 56 130 
(1) Washington = lOO, 
(2) A: Weekly food bill for family of four., B: Food basket. C: Standard shopping basket. 
(3) A: Coat of good business suit" shirt, tie and pair of shoes. B: As A, less tie· 
(4) Ten gallons of petrol, plus parking for five days. 
Evening 
A B 
$ $ 
50 183 
70 158 
55 188 
40 108 
45 142 
35 
35 
35 
45 76 
145 
45 179 
(5) A: Daily rate of double Doom in first class hotel. B: Single room with bath in Hilton type hotel. 
C: Double hotel room with bath and breakfast. 
out6 
C 
Index 
71 
95 
100 
112 
103 
47 
75 
130 
(6) A: Drinks and dinner for two. B: Drinks and dinner for four, theatre tickets and taxi for five miles. 
C: Meal in restaurant (without drinks). 
-"- ... ~. 
q 
in Table 4.5. The relative rankings variously produced are disturbingly 
different. Additionally the variously computed rankings have changed 
with bewildering frequency - bewildering certainly to overseas 
executives of home-based companies to whom the relative weight of their 
local cost of living supplement is invariably computed on "some formula 
bordering on magic that none of us understands" (36). 
All the comparisons quoted above use "shopping basket" methods of 
calculation. An international "shopping bag" comparison, employed to 
measure purchasing power of the native population, that does not weight 
or vary the contents of the basket according to national consumption 
habit must be inaccurate, to a greater or less extent. From the global 
picture presented in Figure 4.4, it can be seen, for instance, that 
"average" protein intake by the inhabitants of the United States closely 
parallels that of Western Europe - but that the parallel does not 
extend to the kinds of food by .. means of which this amount of protein is 
received. Table 4.6 suggests that this type of difference is signific-
ant also internally in Europe. 
The only valid method of comparing living standards as between countries 
must be as the EEC Commission maintains (37),by calculation of 
"\ 
"consumer purchasing power based on the consumption pattern of each 
~ountry examined carried out on similar lines in all the countries 
examined". This type of "massive investigation" was undertaken by 
the Community for the original Six, and extended in 1973 to include 
the three new members. 
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Figure 4.4 Protein and Caloric Intake by World Region 
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Table 4.6 Consumption of Main Foodstuffs, kilograms per head per year (1969-70) 
....... 
E "'0 
co Q) 
Q) C 
~ .r-! 
(J r-i "-Q) Q) 
"Cl C ~ (I) 
c· r-i ' .r-! ~ Q) 
, (I) co Q) ~ ~ 0 
C r-i (I) Q) co ~ .j.J 
.r-! Q) .j.J, ..c .::t. Q) +l 01 (I) co co 
co (J co (I) r-i Q) .j.J ~' 01 01 .j.J 
~ .r-! Q) .r-! .r-! ..c ::J co 01 ::J 0 
t:) a:: ::E 't...., ::E U OJ ::E W (J') Cl.. 
Belgium/Luxembourg 79 1 67 12 81 8 a 13 14 39 . 117 ' 
France 78 2 85 ,14 97 14 8 3 14 34 96 
Germany 66 1 73 10 78 9 7 9 16 32 102 
Italy 127 2 48 11 65 10 2 0 11 27 45 
NetherlClnds 65 2, 51 10 114 8 2 19 13 46 93 
UK 73. 2 73 9 143 5 7 4 15 45 98 
Norway 69 2 42 n.a 176 n.a 5 n.a 10 42 97 
Denmark 68 1 62 n.a 121 n.a 8 n.a 11 48 79 
Ireland 93 1 81 ' n.a 213 n.a 10 n.a 14 51 126 
USA 62 4 110 5 126 7 2 4 18 45 41 
\ 
(1) 1968-1969. . . (2) Fresh fruit only. (3) Litres per head per year. 
SOURCE: SOEC" ' 
/' 
c 
(I) 
Q) 
r-i 
.0 
co N 
.j.J +l 1"'\ Q) .r-! Q) 
01 ::J C 
Q) ~ .r-! 
> t.... 3: 
87 66 12 
131 88 108, 
65 112 16 
170 109 115 
81 85 1 
62 45 (4) 
33 n.a n.a 
42 n.a n.a 
60 n.a n.a 
92 56 n.a 
A major survey was carried out in Autumn 1975. Seven hundred and 
five goods or service items were priced. The "goods" items were 
priced in different types of retail outlets (department store, 
hypermarket, market stall etc.) and the prices weighted relative 
to the share of trade of each particular item in each type of 
outlet. Purchasing Power Parities (the ratios of the average 
prices of an identical item) were then calculated for each of 
the 705 items - and overall par,ities then. obtained "by combining 
these basic item parities together using weights proportional 
to the corresponding household consumption expenditure in each 
state" (38). The end product was a set of indices ,to convert 
into real terms the [SA's "final consumption of households" -
and therefore also related indicators. (CPPPs were calculated, 
by these means, without "rents" and health costs" for the Nine 
as at 1975 - and including "rents but without "health costs" 
for the -original Six as at 1975 and 1972). ---They provide deflator 
indices with which to adjust comparative "prosperity" indicators 
that are calculated on a current exchange rate basis. 
They are approximate. In view of the amount of work involved 
the price comparisons were made in capital cities only. 
Nevertheless, they provide a means of adjusting the relevant 
statistics much nearer to reality (39)-. 
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SOEC has recently provided us, for our research but not for publication, 
with provisional Purchasing Power Parities for GDP, for years 1970 to 
1975, for the EEC Nine. The difference between national comparisons 
based on current exchange rate and those based on purchasing power can 
be seen in Table 4.7. 
It can be seen that the rank-order, for example, of the 1973 leaders, 
Germany and Denmark, changes, and their comparative "prosperity" 
drastically. The relative standing of the United Kingdom is seen very 
. 
aifferently when computed on the basis of-purchasing power. The right 
hand column is the realistic comparison. 
If sub-national EEC regions are being compared internationally, the 
"prosperity" statistics for each region can be adjusted by applying the 
national CPPP deflators. The changes thus produced in international 
ranking of regions can be dramatic - but this obviously takes ,no 
account of regional differences in cost of living internally in each __ 
nation, such as are recognised at a rudimentary level in capital city 
cost-of-living allowances. 
Parallel to the EEC programme; work on broadly similar lines has been 
.., 
anc is being carried out by the United Nations & World Bank'International 
Comparison Project (1CP). Phase I of this project produced purchasing 
power comparisons for ten countries. Three Western European countries 
were included: Germany, France and Italy (40). Phase 11 of the project 
enlarged the sample to sixteen; and the European repres~ntation was 
increased by the addition of Belgium and the Netherlands •. The bench-
mark date was 1973, and extrapolations of the results were made up to 
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, table 4.7 Gross Domestic Product Comparisons: EEC Exchange Rate versus Purchasing Power 1973 
GDP at Purchas~rs' Value per capita 1973 
In Amended GDP per capita in UK as % of 
100 Rank for Rank GDP per capita in the other countries 
US $ Purchasing 3 (1) Power (2) BY $ By purchasing power ( ) 
Germany ~:," 56 1 37 2 55 78 
Denmark 54 2 45 1 57 64 
France 48 3 34 3 65 85 
Belgium 47 4 33 4 66 88 
I Netherlands 44 5 33 4 70 88 f-J 
\J1 UK 31 6 29 6 
..... 
I Italy 25 7 22 7 124 132 
Ireland 21 8 19 8 148 153 
\, 
United Nations Statistical Yearbook.' 
This calculation via t~e dollar using SOEC PP Ps is approximately valid. 
Calculated as in Column 2. 
----~ 
\ 
\ 
1975 (35). Phase Ill, estimated to be completed in 1979 but upon which 
work was still in progress at the'time of writing this paper, includes 
-a comparative analysis of more than thirty countries, with a 1975 
reference date. All nine EEC members are included (basically, it seems 
using EEC 1975 data) and also Austria and Spain. Thus,:in particular if 
the ICP programme is continued into Phase IV and beyond, we have the means 
to obtain quantified purchasing power deflators for GDP and other "prosper-
ity" statistics for eleven Western European countries. These will be 
on an annual basis, since the ICP intends to carry out the benchmark 
studies every five years and to extrapolate to intervening years. Among 
our Western European universe, this leaves Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
-Switzerland and Portugal excluded from this type of ~omparison. However, 
the ICP researchers declared one of their objectives to be that of finding 
a way to make approximate comparisons for the countries "that cannot be 
accorded the full ICP treatment". 
/' 
In 1980 they published tables of "real gross domestic product" for 119 
- countries of the world, including all Western European countries, for 
the years 1950 and 1960 through to 1977 (41). These were based on a 
detailed examination o~ the 1970 price structures of sixteen of the 
'countries previously studied in depth. "Real gross domest~c productll 
' ..... 
was found to vary in a systematic way with nominal GDP. Based on these 
quantified relationships, figures for RGDP (Il real GDp ll ) were calculated 
- for the 103 countries in which no fieldwork or detailed study had been 
carried out. They are approximate. Ho~ever, Il alternative entries 
developed from simple exchange rate conversions will be subject to a 
much wider degree of inaccuracy". At least approximate adjustment to 
Ilprosperity" statistics is therefore now possible right across a 
European analysis currently up to the year 1977. 
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In the work for this thesis, the ICP calculations were received too late 
to be able to be used as amending relevant- "prosperity" indicators. The 
main indicators in this series are based on exchange rate conversions. 
However, in each case alternative indicators calculated in terms of 
purchasing power have been constructed in respect of the eight EEC 
countries and of the regions of these countries, using the EEC 
purchasing power deflators. These are an input to the correlation 
analysis. 
Aggregation 
A secondary, and considerably minor, objection to aggregate "prosperity" 
statistics is that "GDP (etc.) per capita" is a mean not a median. 
Such Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients of income distribution as have 
been produced for Wes~ern European countries (as for. example, for 
selected countries, by the United Nations 1967, Klein 1973, Stark 1977) 
show enough, although not major, differences to prevent us offering 
"comparability of error" as justification for considering such statistics 
properly comparative.· But the difficulties in conceptualising and 
measuring income inequality are notorious. The OECD Working Party on 
Social Indicators had originally agreed in principle on an indicator 
"Gini coefficient of the distribution of disposable income and wealth" 
(42), but subsequently decided it was essential to produc;~n parallel 
a range of alternatives to the Gini coefficient, since these alternative~ 
calculations could result in different conclusions (43). Stark (1977 
(44) recommends that the Gini coefficients he has himself produced are 
not used quantitatively. Gini and similar coefficients,if ever system-
atically provided, will be marketing indicators - not useful, however, 
to amend aggregate statistics. They will be supplementary information. 
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Emphasis and Proposed Requirement 
A Marketing Indicators Working. Party would, as priority, affirm the 
critical importance of the production, both by nation and region, of 
the type of exchange-rate deflators methodologically pioneered by SOEC 
and the United Nations/World Bank ICP Programme. 
4.9 CONCEPT: FEMALE EMANCIPATION 
The phenomenon of female. emancipation is intuitively monitored by almost 
every marketing practitioner. 
In the United Kingdom a hundred years ago the average female grew up, 
worked for a few years, married at 22, had twelve pregnancies, produced 
six children, reared six children, died at 42 (45). Working-class 
women particularly~ "sacrificed themselves for the sake of their 
husbands and children" in a short life of "monotony, loneliness, 
discouragement and sordid hard work". Today a woman of 42 has brought 
up her '''two and a half children" and has already set out on a new li fe 
of work, with thirty years of life ahead of her. Children may not even 
seriously interrupt a working life. In Sweden in 1976, 62 per cent of 
women with children under seven years old went out to work. The 
parallel statistic seven years before this was only 38 pei'·,cent. -This 
progression is such that, in the UK in 1977, four out of 10 adults 
thought a marriage where the husband looks after the children and the 
wife goes out to work could be very happy; and only two out of 10 have 
anything against it. Three years previously the latter ratio was one 
in three (46). Under the continuing impact of birth control, higher 
living standards, more and more labour-saving and food preserving 
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devices, improved education, the consequent advance in -legal, political, 
social and job-opportunity rights, the change in role and status of 
women continues to be revolutionary. "This is a new situation in the 
entire history of mankind" (47), and is recognised as such almost 
universally, and certainly by mar~eting - except statistically. 
Measurement 
(1) The Working Wife. It is generally accepted that the emergent 
phenomenon of the "working" housewife affects the form of marketing 
development:. In our specific context .it is an important factor motivating 
self-service and one-stop shopping. Comparative measurement at national 
level can be tentatively approached, but the measurement at regional 
-level, other than partially, can only be in an elementary form. 
Two "ideal" indicators were postulated. These were: (1) "Housewives in 
paid employment as a percentage of all housewives of work~ng age"; 
(2) (sub-aspect indicator) "housewives who are in paid employment and 
who have children under (e.g.,) 15 years of age as a percentage. of _all 
housewives who have children under (e.g.,) 15 years of age". 
Indicator (1) was proposed as the short-term indicator aim •. Indicator 
(2) was obviously a long-term ambition; no comparati~e indicator can be 
currently constructed even approaching such a measurement. "First 
generation" indicators were then sought most nearly approximating to 
the ideal in the short term of the optimal indicator (1). 
"Married woman" is a working synonym for "housewife". Any statistics, 
however, in respect of married women are sparse in Europe. The more 
readily available data are "females" data. This is the usual basis 
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for measurement, and the following indicators can be constructed, 
certainly at national level and, in most cases, at regional level. 
"Working wife" indicators 1-4: (1) female labour force as a per:centage 
of total labour force; (2) females in civilian employment (avoiding 
the comparability problem of measuring unemployment) as a percentage of 
all persons in civilian employment; (3) ••• as a percentage of all 
females aged 15 and over; (4) ••• as a percentage of all females aged 
15-64. Thes~ indicators become progressively more sensitive 1-4. The 
,usual measurement is indicator (1). 
The emphasis on paid employment in the' "ideal" indicator, particularly 
important in respect of countries with a high agricultural work force , is 
not accounted for in the indicators above. The "females" of particular 
interest to marketing are those who work outside their homes for money 
(references are abundant: she is the "trendsetter in the l'fIarket place" -
McCall 1977 (48)) vlith all that -that implies in terms of shopping-tim~_ 
allocation, priorities, status, outlook, personal discretionary income. 
In a marketing context an indicator that subs~mes this population~into 
an "all females" population is insensitive. DECD, EEC and most national 
statistics include in the "labour force" definition unpaid family 
workers who work at least e.g., (to quote the EEC case) lS'"ilours' a week 
and the inclusivity of this definition critically affects in particular 
the ratio of female to male agricultural workers, and thus all related 
work force calculations. 
At national level, it is possible, with difficulty and sometimes 
approximating, to construct usably-comparative indicators in ~hich 
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the basis of measurement is "paid employment", i.e., indicators in the 
above categories based on a labour force excluding unpaid family workers. 
At sub-national level, these calculations are not currently possible, 
although SOEC do dissect, by sex and region, unpaid j'family aids" in the 
- critical agricultural sector - so that for EEC countries in Community 
Survey years the regional indicators can be adjusted to this extent. 
Other approaches, however, are possible, regionally and nationally. 
One might, for instance, regard the agricultural sector as being not 
indicative, and therefore construct indicators based on employment in 
i~dustry and services only. Alternatively one might consider only 
full-time employment. Such indicators are calculable at least for 
specific years for the majority of countries. 
--
The conceptual validity of these alternatives can be argued. However, 
/' 
all the above are gross approximations to the desired measurement. - At 
national level only is it possible to attempt the following comparative 
indicators: "married women in labour force as a percentage (l) of all 
persons in labour force; (2) of all married women." 
The final indicator is nearest the "ideal", even though it subsumes 
unpaid workers (we are considering here only what is practicable in 
the foreseeable future). - Even at national level, it is data hardly 
won, with certain national inputs to the indicator possibly suspect. 
At regional level statistics of the female married workforce are 
available for few countries. Where they are produced as regularly as, 
for example, in Sweden and Denmark, they appear significantly relevant. 
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Juvenile Dependency 
One can, of course, compile indicators of probability to work as affect-
ing women - i.e., birth rate and juvenile dependency indicators. Such 
statistics are indicative of female orientation ina broad sense, and 
as such are additionally descriptive and not alternative to female-· 
activity indicators. Therefore, if the year of study is 1979: dependency 
indicators (1) and (2): "births per 1,000 inhabitants (1) 1972 (= 7 years 
prior); (2) 1979". Alternatively, dependency indicator (3): "population 
aged 0-7 (or 0-14 etc.) as a percentage of females of working age' 
(15-64)" can be constructed. 
Alternatively again, one can approximate to this measurement by 
constructing the indicator: "average size of household". 
Female Education 
I~ general marketing theory this factor is important. In a retailing 
context it has-been generally observed that the more educated the, 
consumer, the more this creates a demand "for wider choice with less 
emphasis being placed on advice or Thard-s~ll'" (49). This is to spell 
out advantages of self-service and the supermarket and hypermarket to 
the housewife. And, not necessarily paradoxically, it has been noted 
that the more educated the consumer the'more she is'aware'of relative 
i 
price' ,advantage. The "ideal" indicator to illustrate this is "terminal' 
level of female education", plus sub-aspect indicators to disaggregate 
this by age category. 
Considerable work has been done to produce approximately comparable 
categories of levels of education internationally: the UNESCO 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) programme(50). 
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EEC has published comparative education statistics, including terminal 
level percentages, by sex and age group as at 1973 based on ISCED for 
the original Six (51). One has problems in assessing the relative 
. \ 
status of e.g., teacher training - but, in the context of our study, 
the ranking of these terminal levels appears significantly predictive. 
At this level, however, (= six observations only per variable) this 
offers only tentative support for an hypothesis. EEC survey sample 
sizes, however, were large, up to 100,000 households in the larger' 
. countries. The responses are, therefore, available for disaggregation 
by region (or are already thus disaggregated but unpublished, as, for 
example, in France) and a resultant analysis could then much more 
strongly support or not an hypothesis of, for example, the relationship 
between supermarket growth and fema1~ erucation level and, in other 
contexts, other marketing hypotheses. 
UNESCO data, in the main unpublished, are for incomparable years. 
. Convenience Durable Ownership . 
Within the general context of this as a factor in "female emancipation", 
two possible indicators are directly related in trade and general 
marketing theory to specific. aspects of marketing development: 
convenience-durable indicators (1) and (2): "percentage of'-households 
owning (1) a refrigerator; (2) a home deep freezer". 
As related to the large supermarket and the hypermarket, "tbe growth in 
ownership of domestic regrigerators and freezers ••• enables the 
consumer to match the new pattern of larger and more distant outlets 
with less frequent shopping trips" (29). This has affected the 
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frequency not only of shopping for perishables and frozen foods but 
.the frequency .of shopping for canned and non-perishable items also (52). 
A substantial level of home deep-freezer ownership has been argued as 
being a prerequisite of any considerable hypermarket development. 
National, and in many cases regional, household penetration figures for 
refrigerators are available from varying sources: these can generally 
speaking be reconciled. This is not true of home deep freezer statistics, 
mainly through the incomparability of international (also intra-national) 
defini tions (for example, AGB: "separate door + minimum 1. 5 cubic feet 
deep freeze space". Other definitions - different statistics.) The 
- trade places greater reliance on its own commissioned surveys than on 
official statistics; but when all the varying penetration estimates are 
juxtaposed (and a sample only is given in Table 4.8),it can be seen 
that there is little reliable monitoring, and certainly not comparative 
monitoring even at national level, of what in many marketing contexts is 
a highly significant and (at- least for a fo-od retailer or a grower or---
a food-processor) predictive durable. 
Female Emancipation: Summary Emphasis and Proposed Requirement· 
Statistical recording of the female emancipation "revolution" lags far 
", 
behind marketing practice: the reverse is optimal. . We have-.considered 
basic indicators. Additional, and more refined indicators can and 
should obviously be proposed: "Percentage pay equality" is among the 
long-term possibilities. _ This is not currently calculable to be 
comparative and representative. The first and basic requirement is, 
it is suggested, for the primary statistic: "activity rates (optimally 
defined) of married women". It is also suggested that all indicators 
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Table 4.8 Percentage of Households Owni~g a Home Deep Freezer: Survey Comparisons 1974-1976 
Year Source Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Netherlands UK 
1974 EEC 25 . 45 12 39 25 16 
1975 Birds Eye 42 27· 71 1 15 37 321 25 
AGB 13 
1976 EEC 42 53 20 50 36 22 
I Euro-Panel 33 25 16 36 21 I-' 
CJ\ Birds Eye 48 41 74 35 41 43 32 I-' 
I AGB 20 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
-:- 26.5 
(1) Including fridge-freezer. 
AGB = Audits of Great Britain Limited •. 
~---~ 
discussed above are possible in the short term, given a slightly 
higher degree of priority. 
4.10 CONCEPT: SHORTAGE OF LABOUR AND COST OF LABOUR 
Hypothesis. This is that the retailer is impelled towards self-service 
operation, thence to a larger scale self-service operation, by the 
"push" factor of escalating labour costs. 
Measurement 
Conceptually, two approaches seemed possible: (1) a direct measure of 
labour costs; (2) a measure of unemployment. (1) is methodologically 
complex and perhaps not possible comparatively, therefore not discussed 
in this paper. (2) is based on an assumption of supply and demand in 
labour affecting the price of labour. Though this can be disputed as 
a general current hypothesis it arguably remains valid when applied to 
/" 
retail labour, with its high female, high part-time content. It is 
more oblique than (1) but superficially more measurable. National 
unemployment statistics however are notoriously incomparable unless 
based on standardised surveys. For Sweden, Austria, Finland, Spain 
and the EEC countries, it is possible to obtain statistics, if not for 
identical years, based on sample surveys not necessarily s£~ndardised, 
, 
I 
.-\ " ~ 
which are not necessarily the basis of the "official" series. --~ -
International comparisons based on EEC surveys can be made with  
confidence at national level. As regards a regional analysis, all-
statistics based on national surveys become -less reliable the more they 
are disaggregated. This is particularly so with unemployment statistics. 
The Statistical Office of the European Communities warns, in respect of 
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" 
its unemployment figures, that "regional division of the data produces 
an extremely small sample permitting only an overall analysis of 
unemployment. This can only be guaranteed reliable for whole countries 
or very large regions" (53). In the United States, where the 
proportionate allocation of over $17 billion a year in grants to 
counties and cities depends directly on unemployment figures, President 
Carter established a National Commission on Employment and Unemployment 
Statistics to discover the extent of the reliability of these figures 
at the crucial regional and local level. Sar Levitan, the labour 
economist appointed to head this commission, expressed the preliminary 
opinion that the national random survey method is fine for measuring 
the scale of unemployment nationally, but comes "close to being 
straight random numbers" at the local level owing to the smallness of 
the sample at this level (54). The large regional groupings (noted 
in column 4 Table 4.1) that we have preferred to analyse, apart from 
being, it is hoped, ·more socio-economically ~omogeneous, are more 
meaningful in this respect also than those customarily employed but, 
except in the case of the UK, considerably smaller "basic adminis-
trative units" which are the basis of regional statistics, including 
regional unemployment statistics, as produced by goverriments. 
'. 
"-
Single year comparisons are not meaningful. Therefore, if the year of 
study is 1978, the following indicator can be attempted: Labour indicator 
0): "Average annual unemployment rates e.g., 1974-1978" (or longer 
time-span) • 
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Emphasis. Constance Sorrentino of OECD wrote in 1976: "in view of the 
different needs of the countries and the differences in their facilities 
,for producing statistics, it has never been seriously proposed that all 
countries should adopt the same system of measuring unemployment" (55). 
Nevertheless, Sorrentino's paper itself goes a long way towards 
clearing the ground for exactly that proposal as regards Western Europe. 
The requirement is obviously not specific to marketing. 
In a regional analysis of this critical variable large regional 
groupings are a pre-requisite. 
4.11 CONCEPT: INDUSTRIALISATION 
The "Prosperity" model alone is insufficient to explain the economy o'f 
a country, as affecting distribution. Such factors of the economy as 
railway provision, electrification, manufacturing capacity, road 
transport provision and computerisation are insufficiently subsumed~n 
the concept "prosperity". Additional indicators were .,thought to be 
required that could represent the "level of industrialisation". 
To most observers of comparative marketing it is held as axiomatic 
'" industrialisation of a country has an effect on the 
i 
that the level of 
/ development of its marketing institutions; and this will not be argued 
here. It is proposed that a rural and non-industrialised economy is 
the less likely to foster a developed system of distribution as that is 
understood in Chapter 3. As regards our specific indicators of 
,retailing advance, indicators ,qf the progressive developments of 
self-service, the debt owed to many aspects of the basic industrial-
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isation .of the economy has been suggested: directly relevant is obviously 
the packaging industry, and the related paper "and board, tinplate, 
plastics, glass, cellulose film and aluminium industries; increasingly 
important are the computer hardware and computer software industries. 
The concept is broad and measurement is correspondingly difficult. 
(1) Measurement by energy and steel consumption. A "proxy" measure 
calculable at national (and with some difficulty at regional) level is 
industrialisation indicator (1): "Energy consumption (kilograms of coal 
equivalent - or other) per capita". This, however, is quite obviously 
"affected by level of car-ownership and by the amount of space heating 
that climatic conditions demand, and is accordingly a fallible indicator 
of "industrialisation". It is possible to construct" a more precise 
indicator, industrialisation indicator (2): "industrial energy consump-
tion (kilograms of coal equivalent - or other) per capita". At least 
for EEC countries this indicator is possible down to regional level. 
"It has been argued, however, that ~ertain countries, such as Denmark 
and Sweden, import large amounts of crude and" semi-finished steel and 
are, therefore, in actuality importing large amounts of energy which 
are not included in these data on energy consumption. "A" secondary 
indicator of "industrialisation" can therefore logically b'e considered: / 
i 
industrialisation indic~tor 0), "Apparent steel consumption (kilograms) 
per capita". The data for this indicator are readily available at 
national level, but cannot currently be disaggregated by sub-national 
region. 
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.The "energy" and "steel" indicators are argued as being complementary, 
and we have found that, if both sets of data :are indexed and then 
combined in a joint index, the resultant indicator so produced, i.e., 
an energy/steel index (which is our industrialisation indi~ator (4), 
appears more indicative of our concept of "industrialisation" than 
either dimension considered separately. 
A statistic more accessible at regional level is: industrialisation 
indicator -(5), "Industrial electricity consumption (kilowatts per hour) 
per capita". This can be argued as being-valid~ 
(2) Measurement. by relevant employment. Measurement of degree of 
"industrialisation" in terms bf percentage employment in industry is 
obviously also possible, and both nationallly and regionally industri~l:~' 
isation indicator (6): "Percentage of labour force employed in industry" 
can be compiled without great difficulty~ On the argument· that in 
latei stages of industrialisation the empha~is shifts to services 
employment, industrialisation indicator (7): "Percentage of labour force 
- employed in Services" should logically also be compiled. 
(3) Measurement by productivity; A third approach is to assume that_ 
logically greater "industrialisation" results in higher pr~?u·::::tivity. 
, 
At national and regional level the following indicator can be i 
constructed: industrialisation indicator (8), "Gross value added per 
occupied person". In the particular context of our research, this 
indicator emerges as more predictive than "Gross value added per capita" 
or similar "prosperity" model indicators. 
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Any attempt to expand the concept of 'industrialisation and industrial 
sophistication to include also the concept of "marketing sophistication" 
is fraught with problems of conceptual validity and definition, and the 
-, -
problems of comparative measurement are probably insurmountable. The 
difficulties of making international comparisons of advertising 
expenditures, for example, are notorious (56). We have experimented 
with an indicator "Advertising expenditure (dollars) per capita 1970" 
(i.e., an indicator dated before the period of general floating exchange 
'rates) but have not found it satisfactory. For one reason, an adjacent 
year would have produced a different ranking. 
Emphasis. Precise specification of the concept "industrialisation"- and 
how it should be measured is difficult. In this accordingly problematic 
area representation of thi~ factor will, it is suggested, need multiple 
indicators, whatever the hypothesis and whatever the dependen~ marketing 
variable. 
/-
At the crucial regional level, the "employment" and-"productivity" 
indicators noted_above can be compiled for most European countries. 
The "energy" indicators are constructable for many c£?untries for 
selected years but with some difficulty in calculation as regards the 
" 
conversion to a common base of the different units of energy. 
At national level all the above indicators can be constructed using 
available data. 
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4.12 CONCEPT: RETAIL INTEGRATION 
Hypothesis. The hypothesis is that the growth of systematised retailing 
is related to the growth of the large retail organisation, but without 
specification of the direction of cause and effect. 
Measurement 
We adopted the following indicators: retail indicators (1) and (2): 
"Integrated retail trade as a percentage (1) of total retail trade; 
(2) of total retail food trade" (one has,however, the not negligible 
problem of the comparability of the term "food trade") 
In addition wecused in our analysis retail integration indicators (3) 
and (4): "Non-associated independent retailers' share (3) of total 
retail trade; (4) of total retail food trade". 
These last indicators (with ,the relationship with retail development 
hypothesised as negative) are the more sensitive and preferable, taking 
into account as they do the strength in certain European countries of 
, the voluntary chains and retailer buying groups. We constructed these 
i~dicators ~t 'national level only. 
Proposed requirement. The need is for yearly, comparable, national and 
regional statistics. 
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4.13 THE HYPOTHESIS OF A NATURAL TRADING PROGRESSION FROM SUPERMARKET 
TO HYPERMARKET 
This final hypothesis has relevance to the hypermarketing variables only. 
It is proposed that the level of hypermarket development is directly 
related to existing and prior levels of supermarket and self-service 
development. 
It is argued that there is a natural tendancy for self-service operations 
to expand to supermarket size and for supermarket operations to expand to 
hypermarket size, if the concentration is on low price. With gross 
margins progressively cut, progressively more customers are needed to 
maintain gross profit = a larger catchment area is needed = the need for 
a large store in an off centre location where ample car parking is 
possible, to cater for customers travelling over distance and where land 
costs are lower. The logic leads also to the sale of foods and non food 
merchandise, in order: /' 
1. to provide maximum incentive for the customer to travel over distance; 
2. to capitalise on the high customer flow once this has been created; 
3. to benefit from the higher gross profit margins on non ,food, especially 
on non-comparison semi-durables. 
The ultimate of this progression is a free standing superstore, the 
"hypermarket". 
When thus predicting hypermarket provision by this measure, the super-
market variables become the independent variables. 
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4.14 GENERAL CONCLUSION: FUTURE RESEARCH REQUIREMENT 
Available indicators serving marketing are inadequate. There is an 
urgent need for the 'recognition of a Marketing Indicators Working Party. 
Optimally, such a working party would sub-divide into working parties 
per marketing sector - and optimally each sub-committee would: 
'1) consider what marketing variables are currently most indicative of 
marketing development in that sector; propose optimal indicators of 
those marketing aspects; propose "proxy" indicators if optimal 
indicator~ ar~ currently not constructable; 
2) consider environmental, etc., factors hypothesised as affecting 
these specific marketing aspects; propose "ideal" indicators that, 
if available, would quantify these factors; publish these if they 
were able to be compiled; 
/ 
3) ,collate,or encourage the collation of, existing but scattered_data 
to 'construct new indicators not previously compiled but now required; 
publish; press for national and sub-national data to be thus 
structured and published by statistical offices in the future, 
additionally to the structuring 
offices in other formats; 
of the basic data by statistical 
'4) work in the long term to create specific marketing indicators, 
national and sub-national (sub-national, by agreed optimally 
homogeneous region) that are internationally comparative. 
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Then the interaction of marketing and the marketing environment could be 
studied with more relevance. 
Details of the formation of a marketing indicators working party 
orientated towards the production of statistics relevant to retail 
distribution are given in Appendix 3. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA COLLECTION AND INDICATOR CONSTRUCTION 
The major task in this project has been that of data collection and the 
consequent construction of, in many cases, previously unattempted 
comparative indicators. This is particularly so at sub-national 
regional level, both in respect of the dependent (distribution) 
variables and the indpendent (socioeconomic etc.) variables. The 
difficulties have been considerable. As regards the distribution 
indicators, however, I believe we now possess the best data existant of 
supermarket and hypermarket provision calculated on a sub-national 
regional basis and comparative across Europe. (I believe we possess the 
only such data collection.) These statistics are cal~ulated as at- 1st: 
January, 1973. They lay, however, the foundation for a comparative 
yearly series. Similarly as regards the socioeconomic and demographic 
/ 
indicators constructed at regional level: these have intrinsic value ~Od 
-: have not before been comparatively produced at this level. 
The Distribution Indic~tori 
-Distribution indicators were constructed by the following means: 
respectively compiled by the International Association o~ Depart~ent 
Stor~s (IADS),Paris (unpublish~d) and by the International Self-Service 
Association (1550), Cologne, and by reconciling these respective totals 
and amending such totals as necessary in the light of our regional 
analysis. Distribution indicators thus constructed are listed in 
Appendix 1. 
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At regional level supermarket and hypermarket indicators were constructed 
in respect of each country by the following means and using the following 
"supermarket "definitions. (The note on Germany refers also to the 
national analysis.) The 'total range of distribution indicators attempted 
is given in the summary of-regional indicators in Appendix 2. for·clarity 
the information below is presented in note form. 
AUSTRIA 
Basic supermarket data was obtained through the offices of Dr.Erich Ketzler, 
, 
Osterreichisches Institut Fur Verpackungswesen (O.I~V.), Vienna; 
HypermaTket data from A.C. Nielsen Company Ges. M.B.H. (Vienna) and 
O.LV. (Vienna). 
Supermarket definition: Self-service. 400m2 minimum (no maximum) siz~. 
:Proportion of turnover of groceries (including perishables) more than 70%. 
Indicators constructed: Inhabitants per supermarket of size (1) -400 - 2500m2 
(2) 1000 - 2500ffi2. Inhabitants per self-service unit of size Cl) .400;2 
. 2 . '. . 
and over (2) 1000m .and over. -Inhabitants per hypermarket. 
) -- ,-
_ 0 > , _, 
BELGIUM 
All data obtained through the' Comite BeIge De La Distributio(l (Brusseis) 
and Libre Service Actualities (Paris) 
Supermarket definition: 
Self-service. 400m2 minimum. Full food range including "fresh meat". 
Alternative calculations have also been made without the "fresh meat" 
reqUirement. 
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Indicators constructed. All indicators + alternatlves for all 24 
supermarket indicators minus the "fresh meat" criterion. ' The latter 
series is not used in the main analysis, since the first mentioned 
series is the more internationally comparable. 
DENMARK 
Raw material for supermarket and hypermarket data were obtained from 
Per Press (Copenhagen) and Dansk Butikregister 1/5 (Vedbaek). 
Supermarket definition. Self-service with full range of provisions 
including fresh meat. From this category we have deducted those units 
of under 400m2 selling space. 
Indicators constructed: All indicators. 
FRANCE 
,All data obtained from the Institut Francais/Du Libre Service (IFLS) , 
Paris. 
Supermarket definition: Self-service, selling full range of food 
including butchery. Minimum sales area 400m2• 
Indicators constructed: All Indicators except the series that excludes 
s~permarkets in variety and department stores (Indicators 1-12). 
GERfv1ANY 
Supermarket-data were obtained through the Institut Fur Selbstbedienung 
(I.S.B.), Cologne. The national data for supermarkets in variety and 
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department stores were amended in the light of conflicting data from 
I.A.D~S. (Paris) after correspondence with both bodies and adjustment 
by both parties of their original figures; the resultant 1973 national 
figure was then apportioned regionally by Lander according to 1977 
percentage possession (ISB percentages). Hypermarket data were obtained 
from Informationszentrum Nieue Handelsformen (I.N.H.), Bad Worishofen, 
but by Nielsen region only. these agglomerations of Lander were: .. 
considered to subsume populations too large to be included in the analysis. 
Supermarket definition: Self-service. 400m2 minimum sales area. 
Predominantly a food store. 
Indicators constructed: 
, ' 
2 Inhabitants per ,supermarket 400m and over 
,'(bo'th inclusive and exclusive of'supermarkets in variety and dep'artment 
stores). 
:. ,,' .-
'f, - -. ".;,' -
IRELAND 
-... ,', 
,,' 
:.-. " 
"" ' 
Supermarket and hypermarket, _~at<a. Two spe~i'al'runs of 1971 Census' of 
c - .. -' 
, , 
Distribution data were made by the Central Statistics Office, Dublin, to 
-. . -,-. ' .-' 
produce superma~ketdata dissected by selling'area classes, (square foot: 
" , 
and. metric bases) per county.. 'In the process of updating t,hese, figures 
" . 
. to 1973, these we're found to be unexplained discrepancies with information' 
., 
supplied direct by retail companies. Fi~al's~atistics were compiled 
based entirely on .,~he direct 'responses of retail' firms. ,\ . 
, ' .~.' . . .... ;- ~" 
,,' 
, .' -. 
Supermarket definition: Self-service. 4000 sq. ft. minimum selling area. 
It was conside~ed' it would not improve comparability to employ a 400m2 
" 
, .. 
(=4306 sq. ft. ) , tninimum criterion, since statements of size made by 'retail 
! . -
,': > .' 
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companies are approximate. No "assortment" specification was included 
in the criterion, but, since limited-range discounters are uncommon in 
Ireland (as also in U.K.), the resultant statistics are considered 
approximately comparative with those of other nations •. 
Indicators constructed: All indicators. 
ITALY 
All data obtained through the Instituto Nazionale Della Distribuzione 
(I.N.D.I.S.), Rome, and Ministero Dell 'Industria Del Commercia E Dell 
Artigianato, Rome. 
Supermarket definition: As France • 
.. . ', 
Indicators constructed; All indicators. 
NETHERLANDS 
Data obtained by commissioned computer run made by Eug. J.M .. Trautwein., 
Arnheim. 
Supermarket definition: Self-service. Full food range. The 400m2.~ 2500m2 
criterion was applied specifically for this analysis. '-.. 
Indicators constructed: 2 2 Inhabitants per (1) supermarket 400m - 2500m 
(2) Self-service unit 400m2 and over. (Both inclusive of supermarkets 
in variety and department stores.) Inhabitants per hypermarket. 
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NORWAY 
Data obtained through Norges Markedsdata As, Oslo. 
Supermarket definition: Self-service. 400m2 minimum (this analysis 
only). Turnover in excess of 3 million crowns. 
Indicators constructed: As Netherlands. 
SWEDEN 
Supermarket data obtained via Supermarket, I.C.A. - Forlaget AB, Vast eras 
and Butiksregister A/B, Eriksbergagatan. 1973 listings s6 obtained were 
based on a minimum turnover criterion (4 million Swedish crowns) not a 
floor-space criterion, which was only introduced in 1975. We have 
-
I 
I, included in our indicator, therefore, those stores-included in the 1973 
listings which also appear as satisfying the 400m2 criterion in the 
- 2 -
1975 listing. -The assumption of this is that no stores of 400m and 
over were-closed between 19-73 and 1975 • The supermarket indicators are 
.. '~ , ' 
understated to the extent that this is not correct.- 'Hyperm~rket-data 
were obtained from A.C. Nielsen Compa~y AB, Skarholmen.\ 
Supermarket definition: Self-service. Complete_grocery assortment. 
400m2 minimum sales area (this analysis only). 
Indicators constructed: As Netherlands + hypermarket selling area per 
1000 inhabitants. 
-182-
SWITZERLAND 
The establishment of supermarket numbers based on a 400m2 minimum 
criterion ~ canton in Switzerland has not proved possible in the time 
available - despite assistance received from the Forschungsinstitut Fur 
Absatz Und Handel, A.C. Nielsen SA, Advico AG, Litton Business Systems 
and retail firms and cooperatives in Switzerland. The basis has been 
laid, however, for a future analysis. Hypermarket data by canton were 
obtained via Advico Advertising Agency, Zurich, supplemented by inform-
ation from the Federation of Migros Cooperatives, Zurich, in respect of 
their particular stores. 
Indlcators Constructed: Inhabitants per hypermarket. Hypermarket selling 
area per 1000 inhabitants. 
GREAT BRITAIN 
Supermarket indicators were constructed by means of a commissioned run 
/ 
~ 
'of the 1971 Census of Distribution data to produce number~ by Standard 
'Regions of self-service grocery stores of 4000 sq.ft. or more selling 
space - also the sales areas, by region, of such stores. These listings 
were updated to January, 1973 by the addition of new openings up to 1973 
as compiled by A.C. Nielsen Company, Oxford, and also as notified by 
retail multiple firms. 
'~ 
The indicators are accurate to the extent that 
closures of units over 4000 sq. ft. during 1972 a~e matched by any 
unrecorded openings. Our list is considered to be usably correct. 
Hypermarket data were obtained from The Unit for Retail Planning and 
In,formation (URPI), Reading, and the C.W.S., Manchester. 
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Supermarket definition: As Ireland. 
Indicators constructed: Inhabitants per (1) supermarket 4000 - 25,000 sq. ft. 
(2) self-service unit 4000 sq. ft. and over. 
M2 sell~ng area per 1000 inhabitants (categories as above). The above 
calculations are exclusive of supermarkets in variety and department stores. 
Since, however, the increase in- supermarket numbers by adding those in 
variety and department stores in only 2 percent nationally, the same 
figures also serve as usable "inclusive" indicators. 
Inhabitants per hypermarket. Hypermarket sales area per 1000 inhabitants. 
NORTHERN IRELAND 
Supermarket and hypermarket indicators were compiled by direct contact 
with individual retail firms. 
Supermarket definition: As Ireland and G.B. 
Indicators constructed: As G.B.; but indicators including supermarkets 
in variety and department stores are specifically and separately calculated. 
The Socioeconomic/Demographic Indicators 
At national levelt~ese have been compiled from the pUblications of, and 
direct response from, recognised authorities in each dimension (UN, 
OECD, the Statistical Office of the European Communities, International 
Road Federation etc.). 
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At regional level, although comparative material has been produced by 
the Statistical Office of the European Communities (SOEC) in respect of 
the sub-national regions of the major EEC countries, this had had to be 
supplemented by search within the nation; and very extensive correspond-
ence with the various statistical departments of the non-EEC countries 
and of the less-researched EEC countries has been necessary in order to 
produce the requisite new data in the previously noted socioeconomic/ 
demographic dimensions and to make these comparative. The result is a 
prototype series of marketing indicators at the explorative regional level. 
National indicators thus constructed are given in the indicator list of 
Appendix 1. Additionally to theindicators on this list, two further 
national indicators have been calculated but not correlated: these are 
::, 
the Car/Road Indicators 2 and 3 as discussed in Chapter 4. 
,Regional indicators constructed for this project Call constructed at 
both minor region and major 'region level) are given in the indicator list 
-
of Appen,dix 2. 
'. 
i 
" 
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CHAPTER 6 
DATA ANALYSIS: CORRELATION AND REGRESSION 
6.1 At national level the analysis _is based on data for fourteen 
countries - Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United 
Kingdom. At regional level, the analysis is based on the major 
-regions of these countries with Finland and -Spain excluded. 
In the regional analysis, comparative indicators were first constructed 
f.pr the sub-national minor regions of these twelve countries (= 187 
observations per completed variable). The data for these minor 
regions were then aggregated to correspond to the hypothesised 
- _ "homogeneous" major regions. This resulted ·in 68 observations per __ 
- completed variable. In many cases, however, .there are gaps in the 
data. In the c~se of some variables there are considerable gaps. 
The steps in the analysis of the data were: 
1) Rank-ordering of all variables according to the ranking of each 
.., 
"-
dependent variable. This was useful in the interpretation of 
subsequent analysis. 
2) Correlation of all variables. 
3) Regression of key variables in the regional analysis. 
4) AID analysis of main regional variables •. 
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Prior to examining the results of these analyses, there is one main 
objection to any such analytical approach using socio-economic etc. 
data as independent variables that needs to be evaluated. The 
objection applies to the hypermarket analysis only. :,It is that 
hypermarket development is controlled by Government' regulation and 
therefore cannot be related to socio-economic factors. 
6.2 THE HYPERMARKET THE FACTOR OF PLANNING APPROVAL 
Much has been said and written to the effect that the main determinant 
of hypermarket development in Europe is the ease or otherwise of 
obtaining planning approval. ,In -the course of this study ~ great 
deal of material has been collected on the different planning 
- 5 
regulations affecting hypermarket development in respective European 
countries. It is possible to quantify very roughly the overall 
- -impact of these regulations, as was done for this study by Dr Jefferys* 
.' ~-
and two-otheiiriternational authorities who wish, to be' anonymous. 
JeffB~s quantification of this factor is shown in Table 6.1. The 
anonymous responses are remarkably similar. 
No attempt, however, was, on reflection, made to weight the model in 
'. ~ 
any way according to these or other quantifications. It is argued 
that the logic of so doing is circular. Norton and Stahel of 
Larry Smith Consulting have listed similarities in conditions in 
Europe and the U.S.A. that affect out of town development and asked 
why out of town development has been so slow in Western Europe, and 
* Director General of the International Association of Department 
Stores (lADS) Paris, and Chairman of the Distributive Trades 
': Economic Development Committee Common Market Working Party. 
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Table 6.1 Effect of Government (National or Local) ~ 
Influence on the Ease of Opening Hypermarkets 
Grading 0 = Complete Banning of all such outlets 
to 
10 = No control whatsoever 
' •• '1. 
Country Before 1973 After 1973 
Austria 5 4 
Belgium 9 1 
Denmark 6 5 
Finland 6 3 
France 9 3 
Germany 9 5 
Ireland 4 4 
Italy 3 2 
-
Netherlands 5 4 
-Norway 4 4 
_Spain 8 ·8 I ~ ... 
Sweden ... ,' . 6 4 
Switzerland 5 3 
Uni ted Kingdom- 3 5. 
Estimate by J B Jefferys, International Association of Department 
_Stores, Paris. 
they say that probably the most important retarding element has been 
"The strict control exercised by Government Authorities at all levels 
of the development process" (1). Many other commentators, for example 
Tanburn (2),go further and treat the factor of planning control as, in 
~ -
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effect, an unquantified independent variable. But this is only arguable . 
on a basis that Governmental and Local Authority planning decisions 
are arbitrary and irrational acts! Assuming this is.not the case, 
then socio-economic and demographic factors.affect the planning 
decision and the planning decision affects the distribution decision • 
SOCIOECONOMIC 
DEMOGRAPHIC, ~ 
etc. FACTORS 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
• i. 
PUBLIC 
PLANNING 
DECISION 
INTERVENING 
VARIABLE " 
FORM 
of 
DISTRIBUTION 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
If the planning authority is completely disinterested and supremely 
efficient and omniscient, then it can be argued that the essence of 
its ~ction is simply the interpretation of the retailing forms' 
that" conflicting socio-economic, demographic etc. factors on balance~_ 
demand. In this case, if 0I")e could quanti r"y all the ."odginal 
independent variables, one'could study theiiaction on ih~-dependent 
variable and ignore the intermediate "prismatic" effect of the public 
planning decision. 
However, planning authorities are not completely disinterested (vide Le 
Loi Royer), nor obviously are they supremely efficient and omniscient~ 
Their effect is to distort or delay or possibly accelerate the natural 
action that various independent'socio-economic variables have on the 
dependent variable (distribution), if conditions were those of absolute 
6 
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lack of'''friction'' or "interference" in the system. 
Conflicting socio-economic forces create a need for central planning. 
The central planning body thus created attempts to interpret these. 
same socio-economic factors. It remains an instrument of the public 
concern that created it - at least in the long run and if only out of 
political expediency. 
This part of the study assumes a premise that: voters vote, and 
consumers vote with their feet, and in the long run they get what 
they want - in other words, that the primary socio-economic variables 
are relatable directly to the dependent variables. This is a 
simplification but a useful one. 
6.3 ANALYSIS BY CORRELATION 
The results of the correlation analysis of national data are given inr-
. Appe~dix i, thtise of the regional data in Appendix 2. 
The correlation coefficients shown there cannot in many cases be 
compared directly, since the number of paired observations.vary 
according to the variables correlated. (The number of cases· per 
variable varies, and the data-gaps in one indicator mayor may not 
correspond with the data-gaps in the correlated partner). For this 
reason significance levels are given against each correlation 
coefficient. 
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At the national level, non-linear correlations were obtained. The 
cases where these transformations improve the statistical fit are 
noted in the commentary. 
The self-service analysis, the hypermarket analysis and the supermarket 
analysis are dealt with separately. The conclusions are further discussed 
in chapters 8 and 9. 
6.3.i The Analysis of Self-Service Provision 
A subsidiary part of the research was to examine influences on self-
. service development as, such •. This was studied at national level only. 
. . 
The year for analysis was 1962, chosen for the reasons outlined in 
section 4.5.1, that after this date this indicator becomes insensitive. 
Operative influences are suggested in the correlation matrix of Appendix 
. ... - ,'-. 
1.Detailedrefer~nce to this matrix i~ not made in this context •. 
'Obviousl~-only those environ~ental variables dated circa 1960 should be 
taken. into account. The highest correlation of the relevant indicator 
. (15562) is with NATOT62 ("percentage of ,total retail trade held by 
non-associated retailers 19621~. The relationship is positive; The r 
value is O.69122,significant at the .01 level: The more that 
'-, ' 
. ", 
re~ailing is orga'nised, whether' through legal or. through voluntary 
associatlon, the more is this conducive to th'e development of self-. 
service. 
. ~Sign;ficant 
...., . 
. . , 
relationships are also found to exist with, in particular 
. . 
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indicator GNPP~61 ("GNP per capita 1961") and the related indicator 
0160 ("Disposable income per capita 1960") and also the indicators 
ENERGY 61 ("Energy consumption per capita 1961") and fE%WE61 ("female 
wage and salary earners as a percentage of all wage and salary 
earners 1961"). 
It can be argued, therefore, that self-service as such develops most 
rapidly in industrialised countries with a high level of individual 
prosperity where the incidence of female employment is high - provided 
that in these countries there exists a significant level of legal 
or voluntary integration of the retail system. 
6.3.2 The Hypermarket Analysis 
(1) Alternative bases for hypermarket measurement 
It can be seen in the correlation matrices of Appendices 1 and 2 that.-
the alternative methods of measuring hype~'market development, the first 
based on numbers of hypermarkets regardless of size and the second 
based on total hypermarket selling space, are statistically very 
selling space per 1000 inhabitants 1974" (SHY74) is only barely 
significant (r = 0.47922). At the level of the major sub-national 
region. The parallel correlation (in Appendix 2) between IHY and .SHY 
· .". 
is significant at the .001 significance level but accounts for only'. . '~." 
30 per cent of the variance in respective data (r = 0.55598). It matters 
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therefore, whether we are concerned in "predicting" relative numbers 
·ofhypermarkets or whether we take account also of their relative 
average size. Progressively as the spread of hypermarketing advances 
the size measurement will he the more significant. 
(2)'. The Concentration of Population Model 
, (a) Measurement by population density 
The variously attempted measurements of population dens~ty are not 
significantly correlated with the indicators of hypermarket development, 
either at national or regional level. As argued in section 4.6 however, 
measurement of this factor is unsatisfactory to date and needs specific 
research. In addition what is being described here is the global 
relationship only. The relevant findings of the AID analysis that is 
more sensitive in this respect are given in Chapter 7. 
(b) . Measurement by degree of urbanisation. 
The.proxy indicators to ,measure the reality of the urban/rural split, 
. the indicators of "Percentage of labour force employed in agriculture, 
'. 
"'-
forestry and fishing" (AGRIC~~68, AGRIC~nO and AGRIC~073) are in general -.:'-.. j 
significantly negatively related in the regional analysis with hyper-
market incidence. The 1968 measurement is the best predictor. The 
respective correlation coefficients are as follows, the level of 
significance being indicated in brackets: 
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It can be seen that the r values progressively diminish as a more 
contemporary date is applied. In the case of the more sensitive 
hypermarket indicator, that based on sales area (SHY), they cease in 
the more concurrent years to be significant. Hypermarket establishment 
decisions are made several ,years in advance of opening. Environmental 
variables dated some years prior to the hypermarket variables will tend 
to be the better predictors. This phenomenon is to be noted also in 
respect of other environmental variables. 
The proposed preferable indicator "Percentage of wage earners and 
salaried employees employed in agriculture etcH (WAGRI~ 70 and WAGRIC 73) 
, 0" - ~ '.. _"~:'-''''.- ',..' _ '-. 
which avoids the "unpaid family workers" problem,' but which was able t'o 
be constructed at national level only, is very highly correlated indeed 
- ' .' 
, " 
with the hypermarket variables, accounting for 88 per 6ent of the variance 
in IH~ 74; but one emphasises that this is based on only fourteen .~ 
observations. At the more sensitive regional level, howeve~, the, 
' ....... 
indicator,"Percentag~ of heads of households employed in agriculture~tc1 
(AGRICHOH) also eliminates the unpaid family worker. This also is highly 
I 
, correlated with the hypermarket variables with r values of 0.69 and 0.60 
significant at the .001 and .01 significance ,levels respectively. These 
therefore are the predictive variables to be developed for future 
, analysis. 
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The alternative measurement of this factor by "Percentage of gross 
domestic product derived from agriculture etc" is not so predictive.' 
In those instances where this indicator, in both the national and 
regional analyses, is related significantly to- hypermarket development, 
the r values and levels of significance are considerably lower. 
Surprisingly there is in general no significant relationship with large 
local concentrations of population, whether measured in towns or 
agglomerations - and there is no high relationship with degree of urban 
habitation even taking the smallest urban unit as base. The exception 
is in ttie correlation 'of "Percentage of inhabitants living in urban 
agglomerations of at least 100,000 inhabitants" with "inhabitants per 
hypermarket" in the regional analysis. The r value is low and is 
significant only at the 0.1 level.' But the indication here is that 
the higher the urban concentration at the 100,000 inhabitant level the 
less this is conducive to hypermarket growth., -'The AID analysis in - _' -
Chapter 7 investigates'this more sensitively. 
(3) The 'car-ownership and road congestion model 
-(a) Car ownership: It is generally taken as axiomatic-and is part of 
the "hypermarket" criterion that the hypermarket -caters for' a car- -, ';, ---,-
owning public. And at national level the car-ownership and hypermarket 
indicators are in each case significantly correlated - not, however, 
'at very high levels of correlation or significance. 
At regional level, the phenomenon that w~ have already noted in the case 
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of agricultural employment for ~ prior indicator to be the best 
_predictor is -evident here also. Thus (figures in brackets denote 
significance levels): 
CARS 66 (n = 63) 
CARS 70 (n = 68) 
CARS 73 (n = 68) 
IHY 
Inhabitants per 
hypermarket 
, 1973 
0.52(.001) 
0.3l( .02 ) 
0.17( ) 
SHY 
Hypermarket selling 
area per 1000 inhabitants 
1973 
0.32( .05) 
0.32( .02) 
0.22( - ) 
The concurrent indicators are, in fact, not even significantly related. 
Taking, however, the 1966 indicator as the predictive variable, car-
ownership is still not shown as the dominant influence on hypermarket 
development that it is ,popularly supposed to be: indicators of other 
-environmental factors have ~igher coefficients. 
(b) Road congestion Both nationally and regi~nall;t~e'generally-, 
~/ -- - , .. -
used indicator of road congestion, the number of "motor vehicles per~ 
kilometre of road "is not significantly related to -hyp~rmarket dev,elbp-' 
- ment - nor is the measurement "kilometres of road per 1000 inhabitants" 
in the regional analysis. 
"' "-The variable that is significantly related is "kilometres of road per 
square kilometre of total territory" in the regional analysis. This 
has been measured for all roads (ROSQKMPL) and for major roads only 
, - -
_ (RDSQKMMI). The relationships are as follows (figures in brackets 
denote significance levels): 
". '--
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IHY SHY 
Inhabitants per_ Hypermarket selling 
hypermarket area per 1000 inhabitants 
1973 . 1973 
RDSQKMMI (n = 61) -0.3l( .02) O. 47( .001) 
RDSQKMPL (n = 66) -0.47(.001) 0.14( ) 
Where the size of the store is not taken into account the degree of 
\ 
provision of roads as such is significantly related to hypermarket 
development. Taking into account, however, relative hypermarket size 
(as in SHY) then the provision of major roads, as distinct from 
minor roads, is the important factor. This was our hypothesis. 
The "all roads" indicator is not significantly related to SHY. 
The viability of the large hypermarket depends on the provision of 
major roads - not so, necessarily, the smaller hypermarket, the 
"superstore". 
(4) The prosperity model 
In the national analysis all the "prosperity" indicators unadjusted 
- ~ ,-
for purchasing power are significantly related to the hypermarket 
~ari~bles - thaf is to say, to IHY 74, SHY 71 and SHY 74.-
At regional level the relationships of the hypermarket variables with 
the "prosperity" variables GVAHAB("Gross Value added, dollar equivalents, 
. 1 
per inhabitant 1970") CONSEXP ("Private consumption expenditure,' 
'dollar equivalents, per capita 1970") and DISPINC ("Gross disposable 
income of households, dollar equivalents, per capita i970") are 
shown below (figures in brackets denote significance levels). The 
indicator PCFOOD ("Percentage of private consumption spent on food, 
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drink and tobacco 1973") is included also as a "prosperity" 
indicat~r, on an assumption that the higher the individ~al's 
income the smaller will be the proportion of income spent on food, this 
in extension of Engel's economic law. It has a more particular 
relevance, however, in the context of this thesis, in that the smaller 
the proportion of income spent on food the less, it was argued, will 
the purchasing of food be an important "ceremony" to the busy house-
wife, and the more she will accept impersonal methods of food 
distribution. It was argued therefore as indicating something more 
precisely applicable_than simply differences in levels of disposable 
-income. 
IHY 
-.-' SHY 
Hypermarket selling Inhabitants per 
hypermarket 
1973 
area per 100 inhabitants 
.~ 1973 
PCFOOD (n = 21) 
GVAHAB (n = 68) 
~- - . 
.-
CONSEXP (n = 46) 
DISPINC (n = 68) 
- -
GVACPPP. (n = 52)-
CONSCPPP. (n = 46) _ 
DINCCPPP - (n = 52) 
-.55(0.1) 
-.36(.01) 
-.50(.001) 
-.29C05 ) 
-. 49( .001) 
-~ 50( .001) 
-.29(.05.!) 
~9B( .001) 
.37( .01 ) 
> ;-
--.59( .001) 
.-_-:'"42( .01 ) 
-,";,' 
.' 
." .r 
.29(0.1 ) 
.42(.01» 
.36( .02 ) 
, '.' 
The highest related indicator is PCFOOD. In its relation with SHY it 
has, in fact, a correlation coefficient of 0.98. But the direction of . 
. influence is positive, and not negative as was hypothesised. It is 
emphasised that this astonishingly high and unexpe~ted relationship is 
based- on only 21 observations~' Nevertheless it is significant at the 
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.001 level. One can suggest that the "drink and tobacco" element has 
weighted the findings. This is an indicator to be proper~y developed 
for further investigation. 
~ '", 
Of the less tentative indicators, the indicator of private consumption 
expenditure (CONSEXP) is the best predictor, but again this is based 
on a lesser number of observations, in this case 46. Where we have the 
full range of observations, disposable income (DISPINC) is the best 
predictor of the preferred variable SHY. 
--The only properly justifiable indicators of "prosperity" are those 
adjusted for purchasing power. In the regional analysis these_are the 
count~rpart indicators GVACPPP, CONSCPPP and ·DINCCPPP. Similar 
indicators are constructed in the national analysis. From the matrix 
above it can be seen that at regional level the prediction of hyper-
market developm~nt by these indicators is somewhat better in the case 
of IHY and worse in the case of SHY than with the unadjusted indicators • 
.. " . ,-' , 
In general the adjusted indicators have fewer observations, being in 
respect of EEC regions only. Additionally, in the regional analysis 
.the "prosperity" statistics of all of the .regions of a particular 
country are weighted by the same purchasing power adjustment ratio, 
.... 
.... 
since we have CPPP deflator indices at national level only. Even so 
. the CPPP - adjusted indicators are all correlated significantly with 
the hypermarket variables. 
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(5) The "Female Emancipation" model 
(a) The working wife. At the national level, the eighteen different 
indicators attempted are shown in Appendix 1. They are those whose 
codes begin with ,the letters FE (=females) or MA (= married women) plus 
the XFAM70 indicator (= "females in civilian employment as % of all 
persons in civilian employment - excluding unpaid family workers 1970"). 
There is no significant correlation of any of these. indicators with the 
two hypermarket 'indicators based on selling space. As regards the 
hypermarket variable IHY74, the two highest correlated indicators are 
among the methodologically preferable ones. They are XFAM70 and 
FE%WE61 (= "female wage and salary earners 'as % of all'wage and salary 
earners 1961"). The latter indicator, calculated as at 1970 but not 
shown in 'the matrix, is,also highly predictive. Boti-; these types of ' 
indicators are designed to exclude the problematic unpaid family workers 
·,in the agricultural'sector. The "married w.omen lt indicators are -not 
significant~ We noted in chapter 4, however, that these indicators 
. ~ ,~.-' ,,', ~. ~ .' 
were,suspect as to ~ccuracy.', The national data of th~ 1969 sampl~: 
surveys of housewives working full-time and those working full-time 
or part-time ,(WIFEFT69 and WIFEALL) are significantly related to IHY74. 
" , 
At the regional level, the methodologically preferable indicator is aga:i,n 
the highest correlated (with both the "Inhabitants per hypermarket". and 
the' "Selling space" indicators)' of those indicators for which we have a 
full range of 68 observations. This is FECV1564. ("Females in civilian 
employment as percentage of all females aged 15-64, 1973") 
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Alternative approaches to measuring this factor regionally by 
calculating females employed in (a) industry (b) services (c) industry 
and services - as percentage of all persons employed in these sectors 
(indicators FEMSIND, FEMSERV, FEINDSER) - show "services employment" 
as being most significant. 
(b) Juvenile dependency. In the national analysis, the Birth Rate 
indicators are in general significantly related to the selling space 
indicators of hypermarket development (SHY71 and SHY74). In the 
regional analysis, however, the levels of correlation are low. . 
Measuring, in the national analysis only, juvenile dependency by 
direct 'Juvenile dependency' indicators (JDEP60 and JDEP70) no 
significant correlations are obtained. 
An 'alternative method of measuring dependen5!Y" however, is to measure 
th~. ~verage n~mb~r of'perso~s per household (HHOLDSin the regl~~al-
-, . ,<r. 
- '., v·~· _. 
analysis) .. ·'Here the relationships with hypermarket .development are ... 
significant. 
, '~ -
(c) Female education. An attempt was made to measure this difficult 
factor at national level only. EDUC1869 ("~D females educated up to at 
least. age 18 - 1969 Sam~le") .is not significantly correlated with any of 
. ·.the three hypeDmarket variables. EDUCEEC (five observations only) is 
included simply to have the observations included in the data deck. 
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(d) Convenience - durable ownership Refrigerator ownership 
nationally (FRIG73 and FRIG69)is not significant when related t~ ~he 
hypermarket variables. Regionally a significant correlation is obtained 
with SHY. 
Home Deep Freezer ownership is not significant. 
Nationally two indicators were constructed of percentage vacuum cleaner 
ownership (VAC73 and VAC69), on an hypothesis that ownership of this 
appliance to some extent measured" emancipation from hoti5sh8J.d_drudgery". 
- - / - ~ 
The first of these is correlated at the .001 significance level wi~ 
IHY74, and a reciprocal transformation of the base data increases-tne 
r value to 0.947 in this case. However, we are uRable to construct 
these indicators on a regional level for further analysis. 
-Joo much weight should not be given to the-precise correlation 
~coefficient, based as it is on only 14 cases. The function of 
_ corre1ation at the national level is to provide indications and -
suggestions. 
(6) The Labour Model 
To measure the hypothesised "push" factor of escalating labour costs 
·:progressively~r~pelling the retail~r towar~s ~elf-se;~lc~-oper~tion 
and the progressively less labour~intensive methods of supermarket 
and hypermarket operation, the sole indicators we are able to construct 
are those of unemployment. At the national level (but not shown in 
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Appendix 1) the relationship with hypermarket development is not-, 
significant. At the obviously more sensitive regional level, and 
taking a long time-span for the measure of average annual unemployment 
(1965-1973) since yearly percentages fluctuate in many cases 
dramatically, the correlation with the hypermarket variables is 
significant at .001 and .01 levels, thus supporting the hypothesis, 
In correlation with IHY the r value (n = 52) is 0.75708 and is higher 
than that of any other predictive variable. 
(7) The industrialisation model 
The general concept is that a given level of industrialisation and 
industrial sophistication is necessary for hypermarket development, 
in fact for any form ,of systematised distribution. 
(a) Measurement by energy and steel consumption At the national 
-level we measured this by -"Energy consumption per capita" 1971- and ~-, 
'1973, although this is obviously affected b~level of:c~r owhership -, 
and is accordingly a fallible indicator of "industrialisation". We' 
have accordingly constructed an additional indicator: "Apparent steel 
- consumption per capita" (average annual figures -for the period 1971-
1973). In general these are significantly correlat'ed ~-ith-"the hyper-
market variables. We have indexed both the "eQergy" and "steel" 
data and combined the resultant figures in a joint energy/steel index 
which becomes a new indicator ESINDEX. This too is significantly 
related to hypermarket provision. 
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In the regional analysis we attempted to refine these indicators and 
constructed: '''Industrial energy consumption per capita" and "Industrial' 
electricity consumption per capita" (INDENERG and INDELECT). These are 
significantly related to hypermarket provision. 
Cb) Measurement by employment 'At the regional level we calculated 
"percentage employed in industry"- for 1970 and 1973 - and, on the argument 
that in later stages of industrialisation the emphasis shifts to service 
employment, also "percentage employed in services" 1970 and 1973. Though 
some of the correlations of these four indicators with the dependent 
variables are significant, the r values are,not high. 
(ri) Measurement by productivity A third possible approach is to 
assume that" greater "industrialisation" results in higher productivity. 
At national level the indicators VAWORK 70 and VAWORK 73 ("Value added 
" per worker , 'dollars" 1970 and 1973) are si9r:i ficantly related to the' 
. three hypermar~et indicators. The same indicat~rs'~djusted for 
purchasing power, .VAWCPP -70 and VAWCPP 73,. a:re not.· , It is argued that 
the latter is the true representation. 
A t the more sensitive, regional level, however, both GVA~~CCUP ("Gross 
-' "'. ~-
, . - ~ 
value added, dollar equivalents, per occupied person 1970")-and the· 
.similar indicator adjusted for purchasing power, GV~WCPPP are significantly 
related·at~~igh.levels of significance to the dependent variables 'as 
follows (figures in brackets denote significance levels): 
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IHY SHY 
Inhabitants per Hypermarket selling 
hypermarket area per 1000 inhabi ta-nts 
1973 -1973 
GVAOCCUP (n = 49) -.56(.001) .66( .001) 
GVA\~CPPP (n = 49) -.53( .001) .54( .00i) 
The variance explained is higher than with the "GVA per capita" or 
similar calculations in the "prosperity" model. 
(8) The retail integration model 
This was able to be examined at national level only. There is support 
for an hypothesis that hypermarket growth is linked to levels of 
"organised" retailing. As was predicted the factor of "association" 
whether in a legal entity or by voluntary co-operation, is shown as 
being somewhat more significant than the extent of control of 
distribution by "legal entities" considered alone. 
(9) The retail infrastructure model 
It has been suggested that the hypermarket develops by a process-of' 
natural trading progression from a base of existing supermarket 
-provision. 
There is strong-support for this hypothesis. At national level 
(Appendix 1), "Inhabitants per hypermarket 1974" (IHY74) is ",' .-. 
correlated almost perfectly with the two indicators of supermarket 
, -
development exclusive of hype_rmarkets (ISM74X and ISM74V) with 
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correlation coefficients of 0.949 and 0.976. ' At regional level the 
, ,selling space indicator of hyperma'rket development (SHY) is highly " 
correlated with the selling space indicators of supermarket development. 
Thus: ' Correlation coefficients 
Su~ermarket ~rovision H:t~ermarket ~rovision (SHY) 
SSM425X (400 - 2500m2) 0.66635 
SSM825X (800 -" 2500m2) 0.87195 
SSMl025X(1000 - 2500m2) 0.89182 
- so that, for example, 80% of the variance in hypermarket development 
thus measuied is accounted for by the level of development of the 
large supermarket (of from 1000 to 2500 m2 selling space) - and it 
accords with the hypothesis that the correlation coefficients 
increase progressively as the minimum selling-space' cut-off point in 
the supermarket criterion is increased. 
It. can be argued, ,therefore, that probably the most potent factor in--' 
hypermarket development is the pressure for change exerted by existing 
self-service and supermarket operators and their public~ Since there 
is little governmental interference in supermarket development, in 
general, therefore, countries and regions havetheir,rig~tfuf place 
" , 
in the hypermarketing world in relation to the decisive factor of 
existing supermarket provision. Variations in the supposed strictness 
. of planning control for hypermarkets have not affected this 
signi ficantly. 
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6.3.3 The Supermarket Analysis 
(1) Alternative bases for measurement 
An examination of the regional correlation co-efficients in 
Appendix 2 shows the great difference that changing the basis of 
measurement from numbers of -stores to total selling space of such 
stores makes to the analysis. The effect of grading supermarkets into 
size categories is also demonstrated. 
(2) The concentration of population model 
(a) Measurement by population density None of our three attempted 
measures of population density is correlated significantly with super-
market provision measured in terms of numbers of supermarkets - i.e. 
the various "inhabitants per supermarket" and "inhabitants per self-
serv ice unit" measures. There is in general" however, significant 
correlation, in the regional-analysis, of these measures when the 
supermarket variable is exposed in terms of selling -~rea, theoretically 
_the preferable measurement. -Of the three population density variables, 
"Population density of agricultural land" is slightly the best ~ 
predictor. This accords with the argument of cb apt er 4. It is 
methodologically the preferable predictor. 
_ (b) Measurement by degree of urbanisation. In general the comments 
made in respect of the hypermarket variable regarding the~e indicators 
- apply also to almost all the supermarket variables.. The proxy : _ 
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indicators "percentage employed in agriculture" are predictive, with 
the 1968 indicator ha~ing most explanatory value. At the national 
level, "percentage wage and salary earners employed in agriculture" 
(WAGRIC) is again very highly correlated, and its regional level 
substitute "percentage heads of households employed in agriculture" 
(AGRICHOH) is also significant across the range of indicators. 
"Percentage GDP derived from agriculture" is a useful alternative. 
As with the hypermarket, large concentrations of population, however 
measured, are not shown as significant. As regards the smaller urban 
units, where we have a sufficient number of regional supermarket 
observations to justify co~relation (i.e. with the ISM425V and the ISM4UPV 
.indicators) the percentage of variance explained increases as the size 
of urban unit gets smaller. On this evidence large concentrations 
of population are· not essential to supermarket development. 
/ 
: .(3) The'car ow'nershi~ and road congestion model 
{a) Car ownershi~ At national level the "cars" indicators are 
. . , 
:','significantly related to the supermarket variables. , In .the regional 
analysis, only car~ownership 1966 is significantly correlated with all 
, .... ' ......... 
the supermarket variables, and this is in general the best predicator. . 
Where, however, we have the most substantial number of supermarket 
'observations (indicators ISM425V and ISM4UPV) all the .' . "car" 
indicators are correlated with those variables at the .001 significance 
level. 
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(b) Road congestion. At national level, the usually accepted 
indicator of road congestion "Motor vehicles per kilometre of road" 
is not significant. The two similar regional indicators are signific-
ant in some instances but not in correlation with the main supermarket 
variables ISM425V and ISM4UPV. This applies also to the four regional 
indicators of road provision. In this respect, however, the 
correlation tabulations of the hypothesised significant indicators 
among these are of interest. RDSQKMMI ("Kilometres of road, minus 
local roads, per square kilometre of land 1973") and RDSQKMPL 
("Kilometres of road, all roads, per square kilometre of land :1973") 
are not, except in one instance, significantly correlated'with any' 
of the supermarket variables expressed in numbers of supermarkets 
(the variables beginning ISM). When, however, average size and the 
size categories are taken into account, the picture is as follows 
(figures in brackets denote significance levels): 
Sales area provision in supermarkets (excluding 
those in variety arid department stores) of: 
~-
400-
2500m2 
800-
2500m 2 
1000-2 400m
2 800m 2 1000m2 
2500m & over & over & over 
RDSQKMMI .02(-) .5 (.05) .54(.02) .33(.01) .59(.01) .6 (.01) 
RDSQKMPL .67(.001) .69(.001) .73(.001) • 66(.001) • 71(.001) .7 (.01) 
, 
Sales area provision in supermarkets (including , i 
those in variety and department stores) of 
400- 800- 1000-2 400m
2 800m2 1000m2 
2500m2 2500m 2 2500m & over & over & over 
RDSQKMMI .21(-) .2 (-) .18(-) .46 (.01) .51 (.01) .52(.01) 
RDSQKMPL • 46(.01) • 64(.001) • 6l(. 001) .43 (.01) .71 (.001) .7 (.01) 
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Road provision is significantly important where the. larger supermarkets 
.- . , 
are concerned - since there is in general a high degree of correlatio~. 
with the supermarket indicators expressed in terms of selling space, 
but not with the supermarkets indicators simply denoting the numbers 
of supermarkets. The degree of correlation increases progressively 
as a higher sales area criterion is applied in almost every case: 
the larger the supermarket the more is adequate road provision 
important. The indicator of "major road" provision, ROSQKMMI, that 
we have hypothesised as influentially significant specifically in 
hypermarket development, becomes progressively more significant up 
the size categories when hypermarket selling space ., is taken into 
account in addition to supermarket space (the indicators containing 
the letters UP), and, as we have seen, in extension of this it emerges 
as the dominant partner of the two indicators in the 'specific "hyper-
market" analysis. Road provision is progressively. an important factor 
as the average size' of store increases: it .is not an important factor 
for -the-smaller supermarkets. . ~:, -
(4) The prosperity model 
At both national and regional level the "prosperity" indicators (of GNP, 
, "', 
GDP, GVA, Disposable Income, Consumption Expenditure) are in almost 
every instance significantly related to the whole range of supermarket 
variables, and in the case of the ISM425V and ISM4UPV variables, 
mostly at the .001 significance level. The corresponding indicators 
adjusted for purchasing power are also significantly related, and in 
-
respect of the two main regional supermarket variables again mostly 
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at the .001 significance level. 
As regards the sensitive "selling space" indicators in the regional 
analysis, "Disposable income" and "consumption expenditure" are 
significantly related at the .001 level to all six indicators of the 
varying supermarket size categories that take into account supermarkets 
in variety and department stores. The level of significance is in 
general less in respect of the "space provision" indicators that solely 
denote free-standing supermarkets. This can be taken as indicating 
the importance of variety and department store supermarketing in the 
more prosperous countries. 
(5) The "Female Emancipation" model 
(1) The working wife Comments made above in respect of the hypermarket 
are also applicable in general to the supermarket. Nationally XFAM70 is 
the best predictor, FE156570 the next best. In the regional analysis 
.the latter indicator is the best "workwi fe" predictor', generally of 
supermarket development. FEMSERV is also usefully predictive - however, 
with twenty one observations only. 
" 
(2) Juvenile dependency Directly calculated dependency (national 
level on~y) is not significant. The Birth Rate indicators are 
generally predictive - and, both nationally and regionally, the 
earlier-dated indicators (1960 indicators in the national analysis, 
1966 in the regional) are in almost every case the preferable 
predictors. These indicate probable average number of young children 
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(under age 14 and under age 7 respectively) and are on this evidence 
a better guide than current birth rate. The indicator "Average 
number of persons per household" (HHOLDS in the regional analysis) is 
generally significant, the significance levels being' progressively 
higher accordingly as the supermarket variables have more observations. 
(3) Female education EDUC1869 is significant with all but one of the 
national supermarket indicators. 
(4) Convenience - durable ownership Refrigerator ownership 1978 and 
HDF ownership 1974 are significantly related to all the national super-
market indicators. In the regional analysis, non-coinciding gaps in the 
data mean that for most indicators we have no observations to correlate. 
The potential importance of the refrigerator indicator, however, is' 
suggested in those instances where correlation is possible. It is not 
/ 
significant in its relationship to general supermarket provision. 
Considering only the large supermarkets, however, (those .of at least 
800m2 and 1000m2 respectively) it is found that the relationship with 
refrigerator ownership here is very high - with coefficients of 0.92, 
0.90, 0.94 and 0.93 when correlated with ISM825V, ISMI025V, ISM8UPV, 
and ISMIOUPV respectively. Admittedly the number of observations in 
each of these matrix cells is only 9 (the eight regions of France and 
Northern Ireland) - but it does suggest a logical connection and 
indicates the possible direction of further research if more extensive 
data can be obtained. 
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At national level, vacuum cleaner ownership is generally predictive. 
6. The labour model 
Although in the national analysis the correlation of unemployment with 
the supermarket variables is not significant, 'in the more sensitive 
regional analysis this factor assumes g'reat importance showing in 
general high levels of correlation. Taking the case of our most 
substantial supermarket variables, the single factor of level of 
unemployment explains 74% of the variance in ~SM425V (r = 0.86033) 
and 73% of ,the variance in ISM4UPV (r= 0.85705). This is based on 
52 observations. 
7. The Industrialisation model 
(1) Measurement by energy and steel consumption Nationally, the three 
types of indicators (energy, steel and the energy/steel index) are ail 
correlated significantly with the supermarket indicators. Reciprocal 
transformation increases the extent of explanation provided by the 
"energy" variables: the r value of the correlation of ENERGY71 with 
ISM74X, for example, is increased by reciprocal transformation from the 
',-
0.808 shown in Appendix 1 to 0.951. These figures need to be treated 
with caution: they are based on only 14 observations. 
Our more precise indicators at regional level those of industrial 
energy and industrial electricity ~onsumption are significantly 
related to most supermarket variables, not however at this high level 
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obviously not, since N in these cases = 47 and 51 respectively. 
(2) Measurement by employment The regional level indicators of 
percentage employment in industry and in services are related to the 
supermarket variables as noted in Appendix 2. In the case of the 
supermarket variable containing most observations, ISM4UPV, the 
relationship is in each case significant at the .001 significance\level. 
(3) Measurement by productivity "GVA per occupied person" is 
significant with all supermarket variables. 
8. The retail integration model 
Comments made in respect of the hypermarket apply to the supermarket 
indicators also. 
f 
6.4 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL DATA 
The regional data were subjected to forward stepwise multiple regression. 
Variables from each hypothesised dimension were selected for consideration 
given that each contained a requisite number'of observations. The , i 
. 
number of usable observations in the regression analysis was reduced 
in order to permit the inclusion of "unemployment" as a variable. This 
also permitted the inclusion of CARS66 - an indicator preferred to 
CARS70 or CARS73. The constituents of the resultant formulae are given 
in Table 6.2. These have been computed only for those dependent variables 
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TABLE 6.2 REGIONAL ANALYSIS: REGRESSION VARIABLES SIGNIFICANT ® 95~D LEVEL 
-
( ) = STANDARD ERROR OF B 
Vari~b1es -e-xiliained ··over1eaf. 
DEPENDENT REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (B) FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
VARIABLE N CONSTANT POPAGRIC AGRIC ~D70 CARS 66 DISPINC FECV 1564 UNEMPLOY ~D VARIATION 
EXPLAINED 
IHY 43 917.12 -1.93 ~90.05 1124.8 60.62 
(0.69) ,(42.92) ( 200.7) 
SHY 38 32.12 -3.83 0.07 -31.19 28.54 
(4.07) (0.04) (13.99) 
ISM425X 25 9364 ... 0.7/.J 56.24 -18.32 412.7 80.36 
(0.7) (29. 73) (6.93) (l00.2) 
ISM425V 43 -233 247.9 74.02 
(22.94) 
ISM4UPX 34 4326 69.35 ~14.70 350.2 74.21 
( 23.2) (5.72) (90.2) 
N ISM40PV 52 -240 232.0 73.45 I-' 
V1 09.7) 
SSM425X 25 -534 9.72 -3.64 0.25 3.62 -8.2 89.14 
(0.05) ( 1. 5) ( 0.02) (0.89) 0.6) 
SSM425V 33 -632 0.54 0.36 -21. 5 69.07 
(0.12) (0.05) (8.62) 
SSM4UPX 25 154 0.26 0.16 44.29 
(0.07) (0.07) 
SSM4UPV 33 -5.11 0.23 -33.6 54.14 
(0.06) 06.32) 
ISM825V 28 6432, 92.5 -19.6 41.34 
00 ~ 4) ( 7. 7) 
ISM8UPV 28 92.5 -19.9 42.16 
00.4) ( 7. 7) 
SSM825V 23 -136 /7.23 0.15 62.12 
-. (0.07) (0.03) 
SSM8UPV 23 76.2 0.16 -43.7 51.39 
(0.07) 08.9) 
'ISMI025V 23 -1171 887.7 56.51 
068.4) 
ISMI0UPV 23. -1209 881.8 56.6 
068.5) 
SSMI025V 23 -44.2 0.17 0.37 3.7 -13.2 81. 74 
(0.04) (0.07) 0.6) ( 5. 92) 
,", SSMI0UPV 23 . e7.3 0.14 -41.1 47.36 
(n nL:\ ( , n "l\ 
...: 
TABLE 6.2 continued: Explanation of variable codes 
IHY 
SHY 
lSM425X 
ISM42S'v' 
ISM4UPX 
ISM4UPV 
SSM425X 
SSM425V 
SSM4UPX 
SSM4UPV-"-
POPAGRIC -
AGRIC ~~ 70 
CARS 66 
DISPINC 
Inhabitants per hypermarket. 
Hypermarket selling area per 1000 inhabitants 
Inhabitants per supermarket of 400 - 2500m2 exclusive 
of supermarkets in variety and department stores. 
(ISMB25V, ISMI025V) Inhabitants per supermarket of 
of 400-2500mZ (800-2500m2, 10,00-2500m2) inclusive 
of"super~arkets in variety' an9 department-Stpres. ," 
Inhabitants per self-service unit 400m2 andoVet,excluding 
supermarkets in variety and department stores. 
(ISM8UPV, ISMIOUPV) - Inhabitants per self-service unit 
400m2 (800m2, 10,00m2)and over, including supermarke~s in 
variety and department stores. " ' 
. selling area per rocio inhabitants in supermarkets of 400-
2,500m2, excluding supermarkets in variety and department 
stores. . 
(SSMB25V, SSMI025V) - selling area per 1000 inhabitants 
in supermarkets of 400 - 2,500m2 (800 - 2,500m2, 
10,00,- 2~500m2) including supermarkets in variety and· 
department stores. 
Selling area per 1000 inhabitants in self-service units 
of 400m2 and over, excluding supermarkets in variety 
and department stores. 
(SSMBUPV, SSMIOUPV) - selling area per 1000 inhabitants 1n 
self-service units of 400m2 (800m2, 10,00m2) and over, 
including supermarkets in variety and department stores. 
-2 
Inhabitants per km agricultural land. 
% labour force employed in agriculture. 
-Cars per 1000 inhabitants, 1966". 
Disposable income (dollars) per inhabitant. 
FECV1564 - Females in civilian employment as ~~ of all females aged 
15-64. 
UNEMPLOY - Unemployed as % total labour force. 
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for which the minimum number of observations exceeded twenty. 
6.4.1 Hypermarket analysis 
It can be seen from Table 6.2 that we can predict by regression the 
relative numbers of hypermarkets (IHY) with a·great· deal more accuracy 
than we can predict the relative total hypermarket selling space (SHY). 
71.5 per cent of the variation in SHY remains unexplained, as compared 
with only 40 per cent in IHY. Partly for this reason alternative 
methods of analysing SHY were sought. (See AID· analysis, under). 
Surprisingly, since it is contrary to most hypermarket hypotheses, the 
"CARS" indicator is not by regression analysis shown as significant. 
Hypermarkets as such preferentially develop, according to this analysis, 
in regions characterised by high disposable income and a significant 
level of "working" females, where retail labour is short, as denoted 
by labour··shortage in general, as signalised by low unemployment ra~es. 
The larger hypermarkets, but not necessarily the small, characteristically 
develop in non-agricultural regions, as measured by "percentage of labour 
force employed in agriculture etc 1970" (AGRIC ~~ 70). This is predictive 
of SHY that takes into account store sizes, while not predictive here 
of hypermarkets expressed in terms of numbers only. 
The analysis in Table 6.2 is based on socio-economic and demographic 
variables only. We have suggested, however, that probably the main 
determinant of hypermarket provision is the degree of existing and 
prior supermarket provision. Accordingly additional regression runs 
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were made incorporating ISM4UPV (Inhabitants per self-service unit of 
2 400m and over, including supermarkets in variety and department stores. 
1.1.1973") as an additional independent variable. This particular 
indicator was chosen since it contains the largest number of 
observations. Although this indicator includes hypermarket units, it is 
based on numbers of units and not selling space and the proportion of 
hypermarket units in ~ny region is very ~mall compared to the total 
. 2 
number of all units over 400m and does not appreciably affect this 
~ndicator as being a measure of supermarket development: the correl~tion 
of ISM4UPV with ISM425V (which is exclusive of hypermarkets) is 0.99992. 
By incorporating ISM4UPV, the variance explained in IHY is increased 
from 60.62 per cent to 62.68 per cent. It is not significant, however, 
as helping to explain SHY in this analysls. 
6.4.2 Supermarket (plus self-service unit) analysis 
Significant variables and degree of explanation of variation are noted 
in Table 6.2. There is in general a high level of prediction of the· 
supermarket proper - the supermarket exclusive of units over 2500m2 •. In 
these cases, in general the percentage explanation of variation is 
.. 
space (SSM425X, SSM425V, SSM825V, SSMI025V). Methodologically also 
these are the preferable dependent indicators. 
- 217 -
The dominatingly significant variable is UNEMPLOY ("Unemployment as 
percentage of total labour force. Annual average 1965-1973"). It is 
significant in all but four of the sixteen regression equations 
predicting supermarket development. In the case of the combination of 
dependent and independent variables for which we have the most observations, 
the ISM425V and ISM4UPV regressions, it is the sole significant 
(negative) predictor and by itself explains 74 per cent and 73 per cent 
respectively of the variation. We have hypothesised the "push" factors 
of the shortage of labour and cost of labour as important factors 
propelling the retail operator to self-service and thence: to larger 
self-service operation. The emerged importance of the proxy 
measurement of this factor supports this as a prime determinant; 
The level of disposable income (DISPINC) is a significant component in 
all the eight regressions on the supermarket dependent variables that 
measure the precise "supermarket selling space per 100 inhabitants", 
. the dependent variables beginning SSM. -These are inherently the 
sensitive regressions. 
'Studying Table 6.2, however, it can be seen that the ability of the 
regression routine to predict is not good in the case of the prediction . 
" 
of the self-service unit expressed in terms of selling space and inclusi~e 
of hypermarkets (SSM4UPX, SSM4UPV,SSM8UPV, SSMlOUPV). Here the 
proportion of total selling space held by hypermarkets is substantial. 
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Taking the extreme cases, the regression formula predicting SSMlOUPV 
(which is inclusive of hypermarkets) is explanatory of only 47~~ of 
variation, as compared with the 83% explanation of the variation in 
SSMl025V (which is exclusive of hypermarkets); and similarly the 
explanation of SSM4UPX is only 45~~ as compared with the 92~~ 
explanation of SSM425X. 'The relative inability, which has been noted 
'above, of linear regression to predict hypermarket selling space is 
reflected to this extent in the "supermarket" analysis 'also. An 
alternative method of predicting this factor,was employed. This is' 
examined in chapter 7. 
, ..... 
I' 
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CHAPTER 7 
AID ANALYSIS 
7.1 Correlation and regression can throw light only on the statistical 
generalisations that can be made taking into account the whole span of 
the dependent data. An examination of the raw data, however, suggests 
that one combination of 'socioeconomic factors may be an important 
determinant in some regions while a different combination of factors may 
be important in others. As the final stage of the analysis therefore, 
the regional data were subjecteq to Automatic Interaction Detector (AID)' 
,~,/ ' 
.. 
. ' . 
analysis. This method of analysis has the ability to show what factors . ~ 
or combinations' of factors which do not necessarily affect all regions 
nevertheless affect a certain number of those regions. 
For the AID programme the independent data are grouped. The programme 
then considers the means of each of these combinations of predictor' 
variables, and divides the sample through a series of binary splits into 
mutually exclusive subgroups, so that the means of the groups thus formed)·, " 
-~, ."' 
account for more of the total sum of squares than the means of any 'other 
", '" 
'~ombination of predictor variables. 
In order to increase the number of input variables above the number for 
which we had the full total of 68 observations (and in particular, in 
order to include "unemployment" as input) estimates were made of missing 
regional data in the following indicators: 
UNEMPLOY (~6' unemployment) previously 52 observations'" 
MVSROADM (motoi vehicles per km-major roarl}previosly 66 6bservations 
- 221 -
RDSQKMM (major roads per km 2) previously 66 observation~ 
.', . 
RDSPOPM (major roads per 1000 population) pre~iously 66 observations 
~ 
CARS 66 (car ownership 1966) pr~viously 63 observations 
The estimates were made by taking- the relevant national figures for each 
country for the years in question and weighting the regions within each 
nation around this national mean in the light of unquanti fied information 
as to the proportionate incidence inter-regionally of, for example, 
unemployment or motor vehicles per km road. -The resultant estimates are 
considered usably accurate. 
"-
Before conside~ing the results of the analysis, it is necessary to 
evaluate the distinctive use to which AID is put in this particular 
-r~search, and to -relate this to its context of theco~trove'rsial aspects 
inherent in the use of AID as such. 
7.2 AID ANALYSIS USING AGGREGATE DATA _ 
7.2.1 It is not believed that AID analysis has previously been used to 
deal with'this' type of aggregate data. Previous use has almost entirely 
been concentrated on the group behaviour of individuals.' In the 
marketing field,AID has been used to investigate, for example, brand 
purchasing behaviour (1), the duration of the purchase decision process 
(2), time s~ent reading popula~ Sunday papers (3),consumer e~penditures 
on durable goods (4), patronage of a· national grocery chain (5). A 
partial exception is the Gallup Poll model for retail site location, in 
which the data input is aggregate in respect of specific catchment areas 
only' (6,7,8). The Gallup Poll use of AID is different to its use in 
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this research. This is referred to below. In a wider context, Sonquist 
lists, in a "partial bibliography of research reports and citations 
referring to AID or MeA", a total of 37 applications (9). None of these 
uses aggregate data. 
There are problems in the use and interpretation of AID as such. These 
problems are different in degree and the expectations are different in 
this present research using international aggregate data. 
7.2.2 The Question of Sample Size 
There is a considerable difference between what is expected of the AID 
analysis and its interpretation in this present study and the expectations 
, and interpretation where a sample of individuals constitutes the cases. 
Inputting data that are a sample of a vastly larger population, it 
is essential that the sample size be adequate to be able to sustain 
./ 
successive splits ' of these-data - so that the progr'essiyely dimi'nishjng 
, - . - -
sample sizes are still large enough to be meaningful as representing -the 
total population~ Sonq~ist, Bakei and Morgan (10) warn that a thousand 
cases or more are necessary, "otherwise the power of the 'search process-
:" ,- "'- ~-
es must be restricted drasti6ally or these processes will carry ~ne 
into a never-never land of idiosyncratic results"., Doyle fll) argues 
that, if the search technique is to be validated, that numb~r should be 
" , 
doubled. 
The aggregate data used in this present research, however, are not a' , 
sample in this sense. They are obviously a sample to the extent that 
they are not in respect of every region of Western Europe. Spain, 
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Portugal, Finland and Luxembourg are not studied at regional level in 
this research. Of the countries studied, The Netherlands, Austria, 
Germany and Switzerland are excluded from the first AID hypermarket 
analysis; Netherlands, Austria and Germany from the second; Switzerland 
from the supermarket analysis. However, it is not claimed that the AID 
analyses represent th8 position throughout Europe. It is claimed that 
they represent the situation as at 1973 in the countries whose regions 
are thus analysed. The universe in the first AID "hypermarket" analysis (., 
is the totality of the 47 regions of Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, 
France, Norway, Sweden and the U.K. In the second AID "hypermarket" 
analysis, 'the universe, is these regions plu~ the five ~egions of 
Switzerland. In the "supermarket" analysis the universe is the regions 
of all the twelve countries studied except Switzerland. 
The identity of each region at each stage of a particular AID analysis 
can be ascertained. It is useful and important to do this. The identity 
. '-, .- .... 
of any one individual in a sample of individuals representative-of a 
large population is-of no importance at all. And we know.no more, and 
care no more, about bim than what is contained in the data. 
A full analysis will take into account the possible effects of any 
. marginal splits (these are considered below) and the degrea of decisive-, 
! 
ness of the splits. If this is done, and, at the end of each analysi~~_ 
we are still able to discern a coherent pattern in the data, then we 
are justified in saying that "These are the relationships between this 
particular distribution development and the environmental factors as 
these existed in 1973 in the regions of these particular eight or nine 
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or eleven (as the case may be) countries of Europe, to the extent of 
their being hypothesised and within the limits of measurement. 
This is valuable information in itself. It is not essential to generalise 
the findings to the regions of Europe not included in the AID analysis. 
In dea.1.ing with a sample of responses from individual persons the same 
quite obviously is not true. They are meaningless unless they reflect 
the responses of a vastly wider universe. Gordon Simmons Research Ltd. 
(5), for example, used AID analysis on behalf of a national supermarket 
'chain in the attempt to predict the porportion of a customer's grocery 
budget that would be spent at the stores of that chain, in respect of 
different categories of customers. Of the 13 predictor variables, ten 
were of "store image". The total of customers of that retail chain is 
counted in millions. An analysis based on the Gordon' Simmons' sample ,. 
of 1023 shoppers is valueless unless the behaviour of these 1023 people 
can validly represent the behaviour of that universe. 
The parallel case using aggregate-data would be this: An indep~ndent 
shopkeeper on an isolated island of 80 inhabitants has therefore a ,,' 
maximum of 80 customers who shop at his store. He might question these 
customers to try to' find out what distinguishes those' who patronise him 
very ~eldom from tho~e who give him all their custom. If hQ finds that 
the ten or, even five customers who use his shop the least all have the 
same characteristics, that is important information to him in its own 
. , right. It is irrelevant for him to genetalise these findings to "shop 
customers" in general. He has no other potential customers. The 
analogy with the type of aggregate data research in this project is to 
this extent ex~ct. 
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If he is only able to question 60 of the 80 inhabitants, his research 
findings, if valid, apply unarguably to 60 of his 80 potential customers. 
If he had been able to question the remaining twenty customers, or even 
ten of these, this obviously might have weighted his conclusions in one 
direction or another (with such a universe it almost certainly would); 
but it would not be a great leap into the hypothetical if he took the 
customer profiles revealed by his research to be probably typical of his 
customers. 
The total number of regions used as inputs to the general regional 
analysis is 68. If "marketing regions" had been constructed fo!?" those 
,countries not in fact included in the regional research programme, these 
could have been expected to have provided, on the basis of their 
populations, an additional eleven regions (Portugal, ~; Spain, 5; 
- . 
Finland, 3; Luxembourg could not have been included, since hypermarkets 
and supermarkets are banned there by law). The total universe of 
Western European "marketing regions" is therefore approximately 79. ' The. 
AID analyses use as cases respectively 47, 52 and 63 of these. regions. ' 
At the lowest level of data input, the number'of cases represenfs over 
half the maximum Western European universe; at the best it constitutes 
over three quarters. It' is a matter of regret; in'p'articul~r,that" 
the German regions, if the data were to be- properly compared with those 
, of other regions, were not able to be included in'the hypermarket 
i 
! 
research. The inclusion of the eleven German regions might have weighted, 
or even, presumably altered, the findings. Nevertheless, to the extent 
that the research findings are valid, they are applicable to the regions 
of most ,countries of Western Europe. And, in drawing conclusions from 
this research, this project does generalise these findings and takes 
them as probably typical of the situation generally in Europe. 
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Obviously where the sub-group number of regions becomes very small ' 
(three, for example, in the most extreme instance), any generalisation, 
even in the conditions noted, becomes very dangerous indeed. It still 
remains valid, however, to state that in these regions, which are named, 
the following conditions existed. This observation is of interest. 
Doyle (ll), in criticism of Heald and Gallup Poll, says that "few 
statisticians would be prepared to generalise on samples of three or four!". 
In international aggregate data analysis, if,the universe is taken as 
being the countries included in the particular analysis, there is no 
question of a sample and there need be no question of generalisation. 
And, if t~e universe i~ taken as being Western Europe, on~ can say: 
"This supports, (or does not support, or modi fies) the hypothesis. It 
follows the logic of the preceeding, splits. It may, of course, only 
apply to these three regions" - although, as regards the proviso, it 
needs to be said that, in this research, a sub-group of ten cases 
'represents one eighth of the maximum Western European~universe. 
~ . -~--
" -,-;: 
A small number of total cases presents" of course, a _statistical probl,em. , 
, , 
The AID pr~gramme is. based on our examination of the means of poss'ible': 
sub-groups. ,The larger the number of cases the more ,reliable is the. mean. 
Sonquist, Baker and Morgan(lO) note that the least squares criterion 
',-
, .... being used is very sensitive tb extreme cases, and that"cases in ?ub-
. groups can appear extreme even, if they don't in the full sample". ~ This 
is obviously true. Nevertheless, if a sub-group of , to take the most 
extreme example, six cases contains one very extreme case, the sub-group 
will split one and five, not three and three •. And, in fact Sonquist and 
his co-researchers take the former type of split as a warning that a 
sub-group contains one or tWb extreme cases. The AID analysis trees 
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in this research contain few.examples of this type of extreme and 
unbalanced splitting. 
The inclusion in the analysis of five or six of the currently missing 
regions might, of course, affect the terminal relationships considerably, 
even though the effect on the preliminary splits might be slight. If 
we are generalising to all the regions of Western Europe, any generalis-
ations derived solely from some· of the terminal boxes of the tree need to 
be offered very tentatively indeed, and identified by region. That basic 
principle is obviously correct •. 
7.2.3 The Question of Intercorrelated Predictors and Predictors of 
Amost Equal Importance 
Many of the predictors of the AID analyses are intercorrelated. Some 
are designedly so. "Gross value added per inhabitant" is obviously very 
highly correlated indeed with "gross disposable income of households 
per inhabitant" •. Both, however, are used i~/this research as marginally 
di fferenL.inClicators of individual prosperity. The 'reason that both -are 
included is simply to ascertC!inwhich of the two might-be marginaliy 
preferable' in any subsequent analyses. The'three "cars" indicators and 
the two "female employment" indicators .are in this category. The 
indicators within these sets are treated in the main as sy~onymous when 
it comes to interpreting the data. 
Between indicators expressing different concepts, however, the question 
is different. Some of these areintercorrelated. The AID programme 
might split on one that is perhaps only marginally more explanatory. In 
this case, the correlates of this predictor are subsequently less likely 
to be chosen. Therefore, as Doyle and Fenwick have emphasised, "exclus-
ion does not necessarily imply insignificance". (3). 
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A correlation matrix for the predictor varaibles is given in Table 7.1. 
Where there is no overall intercorrelation, however, this is not to 
say that intercorrelation may not occur between predictors in a split 
sub-group. 
Additonally, there may be no intercorrelation, but nevertheless two or 
more predictors may be similar in importance as judged by the Between. 
Sums of Squares/Total Sums of Squares (BSS/TSS) ratio. If, in respect 
of a particular split, the difference in Between Sums of Squares between 
competing predictors is marginal, the the choice 'of a predictor label to 
explain that split is marginal - and, particularly if the predictors 
concerned are not highly correlated, we have no assurance that the tree 
subsequent to the split is ~.~able; "clearly another set of data might 
have produced different results",. (10). If, in particular; the fir~t 
split in the programme is made on the basis of a marginal difference 
in BSS as between two predictors then "had the programme split· by the 
. . . 
. . 
second variable,- the subsequent tree. diagram might have' been ,totally~ 
cii'ffe'rent n.' {1). . What is not, or rarely,' emphasised. is .. that a possible 
alternative tree that is radically different in respect of the cases 
that are assigned to the different sub-groups, as opposed to th~ 
diagnostic labels assig~ed to the boxes, is more likely to ,occur when 
..... 
'" two predictors that are. almost equal in their power to discriminate 
are not themselves intercorrelated. 
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Table 7.1 Correlation matrix of the predictor variables in the AID analyses 
Variable description Variable 
Code ISM4UVP POPAGRIC POPDENS 
Supermarket provision ISM4UPV 1.000 
Population density POPAGRIC -0.075 1.000 
agricultural land 
Population density POPDENS -0.089 0.950 1.000 
% in agriculture AGRIC 70 -0.641 -0.188 -0.323 
~~ in towns> 
250,000 inhabitants' TOWNS 250 -0.102 0.510 0.534 
~~ in towns > ' , 1000 inhabitants TOWNS 100 -0.095 0.510 0.560 
Car-ownership 1973 CARS 73 -0.463 ' -0.071 -0.079 
Car-ownership 1970 CARS 70 -0.517 -0.056 -0.063 
Car-ownership 1966 CARS 66 '-0.566 -0.038 .. -0.019 ' , " 
Motor vehicles per km MVSROADM -0.106 -0.977 0.971 
major road 
Major roads per km 2 RDSQKMM' ":0.002' , ,-0.042 0;000' , -.- .-
.. ~ 
,~ 
Major roads per, 1000 ~ , .. , , 
,population, ' .. RDSPOPM -0.077 -0.139 -0.302 
" " 
Gross value added p.c. GVAHAB ':'0.533 ,0.132 ' 0.151, 
"DisP9sable,income p.c. DISPINC -0.441 0.095 0.083 
, ' - , 
, , 
~~ unemployment UNEMPLOY , ,,-0.857 -0.127 -0.160 , 
Females aged 15-64 FECV1564 .. -0.526 ,0.129 "- 0.131 
,working 1 
Females % labour force FELF -0.474 0.212 0.195 
Birthrate 1973 BIRTHS 73 -0.361 -0.260 -0.293 
~ 
Household size HHOLDS -0.489 -0.377 -0.406 
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CARS CARS CARS 
AGRIC 70 TOWNS 250 TOWNS 'lOO 73 70 66 
AGRIC 70 '1. 000 
TOWNS 250 -0.312 1.000 
TOWNS 100 -0.392 0.902 1.000 
CARS 73 -0.317 0.071 0.062 1.000 
CARS 70 -0.395 0.114 0.095 0.464 1.000 
CARS 66 -.057 0.150 0.151 0.823 -0.417 1.000 
MVSROADM -0.299 ' 0.574 0.587 -0.094 -0.133 -0.192 
RDSQKMM 0.062 -0.157 -0.173 ~0.094 -0.133 -0.192 
RDSPOPM 0.342 -0.318 -0.426 0.174 0.206 0.150 
GVAHAB -0.548 0.291 0.264 0.561 0.662 0.715 
DISPINC -0.417 0.197 0.161 0.477 0.556 0.581 
UNEMPLOY 0.650 -0.113 -0.110 -0.604 0.626 -0.617 
FECV1564 -0.502 0.254 0.209 0.489 0.630 0.794 
FELF" -0.441 -, 0.296 ' 0.251 ',0.405 0.528 ' 0.668 
BIRTHS 73 0.400 -0.089 - -0.161 -0.537 -0.504 - -0.418 
HHOLDS ' O~ 577 ' -0.401 -0.398 -0.590 -0.644 ~O. 68,5 
MVSROADM RDSQKMM PDSPOPM GVAH.L\B DISPINC UNEMPLOY 
" ' 
-, 
" 
, :. , MVSROADM LOOO '. ,-
- "" " 
:- :;.~-. -
" 
,-
" 
-, 
" ," 
" ' -\'"' 
'-RDSQKMM " -.:.0.154 1.000 " -, , ~" :-: ... ,- " " 
---
--
' , 
" " 
-
,RDSPOPM, -0.258 0.029 1.000 . ,"-
" , " 
,'- GVAHAB -0.123 -0.085 ' 0.162 1.000 
" 
'" 
: -
' , 
" 
" 
, , 
-- , -
DISPINC 0.043 0.039 0.241 0.907 -1.000 
UNEMPLOY..- :', : .. -0.157 -0.142 -0.076 ' :-0.628 ,.-0.471 --_1.000 
, , ", " . 
FECV1564 0.190 -0.378 0.036 0.710 - 0.539 -0.578 
FELF 0.262 ~0.481 0.038 ' 0.657 0.429 -0.535 
BIRTHS 73 -0.338 0.127 0.161 : -0.440 -0.317 0.513 
HHOLDS -0.452 0.242 : 0.052 -0.732 -0.580 0.623 
FECV1564 FELF BIRTHS 73 HHOLDS 
FECV1564 1.000 
FELF 0.911 ' 1.000 
BIRTHS 73 -0.338 -0.372 1.000 
HHOLDS -0.638 -0.649 0.704 ,1.000 
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Nevertheless, the programme print out of all BSS/TSS ratios enables us 
to identify at each split the precise extent to which a selected predictor 
is more discriminating than its nearest competitors. This is essential 
information if one wishes to make any judgment as to the probable 
stability of the tree, or interpret the tree. The relevant figures are 
given below in respect of each analysis. The problt3m of marginal 
difference in 'BSS is discussed in much of the literature, but it is not 
believed that any previous published description of any AID analysis ha~ 
detailed these differences by quoting the BSS/TSS ratios of possible 
candidate predictors at each split (or even at the critical initial 
splits). One would suggest, however, that, without this,'it is impossible 
to interpret meaningfully any AID analysis. 
7.2.4 The Question of Measurement Errors 
As the number of cases per sub-group is progressively decreased by the 
programme, so the liability to distortion caused by measurement errors 
,becomes 'more' p'ronounced., ,Sonquist (9) and D~Yle and Fenwick (3) e~phas-
ise th~ factor of measurement eir6r distortion. The principle_focus of_ 
the regional, research has been on comparability and valid and accu-rate 
measurement. As one consequence, a considerably larger number of possible 
':cases has been sacrificed. All- data were originally 'compiled in respect 
of a total' of 233 minor regions in the countries studied. Un examination, 
however, it was found that in many of these minor regions hypermarket 
locations, ·for example, were peripheral: relating these to environmental 
data that excluded"the environmental data of the bordering region or 
regions would be to distort the relationships. In consequence the minor 
regions were aggregated into '~arketing regions" - reducing measurement 
errors to a minimum at the expense of data quantity. It is argued that 
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it is the insistance on the predominant importance of accurate measurement 
in this trade-off that has produced coherent research results. 
7.2.5 The Question of the Limitation of Dichotomising the Data 
The programme relies on dichotomous splits; but a three or four-way split 
might have reduced the unexplained variance more than a two-way split. 
"This problem is partially resolved in that the program can split the 
same variable at the next iteration" (1). This is what happens in certain 
of the analyses of this resear~h, producing in these instances in effect 
trichotomous splits. Nevertheless" the initial choice of variable was on 
the basis.of a two-way split. Had a three-way split been possible to the 
programmes at this first stage, an alternative variable might have been 
'selected in preference. This we cannot know. 
. 7.2.6 The Question of Objectives 
What can be exprected of an AID analysis has. generated controversy. 
'Basically. the. process, is "descriptive", though that term has no precise 
,,- _. - • ,_ - r 
, . 
',- !Tleaning~ 'Theo'riginal Gallup Poll researchers, noting that AID "t'e'~ds ' 
to: b'e rather more ,descriptive than 'analytical" (6),' nevertheless drew,' 
.. -:- -'. 
very precise and quantified conclusions from their AID model for retail 
>, site location'~,as did Healdwhen representing these dat~ (7,8).' 
Regardless of the suspect direction of influence in the Gallup model (12) -',' 
-', 
the main objection to it that has been raised is that it is used as the 
basis for the specification of precise statistical relationships. The 
'Gallup researchers started with no precise hypotheses (although th~ act 
of including an indicator.i~plies a~ hypothesis). Variables chosen for 
inclusion in the AID programme were the six most significant as produced 
by the regression of 53 factors. Doyle has challenged the statistical 
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validity of this method of selection and also the procedure sequence. 
He is categorical that the use of AID is in suggesting the form of the 
relationships as a preliminary to regression analysis (11) - and he notes 
elsewhere that there are virtually no published AID applications in which 
AID is in fact so used (3). If not used as a preliminary to regression 
then alternatively, D0yle and Fenwick suggest, AID is used correctly if 
treated as "a simple descriptive device" 0). 
"Descriptive" and "analytical", however, are relative terms., It is not 
arguable that AID is not more descriptive than it is analytical in the 
'formal sense: unrepresented variables may be significant;' net effects are 
{ 
not obtained; splits maybe made on the basis of ma'rginal difference. in 
discrimination as between predictors. Nevertheless, if these factors 
, ' 
-are taken into account (and, in the case of the last ~actor, the degree 
of difference published)" then the AID process has a very considerable 
and very, va,lidpower to support; clarify or modi fy an 'hypothesis.,,' " 
- -
'. ~--.:' ~; .. -
." .-'<-
-e •• , ••••• _ -r ' 
~ . - • ~ ~ -v· ,,' '", 
-'.<- ./.-.' 
Staslin states that the AID researcher, wor'king with a sample,. has, 
, "inductivedy sear:chedfor new hypotheses" '(2) .-- Where, the cases 
constitute the univers~ he has done more than this. .~ID analysi~ can 
- , 
tell the truth.' Certainly where the sample is also the universe it 
'does tell the truth as in that instance. It can never teli'-'the whole, 
truth. , There are al ternati ve relationships that remain unexplored. 
This does not detract from the more exact description. provided by AID 
.of those relationships it has the ability to investigate. 
This is exemplified below. This is 'what is expected of it in this 
., 
research. 
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7.3 THE AID ANALYSES 
7.3.1 AID Analysis: The Hypermarket - Analysis 1 
The dependent variable chosen for analysis is SHY (IIHypermarket selling 
area per 1000 inhabitants 1973"). This was preferred as the unit of 
analysis for two reasons; (1) It is methodologically preferable to IHY, 
(2) It was predicted with much less accuracy than IHY by the regression 
procedure. On the argument that correlation has indicated the level of 
existing supermarket provision as being a major predictor of hypermarket 
provision, the supermarket indicator ISM4UPV was included in the first 
hypermarket AID run as an independent variable. The results of this 
AID analysis are shown in Figure 7.1. 
It can be seen that· the primary and crucial split is in fact m~de on 
the basis of existing supermarket provision: those regions that possess 
few supermarkets (less than one for every 25,000 inhabitants - subgroup 
'-. ' 2 - .,~ 
C): _~ave an average total bype~m~rket selling space of 2. Bm per 1000 
inhabitants; those regions that have more than' one supermarkei per~. _ 
25,000 inhabitants (subgroup 8) have an average total hypermarket-. -_. ~ 
- ,-2 . 
selling space of 21.3m per 1000 inhabitants. This split is of particular 
- .. 
interest in that it divides the sample into equal halves :"and this split 
alone explains 4l~~ of the total variation in hypermarket provision. 
, 
J 
Sub-gr'oup C (low supermarket provision/low hypermarket provision) in turn 
sub-divides o~ ~he- same criterio~, this time at a yet lower level of 
supermarket provision, in conjunction with an alternative criterion that 
is equally discriminating that of the female activity ratio for females 
of working age 1973. Where existing supermarket provision is very low 
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Figure 7.1 AID analysis by major [~rorie8nREGION6f infl~en8es on HYPERMARKET development 1973 
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\ 
(less than one supermarket for every 40,000 inhabitants) in these regions 
the percentage of working females is also low, 'and hypermarkets are" in 
consequence it may be argued of these two factors, virtually non-
2 
existant (an average of 0.5m per 1000 inhabitants).' In regions where 
supermarkets are more developed and the female activity ratio thus 
measured is over 35 percent, the similar average is 5.9m2 of hypermarket 
selling space per 1000 inhabitants. The split is again into almost equal 
halves, again decisive. 
Group B (above average supermarket provision and in general above average 
hypermarket provision) can be further subdivided into those regions with 
. , 
a major road network less dense than the European average (Group D) and 
those with a road network density above'the average (Group E) - 0.5 kms 
road per' k~2 of territory being approximately the European average. 
Hypermarkets are more prevalent in the latter regions, in the ratio 
of'2.~ to L 
" '-.-
\ ' 
-~ , ' 
;, ,..- -,. 
.' ' 
' .... ".-: --' 
," Where the 'major road network is dense (Group' E) and also where .iL'is, not· 
. - - ., -, . 
(Group D) ,regions in' ,both the~e secondary sub-groups can be further 
,distinguished, yet. again on the basis of the supermarket infrastructure 
but now at a higher level of provision: the split in both instances is 
... 
at 15,000 inhabitants per supermarket. The split of sub-group D is 
I 
I 
again categorical. Conditions are more conducive to hypermarket 
development by a ratio of five to one where supermarket provision is high 
in such circumstances. GroupH (many supermarkets) consists of the three 
regions of Denmark plus the five regions of Sweden. Of the two countries 
, Sweden has the higher level of hypermarket provision. The splitting of 
this:group in Group M (the three Danish regions) .and Group N (the five 
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Swedish regions) indicates that the reason for this difference is a yet 
further difference in existing supermarket levels combined with a 
difference in car-ownership levels. 
Where, at the tertiary level of the analysis, supermarket provision is 
not high (Group J), the combined fac~ors of road provision, road usage 
and population density are crucial. Where the population is small 
compared to the provision of major roads (indicative of a sparsely 
populated country and lack of road congestion - the opposite in effect 
of the conditions described in Box E), then in 1973 hypermarkets did not 
develop at all. The regions thus isolated are three of the four, 
Norwegian regions. 
Concentrating on the optimal path, however, we have already noted that, ' 
, Group E is further sub-categorised by the programme on the basis of the 
extent of supermarket-provision. The regions involved, however, split 
iden~Ically 'onfh.e' basis"' of' one bf the indicators ,of' j'uven,he' 'd~p'endency .... ,0,· .. ,,'.' 
- . - '- - -, : - ~ -- - - ': 
-
" -: ; ~ . " -. ~. , 
The-sequence~f c~nditio~s 'm6st :, '-,-' .the ,number of persons per· ,household. 
'" . favourable, to hypermarket development terminates thus In cell 'K, the 
final decisive factors being a high'level of supermarket provision and 
the small size of the average household unit, arguable' therefore the' 
fa~tor or'the "emancipated" housewife consumer \'tith fewer family ties. 
The two major regions thus highlighted are Belgian regions 
W~lloon region and Brabant. 
The . 
In summary, without an infrastructure of supermarket development, 
hypermarkets will not develop 6n any appreciable scale. Where this 
infrastructure exists, then the emergence of hypermarketing on a 
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considerable scale is higher where the density of major road networks is 
high. Where this is so and the number of children in the average family 
is small and supermarkets are highly developed, conditions are most 
conducive of all to hypermarket growth. In regions of low road density, 
however, considerable hypermarket development is possible where the 
supermarket infrastructure is very highly developed and car ownership 
is high. 
The predominant and pervasive importance to hypermarket development of 
" ," 
- . 
" .: 
~' .. 
{ I' 
. , 
.', .. 
the existing supermarket infrastructure is dealt with further in Chapter 8 • 
. Ther terminal location of regions is as follows, .(Subgroup reference 
letters refer to subgroups in Figure 7.1): 
Subgroup F. The eleven Italian regions, Ireland 
excluding the Eastern Planning Region, 
North Trade Region (Norway). 
-. 
.. ---:.'~".~--- ~:.·Sub·gr~up G. :Centre":Est' "(Fra~ce)ail the U'rilted 
" "" .. ' ,_ " """. Kingsom Standard Regions excludin'g 
, "West Midlands· and Northern Ireland." . 
Sub9:roup K., The Walloon Region, nBrabant (Belgium). 
Subgroup L. 'The Flemish Region (Belgium)~' Bassin 
. Parisien; Nord, Est, Ouest, Sud-Ouest, 
·Meditarranee (France). 
Subgroup M. The three Danish Regions. 
Subgroup N. The five Swedish Regions. 
... 
. ' ".' ~, .:~-:~.' 
',- :' 
_ Subgroup P'. Region Parisienne (France), West Midlands, 
Northern Ireland (UK), the Eastern Planning 
Region of Ireland. 
Subgroup Q. East Trade Region, Central Trade Region, 
West Trade Region (Norway). 
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The ignored importance of examining the BSS/TSS ratios of possible 
(, 
candidate predictors at each split has been emphasised in section 7.2.3 
above. This information in respect of this analysis is given in Table 7.2. 
It is seen that there are no examples of highly marginal splitting • 
. '/ ',' 
" ~, -" -, ". 
. .- . -': '. 
~, "-
, ,." 
; 
/ 
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Table 7.2. AID Analysis The Hypermarket I. 
BSS/TSS Ratios of Candidate Predictors at Each Split., 
BSS/TSS ratios of candidate predictors' 
Sub-group 
being Predictor/s selected Predictor/s 2 Predictor/s 3 
split 
A 0.41286 D.33477 2 0.27816 
, Inhabitants per SM Roads per km Disposable Income 
B 0.42728 2 0.26963 Roads per km Towns of 100,000 
D 0.68617 0.67003 0.63753 
Inhabitants per SM Cars 1970 GVA per inhabitant 
Cars 1973 Females working 
Household size 
,,' 
" 
-
., 
E 0.70119 0.63952 
. 
Inhabitants per SM Disposable Incom~ 
" 
, 
" 
-'" 
C 0.33562 0.32961 0.28894 
Inhabitants per SM Females in labour Unemployment 
Females 'working .: force . ' " , ' .. 
, .' 
, .. ,- '-', -~" 
- " 
" 
.. 
" ' . 
., 
--
.. ' ' 
" 
; 
" ' 
" . . 
" 
~: .,.. 
-, ... -,4-
. 
" 
,. 
" 
~ . ~. - .. ,- -" .~ -
'.' 
. , . ,.', 
, .- . 
., : 
.-
, 
.- ,,'-
',-
. 
., 
.-
-'(--: '. ~ .": . '. L' . '--":::~; .-:::~:~ . ' . 
,,-- ;: R ,- ' ":0.54280 . ' - -_~o- 0.36078 .- • - ~ - < • ' , .- . , , , , -: - -~- ;-: ' .~ - . -' - -, - :::- -, _ .. 
" Inhabitants ' -
.-
per SM Populatio~ d2nsity 
,Cars 1966 . ' .. : ' ~'. ,"". ' ... , , " Roads pe~ km '. 
.-
. 
--
',,, 
--
--Cars 1970 ' , ' . _.-. .. . ' .- .. . ' . 
" 
-" 
. . ,~ 
.. 
, . 
, ' 
-, .. 
.. ' 
.. 
'0.40043 
. , 
.' 
" 
.. 
" - - '-'~ - -' , .. 
--
,t •• ":1--.-• 
J 0.38811 .' 
PopUlation density Roads km 2 ',- .-per . - ~. 
.-
Roads per' :populaticin 0' iil agriculture ,0 
.... 
MVS per km road 
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7.3.2 AID Analysis: the Hypermarket - Alternative Analysis 
In an alternative approach to the analysis of hypermarket development, 
the factor of supermarket provision can be regarded as an intervening 
variable. If supermarket development is in turn a product of socioeconomic 
forces, it can be argued that one should try to relate these socioeconomic 
influences directly to hypermarket development ignoring the intervening 
factor of supermarket development. Accordingly an alternative AID anal-
ysis was made of influences on SHY, this time not including the factor of 
supermarket provision as independent variable. The results of this 
analysis are shown in Figure 7~2. The number of observations is increased 
to 52, since Switzerland, for which we have no regional supermarket data, 
can now be included. 
As seen in Figure 7.2, the first and decisive split is by the factor of 
individual "prosperity" as measured by "Disposable income per capita 1970". 
,Where this was low, below $1750 (Group B), the level of hypermarket 
:. clevelopmentls ,Tow; e~cept~in those regions of 'very lci\-i~'unemployment'tate"""", 
'-'.~_~,..,~ . .",.-.::-.- ,-~,~~,.-, :',-" ": ~<-<~,-- • ;:,,,:,-~, --:,: -:',.,-::' .-:~~- "»-,\- ':-,: ~-:.~"'=~-"'''.--->:>:",>-)~:-~,~ "~>'::/-;;-'-::: <-.. ,' 
from 1965 to 1973 - below 1.5~~ '(Group D). Over the two regions' in='tllis"'> 
Group hypermarket development was approximate'iy the European average. 
'. For the 31 regions with a higher le'vel of "prosperity" (Gro~p c),' th~' 
subsequent splits are of the greatest interest. Hypermarket· development 
is less likely to occur where there is an above average degree of urban 
concentration (Group G) - though this deterrent effect is less where 
high urbanisation is combined with very high historic car ownership 
(Group L). 
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:Figure 7.2 
,I,., . I' " 
AID anal~sis by major EuropeariRtGION of influences on Hypermarket development 1973 
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variance explained = 71.40% 
. , 
Where, above this given level of "prosperity", concentration of 
population into towns of 100,000 inhabitants and over is below average 
(Group F) but where overall population density is not low (Group S), 
then these are the conditions most favouring hypermarket growth -
particularly so if this is allied to the "female emancipation" factor 
of a low birth rate (Group P). Boxes P and Q suggest there may also be 
a maximum density for the ambient population itself, as affecting the 
rate of hypermarket growth. The split between Group P and Group Q only 
- ' 
marginally avoids incorporating all the three "high-hypermarket" regions 
of Belgium into Group P, since the Walloon region is only marginally 
excluded by the criteria break-points. 
" - ,. 
Where large urban concentration~ are uncommon and wher~ overall 
population density is particularly low (Group H), hypermarkets can still 
develop on a substantial scale if car-ownership is particularly high 
(~roup N).' If, however, gi ven thes~ circumstances, carmynership is 
','_ " • ~_ ,: _,' • ,. '" _. ,.' : • L _ ,_._: ,_ • - _ ~: • _'.: ... 
• ~~.,"--" • - -~ - ,:-- " .. ~., -~ .... ". ". -•• _-~ -.'" ~- '!..-,.. ", ---..,-.. .:;.:'," •• ~---;-'--:-•• , •• ~~-•• ~.:.:;,"'!-.:'=~:r,:"..~-'-:::~;:-.~-..... --.:--;----,'~_:':. .. 
-. ':~,t:iot high, arid pppulati(in~density and female:employment" are·~ow',. and --~~ ,'~ _ 
_ ".;-~ ___ .' .~-.:_~-:. .. : .... ~',~ ~ '-~_~;~-::.,.~,,' ..... _,.:.._;:J_._ :- •• ,;_.;,.', .... _.-~ J •• _, ::~.' •• ,_.:_~::~ •• ...-~.~ ;~'~''- ,,_ ,'_.:.~~-< .. -:-_ ;'=--;.'. 
, " ,.' iridlvlduai: prospe:dty is not':n~tably high,:;'-tii~ri hyperm~~k~t, de~'~lopment' :'" 
was lmI'ikely to occur 'at' ail (Group R) in 1973. , The three r,egions --
,without hypermarkets ln Group,R are Central Norway, North'Norway ~nd the 
:Gra~bund~n/Ticino region of Switzerland. . ~, .-Where, 'given the preceding 
factors, car-ownership is not hjgh, this is off-set; however,' as 
affecting hypermarket development by a high' female employment rate and 
high individual prosperity (Group S). ' 
Terminal location of regions is as follows (subgroup reference letters 
refer to subgroups in Figure 7.2): 
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. --' -...- , 
:. : 7-; _ :.. 
.;., "::' 
... - '- -', 
~ .., " .. _'; .. ".:::, 
.~ '".--::. - ~- -
. ~ ,'-
, - , 
Subgroup D. 
Subgroup E. 
Subgroup K. 
Subgroup l. 
Subgroup N. 
Subgroup P. 
Ouest (France), South East (UK) 
Nordest, Centro, Sicilia, Sardegna, 
Abruzzi-Molise, Campania, Sud (Italy), 
the two regions of Ireland, ten of the 
U.K. Standard Regions (not S.E.). 
lombardia, Nord-Ouest, lazio, Emilia--
Romagna (Italy), Greater Copenhagen 
(Denmark), East Trade Region, West 
Trade Region (Norway). 
Region Parisienne, Mediterranee (France), 
West Sweden, South East Sweden, Greater 
Stockholm (Sweden). 
East of the Great Belt (Denmark), Bass in 
Parisien, Sud-Ouest, Centre-Est (France) 
North Sweden, mid-Sweden.-
Brabant, the Flemish region (Belgium), 
Bern/Basle (Switzerland). 
_ Subgi6up Q. - Walloon region (8elgiu~), Nord (France), --
Zurich/tuzern"St. Gallen (Switzerland). 
Subgroup R. 
Subgroup S. 
- ; .-
,_:':,':.' 
. ,,-:-.. , 
Central Trade Region, Northern Trade Region 
(Norway), Graubunden/Ticino (Switzerland). 
West of the Great Belt, (Denmark), 
Est (France) 
-, '~, -
_ .. i: .-:,'_ -, ~ -,--,." --_",~~' ',_ '-~ ~ .. -~:..'" --.-, 
-
j 
, 
! 
.~ , 
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Table 7.3 The H ermarket 2. 
of Candidate Predictors at Each Split. 
BSS/TSS ratios of candidate predictors 
Sub-group r-------------------------------------------------------~ being 
split 
A 
C 
F 
",'J, 
G 
'--", 
, , ,', --', ' 
,B 
M 
Predictor/s selected 
0.20851 
Disposable Income 
0.13712 
Towns of 100,000 
0.30925 
Population density 
0.25121 
Births 1973 
0.79027 
Cars 1966 
. 0.31362 
, Unemployment 
0.94151 
, Female ~~ labour 
force 
GVA per inhabitant 
PopUlation density 
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Predictor/s 2 
0.19472 
Towns 100,000 
0.12860 
Roads per km2 
Predictor/s 3 
0.16791 
Roads per km2 
0.11036 
Cars 70 ' 
0.22348 0.21289 
% in Agriculture," MUS per km"road 
0,.19104' 
Household size 
-'.". :': 
0.63086 
Females working 
0.50095 
Disposable Income 
0.28957 ,0.22237"',,, 
Roads per 1,000 '., :: Female ~~ labour 
popUlation force 
0.41845 
. Cars 1970 
Cars 1973 
Unemployment ./ 
The BSS/TSS ratios of possible candidat~ predictors are given in Table 
7.3. It can be seen that only·in the case·of the sub-divisio~ of Grou~" 
H can the programme split be considered marginal. An examination of the 
regions involved shows that a split by the rejected criterion would have 
made little difference to the subsequent analysis in this instance. 
7.3.3 AID Analysis: The Supermarket 
The supermarket data were subjected to AID analysis (1) as an exercise 
'complete in itself (2) to help explain the supermarket ~ariable when 
this is included as an independent variable in the Hypermarket analysis. 
The dependent variable chosen for analysis is ISM4UVP ("Inhabitants per 
:s,~lf~'service unit of 400m2 ~mdover,' including supermarkets in vCiriety 
anCJ de'partment· stores, 1.1.1973"), 'since here we h"ave the'largest .' ... 
number of observations. Although this indicator includes hypermarket' . 
units, it is effectively, as we have seen an indicator of supermarket 
-. " 
',- ":...:~; '. .,:·.--:;jirovision.· " .",".- .. ':'" 
\::~ -~'~.~ -::~~' ... :-: <: .~, 
,. -l'"., ,~-
. - ~ '-
~ . '-~.~:~~-' ,.:~~-:.~""-
.----' ',--.-':'~:.:-"';:' ... ' _ "--.-:~~~ ~ 
.'>.: ,The results ·of the' analys{-s 'are 'shown in figure 3.·' it: can· be seen 'that' 
--.the decisive split is one based on average individual prosperity as" 
measured by the' indicator "Gross Value Added per 'inhabitant 1970". 
~ .. '.. ~" " ' . :' -,' . >0
4 , .- , 
.This splitseparat~s from £~e"rem~inin~ r~ciions the six regions where 
.the GVA per inhabitant expressed in dollar equivalent~ was"-:less than 
, 
$1500. The six regions so segmented are the Italian Community Regions 
. : 
l 
of Sicilia, 'Sardenga, Abruzzi-Molise, Campania and Sudwith in addition 
Ireland excluding the Eastern Planning Region. ' Over all the 63 major 
regions analysed, the average number of inhabitants per supermarket 
was 43,500 in 1973. Distinguishing regions into "prosperity" groups 
as above produces a dramatic differentiation •. The average' for Subgroup B 
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Figure 7.3 Aid analysis by major European> REGION of influence on Supermarket development 1973 
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Total variance 
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12 
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4 .... 1___ --1 
, " 
., . 
. ( 
(low "prosperity") is 221,800 inhabitants per supermarket. The average 
. for Subgroup C (high "prosperity")' is 24,700 inhabitants per supermarket.. 
The six regions (Group B) of the first split, those with low "prosperity" 
and very low supermarket development, are further distinguished by the 
analysis on the basis of the density of their road networks. Those with 
low road density in terms of major road provision (Group D) have a 
greater degree of supermarket development than where the road network is 
more developed (Group E). It is di fficult to interpret this and the small 
numbers of regions involved make it perhaps not meaningful. 
The majority of regions (57· regions) have a "GVA per inhanitant" rating' 
of over $1500. 'These can then themselves be 'split int·o those regions 
. where the average annual unemployment percentage 1965-:1973 was under 2.4~~ 
and those in which it was above this figure. Where unemployment is low 
_: (Group F) the average'number Qf"inhabitants per superma~ket is 18,800; ." 
." 
., ' 
.' ...... . ,' .. '. ··.:::::::/~b:~~~~~;·(::r!n:fd;::}re::::pki:~; :::~:r::t::U::v~~~v~~~lj··: ••. 
. . . 
- : ~. . - . 
ised stJortage of labour and t~e resultant increasing cost of labour. as 
important "push" factors propelling the retailer to self-service and 
.' , Y • ~ :. - -
.. supermarket development. .' The' preferential split on "unemployment''' . 
. ~upports this hypothesis. 
. . , 
'" 
'. 
Where unemployment is relatively high, by 1965-1973 standards, the effect 
on supermarket development is less in areas of low agricultural employment 
(Group H) than in areas of high agricultural employment '(Group J). 
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In summary, there is a minimum "prosperity" cut-off below which 
supermarkets will not develop on any appreciable scale. In 1973 this 
.. 
minimum was $1500 of gross value added per inhabitant (1970). Above this 
minimum cut-off point the decisive factor is level of unemployment. 
Where unemployment is high, however, the retrograde effect on supermarket 
develo~ment is less in urban-oriented than in agriculturally oriented 
areas. 
The terminal location of regions is as follows (subgroup reference letters 
to subgroups in Figure 3): 
Subgroup D. Sicilia, Sardegna (Italyl~ Ireland 
excluding Eastern Planning Region. 
Subgroup E. Abruzzi=Molise, Campania, Sud (Italy). 
Subgroup F. Greater Copenhagen East of the Great 
Belt, West of the Great Belt (Denmark), 
Flemish Region, Brabant (Belgium), the 
. I 
, ,.~,;" ". :- ,,' " 8Zeat of. France', the. ,9.Lander' ·of Germany, -:". ", 
... .. ~ ~"'~"'-': .. .-:'.. .,··.·::East Trade .Regi.on;::.W~st Trade .. RE19iol'"1·;·<::-'~'~/.:,:, . 
', .. '" .' .':~ ':-'''>'>::'''''~ __ ....... ~.: ... ' ... ,.', :' '.":': f;:entr:af"Trade R~gi?~, (Norway ),. Mid~Sw.e~~f)",,," 
"', ""~-'~"':'> :c," '.c'·" .' "":'.' "''',::'West Nederland,- ZUldwest-Nederland ; .... ,. '. ~:.:. 
. . ,. . ,', Zuid-Nederland, Oost-Nederland, East Austria', - - - --' :. 
-,', 
.. " - '.' 
" ,-
... _', 
. .West Austria, Yorkshire and Humberside, . , 
••• ~.> East ~lidlands, EasfAnglia, S~'L'" S. W. ,(U~'K:) ~: 
Subgroup H., 
Subgroup J. 
Lombardia, Nord-Ouest, Lazio (Italy), Eastern' 
Planning Region of Ireland, Walloon'R~gion 
(Belgium), North Sweden, North, Northwest, 
Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland (U.K.) -
Noord-Nederland. .: -', 
Nord-Est, Centra, Emilia-Romagna (Italy)~ 
North Trade Region (Norway). 
The BSS/TSS'r~tios of candidate predictors are given in Table 7.4 •. 
There are no examples of marginal splitting. 
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Table 7.4 ~A~ID~~~~~ __ T~h~e~S_u~e~rm~a~r_k~e~t 
BSS of Candidate Predictors at Each Split 
BSS/TSS ratios of candidate predictors 
Sub-group 
being Predictor/s selected Predictor/s 2 Predictor/s 3 split 
A 0.67616 0.63929 0.61451 
GVA per inhabitant Unemployment Cars 1970 
B 0.52349 0.39231 0.37649 ' ' 
Roads per km2 Population per Population density 
agricultural'land Towns of 250,000 
Unemployment 
C 0.32962 0.28562 0.23258 
Unemployment :GVA per inhabitant Females working 
- , G ' 0.56626 0.41579 " 
-
, , 
% in Agriculfure Females working -"- ' - .. --
-- , 
~. '.~-- :..~: --
'" '.. ":.,,-'~:'.'V.: :>_'._ ','_-: ~~ .. .., -'_' .. ,;:. ~'.~ .... ~ -"._~' ,:~._. * = .... --::. ~ '." - .... - -.,*<.:_'::- ~ .~ .:~~_~"': . 
:-:'::A mo'redetaffed-'evai~atlori 'of: the'major"findlhg~ of'the'-,AID and, 
'.. ~. ~ *'" - ~ , 
.., " .~,. :<~:" '\ '~_."~:'::""':"~'<:;'~' ,," ~":;:- -. :: ... ·L ~ '~-'~ •• ~ •• :,,~-.:,,:,_ 
"-:correlafionanaiysesis contained in thapt'er'8~-" " 
'-",' 
" '-1 . '.-
. .-
-! 
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CHAPTER 8 
FINDINGS THAT CONTRADICT GENERALLY ACCEPTED HYPOTHESES 
8.1 Many of the research findings in this project support, refine or 
amplify currently generally accepted hypotheses. Particular points in 
this respect are discussed or listed in Chapter 9.- Two important factors 
however, emerge as dominant in this research, as crucial in determining 
hypermarket incidence - the causative factor of-the existing level of 
supermarket incidence, and the factor of optimum population concentration. 
In both these cases the findings of this research contradict widely-
: accept~d theories. __ These therefore -are discuss~d in this chapter. 
8. 2-THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN- HYPERtvlARKET DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF 
EXISTING SUPERMARKET PROVISION 
-'-. -- - --' -:, /Th-~ h-YP~~h~~i~::~6~'~hy~e~~ar~e{_ de-v~i·~p~ent'· ~-s;,;-the -l:ci~i~~i\~xie~~_i~:~~'~'~ f.:-:> _ ~.~-.:;­
."~' .'·'su~'ermark:t' ~~v~idpm~~t, (sec~~~Cri'~:i2jisJirml ~;~p;~~~e~~; £he ' ~o;rWat;on 
,-
l . analysi~ (se~tio~ 3.~2 (9)). It'-is :a-lsosupported decisive.lx in the first 
- -" ~ ~ ~, '.. . - ' . 
.. - --,~'. ~"~~,'~.:--
AID analysis -(Fi6~re 7.1). The total of 47-regions is divided in the 
first split· into two numerically equal halves. Ther~gions with low 
supermarket provision have extremel y low hypermarket prov is,ion. -Those 
' .... 
regions with a substantial supermarket infrastructure are those in which i 
I 
. . 
hypermarkets have developed on a very considerable scale - not in every 
, . -
~ , .. '-
instance, but_ quite positively in general across these regions. The 
subsequent tree splits four times on the basis of existing supermarket 
provision as the preferential variable. This therefore is consistently 
the prime decisive influence. 
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This finding is contrary to much conjectural writing, particularly in the 
U.K. The contrary hypothesis, which when proposed has not previously 
been disputed, is this: hypermarkets are most likely to develop in those 
areas where the existing retail structure for food is uncompetitive and 
prices are high; these conditions obtain where supermarkets are not 
strongly developed. 
We have seen from the Thorpe Studies in Caerphilly and Yorkshire that the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the brief glimpses into the relation-
ship between hypermarket location and previous ambient retail structure 
provided by catchment area studies are specific to the particular 
locations chosen for study and contradictory. The catchment area studies 
of Thorpe and McGoldrick produced contradictory evidence on this question 
(C~apter'2,_section 2.4~6):Hypermarkets developed in South Wales' from a 
base of existing supermarket provision; in Yorkshire they developed in 
a retail. environm~nt characterised by small~hops. Such observations 
, '. 
~'which to, generalise. Subsequently,- however·,'.Thorpe, using aggregate, 
. -- - '-".' 
-'.'. ~ - .. 
,data, correlated superstore ·provision by county. in Britain in 1977, 
1961 (1), ,in order to confirm the following hypothesis: 
Superstore and hypermarket innovation accords with McNair's 
"Wheel of Retailing" theory: innovators, gain entry to the 
market on the basis of an offered price 'advantage •. This is 
the prime attraction of hypermarkets. "Theoretically such 
new outlets could be expected to develop where they would 
. experience maximum comparative advantage. This would be in 
areas where prices were highest and where the least modern 
shopping facilities existed. In British terms such areas 
can be considered to be those where ~upermarket development 
proceeded least rapidly". 
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, The relationship of superstore provision in 1977 with supermarket 
--: .. ~ 
provision in 1961, as graphed by Thorpe, is shown in Figure 8.1 • . Thorpe 
comments that his hypothesis is thus supported: 
"Excluding three exceptional areas: Monmouth, Northamptonshire 
and Hertfordshire - all lying at least two standard deviations 
from the regression equation for the remaining 24 counties -
statistically 34% of the variation between counties in the amount 
of superstore floorspace in 1977 per head of population can be 
shown to be related to the number of supermarkets per million 
people trading in each county in 1961. The slope of the equation 
corresponds to the hypothesis with superstore floorspace being 
inversely related to the number of supermarkets. The exceptional 
areas all include either new towns or major town expansion schemes. 
Hampshire is the next most exceptional county. ' In 1961 it was ' 
characterised by a large number of supermarkets following the 
post-war reconstruction of Southampton and Portsmouth. In 1977 
it had been colonised by Carrefour, Woolco, Asda and an Internat-
ional Stores superstore."· 
- , ",'.' -~ 
-One would, make three comments on' this ,conclusioll:", ,0' '," ',' ',:: 
"'" ," , 
(1) to relate superstore provision in 1977 with supermarket provision 
1,6 years ~efore is to employ too long ,a time _ span i.1J a ,study of, " ,', 
3ea~~~··~~"~~~ffec~.;.}b3~~td,~te;~j~'"~f;~i~:tt;~~~ig~~;~~:~~~:~~·:~,ljK;2:i: 
Census of Distributio~ data are avai~able for, ttlaf. 'year.' ': How,~~er, '0 ,: , ;:"::' 
: '. . ~. " ~ ~.' - . - ~ .. ~ . ~ ; - . ~ 
• -=- .~_ '. • -.~._ "'_ "'~_' ;,. ,;; .••. ':. -. '"- _. -'J._ .'~' • 
at the.end pf 197.0 "there ,were prily.,24: sup~rstores ,in Gr~at" ~r~f.ain ,: 
~ ,. ., .:' :~ ": 
and supermarket data derived from the 1971 Census of Distribution 
_ .. "-; .. ,: . .:-.: 
would have been usable,for Thorpe's purposes and perhaps have 
, ~, , 
provided a more releyant base for the supermarket, vanable. ' ',' , 
However, the choice between the two dates is arguable. Neither 
r': 
. ' 
is optimal; 
(2) many counties other than the "exceptional" counties noted, have 
new towns or major town expansion schemes; 
(3) Thorpe does list other influential factors in British superstore 
location: the fact that the innovators, in particular Asda, 
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Figure 8.1 Correlation of Superstore Sales Area 1977 with Supermarket 
Provision 1961, by County in Great Britain: Thorpe's Analysis 
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happened to be based in the north; and the fact that "planning 
permissions have been easier to obtain in some areas rather than 
others". 
This last is arguably the crucial factor in explaining the pattern of 
Thorpe's data. The main reason given by planning authorities as grounds 
for the refusal of superstore planning applications is the effect the 
proposal is likely to have on existing shopping centres (2). Therefore, 
approval for any new retail development is less likely to be given 
where existing retail outlets are considered already to meet the 
customers' needs. In particular, as regards superstore applications, 
this means where High street supermarkets are already established and 
,successful and are maintaining the vitality of the High street ,-and, 
:,not unimportantly, paying _High Street rates~ For local authorities _ have 
, _ large sums of money invested in the High Streets (in the case of 
__ , ,Birmingham, a direct and indirect investment producing a _ capi tal ,debt" ~:-- -~ ~,~, - ",- ::':;_,:-~<,/:~J~;;;:,i~ :,-~ ::,:'.-:J<,- , , __ .:, '.- ~:j./:" ::::,:A'~?i;>n;:7::.:'/~,,~;:..:;;~~Y~~:~~~i\L/Y<,:,:21:;; 
:,:' <:'~--,':":,:it;was -said'; oL£300millicll). in 1970(3))._ They,are::'reluclant to~~have "":-'-.::,;' '--
. ,: ~:< ,-' ",-. ',- ,':'f: __ '~ - --:::>,,) ::::::::~':'(,:, :::"':''''~':?{:~:,::::::~~,{,i, :~:;:-~' ,':,,~;,;<~,::-:!-;.'~':;~;0:~:;:-;'-::::-::,,::\,>:rl;:'il;J::';:~::-:' , 
-~ - :. ~the value of such investment eroded ~'and a major ijeterminant-of High' 
- ~ , '. ': ..... . ;. ~ . .. ~; "' .. 
=- -- .~ 
S~reet viability is a strong supermarket presence.-
Britain are not located by management decision at places that maximise 
~ their tradin'g ~dvantages, as Thorpe's hypothesis mai~t~i-~s. - Th;y'~'-r~ 
',located, 'at least in effect, by the planning authorties. - 'Tt is common 
- i 
I 
knowledge that superstore-operators submit many simultaneous superstore' 
applications in various parts of the country in the hope of getting at 
least one approved. - This at least maintained during most of the 1970's. 
An attempt was made in this research, in the light of this, to classify 
U.K. regions according to the number of superstore applications 
submitted - approved or rejected. It was thought this would indicate 
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those areas that were seen by participant retail managements to be the 
most ,suitable for hypermarket operation - in other words, the areas 
" 
where hypermarkets and superstores would actually develop in the total 
absence of any planning constraint. Even this approach was abandoned. 
It was considered invalid by Asda executives. These pointed out that 
there were very many areas in the country in which they would most 
certainly like to operate, in respect of which they did not even submit 
applications - exploratory discussions with the planning authorities 
, having convinced them it would be a simple waste of time and money to 
do so. 
Thorpe's hypothesis, even if valid, cannot be subst~ntiated if confined 
to one area of rigorous planning control - and the U.K., together with 
Italy, had the tightest planning control in Europe, up to 1973 (as 
. , .... , .. 
, ' 
emphasised in Table 6.1). If valid, however, Thorpe's hypothesis should 
be able to be supported by an analysis of ,the relationship between, 
, ,' .. ~'~ ',:'" "hyperma~ket' and "~u~ei~~rk~t :d~~e~'~p~ent:,{~>much :~(,ih'e~~~~t<6~,'w~~~e~;~,'~: <>: " 
> , ~ ~ :~~~. >~.:: . ~~ :~') '::. ~'. __ -~~ .!- - :~, -' :.' >:~- ::' ~-:_ -.- '- ~:: • ~~;~.: -' :'~ ~ ~;-l: ~::: ~ ":" . _~ .~~. ;~: ~-__ .,~-:i ~~~~;; _ '-.: . :: .. :':-:-: /:.~~~::; . __ i~.-~:~_~:~~ ";:'~f~~ .:" :~\:;'~·J~i:;.~~~~' ;:-:.: :' .... '~ - . 
~.,: ,c c :': ,:". > ';, ,;, ,; Europe ',: '. in ,cparticu).ar' 'in, BelgIum~" Trance,~ Germany arid: Sp.ai!lwhe're; :,:'::: ',:,_: ::, 
'-,-,- ..... """"". ,._ . .., .' ".' - - /-. .- -:.- .". _.-'. ~- -. - -'., - - '.' , - -,~ - . 
• -, .' ,', _. _ ..'. .. • ... • •• > A ~ " ," 'r '._' •• _. 
: .::, ':, up to 19.73, planni'ng control was virtually non-existant',(Table/6~1). 
- " - - ." . -~,_._. :-~-- _ , . __ -'---v..--~_~~.,--<.::---.':.'--:.~" 
~ The comparative strictness of planning control is a function of . 
, : envitonmental factors; a~d the data on hypermarket' and supermarket' 
relationships only become valid if ge~eralised across Eurbpe as ~ 
whole. Thorpe's hypothesis is not substantiated generally in Europe 
, , 
not by the high positive correlation of concurrent supermarket and 
hypermarket indicators noted in 'this project, nor by the AID analysis. 
On the contrary, the opposite hypothesis is supported that hyper-
markets develop as a logical trading progression in regions that have 
a strong base of supermarketing. 
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The hypothesis that areas where supermarkets are weak are the areas 
most susceptible to hypermarket development is not a new one and pre-
dates Thorpe, though Thorpe may be the first to attempt to -validate' 
it using aggregate data. It has long been implicit in British 
'''marketing mythology". It derives originally from the attempted 
explanation of why hypermarketing should have originated in France (in 
general terms, if not in precise fact: the first European hypermarket 
was the Super Bazar of the Grand Bazar d'Anvers opened in Bussels in 
1962), and then developed rapidly there. In the early 1970's there 
was considerable speculation that the different retail structure in 
Britain might prevent the successful exportation of the poncept'to 
'this country. The basis of the argument is (or rather was: it has now 
been abandoned): British grocery trade is dominated by an efficient 
system of supermarkets which keep prices ,row. - -Hype-rniarkets therefore 
, , , ,-' ..... - '. 
would not be able to offer a substantial price advantage. It was argued 
that the situation ,was and is entiEely different to the situation_fn 
, <-- >-::}ian6e';--: Si'n~e,:jr~~ce ' had -'n'~':, ~~perma;ket -i~ f~ast-r-uct~i~ ;~:"-: lri'i9;i 'f~~ , ' -
.:, >:~::'i'~~:t~~c-~:,.~d'~-f~c~g :t~~-- e~~~~'r}'~a~"'-E'a~tl:~'i;~~;':-~~~~: c~~~~~~~-u~~)~.:;~p:r/~Y~~~\6g' 
~. --'.. ' ' .. " -'-.; -:;;. ..' --
~?~build t~E<n~sf_.U.K._liyp.e,~rTlar:ke~, r:nuch.~~rt~e. de?ate 'was :'co~c~'~ned , '_' 
- -
. . 
with whether or not the French hypermarkets had, in fact, produced any 
really sustained general price reduction. The Financial Times commented: 
. - . -
. , -
"But, given the very different retail structure in Britail=l, this is' not 
. ."'" , - - ~ 
the issue. The issue is whether the hypermarkets can do better than 
'existing ~~permarket competi ti on I' • (4)- , 
.. 
-', 
The anonymous quotation that "retailing in France moved from the corner 
shop direct to the hypermarket, then started filling in the supermarket 
gaps "has become a U.K. marketing cliche." Smith maintains it: "France 
would appear to have missed a whole evolutionary stage in retailing, 
namely the multiples and the supermarkets". (5) 
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The proposal of under provision of supermarkets in France in the mid-
1960's and the consequent progression direct to hypermarketing is". 
supported_by Smith by the statistic that there were 'only 754 supermarkets 
in France in 1966. At the end of 1966, however, Britain, with a 
population larger than France, possessed 753 supermarkets (6). It may 
or may not be that supermarkets in 8ritain were more efficient and 
effective in price r'eduction than the supermarkets in France. Whether 
they were or not, they were not more thick on the ground; and the 
. proposal of a logical progression from supermarketing to hypermarketing 
stimulated by trading economics and customer acclimatisation, is not 
'contradicted by a comparison of the U.K. and France. In addition', it 
needs to be said that by 1974 supermarket~ were still more numerous 
"' .. 
proportionate to population in France than in Britain ~ by which time 
France posses~ed in addition~.not in lieu,. proporti9nately more' 
hypermarkets than Britain by a factor of four and more hypermarket 
. selling space by .~. factor of six •. And, ignoring this va,st additional 
.... ~:"': j. hyper'~ai~k~~ ·~~~vis.i ~n', :'in. ~~7~ '~~e" ~verage iii"e' o~, ~he , iupermar~':'~~:: :'>" '.' 
: "; .... ,;.i~:,·,\:-::;:· ,:.'C::)'.:~;'::<~ .. ;~~~.;~.~~.' . > -," --;'~::"',~ ;,:,:.'-'5,,', ~~:::"~\");;:::C':)-?\;'·~\:}'::';;~\;;:.,~!};/0!::;.{,?"~>~:~·-:··\/"::2< 
" ,',' as such in.Trance was still marginally larger" than that' of the U.K. • 
, - '" ~ - ~ '~ ., .:supe~rn~r~~.~.: ~ .. W:~ t6·.",~;·.q5· s'qu~~~ 'm~ires.·: .~'~ '.~,e~li~~. ~p.~e~~· prov,f~i?~ .. ~erc.>, ':' .:,' 
100 inhabitants compared with the U.K. figure of 2.95 square metreE? 
>y~t' i d~ 'not think i'thas' 8ve'r' been sugg~sted that 'B~it~in' "~issed' a 
.. whole eVCllutionar:Y stage in retailing". ',.' 
Van Musschenbroek maintained lri1972 in The FinanciaITi~es:' 
"In a country like France the hypermarket represents a 
sudden awakening in the field of distribution after decades 
of almost total inactivity ... (and, even as late as 1972) 
total self-service stores still represent less than 40 per 
cent of the total food-grocery business in France, against 
70 per cent in the U.K." (7). 
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Unfortunately Van tvlusschenbroek is quoting a "percentage of food sales" 
figure for France and a "percentage of grocery sales" figure for the 
U.K. In tvlarch 1972 self-service store sales as percent 'ofa11 food 
sales in Great Britain were 43 per cent (8)'sf-lf-service shares of total 
grocery trade were quoted by Nielsen in 1974 to be respectively: France 
83.6 per cent; Great Britain 75.4 per cent (9). 
It is true that Britain did possess in the mid-1960's more of the 
2 ' 
smaller self-service food shops (those below 400m ) than did France; 
though less proportionate to population than Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, 
Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Denmark and Austria. The overall 'picture 
in certain of these countries ,as at the end of 1967 is given in Table 8.1. 
",. ",-'-
: Total provision for Great Britain is slightly understated, si~ce the 
2 
statistic in the. "400 m +" category is the prev~ous year's figure. 
Ignoring:the size of store, at the end of 1967 Britain had, proportionate 
-'-4-' .' _ • "'_- '-. "~' ,-. ;-: ... _ •• - - __ :" ,; - > _ -. ~ ' . .-~.--=--:~ ,-!~:--~"~~_:,;, .'~<_~.~:.~J ',-, .-' 
.· .. :.to pop·ur"atlon,:more.self-seivi~~:·f~o·d shop~'"as such'than France' by'3··:·.·· ,~~:.,:~. 
': .~' ~~='.~-~ -.. ~-~. _-'~~": -,~: : ~~·::\-~';;~:-',::-i>~· ~-:~'-, ~:~:~,~ -.:.~:~.:;_:~.~>-~~~.~;.~)~~~~~:--; :~--: ~~_ J-- ~ ~,~-.-_~ '~-..;~;~-~ :.~~~;~.-; :~' .;'-:,: ~- ~~.:}~/~~.~~-:,:.~:~~;:,-~:£~.~~:~:_~:.~;: ~~~!;,.~:~_~.~~-~: ~'-~~:~C~~~ 
.': ~.atio of L 3~ tq L' 'Conside'ring only. those stores over 100 s.quare metres ,." 
~:~~~ ,~--- : ·.-_ .. _~ ;,.<: .-,:'<--:""-:-l~,:-._; ~.' ':~-. "':";-'7_ ,.-~~-.-.-, • .: .. ~--~ .... -... : __ .:_~ -;-.. _,:~':. __ ~, , ... :~:, __ : 
: :.' '(~hich ~s a' :,q~a-rter' of the' si~~:--'required \0" qu'all fy as a "sup'er'market ,,'" "'. 
-' .• ~-: '~:-.'. ~ '-:' ,;~-~-. -;' - :-:~~-~ ..... ~.~ -. ,- ~~- .- -,~ -"~":.. ~-~.:~ ":-~'"-~_·T·" :.:- "~.-- : ... --' -'. '"~ .~ ,::" .:;: .. ) ~;~ .•. :::: --". -'-.:_='-~_ -.. -- ,- I': -_-':"-
~s defin~d generally in Europe), provision in G~eat Britain again e~ceeds 
. prOVision in France by the same ratio- of 1. 3 to 1. ~Th'e difference' is . 
~arginal - ce~tainly marginal ~he~'comparedto the six to'one difference 
, betwee'n Sweden and Great Britain in the provision of such units. Where 
.: . 
it is possible to dissect at an upper size level (at 400 square metres 
a~d over )'p;~~ision in' France i~ higher than' in Britain. It is there-
fore logical to suppose that if comparative statistics were available 
of self-service units of over '200 square metres (which approximates to 
the minimum requirement of 2000 square feet that formed the base of 
- 261 -
" 
I;~, "I', , 
, :1~ '~;':/I;r: _: '~" 
Table 8.1 Self-Service Food Store P~~vi~i'oh by Size Categories~ Europe. 31.12.1967 
" 
99m 2 Inhabitants , -. 
Per 
S.S. Food 
Store , 
Nos. 
Austria 1,463 ': 3147 
.. 
Belgium 5,615 720 
France 3,885 10,701 
G.B. 2,957 9,472 
Italy 24,113 109 
Netherlands 1,804 4,831 
.' 
" 
~. Sweden 925 3,107 
. ' 
(1) Figure for previo~s year. , 
N 
0\ 
N 
0' 
,0 
of " 
total 
73.2 
38.0 
68.9 
59.2 
14.7 
66.'0 
35~9 
' < • 
, 1-' 
-- . 
. ' 
" t· ' , 
,.;'-' 
, .: :~1. ";1 
ioci:'-:~: 399m 2 400 2· .. 100 m + Total 
. '" 
nos 
" 
' 0' "0 1 (=100%) " 
.' 
" : ,0 ,0 
.'; , . , 
'of of, ~' ' 
" 
Nos.",' :\-'total , Nos. total Nos. 
" 
:, ',,,' ' 
" .. 
1 , 
":,,,,:,',', ! " 
1,114, 
': ~:.z5~, 9 " 39 ; 0.9, 4,302 1~153 , 
, , 
, .' 
':'. , 
:::,:;:{ 0 : 950·. , ,", . 
" 
210 11.0 1,88~ 1,160 
, . 
';?d,:,," 
" 
. ' "'" 
,,( l-'l' 
3,947, : :",~i5·.:4 895 5'.7 15,503 4,842 
. :' (1 ' , '-:" , , .'. . -- ~ 
',; , 
752(1) ". 5,776' ':;,36.1 4.7 16,000 6,528 
" 
.' 
, 
, i'/:'-
" • ' .~ ! • • 
" '~;:~8:l~'::" 358 ' , 274 36.9 741 632 ,. 
',.', 
" 
,,:':: ;,: ' , 
~ :, ' " ' ,,, 
2,241 
.:,:'\ :;-30'.6:; , 248 3.4 7,320 2,489 
' .. ,' /Til;;, , ,::. " 'I', " /t, 
, , 
" ! : ~ ~ , 
4,915:: , )::~·56. 7 'I , 741 , 8.4 " 8,823 5,656 :!~!;.>. :;::,:' 
, 
.. :' 
Organisation, Cologne (10). 
... 
, .,-
~ 
2 Inhabitants m + 
Per 
0' 5.5 . Food 
,0 Store2 of 100 m + total 
26.8 6,323 
" 
62.0 8,190 
31.1 10,343 
40.8 8,425 
85.3 85,348 
34.0 5,087' 
65.1 1,391 
1_. 
, ~,: " , 
/ 
the British definition of "supermarket" at that time) provision in 
Britain would have been greater than in France by a ratio of less than 
1.3 to 1. The British definition of 2000 square feet was peculiar to 
that country. Elsewhere in Europe it was not considered that economics 
of scale could exist or a full assortment be provided at that size. 
The lasting consequences in respect of the British conception of the 
relative status of British supermarketing of the different and 
idiosyncratic definition of "supermarket" that has historically been 
applied in Britain are considered below. Whichever definition is 
applied, however, at and before the birth of the hypermarket in Europe, 
supermarket development in France was comparable to supermarket 
,,' development in Britain.' 
market infrastructure and that in Britain supermarkets were more 
.' , 
:'. 
" '~developed th~~ ~l~ewher~ ~n: Eu~op~ 'der'i ~~~ ·.~~;hap's:· i~ : p~rt - fro'~: fht ' "".~.-
' .. ' ·;···.·.'i,:: ;c:,s~oc~':H£~ :,~i ,! :,,~pe{~ar~~t'.~\Fh;.-i~,nat ~ b~~~'~rDc eiy,,,~;t~'si:o;~';~~~;,; ";';'!fE~¥;C 
is' ,irlStin~ti~~ ~~' Brit"ain. " In Brit~in: i:h~ "two are, in effect,'largely'-,·::~.' 
has,onlY,one truly national multiple grocery group, Casino. 
~ .... - ~.' 
" . ~ ~ ",.:.l' • 
- ~ .... '~ 
A~' impo~tarit. p'art' of the reason, however, is .. statistical.'· For most', 
years, the use of the traditional. U. K. definition based on a "2000 
square feet minimum" requirement more than doubles the number of U.K. 
"Supermarkets" as compared with a calculation based on the International 
Self Service Organisation (1550) definition that demands a "400 square 
metre minimum"'. The latter is the definition applied in most of Europe, 
. including France. In 1974, for example,; using the British definition, 
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,,,";-i.' 
~. - ' . .-
, . 
• ~ .... " .. 1,' ''I _.,·,",.:A· :''''_'': ~ 1 '1'-' I<J>!, ">'ti7 -'P :'" '-~ I 
there were 5840 supermarkets in Great Britain. Using the 1.5.5.0. 
definition, there were 2469 (11). The ratio of the difference would 
..... 
be considerably greater in resp~ct of eariie~ yeari. Though the: .. 
di fferences in definition are now officially abolished, it was as late . -'., , 
, , 
as 1974 that the Institute of Grocery Distribution officially adopted 
the higher "4000 square .feet minimum" criterion base. As a result 
generalised comment in Britain has alw'ays tended to over-estimate the 
number of U.K. ,supermarkets. Additionally, in France the variety chain 
stores opened supermarket departments that corresponded to the 1.5.5.0. 
criterion with great rapidity as soon as the supermarket concept showed 
itsel f to be viable. Any, statistics listing "free-standing supermarkets", 
such as those produced by NEOO (12), need, where these refer ~o France, 
, " 
currently to be increased by around 20 per cent and the ~igures 'for the 
mid-sixties by over 35 per cent, if they ,are to reUect .the reality of 
-.' ',. 
, !"+'." 
. , 
provision. In consequence of these factors, and certainly in the 
,,', 
'; -
,1960's, even wi~hin the trad.8.Lit. was widely and wrong.!y assumed .that 
.. ,':' ~ .. ~.:.~:., Bri taln_'l~d"'no'~ __ ~nlY Franc~ but' ~ais'o~ll ~f ~E~'~ope :'"iri~·i~·~~r~~i~·~~,:·:":~- ' .. '.:. " ... ~.', ~';?: -', 
; ···provisio~::·.r~i:i~;s;n:itfio~ ;;w~: wrong ·what~v~; th~ cr~~:!i~~."~,~~~re 
statistics. 
~- / -.. .-' 
<.Neverthel~ss ,the contrary and quite erron~ous hypothesis"has been and " 
- - -.,' / 
still is repeated by almost-every U.K. commentator.- The belief that 
_throughout the sixties Britain.had supermarket supremacy and leaders~ip 
-. - .. - -." ..
.; ,_. -., " ~ '.:..' . -," .. ' . 
'in -Europe Is historic- 'i~ Britain and- is now ingrained. -- John"S'alnsbury, 
Chairman of J. Sainsbury Ltd.~ and possibly therefore not impartial on 
the question, is explicit: 
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"There can be little doubt that (outside America) Britain 
led the way during the early 1960's. The move from counter ,: ~, , 
service to self-service; from small supermarkets to larger 
and larger supermarkets •••.• AII this took place while in 
Europe there remained an unchanged multi-layer traditional 
grocery structure,with little or nothing to reflect changing 
consumer needs", and then came the advent of the hypermarket 
and "quite suddenly Europe has become a retailing Mecca for 
Britons wishing to catch up on what is new in distribution 
methods". (13). 
Mathias carries the proposal of ,British retailing leadership to an 
extreme - in a' newspaper-column appropriately entitled (presumably 
not by Professor Mathias) "Rule Britannia - Even in the EEC": 
" •••• the older French department stores and the new out-of-
town. hypermarkets apart, every other trend in improving - __ 
the" efficiency of the distribution system has been. led i_n° ~--, 
Europe from Britain in 'the speed of innovation and the extent 
of its diffusioni the multiples, self-service, supermarkets, 
',~ '_-:- ,,_' '_,: mail order -trades; even the more recent basic cash and carry_ , 
warehouses and discount stores. The line of innovation ' 
has run from North America to Britain to continental Europe". (14) 
-,. . ~.~ :, .... - , 
-~, ." -~ 
',:,_; ",' , ," - '._: ,,:-' ~,r , • " .... ": ,: ~,~ ; .. , ~ 
-'. :"-~'" ,.e :'. '~_', n ..... -.• '_ ,.. ::; .'. ,~ . .;,'.- '~>~7';:':~:""·~~·""·' '- ..:;, ,' .. ," 't':. "0 
" ' .......... '.. ..... Thisst~£e~e~t'i~ ~h~ile~geabre o~ e~erY~~~~~.~.~,)(~~%.:~;h~)rt~:?~~~;~i~:;;~f~. 
..• ..... . _ .. '~ m~l~Si ~',. ';;fl~~%~iY o;~~;;;;·:/~ti\-~;e·rv ic"a~~~~~ch w';~.tertaini ~.' .. ; le: ~~{c:'~~; 
-, ,-. --~~- ;,>·::~:"-·~-pioneer_ed ;chronologically in EuropebY-'_Jhe 'British _coo'p~i·~tive soCie~ies'; ,~, --' --
~. - - - - -- -- ," .. ~ . . - -' - - - ,- .- . -... - ... ' _.' . . -, - ~ 
--~ ,'-.,' ":, 
--though in their particular case with no great success~ but the fact 
that Britain had been overtaken by_many countries by the 1960's in the, 
--" _ "extent -, of diffusion'; of self-service and supermarkets 'c'ari-:' be seen- by , 
. -~ ~ - : 
reference to Tables, 8.La~d S:2'.,'"and the" fact pre-dates _._ 
, :~-' , 
-' - ~ . "'~t.'he tables. "~omparati ve -supermark_et prav ision' in 'th_e ,1960 's is shown 
'".- ~, .;.,' "; ,.. -'::<:-'-:_£- .', _ ..... __ ••. ," ;:-;.r.~' .~.-_! ~ ~. 
in Table 8.2. As regards supermarketing, if it is possible to trace a 
- -
s'ingle' "line of innovation", the evidence of the principal continental 
, , 
supermarket innovators_ suggests this ran via Bernard Trujillo of the' 
"~lMM Club" -of Day ton , Ohio, direct to continental Europe. _ 
, '.. '''~ d '. -
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This assumption of British supermarket supremacy has extended the 
application of the hypothesis that in international terms the areas 
of high hypermarket 'development are the areas of previous low 
supermarket development beyond a simple British-French comparison. 
It is offered as the principal explanation of the differential rates 
of hypermarket development throughout all Europe. 
"What has happened' in France, Belgium, and Germany is that, 
,the hypermarket and regional shopping ~entre development 
'is,in front of the U.K. situation, these countries to some 
extent having missed out the 'supermarket' rationalisation 
,stage": Lowe, 1974 (15). 
"On any basis, the most developed contries in Europe (as 
regards hypermarkets)are France and West Germany. Their 
,growth was largely the result of the sluggish acceptance 
of sLipermark,ets in these countries": ':Donovan,' 1973 (16). "','" " , 
The factual basis of the hypothesis, explicit or implicit in these 
statements, is incorrect. The comparative levels of supermarket 
,,' -_""":"'~' ':::~c'd~'~elopment- ~~ E~~ope .i~,th:~:',earlY ~;~d'::~~~-l'§60"s :(~~~,'th~·~-ca~e~:'~~f':~. ':;:; ,;.>~;~':~'>~:';':-: 
"~,'- ~:, -.. ~ .- . . - - .-~, " -~- ~ ~.' -,~ :~: -:,~~: -:" ~~ ~ ~r:~~ .. ;-<:~~.~~~::~ ~;' ~-: ~ .~~ ~~:;: ~~:~~~:;~~~~~:~ ~~:~~ ~~. -.,' ~,~:~, ~ ... ~: :~ ;:~.;~-~<::~~ ~ :~: -~_'~-~~,~::_~~~>: .. ~~~?~~ ... :':. ~~~/~ ~ .. ~~"::~~~,:~~~~~~~:,~~~:'~.' '~~~;:~-~i~':~~~-~;~~;'::; 
;::' ~"< ~ .,:~: ':-" :~: ,those·~countties, where:.'J.t."is",pCl$,sible ,to,"'applY" or':~approximateI9,::'?"'::':~~t':-~'~o:~~:,~::,',;.-;::;; 
, .. , ", ." .. :' '~PP:l y ~.~ for': "th~'~::':.'~ar ~;{e'~~:~~'~'~'~~ ::the'I~i~;~~~~:i~n~l'~~e:l f ;~~~~i~e'}';::~:<~''''':,,:::~,':',:~,'.:~~-~':~::: 
9~g~~I~'a;i{~'~ "'~~'~~~'ri~~:) ~':~;~::,f~-r~~n inT ab~~:' '8~~:2 ~>' ~:;:"""""" " 
'"The following concusions are .. unavoidable on .this evidence: 
~ " 
_ ! .' r' , : _ • " ~. -'_ .' 
,(1) ,Britain in the 1960's did not lead supermarket 
-,-" 
. ~ , , -
,'.' , ':, " de.velopment:" 'oil, th~ ,~contra:ry sh.e. w?s iagging' be.!lin'd .. '.',. , 
• -. ;, -r
v
'·::;:·':: -, -- •• -:' .- _ ~' ... : ,.~" .~';:'j.~- -, .-. 
~ost of the rest' of Europe. 
(2) An hypothesis that hypermarkets develop in the absence 
'of a viable supermarket infrastructure cannot be 
supported using national data. ' 
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Table 8.2 Comparative Levels of Supermarket Development 'in Europe 
1962 and 1965 
Comparative Levels of Hypermarket Development in Europe 
1974 
Supermarket Provision . Hypermarkets 
. SMS 
Sweden 
Switzerland 59 
Germany 350 
'Belgium 44 
Netherlands 44 
121 
"'. ,1962 
Inhabit- Rank SMS 
ants per 
SM 
(ODD's) 
. 2961} 
95 1 1362) 
162 2 1000 
210 .3' 151 
268 4 159 
388 
.. 
470 
1965 . 
Inhabit-
ants per 
~M (ODD's) 
27 
59 
-63-" 
77 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 " 
5 
1974 
. Rank 
3 
-5 
2 
'-:1 
7 
Hyper 
Sgace 
m2 per 100 
inhabitants 
3.1 
2.0 
4.5 
- . 
:4.8, 
0.7 
'. ,~. 
France 
. :, . 
.G. B. -," .... . 
Austtia: ... ;' 
.-
.. .' 
130 
. 400 ; 
, 
" 
-5 104, ./~. - 6 '4 -~2. 9 __ .. 
. 7~,~' "}'~:i;>H"::\~~C .....,. :< 
\ ". 
,- -.; 
8 ,).: 6 .,,'- -; 1.9, -.' -_::" . .;. _ ... 
',', .. '~~.'- .. -~ .' - ---~.-.:.~: --;.--';:-:._~'~ ~-'J' 
Italy 36 1373 8 
362) 1028 7 
371 . 
458 
. -:~ . ' 
9 , .. '-
10 
'. :9 
9 
,~. --
(1) The figures for Sweden as publish'ed in Sw~de(l up to 1975·, 
..... ' 
O.l-·'·'·'~ 
0.1 
'a~e derived according to th~ Swedi~h d~finition of a~~upermarket:_~ self~ :~ 
service store with annual sales of,at least 3 millio8 SK When 3 
million Sk . are converted to sterling and related to selling space by 
, applying the then current U.K. ratio of £1.50 average turnover per week. 
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.' . 
'---, 
per square foot selling space, the resultant size is considerably less 
than 400 m2.I.S.S.0. size dissection dat~ and I.A.D.S. supermarket-
data enable us tb-estimate the differences for specific years - thus: 
Swedish Supermarkets: 
A 8 C 
Swedish definition 400 2 B 0' of A m + as ,0 
1973 _ 1807 1000 55% 
1971 1417 788 56?~ 
--
1969 1063 848 8m~ 
1968 917 741 -8m~ 
- , -
-The ratio is higher in the late 1960's than ln the 1970's dates (perhaps 
~- _du-e, toinflat}on_~ affecting the monetary -base in- the S,w_edish, crite-rion) ~ 
. '.- . ',' '. - . . .. '. _. " 
In 1965 there were 447 stores that met the Swedish criterion. On the 
,'-'_;, evidence above, it is assumed that at least_ 65?~ of these 'were over,-;,-'" 
'.:. :.-.. 
,--" ~do-~m2. -:'/T~;:~ap;li~~tio~'ol,-this-perc~n-tage -pr~duces a :~1~'3~'e of-~290: -- , 
......•... ) ·s~p~~~~:k~~~:·.·Wj'~:~~tl~~~§:~}b~~,,~~l/~ionser~~~fJ~··:~gf?!;;;i;.f;~t/} .. ·:·· 
~:- -', .-: .-, '.;, ... :~.-~,.:.;.-;.--
" "',',:: .~, I 
. .,."-
- " ~ .~:-':-'::.-;-::~:;:..:- .... ~-<' ~--::-:-:-' •• ,- :',' 
(2)'Estimated from the data for nearby years~ 
- '.' 
) ..... -:: .. \ "'," ~; - ,-
... - .-
. -" " 
SOURCE: 1.5.5.0.' Cologne; LA.D.S. ,- Paris; National Studies.- , -', '-~- ... ..' 
~ -' 
i 
I 
, ~ " 
,',. 
--
" 
.'.'-: 
- ','- . 
• > • -". - ~ 
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(3) ,There is support', however, for the contrary hypothesis -
,that in general and in European conditions hypermarkets 
have developed as the logical progression of super-
marketing method. 
Three of the four countries ranked highest in terms of supermarket 
development before and at the time of the advent of the hypermarket 
are also three of the four countries ranked highest in terms of 
subsequent hypermarket development. Three of the four countries ranked 
lowest on the basis of previous supermarket provision are also three 
of the four countries ranked lowest when measured by subsequent 
hypermarket' provision." 
, "'In this context, reference can be'made back to' Thorpe' s analysls"'(of!, 
1961 supermarket provision in the counties of Britain as related to 
. "',' 
:'subsequen't superstore,p'rovision).' It was, ~aid that his analysis 1s "",:,,:.:-, 
..... "': .···i.· ~ ...... ...:~::::~:~:d~~:r!~:::~:::::~::~:::e::::~~l:~~~~;n~Ia:~:~~t!~t~~f~s;;~~~i~~:· 
and pl,anning' approval for a superstore was not easily gi~ef1 where " ',_, ... 
eXisting retail facilities,were considered adequate or,strong. This' 
" 
"'" inade'th'e negative relationship ~hat' Thorp'~, found: in hi~ ':d~ta almost: 
, 
,:, inevitable. , , 
We can refer again to Table 8.2. The three countries in which, up to 
,1973, planning control was virtually non-existant were Belgium,'France 
, , ' 
and Germany (as emphasised in Table 6.1). The environment that 
,Thorpe's hypothesis assumes to exist (but which did not exist in the 
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country he studied) e~isted therefore in these three countries during 
this period. In 1965 Germany and Belgium had high ~n~ alm?st ide~tical 
levels of supermarket development - an average level approximately 1.7 
times that of France. In 1974 Germany and Belgium had almost identical 
levels of hypermarket development and these were the highest in Europe~ 
They ~ere approximately 1.6 times the level in France. The rate of 
hypermarket development as between these three countries is almost 
exactly proportionate to their previous levels of supermarket develop-
ment. Where the free market forces that are assumed in Thorpe's 
,hypothesis exist, his hypothesis is supported precisely: hypermarkets 
will -develop ,proportionate to the prior level of supermarket development. 
, -
----
. 
-' 
Using national data, this relationship cannot be so precisely supported 
in respect of other countrie,swhere environmental f?ct9rs(other:, that 
, :" - ,~ ~ 
is to say, than the environmental factors taken into account in the 
profit-maximising analysis, 9f the hypermar:ket operator) had, it can be 
- -"''':{-~rgu~d,'' -~ ~~~~,"si~n~ ;i~~~t:~'~~~-~ct ~n reta~}"'~ocat{~~-: 'Variaho~'~-'~'~' ',-
, -', :: :~:;':d\:-_ih~s~ ::~~~f;o;'m~n~taf' 'i~-6t~:~i' '~'ff~~t:ed th'e :,:d~g~,e~-;of: _~,~jl~tne~s'_ bf:,o 
-',"- ',-' ,.::~~,c -"'-';~pi~~~i~~:: c~;~~~~~l::i~:;':o~t ~o'~~f'i~~~'. ->.-,'-~~~'~~:~E~~~~:~~e:rit'~'i\H f~~;e'~c~:s::" :''''',',' '. ",' 
"':" -~-:.~- ".r. ". '. ,'- ~ ~~" ~- ._,;~ ',,-< :_,,:~ " .,) ,,',.<"}" ~. ~ :' L_~-. ~_ :;:~ 
" ,-; 
,within these'countries affected the extent to which the available 
"" c,ontrols were' enfdrced in the various regi'ons of" these countries. 
',,! __ ,National ,observat,iof!s, are' gener~llyinsensitive as- unit~_ ofana~'ysis.' 
- , - . , <. 
, They can~ot record this type of variation.- The regional analysis 
'. developed -in this research can ~_ ' This' support~, and: supports mC?st ---
".' - - , 
strongly, -the' hypothesis of this section:" both in the high levels 'of 
c~rrelation and categorically in the AID analysis. 
- 27D -
, .J' -. - ~--' ,:. : 
f 
, , 
. l -.;, 
This research evidence, it can of course 'be argued, is not conclusive 
,the hypermarket indicators and the supermarket indicators are concurre,nt.-
, , 
If the hypothesis is one of a logical progression from the sup~rmarket 
to the hypermarket, then logically for methodological validity the' 
supermarket variables should be dated to precede the hypermarket 
variables. lIt was neither practicable nor desirable for this to be done, 
however. In the first place, the construction of such supermarket 
indicators is hardly within the bounds of possibility. The construction 
at regional level, for almost all the regions of Western Europe, of 1973 
indicators of supermarket provision, such that these were accurate and 
comparable, was a major undertaking. To construct a similar set of 
indi~ators dated back to the mid-sixties~ould be impossible; it is 
',thought. Nor, however, and more importantly, would this be desirable. 
,rhe argu ment is as follows. 
"-'..'~~. _. 
At national level, the rate of, progression of supermarketing for those 
_ ;. - "",.,". .. • '. ,_4 , ._ • .:,.. • _ ~ , , .. :. : 
,~ ':- countries included in the" cirial ysi s for '~hich "'comparable" mid:..:~i'~'ti~~:'data 
,:"::;~<;:' . -:: are 'ob~ai~ab'le"i'~--g'f~en':i~' ~~'~br~ ,8.,3 • .' 'In':"~~k'~:'or' the:e" ~o~nt~i-~~"~~;~~'e"': ,-.. :, "' .. 
. . :-~~_~~' .. -:'~ -_ : __ . ~ ... :~': -~~ :~ ,"< .~_ ~ ~ .. ; ':: '.~ . ~. :. i:=~ -, .~~ .. \ _ ~ _ ~ I • ~"~;f::-:~'~ ~ . ~ -~' -. -:- :. ;~ <~-~:-~: .. ;-' ,- ~<~ ,,~"'~' ~ ~ ~ :~~,: ~~~~~ :'.:;-~ ".- ~~~~ :" .'~'!'~' :~.:: ~.~. ~ ~~\.~~-l ~~"~~'~.:;~ .~/~--~" ~;:-{~~~-~~,~:~~~ 
., ';' . ': ':"'Was' a' 4~ '5 f6' fl vefold , inCrease'~ in ,supermarkets betwe~ri' ,1965 :and,197,?I-,.Super':'>,,:':;~'·: ~:' 
--:.' .: ... ' - ,-~ .. :,",~' '.~:_' __ ' ;..'-. ~ __ ;_":-"' '_'~~"', :_"'~';':,~,-:~:~__ -, ,'.-, '.~:."~ .. ' - .~:_':-::-',' :"'2.'~, ~ '"'::, ','"',,. '.~~. - .'~':~l"'~'--:< ,-
markets in Denmark, as measured by the Danish definition of "supermarket" ", " 
'.,~o,untry,is'Aust:dci._, It might be said, the~efore"that, "wi'th"the.,:,<" ..:., 
, I 
'.:: exception 'ofAustria', the 1974 date is nearly as use'ful as a mid-sixtie's 
date in indicating relative mid-sixties supermarket provision. This 
would be to ignore, however, the fundamental reason for adopting a 
regional basis for the analysis. In Italy taken as a whole, for 
example, super~arkets increased by a factor, of five, but this rate of 
increase varied widely between Italian regions. The purpose of using 
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TABLE 8.3 Supermarkets in Europe: 1965 and 1974 
1965 
A 
Supermarkets Inhabitants 
per 
Nos. Supermarket 
(OOO's) 
-Austria 25 290 
Belgium ,151 63 
France 470 104 
Germany' 1000 59 
G.B: 498 106 
. Italy .c.: 140' 371 
Netherlands 159 77 
. Sw~deh '.. ~, , '290 27 ' 
: .... :,-., (1f::'" 
',·91 .. " '. 
, '-, ~-
, _;: -i,':'" 
Derlmatk ,'"." 
.. 
, 
., .. (,' 
-. 
1 •• ~ 
--: '. - . 
., 
'. .. 
. . 
1974 
Supermarkets 
Nos. 
280 
801 
2520. 
4590 ' .. 
2400 
','755 
900 
'1150 
B 
Inhabitants 
per 
Supermarket 
(OOO's) 
27 
12 
. '21 
13 
23 
"'73 
15 
:.~' 6 . 
'.'-'::-:: 
' . 
. " 
- , .... 
. '; -
Times 
increase 
in S.M. 
provision 
A/B 
10.7 
5.2 
5.0 
'4.5 
4.6 
·5 .. 0' ,---
5.0 
. '4~ 5 :: .-~. ' . 
'.:,:.;. ;'<0) .. <' .. 
··.·445, ' 
, :>-:';> .. :.: ;'.\ .·cf." '.::-. :." 
. ' 
.-1: :/: .' ,~:> •• '. 
" .- -.. -' 
~ ,:~,' -~ , ... ~,-
c:-' , 
: '." . " .. ' .. ,:: ' :. - ,', .' 
. 
-: '.., .-.... :~ - ;";--..... " ... .:.. 
- - . ~ 
(1) as measured by the Danish definition of "Supermarket". .' . ' -. 
I" .", •.. - '~;"".' ." .•. ' '.:>. '.' .' ' 
, SOURCE: Catculated from 1.5.5.0. LA.D.S. and country, dat~·. -. ,~,~. 
-. ,- ~; '- --::: ~ . -', -
, ,.t. _., -."~; , ' , - -" ,", 
_~: '_, ~ r ,'" 
:.:: .... '-'. .. , '. • ~ '. > - , -. 
. - ',.-.,'. 
,.' , 
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regional data, is to produce a more sensitive and valid analysis than' 
"national data are able to provide. 
Table 8.3 is not included in order to justify a concurrent "supermarket" 
indicator on the grounds of comparable rates of supermarket growth. It 
has been noted that the Austrian case disrupts the general pattern of 
this tale. Between 1965 and, 1974 there was a tenfold increase in 
supermarkets ih Austria. This was twice the rate of increase in other 
countries. A 1970's indicator cannot therefore, represent relative 
mid-sixties supermarket strength in the case of Austria. It can also 
be noted, by reference to Table 8.2, that in the mid-sixties Austria 
", was badly proviped with supermarkets and yet in 1973' had a'substantial 
. . . '-.~ . ~. 
hypermarket development. It might seem therefore that the ,Austrian 
"case not' only'condemns the use ora. 1970' s supermarket ,indicator but' ,'- , 
also refutes this particular and important hypothesis of this thesis. 
".:c,:,,~either ,ho\'iever, is the case • 
. ~ " .. -, ~\, ".... '--"-'~", ~~ ":"~~'~"~""'-~ 
, ." . ,- ~.' 
,." ....... ~_: .. -.t :, :' .... ' . ..:: )~- ,_~ ';;:~~' ":':,: "::-.', "";-.... -, 
.... , 
- .' ;,<-:~ .~: - - '" .-: '~"'.' ':~, ~- ..... ;." " '''.'-:'-',-', 
':: The' si tuation~-"in-A~stria both_supports the )lypothesis and- .in:clicat~s' _.-::: - ;:::,;-.. :>-":--:,: 
·1,.·~ , "".~ .;.,_~.,~._._-~ .. ..:..; :,'_':.'~~" ~ .. , ~<;._;-,_ .. _._. ,: ....... :~-~"'~-;~ -_. ~'.; ~:,~-,~"':':-'~ .... :-":-'~ ~::. ~' ">_~'~~:". 
, :,.~. • 'T, _-",-::.:~.;_ ...... '._' •• ,~" ,":. , ',_ .~.~--,;.-_~".,.:,,(_~:-,,: •• -: .' .~1";._:~~-'-.r-_",,v,:~:-.::-,:. ... j: .. ':~_!. _ .... ,:.~:. . ~=-._:;..;.::._._ 
: .. i' -,'-,-;:, the • d~fficul ties of "l!sif}9 a "supermarket" ,~~ri~icatot _dated' sirriulti:tneiJusly,,'-;: '.":..c:<,; 
~ , .' .,' 
, for all regions and countries at some prior pre-hypermarket year 
',thought optimal for the deduction of cause and effect. Austria 
in 1962. In 1965 there' were' an ',estimated 25. Between 1965 and 1971, 
.. ' 
, , 
,however, there was ~ six-fold in~rea~e i~'~upermarkets~' and,by'1971~ 
150 supermarkets had been opened. The number of inhabitants per, 
, -
supermarket was then 48,000. This is in advance of the supermarket 
density in the countries that first developed hypermarkets at the 
time that hypermarkets began in those countries. (in which respect,this 
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Austrian supermarket density in 1971 can be compared with the 
supermarket densities of Germany, Belgium and France in 1965 noted in 
Tables 8.2 and 8.3). It was in that year, 1971, that the first 
hypermarket opened in Austria. Austria developed supermarkets late, and 
in consequence, it may be argued, the hypermarket developed there 
proportionately later still. In the case of Austria a mid-sixties date 
for the supermarket indicator would not have been optimal. 
The optimal "supermarket" indicator to support this particular 
hypothesis would be an indicator set in the case of each region one 
year prior to any significant hypermarket divelopment in that region. 
Even if one ignores the ,di fficul ties of defin~ng ~'signi"ficant If. in.tJlis •. 
- '.'" -, \ - -
context, the raw data do not in most cases exist for such an indicator • 
.In a regional .af!~llysis, '''supermarket'' indicators that 'are concurrent ' 
~ - - - - - '- - -
,,' 
--- -; 
. ' 
with the hypermarket indicators are the most relevant indicators that 
the. analyst is in practice able. 
Th~: total' evid~ri6e' ~;t:~~tio'~:a~~';'iev:~i' su'pport's the, bypoth~sis:that··""·:.:} 
,v - ... ,.-"--:,--- ,~-;, -~-'--"":"'---:~ ':'.\-:'- _,.,_~- .. >- . -. ~ ; ... -- '. "-- _~-~'~::.;--'~'-'-';':~~'('~-~:' 
'hypermarkets develop in those 'areas where supermarkets aiready' exis't ',' 
; '. ;' 
,'. 
- -- '_'C-", -' .1- , 
- '-, 
'.ecorlOmics, then .propels the·.·supermarketer .. .t'ow~~ds 'the ',l~rge'r~ ~'lit: ~md 
~ wider stock assortment - that is to say, ~owards the hypermarket • 
. ~ - '; ~,-: 
The evidence' of the "more sensitive regional-leve18r'lalyses strongly· 
supports the national'evidence. If conf{~m~ that in 1973 high (or 
low) hyper~arket pr~vision co-existed with conditions of high (or low) 
supermarket provision generally throughout the sub-national regions of 
Europe. ,The opposite condi Hons would have been the case if the contrary 
- - ',-
hypothesis' that has to date been accepted in Britain were correct: 
It is not correct. 
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8.3 THE FACTOR OF CONCENTRATION OF POPULATION 
8.3.1 As shown in the AID analysis in Figure 7.2, a high level of 
individual prosperiti and disposable income is a pre~requisite of 
hypermarket development. Concentrating on those 31 regions where 
hypermarkets and superstores had developed on a substantial scale in 
1973, the subsequent AID splits show that the crucial distinguishing 
factors thereafter are factors of population concentration. Tracing the 
"optimum hypermarket path,'," through Box F to Box J, it can be seen 
(comparing Boxes F and G) that those regions in which many of the 
population tended to be concentrated in large towns were not regions in 
~which ~ypermarketsrapidly developed. In fact, hypermarket development,-:' 
in such regions' was below the Eu~opea~ average, even 'when this average 
<,', .. ', - :,' ,,:,;is:cca'lcul~ted includirig 'the ,low':"income regions havl~g ,minimal hypermarket' 
development. On the contrary, hypermarket development has been more 
, ~:' ,pronou[lced;' by a ratio of more than two to one, in those~egfons"ch~r~ct-.', ",' 
:, "~'",,' ,', .,~,~~':is~d ~b~-,i~ la~k' ·of:'~rb'~';::~a~,~i~T~~ation., <Th;i,,~,'\~'\;-~,~tEa:Y:;;~'~~~i~<~an~':"{ 
"',",'in 'f~ct' t~ '-mo~t:,'~'~'~'~~~ali'~e-d 'hyp~the~~s o'h 'th~;': pr'ereq~isi tes";ofhype~-: 
',',:,' "," ,-' "m~~k~t" g~ciwth". ,'~ '~egi~~~:"i~' ~;'lch geOgr-aPhlC~~~m~g~~~h~;"c:ci~di{i~~t:~~~'''::.'-'-~'~' -, :; ,,--:':: 
, '.' 
- . , .-, 
,most conducive to hypermarket development are those in which tow,n sizes 
- .. ',--_ ...... -,,--: .' 
'are not la'rge, but in which'" nevertheless, the total ~~p~latiori of th'e' 
-. 
,- ,~eg-ion'i~":faidy, dense"(ove~ lOO ,persons, per square kif~in~£~ej~;::""I~~::6the; .,-:,>::::'" 
'".-.. -- " - " f "~ 
- ......... ' I 
l 
'words,- urban mass as such, is a deterrent. The areas most favourable to 
. --' ~. -. .:-- -
" ' 
':hype'rmarket development are those 'which' contain small' tWor:1S surrou'nded , 
by an evenly spread but in total substantial ambient population. 
:This is the quite clear indication of the AID analysis. It is contrary tG, 
" 
m8l)Y previous assumptions and .working hypotheses. It has not before been, 
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quantified and shown to apply, at least as a generalisation, right 
across a European analysis. 
There have, however, been many oblique indications that this finding 
would logically result when the data were subjected to this type of 
analysis. 
Two discussions I had in Paris in 1975 are relevant. In the first, 
Mr~ttienne Thil, Public Relations Director and now Marketing Director 
of Carrefour, in answer to the question of what minimum town size 
Carrefour required for oper~tion, gave the quite unexpected answer of 
,,"40,000 inhabitants'~.' This was '-related- later that day to the " " 
Vice-Chairman of the international retailing development consultants, 
, Larry Smith Consulting; who was' increduloLJs.' He tactfully suggested, 
. .' ,-
- '-; .. 
that Thil was a public relations director and that that was a public 
. relations statement., ~he analysis now suggests, h~wever,that Thil's 
" 
,,"-- ", .. ' ,,';i~LJre"~{~4d''-OOd' ~,~:g~( ~'~~,'~, be'~~~ \~:~~~t, ~,n '~p~~atf;~~~ o~~·:,'·~,~~~i.~i·d·,.-,~:, .~~~7~ 
" ~'.,' .~ '" '," ,::~".'_ '~iw~ys, ac'c9~'di~9t~"_:t:~e analysi~"~ -"Ulat: ·there~x·~~·~ed' '~·~u ff~'~l~~t~::~~t:~::.:, '; ,,' ,,' 
"J.:'~'.~~""'.- ... _",_:'" '. ," ".~._ ."._ .. _ ..... _.- '.: .... ,~.,'.,~~.~ 
" ~""':. = 
:<:density:of popu~ation in,the' surrounding countryside'~:Giv~~' the~e '. ") 
conditions it is even possible that a figure of 40,000 for the town 
, . ..: . ~ -- . .. ~.r. _.: ;" ~ _ , •.. .; .... _ ': :. 
, 
: _ ~<, size might h~£be at all SUbstantially below the optimal. 
-', The fir~t innovatory Carrefciur hypermarket was, in fact,located,' 
.. , ~ 
-- - - :. : \. -., 
adj acent ,not to a" large town but a ,small one. Thil himself hadmad~ , 
a conference comment on this in 1973 : 
"Everyone predicted the imminent bankruptcy of Carrefour 
when it opened its first hypermarket in 1963. They said 
Carrefour was mad to build such a huge store in such a 
small town"., (17) , . 
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And it.has been noted elsewhere that specifically in France: 
. "Several relatively small towns, for example, Caen, 
Quimper, Besancon etc., have attached out-of-town 
hypermarkets to serve not only the town but also 
the surrounding countryside. For, given an increasing 
high level of personal mobility and good accessibility, 
people in rural areas can also shop at the hypermarket" (5). 
The implication of this latter quotation, however, is that this is an 
. . 
exceptional circqmstance, the sit'i'!:9 decision perhaps a marginal one. 
The implication of the AID analysis is that in general in Europe at 
least up to 1973 these or broadly similar conditions were more 
conducive to hypermarket development than was the association of a 
- -. ~ -:.'~ - -., --
.... -;- .. 
. . 
hypermarket wit'h a nearby highly' concentrated urban"population -' not .... 
marginally so but by .a ratio of more than two to one. 
There are several possibly parallel hypoth~ses as to why this should 
;-' 
. ~ . ~. :.. -~ ~ :: -
'-',-- - ,'.- ~ '" 
, 
, " :<,·"'·?:~~'~j~.2~::H~Pot'h'~~i~:-i·":·"·:~he···pri~~ lack of'--or'~:a'n'is'~d: ~~iaiii:~g .. i~':'(: <~:. '.' 
,,,' '.,". small towns . . ... .... '. 
:-. -' - --: . -, \ 
~The first hyp6thesis is that· of the prior lack of organised reiailing 
. ·.in small towns as causative •. This hypothesis argues that a main 
,_ ., _,." :' I _ .. ~, ._ • ,', ~ • 
~ ... ca~sative variabl~'affectingthe'rate of.hypermarket development ~n·. 
- ~ ; 
I 
E,':lrope. is the prior level of. penetration of the ret~il tradeCin, .. . 
, particular,' the retail grocery· trade) by multiple firms •. This <--::~ ... ,," ' .... 
argument assumes (1) that multiple retail operations are intrinsically 
competitive and cost-effective : they can achieve organisational 
economies of scale and more importantly buying power in the market 
without necessarily running.operating units that each individually 
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achieve economies of scale; in consequence the price advantages that 
multiple stores already offer their customers do not ~ncourage the 
establishment of hypermarkets that depend on a ptice advantage' for 
their patronage. (2) It is additionally argued that existing multiple 
retail firms have vast amounts of capital sunk in their existing 
High Street' and suburban premises. This will tend to restrain this 
movement to out-of-town or fringe locations. Woolworth's, for instance, 
.at one stage stated they would restrict openings of out-of-town Woolco 
'Stores: "We do not intend to compete against ourselves". And, in,fact, 
J.B. Jefferys, Secretary General of the Paris-based International 
Association of Department Stores, categorically told a British Institute 
" ,of Management meeting in London in 1972 that the reason hypermarkets' , 
.. '-',' -
: ... - .' 
were not being developed in Britain as they were on the continent had 
. :,.':, nothing to: do with t~e charact~r of the customer, the planning mech~nism 
'.. -\ - -.~~- ,- - "::.. '. -- - -- ,',' -. - - _ . .' . . .: - . ;,'- - -. -. - . - .- . _:-. ) 
or geography - the real reason was the high degree of concentration 
"",,," that ,exists in British retailing,' higher than anywhere .else in Europe. 
::~~ ~," ': ... :~,":;.;.·':~.-:;nd the, BrltCishrefaii :~~t,ablis'h~e~t;~ he~"said,' "wa~' Pla·nted"·;:ifl/,<:.:: .'. 
',h' ... '. ;': . ';~;~~imr~lYi.;'th~··'c~~tre . o~"fown~i'\";~~~'~i~h ~{~~et : 'Ani[~~;;:;;,{~i', . 
. "\ ")':'·",~'~stabl~shm'~nt '~ays' '~~hat we have we hold';~' (18) >'. In·"the case 'ofthe 
.;' Netherlands, in this context, one authority who wishes to remain 
-c. " anonymous suggested, 'in personal discussi on' in 1977,. that the reason 
:,tor'the slow development of hypermarkets in that country:(8 that' ,:' 
"shopping centre development is largely controlled there by the OBW 
- '.,' 
-;-, :;-::""- .-
-,-'" 
, ,'::. '. group. ' 
The argument then is that hypermarkets will be slow to develop within 
an already highly organised retail structure. If this is so, then 
there are some observers who maintain that a highly organised retail, 
. , 
~. I 
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structure for its part will only develop in regions that are highly 
,-urbanised, and will not develop in a country characterised by small 
_towns. 
Divorced from the hypermarketing context, the basic argument is long-
standing. It was qUdntified in respect of Great Britain by Hall,Knapp 
and Winsten in 1961 (19) who, analysing the 1950 Census of Distribution, 
showed that multiple shop sales varied systematically with total size 
of town: the larger the town size, the larger the sales share of the 
multiple retailer organisations. However, it needs to be noted that 
Dawson (1979) (20) showed that ,this relationship, if it 'existed in 
,:,~ 1950, no' longer existed at the" end of the 1960' s - that" is to say, -'at· 
the time of the growth of the hypermarket. - His similar analysis of 
,', ~:,:' -, data of' the 1971 Ce~sus~f Distribution, of a sample ~(:12} town~ ~f~'_, 
over 20,000 inhabitants, showed that no systematic association between 
. ,: 
: __ , _, ."'_ ' . tow~ size and m~l~iplesale;s existed by that date in' Britain. How'ever, -,~ ~ 
· .. ~:;.c·, . • .. , •. ' •..... ,~; ." ~ ~ .~bvi ~lJsl y.~o~{~ ~tn"ie;'.~~, il{' f Oll;;~.! h~t '. SU~h~:;;:Gh ~~~~il-~~~;~·:~'''.''.'· 
:-: .. :'~_': ",:,,-'-_~ -' not hCiVe existed', and ,c~u:id'.n~t still e'xist ;'in the, regions .-of __ countries"',',.--,:. 7 
I .,"'-'~ ~,'. ~. :.~: •• -~:~.~~. __ ._" - • -. •• - "' • ::. ,.. '. '. ~." ".,,:~ --•• ' • _.- ....... ,.: • 
• ~.4 • -.\."t..'~-"."-: ", " k" _ J-~'-- '.', •• '.:~~-.; _'~~ - ~~:"S'_ '~"'~,-"_,,,: -'-;-' '-.- ~ ~ --'::-_:::: ;' -.. -:-_--••• -~" ~ 
'~; less 'strongly peneb~~ted by 'the multiples ~'- It has been ar-gued -that -
<this is so, and can account for "di fferential, hypermarket, development. ' 
.. " .~-:' ,~~'~ "- ". , .. ~' :. ,,,' 
- , 
:', :,:-The comparisons made to support, this are in~ariable comparisons between 
,: -::the U.K. 'and France -: as by Carr.eron in 1977:' 
',' 
'-,. " ~. . . "~';;'" '.. ." .' . - ,~" ,".., 
"Itis p~-~bably the i~~k ~f 'practical -i6cat'ions -whi~h has ,"" 
held back the growth of out-of-town centres in the U.K., 
but it has only held it back - what has positively stopped 
the growth is undoubtedly the pattern of retailing in Britain' 
from the rest of Europe and the United States. 
Retailing in France, for example, has been influenced by the' 
fact that there are only 35 towns with over 100,000 population, 
compared with 60,in the:U.K., while only five French cities 
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-:.,-, 
. , 
have a population exeeding 300,000, against 12 in this 
country. This contrast has meant that there has been 
little opportunity for widespread growth of traditional 
multiple retailers in France. It is still common to 
find small communities served by very local traders, 
since the catchment population is too small to provide 
a viable market for multiple organisations. 
In a recent survey of retailing in Europe, Healey and 
Baker point out that the restricted number of large 
centres in France makes it difficult to achieve true 
'economies of scale, and the dispersed nature of the 
principal towns operates against an economic distribution 
and supervision system" (21). 
Smith had made a similar comparison four years prevously (5). 
'Theargument~ therefore, takes the form: 
!. .• 
,'. Small 
~' towns !~~~i~i'e strong" ~ "~<'~~~~~t~~~~~e's'" 
representation 
. ~:·'~).f:; 'B~'~h"'~a~e;'~n"~~~"~~~it'h' ii~it~: {h:~>' de~~i'i~~ dis:uSSi'on' ~~'<i~~:r~~~~}:~~~'~:: of '. 
, .. ~. Lth~ ~\.~nd ~~an~e~·;If.h;~e:"er. th:;c~nClu~~:~~s;aliithenD:"'\:<: . 
-- -" : ~- , ' 
· .. ·<:~ogic'ally it should also be:proportionately applicabie' befween~theoth~r"., 
.. . 
. European countries,as Cameron suggests it is, and also between,regions • 
. , 
~ ~- .' , -'-~ 
:~ ', .. , '.,..,... ,:. - -.--
.. ' . '. At. regional level, in general,' data' on 'percentage pemetration by . the" 
l 
retail trade were not obtainable. At the level of the nation, however, 
• ._--~'-' ~_-___ - .,'_-' 0' • _~_, ., _ _ , _ _. ~._ ",'~- :-'- •• - ". 
-:. a scattergram of, the observations of. "Integrated retail. tr.ade as per: 
cent of total' retail trade 1971" plotted against "P~rcentage of 
inhabitants living in urban agglomerations of 100,000 inhabitants or . 
more 1970" is shown in Figure 8.2. The r'elationship' is clearly' 
positive. This 5ub-hypothesis is, therefore, ,to this extent supported 
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Inteorated Retail Trade as' ~~ Total Retail, Trade' . 36~000 " 60,000:: , 42,000 '46,000 54,000 
at least 500,000 inhabitants. These percentages are the highest in 
Europe. Up to 1973, the restrictions on hypermarket development in 
the U.K. were (together with Italy) the most severe in Europe. It is 
perhaps natural to assume cause and effect - that so great is the 
concentration of population into these large agglomerations that environ-
mental problems of traffic congestion, access and green belt maintenance 
become acute: therefore a strict planning control procedure is imposed. 
It is obviously possible to generalise this as a hypothesis affecting 
variously the different regions of Europe. 
However, in thus considering national-level data, other "urban 
agglomeration" figures need also to be noted. At the "100,000 inhabitant" 
level the next highest ranked country is Germany (55 per cent of 
inhabitants lived in agglomerations of at least this size in 1970), 
foll~wed by France and the Netherlands (45 per cent of inhabitants). Yet 
of these there existed virtually no hypermarket planning restrictions in 
Germany or France up to 1973. 
The more sensitive analysis is, of course, the regional analysis. For 
those who insist that planning control should be treated, as this 
hypothesis treats it, as in effect an independent variable, it should be 
", 
emphasised that in the AID analysis the U.K. regions have not weighted ; 
the "town size" findings at all. None of the U.K. regions is included 
in thebase data on which the split on "town size" is made - all eleven, 
U.K. regions having been eliminated (on the basis of low disposable 
income) in the first split from this branch of the tree, as have seven 
of the eleven regions of Italy, the other country where planning approval 
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was equally difficult to obtain. The conclusions as regards optimal 
town size are thus derived from regional observations in respect of 
countries with varying degrees of, in most cases, very much lighter 
planning restriction. This particular hypothesis, therefore, is . 
unconvincing as an explanation of this pattern in the analysis data. 
8.3.4 Hypothesis 3 : The factor of movement restriction 
The third hypothesis is that adjacent extensive urban mass is a 
deterrent to hypermarket development in that it restricts traffic flows. 
A revaluation of the relationship between the trading area of a 
shopping centre and its neighbouring urban agglomeration has been a 
feature of recent years. Desplanques, for example, analyses the 
catchment area of French regional shopping centres - which he considers 
according to their theoretically accepted sub-division into immediate 
(or pedestrian) zone, and primary, secondary and tertiary zones, with 
* respective radii measured in time - distance from the centre. 
He observes: 
"Unfortunately this entirely theoretical definition which 
irresistably conjures up the picture of an archery target 
is far from representing the reality •••• The shape and 
compass of the different zones depend above all on the 
"-importance of the commercial centre, but depend also on 
the traffic routes •••• , on the density of population, on 
the existence or otherwise of natural obstacles •.•• and, 
above all, on the competition (the presence or absence of 
other shopping centres or important shops which in themselves 
constitute a barrier to attraction).: 
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*As regards continental Europe, "time-distance" conveniently means 
time or distance - since assuming an average driving speed of 60 km 
per hour, as is becoming accepted practice, in the calculation, then 
"distance in kilometers" and "time in minutes" produce the same figure. 
In this way, for example, the primary zone of Parly 11 shopping 
centre is limited to the south-west by Versailles and, taken 
together with the immediate zone, consequently assumes the shape 
not of a circle but a kidney" (22). 
The reference is to a major out-of-town shopping centre. The hypermarket, 
like the shopping centre, attracts over distance. Therefore it is 
customary to measure a hypermarket catchment area in' terms of travelling' 
time. In the U.K., both the Department of the Environment researchers 
at the Eastleigh Carrefour,and the Donaldson researchers at the Caerphilly 
Carrefour (23) assume a 20miriute _driving time distance as effective in 
nominally defining the "catchment area". These studies found, however, 
that at Eastleigh one in five customers and at Caerphilly one third of 
customers lived outside this area. "Catchment area" definitions of the 
hypermarket operators themselves have been more inclusive - 25 minutes 
driving time in the case of the Eastleigh Carrefour as cited by the 
operating company in 1974 (24), and 30-35 minutes driving time in the 
case of the average Asda store as cited by A?da in 1971 (25) (though 
Asda,stores-were subsequently redefined in 1974 by their managing 
director as "neighbourhood stores" with a realistic catchment area of 
seven miles radius (26), such later definitions have a tendency to be 
political statements intended for the ears of planning authorities, 
therefore minimal. An Asda trade survey has shown that 21 per cent of 
A$da customers travel more than ten miles (27». 
By general agreement the decisive factor in patronage is travel time. 
i 
,I 
The shapes of hypermarket catchment areas, invariably expressed in time -
distance, are obviously determined by differential road congestion. 
They are also affected by the location and strength of competitive 
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shopping. Only on a flat featureless' plain with an evenly spread 
population and no competitive attraction can the shape be circular. 
A kidney or triangular shape is the typical overall shape of the catchment 
area of a hypermarket sited outside or on the fringe of extensive urban 
agglomeration. Within such a catchment area ••• 
"the general pattern is for market penetration rates to be 
higher in areas of low population density but to diminish 
as population density increases. In this the hypermarket 
reflects conventional features of marketing and distribution 
systems. The lower the density of population, the greater 
the propensity to movement and thus the greater likelihood 
of capturing trade" (28). 
One of the few firm conclusions one can draw from the RORU Caerphilly 
study (29) is that "penetration" in the densely populated Cardiff zones 
was very low compared with "penetration" in other zones of the catchment 
area of equal distance from the hypermarket. Nevertheless, for a 
hypermarket dependent on one densely populated city area, the sum of 
"penetration (low) x population (high)" could in theory provide it with 
a very substantial market. This type of location could therefore be 
preferentially attractive to the hypermarket operator. This was the 
. original hypothesis of this thesis and a vi~w almost universally accepted. 
The findings of this research correct this, to the extent at least that 
, 
these are not the circumstances in which hypermarkets have 'tn practice 
. been developed in general in Europe. 
Traffic routes and, perhaps as importantly, habits of travel for leisure 
and shopping converge on the city centre: and the derivations of Reilly's 
law of retail gravitation seem obviously to apply. However measured, in 
time-distance or psychologically, the "deterrence".factor of sideways 
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travel across congested traffic routes is considerable - and the 
counter-attraction of competing city centre and suburban shopping 
increases, the more one departs from the radial linking hypermarket 
to city centre. One would,'therefore, expect that that part of a 
hypermarket's catchment area that projects into the neighbouring 
urban concentration to be a triangular segment with apex pointing 
to the city centre. Empirical studies of indentified catchment areas 
at least suggest that this is so. 
It has been found, in the case of the out-of-town shopping-centre 
that in France ••• 
"oddly enough,. customers seldom travel out of town into a 
centre, but mainly stop off at a centre on their way towards 
a city from the provincial hinterland. ' Therefore, if a 
centre is' simply sited on the outskirts of a big city it will 
not succeed unless it is within easy reach of a large out-of-
town population as well. Its catchment area is shaped basically 
like a comet - 10 per cent in front and 90 per cent behind" (30). 
The two splits in the AID analysis with which we are primarily conc~rned 
can be seen as being quite simply the expression of this-statistically 
when applied to the hypermarket. 
8.3.5 Optimum size of urban agglomeration 
As regards the optimum size of urban agglomeration,' it is 'difficult to 
be precise as to the maximum size above which hypermarket development 
was deterred •. The difficulty arises because of the necessary uses of. 
categories of size. In the regional analysis, in common with general 
statistical practice, this research has used the following settlement 
categories: 
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0) less than 10,000 inhabitants 
(2) less than 20,000 inhabitants 
(3) less than 30,000 inhabitants 
(4) less than 40,000 inhabitants 
(5) less than 50,000 inhabitants 
(6) less than 100,000 inhabitants 
(7) less than 250,000 inhabitants 
In addition, using an "urban agglomeration" definition, as opposed to a 
"town" definition, indicators based on "100,000 inhabitants" and 
"250,000 inhabitants" were constructed. 
In relating these to the hypermarket selling space variable (SHY), the 
correlation analysis showed no significant relationships. (Of the 
"town" indicators, however, the correlations with the "100,000 inhabitant" 
and the "250,000 inhabitant" categories were both negative; the 
correlations with all the lower town-size categories 'were positive)~-
. When the town-size variables and the variables oLurban agglomeration 
are related to the "inhabitants per hypermarket" variable, the only 
significant correlation that 1s obtained is with the ."100,000 inhabitant 
urban agglomeration" indicator - positively significant at the 0.1 
" significance level; that is to say, negatively related to hypermarket 
I 
,I 
growth •. 
On the combined evidence of the corr~lation and AID analyses, therefore, 
we might summarise (1) that in the main up to 1973 hypermarkets were 
not associated with town sizes of under 50,000 inhabitants (2) equally, 
they were not associated with town sizes of over 250,000 inhabitants 
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(3) they were associated, however, and associated very positively in 
the AID analysis, with town sizes of 100,000 inhabitants and less 
(4) therefore, on this ~vidence," hypermarkets were mostly associated 
with town sizes of between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. 
However, we have no indicator of, for example, "Percentage of population 
living in towns of 150,000 inhabitants". To that extent the ceiling of 
"100,000 inhabitants" is a product of the accepted statistical categor-
isation of towns. We can say, however, that this ceiling will be nearer 
100,000 inhabitants than 250,000 inhabitants. The consequent working 
hypothesis is the hypothesis in (4) above. 
8.3.6 The German Case 
A limitation of this research conclusion is that, owing to the distinc-
tive categorisation of the large-scale self-service units in Germany, 
it was not possible, at least in the time available for data search, to 
produce hypermarket statistics for the German regions that were comparable 
.. - .'. 
~ith those of the other European regions~ In absolute (though not in 
comparative) terms, GermanY"has the largest number of hypermarkets in 
Europe. It is instructive therefor~, in default of German regional data, 
. to test the above conclusion against the evidence of German national data. 
The hypothesis receives precise support from Germany. The 
Bundesforschungsanstalt Fur LandeskundeUnd Raumordnung (31) juxtapose 
the two 'sets of figures shown in Tables 8.4 and 8.5. 
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TABLE 8.4 Po ulation distribution b settlement size in West 
Germany 1965-1976 % 
Settlement size 1965 1968 , , 1971 1976 
over 500,000 19.7 19.0 18.4 17.7 
250,000/500,000 7.2 6.9 6.8 6.7 
100,000/250,000 11.0 11.0 10.9 10.7 
less than 100,000 62.1 63.1 63.9 64.9 
Table 8.5 Distribution of retail turnover b settlement size in 
West Germany (1965-1976 % 
Settlement size 1965 1968 1971 1976 
over 500,000 26.7 24.8 25.7 25.0 
250,000/500,000 8.2 " 7.3 '8.0 ' - " 9.1 
100,000/250,000 13.2 12.2 13.4 14.2 
. 
" less than 100,000 51.9 55.7 53.0 51. 7 
-
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In Germany between 1965 and 1976 the percentage of population living 
in settlements of over 100,000 inhabitants progressively fell in all 
dissection categories. In contrast, the percentage of population 
living in towns of less than 100,000 inhabitants progressively rose. 
Despite this pronounced trend, if we consider the percentage of total 
German retail trade conducted actually within towns in these different 
size categories, we observe an exactly opposite trend since 1968. ,The 
percentage of retail trade retained in the large towns has been steadily 
increasing, despite the percentage.fall in population. In contrast the 
proportion of retail turnover in smaller settlements of less than 
100,000 people has been steadily declining since 1968, despite the 
progressive increase in the proportion of population living in those 
towns. On this declin~ since 1968 of the share of retail trade held by 
towns of under 100,000 inhabitants, Shaw comments that "the date of 
this decline ~s particularly significant since it marks the main period 
/ 
of growth of hypermarkets and superstores in the Federal Republic" (12). 
, - -
In Germany on this evidence the main impact of, hypermarkets-and: super-
stores has been on towns of under 100,000' inhabitants. ,This national-
level evidence supports the findings in this research precisely. 
This evidence stands despite possible qualifications to t~~ d£awing of 
. , 
, 
, 
this conclusion from these data~ Cresswell, for example, has maintained 
as a general thesis that, since more convenience goods shopping is done 
at the town centre in a town of"up to about 100,000 inhabitants than is 
done in towns of, say, 250,000 inhabitants, the impact of a hypermarket 
on central area trading will inevitable be greater in the smaller town(33). 
The German statistics, however, do not relate specifically tocentralarea 
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trading but to the total of retail trade within the town. The 
observation therefore is not explanatory, or only very partially 
explanatory, of the pattern of the data in Table 8.5. Cresswell's 
hypothesis, however, is of interest regarding Germany. He logically 
maintains that the effect of a hypermarket on city centre trade would 
be comparatively small. c But it seems that in Germany this effect was 
not even minimal. 
Although it cannot be validly deduced from the statistics of Tablci 8.5, 
since these are expressed in percentages, there is e~idence, in fact, 
that, even during the period in Germany of greatest hypermarket growth, 
retail trade increased absolutely in the large cities despite a 
declining city population - and increased also in the central areas of 
these cities. c cThe experience of the Kaufhof Group of chain departmen~ 
stores, one of the two most powerful'store groups in Germany, can be 
taken as indicative. Between 1970 and 1974 the total sales of the 
Kaufhof Group increased considerably. During this time, the proportion 
-' - - ,~ .. ~ . , '-. - . 
::of'its'sales'made in ~ii{~i wit~ ~ p6pulation of more than 500,000 rose 
, " 
from 30 per cent in 1970 to 35 per cent iri 1974 - ana the ~roportion ofc~ c 
its sales made in the central areas of cities went up from 23.1 per cent 
c in 1972 to 25.5 per cent in 1973 (34). Taking Kaufhof ~stypic~i-of 
the city centre trader, as for example does The Financial-limes in this 
context, at least after the initial impact of the hypermarket, the 
large towns regained or more than regained their percentage share of 
trade. The towns that lost retail share were the towns of under 
100,000 inhabitants. 
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Certainly in Germany the first hypermarkets were all located near the 
, , 
largest towns. As early as 1970, however, Self~service and Supermarket 
was reporting that hypermarketing in Germany was, even_by the end of 
1969, into its "second phase". A feature of this "second phase" was 
that hypermarkets were being located near "the smaller, yet still 
heavily populated towns" (35). 
From a national perspective the German case supports the conclusions of 
the regional analysis. These conclusions are: 
(1). A very high urban density is a deterrent to hypermarket 
development. 
(2) By 1973 the areas of extensive hypermarket development 
(3) 
in Europe were areas characterised by towns of fro~·· 
50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants (though the upper ceiling 
may be higher: possibly 150,000 inhabitants), provided 
that in these areas there was a significant .l,e~el:of 
. --( __ ' - .- ;: .-: :: ... T-,--~·-_'::·'~'~_.L. ~ 
, ., ." I" - '" 
population living outside these towns. 
One flnal observation is offered very tentatively indeed~ 
There is possibly_an optimum population d~nsity of the, 
ambient population also - possibly between 150 and 200 
persons per square kilometre. Above this level;--....the -
AID analysis suggests, by the split of BoxJ, the lack-_ 
of freedom of movement may again become restrictive. 
This last observation, however, is based on the evidence 
of only seven regions. 
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8.3.7 Addendum: Population size necessary to support a hypermarket 
The'questionofthe pop~lation size that is netessary to support,a 
hypermarket has been a subject of some discussion in the 1970's as a 
generalised topic. This has been mainly in the context of conjecture 
as to the total number of hypermarkets that would represent national 
"saturation point". 
In 1973 t1arcel Fournier, the founder of Carrefour, announced that a 
hypermarket is possible and viable for 100,000 inhabitants. From this 
he concluded that France, with 50 million inhabitants in 1973, could 
support 500 hypermarkets (36). At a count in Britain in 1978, it was 
estimated that -in NorthWest England there was one superstore' for' 
every 200,000 inhabitants (37) - a figure quoted subsequently in 1980 
'by Tesco Stores as ammunition supporting its planning application in 
the London Neasden area. ("The provinces are five years ahead of 
London") (38). Would it be logical then to assume that, even if its 
- > - ~-
:'' ~cl~~population were perfectly evenly distributed:and not bunched into tow~s, ' 
" ,North West', England would still, have' been hal f way to abscilute' 
--
"saturation" in'1978? 
,As Rousseau (36) has pointed out, the definition of hypermarket has a 
'~, 
bottom size limit (2500 m2) but no top limit., ConsequentlY "saturatio~: 
! 
point" estimates based on hypermarket numbers are meaningless unless an 
, ." ' 
anticipated average size'is included in the calculation. "Rousseau 
quotes Defforey, also of Carrefour, as maintaining that a 20,000 m2 
hypermarket unit needs a 200,000 population to support it. Rousseau 
surmises that, on this basis, a market of 100,000 inhabitants might 
justify a 10,000 m2 hypermarket this is to say: 0.1 m2 of hypermarket 
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space for every inhabitant. He recognises such a ratio is not, in 
practice, possible. In the Haute-Garonne, the department in France 
2' 
with the highest hypermarket provision, this ratio is, however, 0.08 m 
per inhabitant: Therefore he takes this latter ratio as the practicable 
maximum, and suggests that a maximum figure for the "saturation point" 
could be calculated allowing for variation locally in population and 
consequent variation in hypermarket size, "from units of 2500 m2 for 
small zones of about 50,000 inhabitants to units of over 20,000 m2 
for the zones with important and dense populations". If one accepts the 
validity of this calculating down the hypermarket size scale from 
Defforey's operational observation regarding the largest units, one is 
~lso, in effect, saying that a minimum of ,12.5 catchment area inhabitants 
" ' 
-
" ' 
is needed for each square metre of seliing space provided, if a 
hypermarket is to be viable. 
At the bottom end of the scale this method of extrapolation is obviously 
2 -
challengeable:, that a 2,500 m "hypermarket can be supported by a, 
, ' " -,'31,250 population.' Further' .irives'tigatirig Rousseau' S criterion of' wha~ 
,~," is,' practic~ble':(the level of profitable pr~vision- in Haute-Garonne), 
'2 
'however, we see that it is-midway down the size scale from 20,000 m 
that this ratio is being achieved: in January 1973 Haut~-Garronneis 
population of' 729,600 supported five hypermarkets wit~ ~ t9tal,selling 
space of 62,087 m2 (39). Assuming no disproportionate inward migration! 
" :ofshoppers from neighbouring department~'~" these hyperm'arkets' o'f 
2 ' 
12,417 m, average size, therefore, were viable and presumably profitable' 
when supported by only 11.75 persons per square metre of selling space. 
The French department ranked next highest by this criterion was Loiret, 
in which three hypermarkets of under 11,000 m2 average size had a 
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','total population/sales space" ratio of a little under 14. It seems, 
, ,therefore, that the population/sales space ratio of 12.5 is applicable 
as a measure of minimum population requirements at least down to 
hypermarket sizes of 10,000 m2• In 1973 the average size of a hyper-
market in France was under 6,000 m2: in theory, therefore, the average 
French hypermarket could have been viable serving a' population of 
75,000 inhabitants, if the ratio were generally applicable at all size 
levels. In this case thi~ would be the average minimu~ requirement for 
operation. However, most hypermarkets in France are substantially 
below the average size where "average size" is calculated from total 
national selling space. The average size, thus calculated, of all 
, ,', " 2' -, , ,J .• " ":. "', 
hyperm~rketsih. Europe, was 5,852 mat ~he end of 1973" (40)* <. ,It' is ": ,," ',_ "'--, 
not illogical to assume that the "average hypermarket" in Europe in 
1973 needed a supportive population of 75,000 people. 
" -, 
." . -.' 
" -
---.... : '.':'~~~ :~:--;:-':.,-, 
_.". --, 
"-:: , 
1 ••• ,-' ... 
- ''', - , 
, .' ",. ~ .' 
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*Ihough this figure varied considerably nationally - from over 12,000 m2 
for the few units that existed in Denmark (4 units) and Spain (2 units) 
down to the 3,571 m2 average size in the U.K. Nevertheless in three 
countries (Germany, France and Austria), accounting for 75 per cent of 
all hypermarkets in Europe, the average hypermarket size was almost 
identical and slightly below 6,000 m2. 
. ..... -=:.: -. 
'--, 
References Chapter 8 
(1) THORPE, D., Shopping Trip Patterns and the Spread of Superstores 
and Hypermarkets in Great Britain, Retail Outlets Research Unit, 
Manchester Business School, Research paper No.IO, 1978. 
(2) HOGGETT, T.J., Report on the Future of Hypermarkets, Peter Black 
and Partners, 1973. 
(3) . As quoted by Councillor Povey of Birmingham, in Nuttall, G., 
"Blinds dolttn on the High Street", The Sunday Times, 29 November 1970. 
(4) VAN fvIUSSCHENBROEK, K., "The national implications of a local 
enquiry", The Financial Times, 29 July 1971. 
(5) SMITH, B.A., "Retail planning in France", Town Planning Review, 
Vol.44 (3), 1973. 
- (6) Self-Service 1971, International Self Service Organisation,' 
Cologne. 1972. 
: ~ - .: ".'; .~, • > -
. " (7) VAN MUSSCHENBROEK, K., "Rise in food prices may be less than' 
predicted", The Financial Times, 2 fvlay 1972. 
(8) Self-Service' 1974, 1.5.5.0., Cologne,· 1975, ,gives both sets of 
food sales figures. 
(9) A.C. Nielsen Company, The Grocery Marketing Scene: A Neilsen 
._ \~orld-Wide Review, 1976. . 
'" 
-- .,' 
'. '.:- (10) __ Self~Service 1969, International. Self'Servic~ Or-ganisation~ " 
".-.';-, ,: '-., Cologne, 1970 •.. _::. :.', ... ':>-:,~' .,' '., . , .. :" '.: '. ," "',: :,' 
'-- .' . . -",- , . 
. . 
~,~ ; 
... -.. :. 
, , ........ 
'-
'.- . -~. ,,' ,. -: ' 
. ',' .~. ~ Sel f-Service 1974, ,Internat'ion'al s~ir' '-Service O~~~~isatio~ ," ::\,"": '~~'.' . 
Cologne, 1975. . . , .. " .... : 'r._ 
(12) Distributive Trades Economic Development Committee, The Distributive 
. Trades in the Common Market, . National Economic Development Office, ' 
H.M.S.O., 1973. . 
. (13) SAINSBURY, J., "Britain can leanr much from Europe" ,~"'5upermarkets 
Survey, The Financial Times, 25 May 1971. 
"(14)· MATHIAS, P., "Rule Britanrlia - Even in the'E~t~c", The Ohs'erv~r,"''''':",: 
. 9 December 1973. 
(15) LOWE, J., "The U.K. and the E.E.C.: Ahead in retainling, behind 
in economic performance", Retail and Distribution r-1anagement, 
November/December 1974. 
(16) DONOVAN, M.H., "Prospects for hypermarkets in the U.K.", 
E.I.U. News, Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., October 1973. 
297 -
(17) The Financial Times Conference on "Retailing in Europe" 1973, as 
reported in "Retailing in Europe: Present and future", The Grocer's 
Gazette, 20 April 1973 " "~ 
(18) VAN MUSSCHENBROEK, K., "Shopping for a policy", The Financial Times, 
24 February 1972. 
(19) HALL, M., KNAPP, J.,'& WINSTEN, C., Distribution in Great Britain 
and North America, Oxford University Press, London, 1961. 
(20) DAWSON, J.A., The Marketing Environment, Croom Helm, London, 1979. 
(21) CAMERON, B., "Shopping centres round the world"", Estates Gazette, 
30 April 1977, pp 365-367. 
(22) DESPLANQUES, L., "Le' Prof,il Des Centres Commerciaux Regionawt', 
Et Le~~r Attraction", Revue Francaise du: t~arketing, Numero Special: 
Distribution et Centres Commerciaux, Cahier 49, 4 Erne Trimestre, . 
1973. ' 
(23) WOOD, D., The Eastleigh Carrefour: A Hypermarket and its Effects, 
Deparment of the Environment, 1976. 
and ~ , 
',-~:.:~ LEE, M.; JONES, -P., & LEACH.; t., Caerphilly Hypermarket Study', 
Donaldsons, London, 1973. 
(24) By Aylett Moore,' Chairman of Hypermarket Holdings (in The Groce~ 
20 July 1974, p.6.) 
( 25) By Noel Stockdale, Chairman of Associated Dairies (in 
30 minutes away she' will shop at Asda", The Grocer, 7 
:.PP 38 & 39. ) , ' . ..... , 
"If she is 
August 1971, 
'_ __ _ __ • _ - - T 
'.- ,'.'. 
, .' :'(26) " : By: Peter F etnston-Wilii~ms ,then Managing Director of Asda ..• 
•• ", 'C,\ .... --, Superstores (in Thomas, D., "How Asda took its chance"", . 
'_.~ ." --:'< -, The Financial Times, 22 Januar)t 1974) • .... ..:; . <." .- __ 
. -. - ,,' .: .' - -.- - . -', - , ....... - '. ~ , ~ -'). ~"- - , - ".-
, . ,-... ' - , , - ~ . - , , ",: ~; . 
.: (Z7)THORPE , D., Shopping TrIp Patterns and the spread o'f Superstores 
and Hypermarkets in Great Britain, Retail Outlets Research Unit, 
',' _'Manchester Business School, Research PaperNo.10,~978. " 
• _ • -:. _ _ _, • _ _ _ _ ~' • ' • _ • > _ _ _. ~ • • '. ' ... , .r ~ __ ; _ 
(28) LEE, t4., "Hypermarkets, Superstores and discount retailing in 
Scotland": paper given to the Institute of Grocery Distribution' 
(Scottish Branch), published in The Grocer, 25 March 1978. I I 
.1. 
(29) THORPE, D., AND MCGROLDRICK, P.J., Carrefour: Caerphilly - Consumer ~ 
Reaction,'Retail Outlet~ Research Unit, Manchester Business School,. 
Research Report No.12, 1974. . 
(30) REDHEAD, P., "France: the new face of retailing", The Financial 
Times, 25 June 1974. 
(31) Untersuchunq Kundenverkehr 1976, Bundesforschungsansta1t Fur 
. Landeskunde Und Raumordnung, Bonn, 1977. 
- 298 -
','.' .... 
"-"' . 
"" -.'... 
(32) SHAH, G., Retail Developments and Structural Change in West 
Germany, Retailing and Planning Associates, 1978. 
(34) 
(36) 
(37) 
, (38) 
- (40) 
CRESSHELL, R., -"Hypermarkets and urban,structures", Built 
Environment, February 1973 
COLCHESTER, N., "German property: Rebirth of City Centre Shopping", 
The Financial Times, 18 November, 1974. 
"All under one roof: theme of giant German discount centres", 
Self-Service and Supermarket, 26 February 1970 • 
ROUSSEAU, H.,"L'Hypermarch~ My the et Realit~", Libre Service 
Actualiti8's, No.627, fvlay,1977, pp 115-120. . 
DENTON, L., "Shopping pattern of the future": paper delivered t9 
the South Midland regional conference sponsored by the Economic 
Development Committee for the Distributive Trades, published in 
The Grocer , 8 July 1978, pp 86-87 •. 
"Stores fight for 1984 control", Marketing, 28 May 1980, 
pp 24-25. ~~ 
.' '.," , " ......., "",._,',., . ,;.:,,',.- c' ",'.::-.', ',,' . ""_ .' -'.<, '.',';;;-:".:':' 
"Repartition et Densite des Hypermarches"; libre Service Actualities, 
No.430, 21 December 1972, pp 362-363. 
As calculated from Retailing in Europe: Figures and Tables, 
International Association of Department Stores, Paris, 
(unpublished) 1975. 
, '. 
.'.' -
- :<',' -, -.~ 
, ,___ .1. __ ~ _ ." ~. ?' __ ..... __ ~ -
~. .' 
.. -- - ~ 
. , 
."' ,> '-' 
- -",-~ ~ 
~- , - .. -
- -, ~ . -.- .. ';;~ 
'. 
- . ~. -" ,. 
. -= - ~ ~-~-~~': 
-,...--,.::-1.::0..-;.---
.. .. ,'~ ," ~ -: , , , .' ~'";-- : .... -
-
. '~- ~ 4: -:;, :-.' -. ' - -' 
-.:. - ,,:-
. ',".- - -. ,-." " 
- : ~ -.... - ~..;, .~ - ':'-':-".;-: 
.. ' 
, ' 
i 
~ , .' 
. ;-:: 
-'::, ' 
-.299 -
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND REVISED HYPOTHESES 
9.1 This chapter outlines the major conclusions of this research and 
proposes revised hypotheses where this is applicable. The conclusions 
specific to particular indicators are contained in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, 
and are not in most cases reported here in detail. This is not'to deny 
the importance of these more particularised findings. ' 
9.2 THE FACTOR OF CAR-mJNERSHIP 
- . " --, '. -,. 
- ""~-:, -, -, .~: : ,-, ~- .-
_ ..... ,' -1 ',_ 
Car-ownership is important to hypermarket development; but not as 
important as is popularly supposed: .this 1S the research conclusion 
in this research area. 
,' .. ', .. -' --~' ~-. - .;:. 
, '-, . ',' - '.~" -.,..-
Car' ownersh'ip h'as. genera'llY' been 'hypoths1s8c:("as 'fhe:':dorTd.nanta~d '::':./." '-, . 
v.' _~ __ • - . .--z, .. ~ ... ~;- _.:._._--:~,;: ... '_':._' -~,--,~,.",::--~,;_-":i~,::·-'.~', ._--~r...::.. .. : ..• _ ..• 
crucial en~ir'~n~ent"al; ~'~riable:"~:ffecting' hypermarket "developmen,t '".~:,<',:," ,', , '" ' 
:'~~'~"'~~~~~/~~own'~ret~'U'd~v~~~'pme'~t' ~n 'gerierai~'" ~h~ ,~~~t' pu~~~ci:s;{":"",:':':' .... , :':;'<'0,., ,',~ 
h" 
hypermarket catchment area reports have almost invariablY signali~ed' 
,. , 
the dominant importance of car-ownership as deciding patronage. It 
was therefore originally thought that'in the hypermarket ana~ysis the 
'I 
, "car ownership" variable might "swamp" all other variables and 
• ~ ", -! • • - , •• - • .... " ~ -, '., -- -., ... ~ - ~, 
render the analysisiAsensitive'to other fact~rs.' this is not' the case. 
Car ownership ~merges in particular as subordinate to income factors, 
but in conditions of ever increasing car-ownership, only to some 
extent. The correlations in the regional analysis in our research 
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of the "prosperity" variables with the "car-ownership" variables 
are as follows: 
Cars 1966 Cars 1970 Cars 1973 
Gross value added per inhabitant 
Consumption expenditure 
Disposable income 
.71 
.66 
.58 
.66 
.63 
.56 
.56 
.57 
.48 
The levels of correlation are not as high as might perhaps be supposed. 
Nevertheless, there is a significant degree of intercorrelation. The 
levels of correlation with the dependent hypermarket variables are as 
-follows (figur~s in brackets denote significance levels): 
, CARS 66 
IHY 
(Inhabitants 
per hypermarket) 
-.52(.001) 
. , 
SHY 
(Hypermarket selling 
area per 1000 inhabitants) 
.. _, 'cARS' 70 '- . ~.-~, 
, (N=63), 
(N=68) 
.32(.05) 
- , .32(.02) , 
--'T- ..". T_ 
, ' . 
- _.. ._< ____ ~ ;'" _. _.0._.,._ 
:.:,CARS,7Y .' (N=68),' ~~ ~,,:~ 22 ( - ) ,':,'::,::., ;--,<,,'., ' ':; ': 
-, -.' 
.. 
Gross'Value Added'. (N=68) 
Consumption (N=46) 
,Expenditure 
Disposable Income (N=68) 
'-'-36(0.1) 
-.50(.001) 
~'-29(.05) 
'-.::~-:' -;:'~,>-~-.\'" :-..... - ~-;,.;.~-,:~--:--. ;- - '-".~."::-: -
~, .: 
~ ~, .: - . - - , -' '~ 37 ( • 01) . . . ',' .. ' 
'. 59(.001)' 
.-42,(.01) 
Certainly' for the 'more sensitiv~ dependent variable'; the' "selling- . 
space" variable SHY, the "prosperity" indicators are more predictive 
than the "cars" indicators. In the regression analysis (section' 
6.4) the net effect of this is that the "cars" indicator is not 
represented as significant in the regression equation. Without the 
inclusion of a "prosperity" variable it might have emerged as a 
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significant factor. In the AID analysis in Figure 7.2 the crucial 
initial first split is made on the criterion of disposable income. 
Car ownership remains important and is the basis of two subsequent 
splits. But the evidence is that it is an important influence 
, 
subordiante to the yet more important influence of the level of 
income of the consumer. 
The conclusion is that the relationship between car-ownership and 
hypermarket patronage is not as close as is frequently, although 
not universally, supposed, and as widely quoted. figures might suggest. ' 
'9.3 THE FACTOR OF INDIVIDUAL PROSPERITY 
. ,"The level of consumer disposable income is a decisive factor in 
hypermarket development. 
~_, .: ; •••• < ,,::: ::::::i::::d:::d~:r:::::~r:::t:::.:~:dI::::gf:::::m:::::ted: .....  
_-~t·~-~ -:":" ... -~. .-~ -'- -" .- ..... -:.--,;,--.::~ ::"'":'-,-", ,---:... !- ~- '.",..., 
",' C '<provision. In'the AID analysis' that exclui~i~s a super:inarket input', 
'. ' 
.~Figure 7.2) it is the prime distinguishing factor segre'gating 
levels of hypermarket development. It subsumes the factor of 
,car-ownership, but provides an explanation of variance greater 
. '. ," 
The level of individual prospe~ity, as measured b y '~ross value' 
added per inhabitant" is also in the regional AID analysis seen to 
be the crucial 'distinguishing factor in predicting supermarket 
development (Figure 7.3). 
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9.4 THE FACTOR OF EXISTING SUPERMARKET PROVISION 
The natural thrust of trading economics combfned with increasing. 
customer acclimatisation propels the supermarket operator 
progressively to expand his scale of operations. The ultimate 
of this progression is the hypermarket. The discussion is the 
discussion of Chapter 8. Hypermarkets develop in general 
proportionate to the prior level of the supermarket infrastructure. 
This very positive conclusion is contrary to most UK hypotheses. 
One notes parenthetically that the AID analysis that· includes 
supermarket provision as an independent variable explains 90 per 
cent of the variance in hypermarket development,-while the level 
of explanation omitting this variable is 71 per cent. 
9.5 THE FACTOR OF SHORTAGE OF LABOUR 
- -- ~~.. -. ~~;-~- ~ : ~ ~ - ",::,,;.:-.. ~:.. .. - -- -"- - -. '~' -,--
'- ',." -',-An :associated factor .In--th~ tradir;g 'e-c~noinics-'that"pr~mqte-the' <','":/-~:'- ,"." 
'.- " 
• • - • - - ~ 0. _ ' _, _,_ _ .;", ,_ ",. ": : ." ~, • '._' 
" - ~:". ':' • ' , • ~ -> ~ - - '~ 
".:,':' :.:-_-succes'si~~ developments of self-service is the fact ih~t -,"the - , .... , " ' 
• .. •• :"': ~. - - - • ~:, " -- h" , .--- > ~ •• ; ", • -. - ~ - " 
" r~lativeshortage and' cost, of- labour will correspondingly propel '. 
_ ~the" ret ail. operat or pr~gressi v~l y towards sel f .,.serv ice oper ati on. : 
. In the regression analyses, the factor "unemployment" is dominant , 
<-
in explaining (negatively) both supermarket·and hypermarket 
development. In the "supermarket" AID 'an'alysis (Figure 7.3) .-. ", 
., 
"unemployment" is the' prime discriminator ,subsequent to the -, 
initial split on relative prosperity.' In the AID "hypermarket" 
-- " . 
analysis (Figure 7.2) "unemployment" discriminates between 
regions of average hypermarket provision and those of low provision. 
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The hypothesis of environmental shortage of labour and the consequent 
high cost of labour as factors in the tradi ng economics promoting 
supermarket and hypermarket development is thus very strongly 
supported. 
9.6 THE FACTOR OF MAJOR ROAD PROVISION 
On an ascending scale of store size categories from the smaller 
supermarkets. to the larger supermarkets, to the smalle~ hypermarkets, 
to the larger hypermarkets - so progressively does the provision 
of a major road network in the region become increasingly important 
, to the retail operation. The evidence is the correlation analyses 
contained in sections 6.3.2 (3) and 6.3.3 (3). In the AID analysis 
. (Figure 7.1) the extent of major road provision is the critical 
distinguishing factor for those regions with high hypermarket 
prov~sion, after .the influence of the exist~n~ supermarket infra-
. .~tructure. h~s~o segregated -those, regions., - ~ ~ >' 
.. 
. .~. 
, . .-~' :....~' .;- . -- - -, - ~.- - -,' 
-. .,. ,: 
. -' ---~ 
- ~ -'. : "~ " 
-·9.7 THE FACTOR OF CONCENTRATION OF POPULATION 
Supermarkets and hypermarkets develop significantly more in urbanised 
", 
as opposed to rural communities. Supermarket development is, however, 
: indep,endent of relative town size. Large urban mass. as such is a .-
deterrent to hypermarket development. ,The optimum demographic' 
environment for hypermarket development is one of, an adjacent 
town of under 100,000 inhabitants (the suggested optimum is 50,000 
.. 
- .--
.0-., __ :.'::, 
- .... -
.,' 
to 100,000 inhabitants), but with a sufficiently dense ambient popUlation. 
In the main this important discussion is the discussion bf Chapter 8. 
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9.8 THE FACTOR OF "FEMALE EMANCIPATION" 
Of the indicators of "female emancipation", the preferred indicators 
are in general significantly correlated with supermarket and 
hypermarket provision (sections 6.3.2 (5) and 6.3.3 (5)). The 
indicator included in the regional regression and AID analyses to 
represent the factor of female employment, FECV1564 ("Females in 
civilian employment as per cent of all females aged 15-64. 1973") is 
-, 
signi ficant in the regression on "Inhabitants per hypermarket" IHY, 
and significant 'at the secondary stage of the ,AID analysis of SHY 
'in Figure'7.1. This is offered here, however, only as the best 
such indicator that can be currently constructed. The important 
female purchasers of routine purchases are, however, those who 
, . ~re 'married", 'Work is n~eded to construct at regional level the' 
indicators of activity rates of married women proposed in Chapter 4 
,.,as optimal • 
. ; .. ~ . ,,/,~, ' 
---
J,·>,.:>~here . is a~ in~~Ca~iQn, b~tinai6atiQn only!. in ,the r~giQ~al ~nalysl~ '. '. 
, -~. : -- -: . , - ",'. - :,~' 
': -that refrigerat:or ownership' may': b~' highly' predicti ve of' supermarket , ~, 
development •. The very low number of observations available prevents, 
, :.. -:' - " ,- ....... -' 
. however, a valid investigation of what is a commonly accepted but 
always unquanti fied hypothesis.' 
9.9 THE FACTOR OF INDUSTRIALISATION 
The indicators of the innovative "industrialisation" model similarly 
need refinement, but are significantly correlated with hypermarket ' 
development however measured. The ~ndicator '~ross value added, 
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J 
dollar equivalents, per occupied person, 1970" (GVAOCCUP) is the " 
environmental predictor most highly correlated with SHY, relative 
hypermarket selling space - though with only 49 obse-vations. 
The lack of a full range of observations prevented its inclusion 
in the AID analyses. It mayor may not have emerged as influential 
when subjected to this routine. 
9.10 THE FACTOR OF RETAIL INTEGRATION 
There is a significant relationship between levels of supermarket 
and hypermarket development and the degree of integration or 
association in the ambient retail trade. This conclusion is derived 
from the national analysis only. In this, retail or'ganisation by 
legal inlegrati~n and 'n'~n-iegal affiliation is more predictive than 
retail organisation purely considered in terms of formal integration • 
.. 
:..' -, -, :.-._", 
, , " -- ' ,- 'W~, hypothesised no directiorrof cause ,a~dJeffect. 
.-~~.- -~:=,-~.:'.' ~- -~ 
- I, _~ 
- ",'-
In hype~market:: 
. - ; -.- '- ,-~: ~', 
,", ".and supers tore innovation .the pr~minent 'inrlovators in France and 
-
the UK were Carr~four and ASDA. ,These were unaffiliated independerits 
at the time of their adoption of the concept.' 
Owing to the, in general, scarcity of data at, the sensitive'regional 
'level, this important question was not able in this research to be, 
'examined in depth: we obtained regional indicators in the case of 
France only. Sensitive and more sophisticated indicators at the 
regional level are an important requirement for a full comparative 
distribution analysis. 
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9.11 THE VIABILITY OF THE DI.RECT USE OF SOCIOECONOMIC DATA 
It is possible to explain hypermarket development in terms of socio-
economic and demographic influences on an assumption that government 
intervention is in general based on a rational interpretation of 
those'influences. 
9.12 THE VALIDITY OF AID ANALYSIS USING AGGREGATE DATA 
It has been demonstrated that coherent conclusions that are valid can 
be drawn from an Aid analysis using considerably less than the 1000 
cases proposed by Sonquist and his co-researchers as the requisite', 
input using sample data. When this is in respect of aggregate data 
using named entities (in this,case, European regions) that can be 
identified at each step and which constitute the universe, then valid 
,conclusions can be drawn in g,spect of those particular entities -In 
- , 
- ,~ 
',- -,~nalysi~, "excl~~i'a~ does not-i~ply insi'gnlr'{cance;-', but,; if'the 
,- . ~--~-- : - -., .'. ~ :,' - -} - - - - .... - '. - -- -
: statistical claims of candidate predictors at each step are listed, 
the extent to which exclusion does or does not imply insignificance 
can be observed. Uniquely, this project examines the rival merits 
'. 
"-
:' of predictors; and -finds virtually no examples of extreme marginal 
- ,- _ splitting. 
- ~ - . - -- .' - -
, , 
,-~' -'.:. -
9.13 THE METHODOLOGY OF QUANTIFIED COMPARATIVE RESEARCH 
,- . 
. , 
In general literature the main conclusions as to, in particular,-
hypermarket development are based on micro-studies, on surveys of 
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./ 
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the patronage and environment of particular stores. These are not 
--
numerous. Their findings are often contradictory. Quantified 
comparative studies -are also few. In the main, such studies start with 
no hypothesis and are concerned with clustering or factor-analysing 
what data are available. The precision or specific relevance of the 
data is not, in this ~ase, an immediate concern. There is no 
hypothesis to be confirmed or refuted as a result of the analysis. 
Ehrenberg has described such studies as "fishing trips": one simply 
sees what clusters the analysis produces. 
This project proposes a methodological framework against which the 
findings of individual catchment area studies can be compared and 
within which they can be positioned. No such methodological 
framework or properly quan~ified analysis currently exists.' 
9.14 THE PREDOMINANT NEED FOR VIABLE MARKETING INDICATORS 
" , ~ - - ~ 
-: Available indic?tors ~ervingmarketing arE{demonstrabiy i~ade~uate~:, 
", '''. ,.~ .. ---. .-- -' , .. - '-'~- -. 
" - 'In this ~~esearch the' sensit-ive a~~'lysis is'tt~-~-;' analysis at regional' 
- -
level; and the main research thrust has been towards the construction 
of' serisi ti ve' and comparative regional-level marketing -indicators.' 
At national -level' the re'adily av'ailabl~ indicators are gros~ly 
- , ' 
insensitive and compiled for purposes other than marketing purpose~~ 
In this resear'ch more refined indic~tors hav~ been propo'sed and ,-
prototypes constructed. 'At- regional level, with the exception of 
~ajor EEC co~nt~ies in certain instances, readily-available 
comparative indicators do not exist. This project has be~n to a 
large extent concerned with laying the foundation for a relevant 
series of regional-level marketing indicators. 
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As a consequence of this research, the first steps have been taken, 
as noted in Appendix 3, towards the formation of a European 
Marketing Indicators Working Party that will work.towards the 
production of regional level indicators specific to the requirements 
of marketing. 
.- <.-
- - -~. -: : ,- -- . . .. 
--. -
.. . ~ . '.-
-. 'r.'-. 
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. APPENDIX 1. National Analvsis. Variable Codes and 
ISi"174X '='::.;..;..I..-"-~. 2 
400 - 2500m • 
Variable Descrintions. 
Inhabitants per' free-standing supermarket 
1 .1 .1974. 
1Sh74V. Inhabitants per supermarket (including super:narkets 
and Department Stores) 400 - 2500m2 • 1.1.1974. 
Inhabitants per hypermarket. 1.1.1974. 
Inhabitants per self-service unit 400m2 and over 
superl!;arkets in Variety and Department Stores) 
1ADS/1SS0 totals. . 
5)· . 1Sr>:,NB';[ Inhabitants per self-service unit 400m2 and over 
6) 
7) 
including SNS in V and D Stores) 1.1.1974. Amended totals •. 
1SS62. Inhabitants per' self-service food store 1962. 
SSl·:74X. Selling space (I'i~ per 100 inhabitants) in free-
8) 
standing supermarkets 400 - 250002 • 1.1.1974. . 
SHY71. Selling space (112S per'100 inhabitants) in Hyper-
markets. 1971. 
9) Sh"Y74. Selling space (JlI2S per 100 inhabitants) in 
Hypermarke·ts. 1974. 
SSf,1H74. Selli~ space (r.I2S per 1000 inhabitants) in self- . 
service units 400 m2 and over (excluding supermarkets in Variety 
10) 
11 ) 
.12) 
13) 
14) 
15) 
16) 
17) 
and Department Stores). 1.1.1974. . .. '
ISS70;Inhabitants per self":'service food'store - 1970. 
PAGRIC60. I~~abitants per km2 agricultural area 1960 .. ' 
. PAGR.lC70. It 11' 11 11 11 1970 .. 
PDEi';S60. '11· It 11. of total territory 1960~· 
PDEHS70. It 11 "" 11 . 11 1 970. 
AGRIC5~·61 • 5; labour force employed in agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 1961. 
AGlnC~&70.· ,S labour 11 11 " " ., 11 
., -. -.- .- . .," 
.. . .and fishing 1'970.'.. >" , 
" '.' 
'18) .' .AGRIC5~73. ; .'~;~ labour': .' u"'>: ···~U.:"" ." 'v" ... " ... ~. 11 
. ~ " .' .'. _, '" _,. __ . " .~-' ~ . '. _~. . .,._ .:.~,'.~:.{ .. ~,:'_':"):.,\ ••. ':-::'O~: ...... _' _':"'>:'::"'!"".~~~:~'_ 
"':'.:;' .:'~.":'" .')mdf.ishing 1973~·~·.;·.":; '-~~<::".<--"' .• ": . _ '. ,::.',' '.,,::'.'-~/.' .. :.:.' ::".:.'", " .,.: .. ', . ., 
... '::"'" -:~'1.9)·j :,., HAGRIC 70. > . ~ of \.rage' e.arner's·','arid s!'ilaried'" employee's; ~emptbye:(f'~:i~:' <.'.' 
',.:: ::: ."-':~" . ; ...... , .. agricul till'e etc .1970 ...... ' .. ''': .. : ....... " .. ' .. ~:::.,. . . . ,,-.: ... ,." . 
::-".., .-.;20't· .. ·'''AGRIC ;73.;·.·.,&· of: ''lage .. :.'~' .. " .. ~I ... _; ., }~:~"'J"'" ".,:.:-'11., _.'" 
", ... .. agriculture' etc •. ' 1973 •. 
2'1) ·AGRGDP60. );. GDP derived from AgricultUre, forestry and 
.. fishing 1960 • 
. 22) : AGRGDP73. 11 11 11 11 11 ,11 
2~). 
'24) 
25) . 
26)', 
27) . 
fishing 1973. . ... 
AGG10060. 7b population living in urban 'agglomerations~ of - '. 
. It .. < . 11 : .11 
- ,;: 
100,000' inhabitants or more 1960. 
AGG50060 •.. ' . 5~ population living 11 
500',000 inhabitants or more 1960. 
LAR25062:. '. 5; population living, in u~ban catchmen't areas of . 
250,000 inhabitants or Dore 1960. L.AR..qy SIUTH CONSULTING. 
AGG10070~ ~~ popUlation living in urban agglomerations of 
100,000 inhabitants or more 1970. 
AGG50070. 5~ population living in urban agglomerations of 
500,0'00 inhabitants or more 1970. 
i 
, 
! 
,~ - - -
. ~ -~ ---
. - ,.', 
i 
) 
....... : 
. ; 
28) 
29) 
30) 
31) 
32) 
33) 
34) 
GNPPC61. 
GNPPC70. 
GDPPC70. 
GDPCPP70. 
GDPPCT5. 
GDPCPP73. 
DI60. 
equivalents) 
35) DI70. . 
36) 
equivalents) 
DICPPP70. 
CPP) 1970. 
37) ].ID. 
38) DICPPP73. 
CPP) 1973. 
39) DI72. 
GHP per capita (dollar equivalents) 1961. 
11 11 11 11 .11 . 1970 •. 
11 (dollars) '1976. GDP 11 
11 11 
11 11 
11 11 
Gross 
1960. 
Gross 
1970. 
Gross 
11 
'11 
." 
'"'. 
" {adjusted for CPP) 1970. 
11 (dollars) 1973. 
11 (adjusted for CPP) 1973 
Disposable Income of households (dollar 
11 11 
It 
" 
11 11 
11 11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
" 
It (adjusted for 
.11 (dollars) 1973. 
'11 {adjusted for 
11', "" 11 (dollars) 1972. 
40) COHS69. 
(dollars) 
CONCPP69·. 
Privatec'onsumption expenditure per capita": 
1969. 
41 ) 11 '11 11 11 11 
(adjusted for CPP) 1969.' 
42) . . VNI10RK70. Value added per ''lorker (dollars) 1970. 
43)' VAi'ICPP70. . 11 " 11 11 (adjusted for CPP) 1970.' 
,4
4
4
5
>" VAl/ORK73. .." ,11 .', ,,'.11 .' ,'11, {dollars) 1973.:'···· " - -. 
) VAUCPP73. 11 11 11 11 (adjusted for CPP) 1973.' 
46) ~nm:II;C69. Median net household income (£s) 1969. ' 
47) lUNCCPPP. ,,11 "11 ,,( adjus ted 'f o'r C pp) 1969. 
48) FOOfftb70 '. ~b ~f' private consumption'spent on food, drink and 
tobacco 1970. 
49) CiiliS60. Cars per 1000 population 1960. 
50)" CARS70.. "" 11 11 1970. 
',.' 51 r u CA.ttS73. ,un, 11.' 11 ,: ',n . .1973. 
_ ....... ,., 52), ·HHCk •. " """I~ households mminr;'cars 1969 •. ';:'.~'."­
~,,,:.;-::,-,-,:.,, ':53) '. i0!.Si{D61 .,,< __ :',':,. Hotqr vehicle,S 'pe!' km road '196l.·,:,~.!r:~;:~' ' .. , . 
. '. ,.' ;; '. '54)' :'!VSftD7 0 ' 11 , ',' " -.' ·'·c 11,' .,n~ ',' 11 :? 1 970', ',;' : .. ".J::,/:,;:'-;" " . :,':~~ .' . .'::"-55) ',iwsiW73:";'-" ·,,·r·.. ,\. ;:i:·.:i;,-,"il:.':-~II' :!f973~' '.~:: .. '-:'>~, :":': .. 
- ~ " .': ··,'.:5?L ,'-.-EESRGY61. , Energy'consumpti~)ll'per' capita 1.961.,':'··, .' _, -.";.:, ..... 
.-:i ',,: ._ ::57) Ei\TERGY71.··.·:' .::' n':' '.'.' '''~:II "',-, ,,11 ".11,." 1971' .:.'. n •• ' .--
'," .. ' :58) 'ENERGYT).· .' u ... " . ' -11: "11 :-.', ',,:' '1973: :~":'< .' 
. 5$) STEEL613~ . Apparent steel consumption per ~apita1961-1963 .' .... 
(annual average). . .. 
60)·· STEEL 1 • '. Apparent 11 11 ,:n, .n. :., :,,1971-1973 '", . 
. ' annual average). 'n'" ,':, , . 
'~ . , 
'61) :-ESINDEX. .... COlffiIllED IHDEX Energy Cc St~~l. 1973/1971-~13~ . 
: .. 62) ADPC70. Advertising expenditure (dollars) per capita' 1970. , 'j . 
. 63) FE5;LF60.·· Female labour forceas~6.of .. totallabour·force' '.:.-" ...... :,,'. 
'. . 1960. . . ' . : " '. '-... , . .' ,:-"'.:" -' .. ,,' _ 
,'64} . FE{,;CTv61 • Females in civilian employment as 5~ o·f'total.· . 
civilian employment 1961.' . 
65) FEI/?SF'E61. . Females in labour force as % of female population 
66) 
67) 
68) 
69) 
,1961 • 
Fb1~I,lE61 • Female wage and salary earners 
and salary earners 1961 •. ' 
, PE~bI..F70. Female labour force as ~; total 
FE5;LF73. " 11 11 11 11 11 
•. }'E7X1V73. Females in civilian employment 
employment· 1973. 
ii 
as 7b of all \-lage. 
labour force 1970. 
11 11 1 973. '<,' 
as ~;; total civilian 
• '. .<'~.~. 
'!.,. --<.;-
1- ,". 
'-. 
70) 
71 ) 
72) 
73) 
74) 
75) 
76) 
F8156470.' Females in labour force as 5~ of all females 
aged 15-64. 1970. 
l!'B156473. Females" il 11 11 11 11 11 11 
aged 15-64.- '.1973.' 
FE15UP70. Females" 11 " 11 " 11 11 " 
aged 15 and over.1970. 
FE15UP73. Females" \I 11 " 11 " 11 11 
aged 15 and over.1973. 
FE\12;FE70. Females \I 11 11 11 11 " total female 
population 1970. 
FE\'l}b}'E73. F.emales" . \I \I 11 "11 11 
population 1973. , 
XFM'ITO. Females in civilian employment (excluding unpaid 
family workers) as ~b of all persons in civilian employment 
(excluding unpaid family workers) 1970. - I 
NMbf.1A70. Harried ,wmen in labour force as ~o of all married 
women. 1970. 
YlA%r>lA73. 
"lOmen 1 973. 
\I 11 11 \I 11 
" 11 " " 
NARCIV70. Harried women in civilian employment as % of all 
. persons in civilian employment. 1970. 
80) BARCrV7). Narried "Tomen in civilian employment as ijb of .all 
persons in civilian employment. 1973. 
81): ,: 3DBP60.' '.: Population aged' 0-14 years as 5b. o:f:p·opulatiori. 'aged, 
15-64 years.' ' 1960. 
82)JDS?70. Population' U 11 11 11 " 11· 
" 
11 11 
15-64 vears., , 1970. 
83) BIIlTHS60.·· Live births per 1000 population 1960 • 
. 84) BIE'l'HS63. """" It 1963. 
-.: : '. 
85) BInTHS73. 11 11 11.. 11 1973 • 
, ',-' . 
. 86) ';lll-'LFT69. )b 'housei'li yes in p~id el'!1ployment, (full-time) 1969.,· 
87)'. 'ilIFBALL.·· "":'.' ell. ",' .... ~I ," ". ." . (full,til'!1e··and·"<·"':,.·· .. ·'" ,. 
: '~,/ ··part time J: . .1'969..', .: "<:".::>;::'f:, ',:':~,:: .. ,'.: .: .. :~. ',," ,: ;.' ;, '. ::'. ..,' 
8$):~':):;DUCW69· •. o'~::": .:: ~~ fe'males :,educat-e'Q' up> to ,'at ie'ast' age"'18:.':: i 969.,~ . 
:89) , .,: !:;Duc:ra'J~. ,:<~, ,:::::~~: t.elJial~s'::~Ii th·.).eV:e'l':·3· 'e~iuc~t~on "'(BEG ":5~''Only) ':'~:'~'::-'.. .' 
.90)':~ .r'RIG73~ , '.-;' .:,;; ~o housenolds .o~ming :refrit;erator J.973,~:" .. '/,.'.:' '7;:"':,.,<",,;-
91 )' ,'."FRIG69. " -','.', 'u .;:. ,','. .:_ "'" .: '" '.~ : ,1969.:" ',:,:, ,:. ;;',; '::~:';:" c', .,-:,:': 
'92) "IID"'74- ':"~, .. ,',",,:,:-·;·'f~·,' ,.·.:;:.-u ..... ,' 'hcirnedeepfreezer '.1974.'" 
'93) :'HD~'6q:' n"'>"'i' ,:",,;,':""",:. '11' " ','" '. 11·, 1969. ,"c'Y" ,-" 
94) VAC73· ".. "vacuum cleaner 1973. "".':"" .',,, h 
95)' . VAC69. " .' , ". 11 ' 11 ". '.1969~., "-.:. ,. ",," .. 
96) IN'1.'I~G62.'.-' .. Intee,'Tated retail trade ·as f;'of total retail 
97) '.; ':~~;~;6~ :62.<:.~- I;'n~n~a~'sOciat~dll ~~'tail' t~a~~ :.~~ :;-;: ;~<':~'~tai' "~~--~~ii-'~':-><" 
. -::--_trade _.1 962. :' " .-
98) mTb;G71.· . r~teirate,d retail trade as ~; 'of total~- re~taif:t~a:de,:: - , , 
:1971 • : " '- -.' ; ~ ,- , ~";- - ~ . - ." -' - ~'-1 ~. \; , --
99)i:iATOT71. '.. "l-';on-as'sociated" retail trade as 5~·of'total·'ret~ii:;' 
trade. 1971 • 
100), NAl<'OOD71. "Non-associated" retail food trade as ~; of total 
trade, 1971. retail food 
IJ~T:!:.;G73 • 
1973. 
Integrated retail trade as %of total retail trade. 
102) HA'l'01'73. "l'lon-associated" retail trade as 5~ of total retail 
trade. 1973. 
Hi 
103) SALESl~HP. Retail sales per person engaged in retail sales. 
1971/72. 
m2 retail 1971/72. 104) SALESM2. Retail sales per selling space 
105.) SAlliSPC. Retail sales per capita of population. 1971/72. 
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APPENDIX 1 (CONTINUED) 2 . 
• "SIGNIFICANT 
DISTRIBUTION ANALYSIS NATIONAL 
AT THE .001 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL 
TqTALS 
· . 
,Correlation coefficients: " . 
· 
'L .01 
.02 
.05 
" 
ISH74X 
ISH74V 
IHY74 
ISH4U74V 
ISHNEW74 
lSS62 
SSH74X 
SHY71_ 
SHY74-
• 
',' 
" . " ~ , .1 _:,' 
" 
N ISH74X ISH74V IHY74 ISH4U74V \:: ISHNEW74 ISS62 SSH74X SHY71 SHY74 SSHII74 
14 1.00000 0:96247(1) 0.94860 (1). d~96289{~f' '0.96242 (J) 0.6859212! -0.71846 (~) -0.39974 o 49099 (I) 0 668441~ 
14 0.96247 111.00000 0.97613(1) .0.99984 1 . 0.99964 (00.66854 2 -0.680:?5 (~)-0.37094 :0:47121 ;~:0:63482 3 
14 0.94860 1 ' 0.97613!ill.00000 0.97885 1 0.97899(1) 0.77641 2 -0.62721{31-0.35589 -0.47922 5 -0.60661 4 
14 0.96289 1 0.99984 1 0.9780511 ! 1.00000 0.99982(1) 0.67112 2 -0.67407 2 -0.37416 -0.47647 5 -0.63406 3 
14 0.96242 1 0.99964 1 0.97899 1 0'99982{1~ 1.00000 0.67213 2 -0.67308 2 -0.36774 -0.47120() -0.63060 3 
14 -0.71846 2) -0.68025 2 -0.62721 3 -0.67487 2 -0.67308(2) -0.57619(4) 1.00000 0.65940(3) 0.68797{2). 0.9364S 1 
14 0.68592 2) 0.66854 2 0.77641 2 0.67112 2' '0.67213(2) 1.00000 -0.57619(4) -0.28911 -0.38679 -0.53453f4i 
14 -0.39974 . -0.37094 -0.35589 -0.37416,· -0.36774 -0.28911 0.65940IJ} 1.00000 '0.96164(1) 0.86024 1 
14 -0.49099(5) -0.47121(5) -0.47922{51·-0.47647(5) -0.47120(5) -0.38679 0.68797 2 0.96164(1) 1.00000 0.89788 1 
SSMH74_ 14 -0.66844(2) -0.63482(3) -0.60661 4 ,-0.63406(3) -0.63060(3) -0.53453(4) 0.93648 1 0.86024(1) 0.89788(1) 1.00000 
ISS70 - 12 0.45962 0.42573 0.56252 5 '0.42823 ,0.42810 0.95393 (1) -0.50120 5 -0.26010 -0.32947 -0.41>006 
PAGRI60_ 13 -0.38850 -0.32350 -0.28217 -0.32127 '-0.31006 -0.15361 0.41653 0.43088 0.35549 0.4()891 
PAGRIC70_ 13 -0.45957' -0.39816 -0.34883 -0.39535 -0.38478 -0.19385 0.47893(5) 0.43600 0.36652 0.45172 
PDENS60_ 14 -0.24224/, -0.15683 -0.11192 -0.15492 -0.14608 0.04951 0.27234 0.37331 0.32026 0.30338 
P['ENS70_ 14 -0.24206 -0.15734 -0.11204 -0.15528 ,,-0.14668 0.04448 0.270:!8 0.35645 0.30433 0.29384 
AGRIC%61_ 14 0'74036~21 0.63136 J 0.59168 4 0.62684 3 0.62572 3 0.47011(5) -0.734892 -0.43751 -0.44618 -0.657023 
. AGRIC%70- 14 0.73801 2 ',0.65577 J 0.58719 4 0.64923' 3 ,0.64758 3 0.42987 -0.77289 2 -0.46033 5 -0.45504 -0.68410 2 
AGRIC%73_ 14 0.70631 ~ 0.64528 3 0.57778 4 0.63809 3 0.63682 J 0.45163 -0.78113 1 -0.46605 5 -0.460..,0151-0.69228 2 
WAGRIC70- 14 0.95460 ,,0.91737 1 0.92511 1 0~91825 1 ,0.91707 1 0.74300(2) ,,0.72379,2 .-r0.4,576.4 5 -0.54747 4 -0.69880 2 
WAGRIC73_ 14 0.93751 ~1} 0.91166 1 0.93892 1 '.0.91354 1 '0.91236 1 0.79804(1) -0.7:!?:87 2 '10.47972 5 -0;58630 4 -0.71906 2 
AGRGDP60_ 13 0.67390 J . 0.58365 ~ 0.52017 5 0.58018 4 i 0.58193 4 0.31821' ':'0';67463 J -0.53150 5 .. ':'0.49567 5 -0.64660 3 
AGRGDP70_ 13 0.54445 5 .0.45921 0.40197 0.45458 0.45821 0.32423 -0.6700,;", ;-!> •. 52445 5 -0.48033 5 -0.63684 , 
AGGI0060_ 14 -0.25733 -0.15338 -0.20915 -0.15585 -0.15637 -0.25032 , 0.02535; ,,0.12397 0.06998 0.04364 
AGG50060_ 14 -0.29493 -0.21199 -0.26646 -0.21499, i' -0.21437 -0.;>7474 -0.01214,,"'; 0012986 0.06088 0.01824 
LAR25062_ 14 -0.30185 -0.18015." -0.23644 .' -0.18412, -0.18603 -0.22501 0.14144 0.20843 0.19791 0.18204 
AGGI0070_ 14 -0.25720 -0.14721 -0.19275 -0.14888 ;,., '-0.14873 -0.23532 0.06273 0.16242 0.09183 0.07527 
AGG50070_ 14 -0.30337 ,:"0.23055 -0.26972 -0.23291" -0.23237 -0.26412 0.05468 0.21054 0.11816 0.08485 
GNPPC61 _ 14 -0.78851 1 -0.76593 2 -0.71356 {2} -0.76082 2 -0.76337 2 -0'58849~4} 0.80481 1 0.45231 i ! :'~0'50934~51 0.739771 21 GNPPC70_ 14 -0.73808 2 :"0.72308 2 -0.64461 3 -0.71664 2 ':-0.71889 2 -0.52647 5 0.83731 1 0.49676(5), ;0.53570 4 0.77064 2 
GDPPC70- 14 -0.72363 2 -0.71360 2 -0.62960 J -0.70668 2 ":0.70921 2 -0.51577 5 0.85760 1 0.51334 (5) 0.53581 4 0.78246 1 
GDPCPP70_ 8 -0.66609 5 -0.69263 5 -0.52720 -0.67978 5 -0.68878 5 -0.54372 0.72650 4 0.51401 0.50596 0.66568 5 
GDPPC73 _ 1lj -0.72456 2 -0.70449 2 -0.64239 (,) -0'.69922 2 ,-0.70115 2 -0.57161 (4) 0.82891 1 0.52512 (5) 0.58097(4) 00 •• ~B66204~ 1 
D
G
I
D
6
P
O
C?73. 18 -0.63388 5 -0.67209 5 -0.50185 -0.65634 5 :-0.66490 5 -0.52003 0.(,6651 5 .0.33620 0.36922, '" _ 
'l -0.76354 2 -0.75912 2 -0.70416 ~2} -0.75382 2 ~'0.75662 2 -0'57550~4! 0.82048 1 0.46597(5) 0.51467(5) 0'75140~2! 
DI70- lit -0.72469 2 -0.71573 2 -0.62812 J -0;70866 2 ':0.71060 2 -0.50102 5 0.87077 1 0.53494 (4) 0.53787(4) 0.78936 1 
DICPPP70- 8 ·-0.78173 'i. -0.80434 '3 -0.65614 5 -0.7';'200 J -0.79995 J -0.67563 5 0.77273 It 0.47619 0.48582 0.67797 5 
0173 - 12 -0.68581 , -0.72609 % -0.49678 -0.71187 2 -0.71534 2 -0.50831 5 0.83534 1 0.58404 (It) 0.55788(5) 0.78167 2 
01CPPP73 8 -0.64415 5 -0.68391 5 -0.51105 -0.66681' -0.67416 5 -0.53092 0.68044 5 0.28899 0.33189 0.54893 
Dl72 - 14 -0.75093 2 -0.72381 2 -0.64909 (J) -0.71768 2 :-0.71934 2 -0.54491 (It) 0.87459 1 0.52479(5) 0.56927(4) 0.80739(1) 
. CONS69- IJ -0.74862 2 -0.70334 2 -0.65259 (J) -0.69950 2 -0.70376 2 -0.51101 (5) 0.78109 2 0.41309 0.51065(5) 0.72423(2) 
CONCPP69- 8 -0.59311 -0.61429' -0.4S106 -0.60278 -0.61454 -0.46607 0.64090 5 0.31696 0.37910 0.55596 
VAWORK70- 14 -0.74801 (2) -0.72800 (2) -0.63345 (J) -0.72159 (2) -0.72228 (2) -0.44670 0.82904 1 0.51617 (5) 0.52595 (5) 0.75566 (2) 
VAWCPP70- 8 -0.52576 -0.55117 -0.39284 -0.53833' -0.54918 -0.38771 0.64600 5 0.31843 0.33261 0.51833 
VAWORK73- 14 -0.76119 (2) -0.75131 (2) -0.66573 (2) -0.74652 (2) :'0.'74614 (2) -0.43679 0.79252 1 0.54709(4) 0.58085(4) 0.75725(2) 
VAWCPP73- 8 -0.47388 -0.49621 -0.34350. -0.48671 '-0.49575 -0.31504 0.66968 5 0.46047 0.47302 0.61220 
HNHINC69- 14 -0.77759 (2) -0.73255 (2) -0.67166 (2) -0.72609 (2) -0.72997 (2) -0.60314 (4) 0.81404 1 0.36875 0.39725 0.68316 (2) 
HINCCPPP- 8 -0.63620 (5) -0.64339 (5) -0.51862 -0.62748 (5) -0.63686 (5) -0.60611 0.52152 0.19080 0.11559 0.32583 
FOOD%70- 14 0.41887 '0.40432 ~ 0.37826 0.39663 : 0.39679 0.55883 (It) -0.71543121-0.44329 -0.4629315! -0.65968!JI 
CARS60 - 14 -0.68630 12! -0.62201 I J 1-o.59365 14~ -0.62083 ~Ji -0.62340 1'1-0'45076 0.70892 2 0.46845 ~5l 0.51045 5 0.68222 2 CARS70 - 14 -0.76106 2 -0.72293 2 -0.62734 , -0.71815 2 '-0.71972 2 -0.33624 0.75554 2 0.50883 5 0.52416 5 0.71020 2 
CARS73_ lit -0.71521 2 -0.68304 2 -0.57618 4 -0.67878 2 :"0.68137 2 -0.23457 0.70557 2 0.51935 5 0.52708 5 0.68029 2 
HHCA - 14 -0.77434 2 -0.67725 2 -0.62159 J -0.67370 2 '-0.67828 2 -0.44152 0.67845 2 0.26501 0.32200 0.57075 4 
HVSRD61- 1, -0.31128 -0.24135 -0.16547 -0.23547 ... ' ;.-0.23554' 0.07836 0.19689 0.02384 -0.02840 0.10870 
HVSRD70~ 14 -0.00057 0.07000 0.17971 0.07782' 0.07895 0.31368 0.14668 0.16576 0.02250 0.08947 
HVSRD73- 14 0.17720 0.24504 0.35041 0.25232 " \ 0.25330 0.44810 0.00764 0.09883 -0.05562 -0.03179 
ENERGY61· lit -0.69019 2 -0.61072 4 -0.60502 14! -0.60829 4' -0.60400 4 -0.53301 {4} 0.65207 J 0.50195\5\ 0.46854\5\ 0.61988 !'! ENERGY71_ 14 -0.80790 1 -0,79503 1 -0.73852 2 -0.78S75 1 -0.78586 1 -0.60903 4 0.83523 1 0.52766 5 0.49807 5 0.74112 2 
ENERGY73_ 14 -0.77937 2 -0.78211 1 -0.74713 2 -0.77697 2 -0.77329 2 -0.65197 j 0.90768 1 0.52720 5 0.50484 5 0.72357 2 
STEEL613_ 14 -0.59043 4 -0.56386 4 -0.46896 5 -0.55859' 4 -0.56190 4 -0.29606 0.76150 2 0.65545 J 0.60821 4 0.75745 2 
STEEL713_ 14 -0.51442 5 -0.49012 5 -0.39708 -0.48423 5 ':0.48822 5 -0.31034 0.77689 2 0.66982 2 0.62128 J 0.77582 2 
ESINDElC_ 14 -0.72296 2 -0.70972 2 -0.63933 (j) -0.70369 2 .-0.70412 2 -0.54191 (4) 0.88643 1 0.67284 2 0.63460 J 0.84138 1 
ADPC70_ 14 -0.63674 3 -0.61323 j -0.56956 (4) -:0.60542., 4 :::p.60769 4 -0.60553 (4) 0.6o:!85 4 0.20946 0.22601 0.47764 5 
~ " i 1> 
-I:, 
• (1) = signiflcant ot the .001 signlflc;)llCP. level;,:(2):'= .01 ldcl; (3) ... 02 level; (4) ... 05 level; (5) .1 level 
N. I S~7UV " ·IHY711 SHY71 SHY711 SSMH7il 
ISM711)( 14 1.00000 0.')1.2 11 7 0.9QRI>O 0.%2~'): '°.9"7
"
2 0."115 9 2 -0.7tll/JI, -0.,99711 -O,Q9099 .. O.""~QII 
ISM711V ", O.9,,?Q7, 1.0000r) ,0.97"'5 ':', O.I/Q'I(\Q :.'0.'19'11>11 0.1,1>11<;;1 -0.h8 0 75 -0.370911 -O,Q7!21 -0,1003482 
IHY7/J "O.I/IIA"O ,0,97613 1,0(1000' 0.978 A<; :,:,', 0.nIl9,) 0,77hQI .. O,fl27?, .O,3~589 -0,Q79n -1),"01>"\ f 
I S M 411711 V 11 0 • 9 "2 A 'I 0 • q 9 9 R 11 : 0 • (n IJ 11 '5 I '. 0 ° I) 0 0 ° , 'l q ') R 2 0 • /,7 1 , 2 - 0 • " 7 11 A 7 .. 0 • 37 III " - 0 • 11 7 I> Q 1 .. Q • I, 311 0 I> 
c IS~Nfw111 11 0.91>211;> O.'lqql,IJ'. (I.')7R,)9 (1'.9q,)A? .1.00000 0."'213 .. 0.673011 -0.3&17 11 .0,117120 "(l.1>30,,0 15Sb7 .. 0.,,11,)'12 0'.61-.8')1.1',"; 0.771,11'1 0."71 t? 0.67;>13 ,1.00000 -0.571>1,) .0.21'911 -0.381>79 -0.53 1153 
SSM711)( II -0.718116 -O,6RO?'5'-0.62721 '-0.67111\7.0.6730R -0.~7"lq 1.00000 0."59110 0,&8797 0,911>118 
SHY 7 I ,,-0 • J 'I 'I 7 11 .. 0 • 37 01/ 11 - 0 • 3., 5 A ') "", - 0 • 3 7 III & - I) • 3 h 7 7 11 .0 • 2119 1 1 . 0 • (, ~ q 11 I) 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 ' Il, 9", t & 11 0 , A 6 I' 7 11 
SHY711 "-0.11')0')9' -0.117121' ,-0,47922" -0.£.7&117 "0,117120 -0.311&79 0.1>8797 O.(H.lbll 1,00000. O,8 q 71:l8' 
SSMH711 "-O.bl,OIlIl· -0.63qIl2 .. 0.6 061>1,' -0.&31106 .. 0.630/,0:' ~ .. 0,53 11'53 0.93b118 O,1I602/J··.. 0,1197811 1.00000 . 
( - 15570 12 1),45962 '0.112'573,,' 0.50252' 0.I1?A?3 0,421110 O.~ill.3 .. 0..r2.QJ?'0 -0.2~nl0 -0,32947 .. (),III,OO~6 ___ .... , } 
F£XLF'bO 14 -O,Q?II&O -0.<;354 1 1'4) -0.5811,/l(4) -O,5I1n<)3 (4) "0,SI1811(4) -O,40(HI8 0.1111>116 0.32129 ll,1I1I1611 O,J211SQ 
F~XICV61 11 0.0<;1~5 -0,32701 -0,311""0 "0.33069 -0,3I1R9~ -O,3111?\ 0,07823 Oil1l575 0,19705 0,13704 
( FEWXFE61 12 -0.370 /10:; .• o,r;Otl76(S) .0'.5011,,)9 (5) -0,510?1 ,(5) "0.51907(5)' .. 0,33261 0,27
'
1112 0.22F130· '-0.320/02 0.37<;7& 
F£Xl1fbl 12 -0.bonM4) .. 0.70312(3) -0.BI>QII(2) -0.7060b (3)-0.713 9 &(2) -0,<;7097(5) 0.2811'52 0.09085, 0,19f.1211 0.272t'\ 
Ff.XLF70 14 -0,/13303 .0.55830(4) -0.57197 (4) -0.S'5883 (4) ,,0,5/00/,90(4) .. 0.<;0'3'52(5) O.II<>2IS- 0.276('7" 0,38157 -- O,II1I9rq 
FE'l:LFn 11 -0.21'1865 ,,0.110364" -0.4111\9 -0,1102'71 :,,0.11\0111 -0,412')5 0.34137 0,22?7J -·_·0,31030 0,37236 
fEXCIV73 ,,-0.31201 -0.112883 -0,111127'5 -0.11"01'\2 "0,1135 0 1 -0,1151/57(5) O.lIl/,Ab 0.211128 ,::. 0,32177' 0.1(1128 
FE15/OO1170 " -0.111>536(5) -0.575115(4), .0.51\9 110 (4) ,.0,57441, (4) -0.51'1125(4) · .. 0.'57?01(4) 0,1I67H (5) 0.23bIl3_ 0,311761"-,_,, 0,45'1~7(S) - .. ~ 
( 
FE:!5bll73 ,,-0.3/1H7 .. 0.47576(5) -O.IIAS?O(S) "0.117318 (5)-0.47962(5) .0.'53793(4)'''-0.1I301&--·-·--0~lcn'5&--''---Oi28127----"--Oi'll179 
FE1'5l1J>70 " .. 0.41 \118 -0,~1I271(4) -0.5'51&9 (4) "0.511081.(4) .. 0.547110(4) .0,5'3<127(4) 0.42307.. 0.18213: ___ : 0,28693· .. _0.'lO?79 
FEI5UP7] ,,-0.32930 -0,4117,117' -0.411707. ',-0. 43910' .O.411S311 -0,50&&9(S) 0,H220 0,14203' .. -. O,2H3b '.- ·0.3bll;?9 
( , ) 
( ' FE. W X n. 7 0 ,,' - 0 • 112011 (j .0 , 511 4 7 5" - 0 • 5 3 q 13 ' ... 0 .542 I 1 , , " .. 0 • '5/11\ 'I 3 .0, 'lI 221 - O. 47002 . .. .. 0 , ? 2 8 9 8 -- .77. - O. 32& 1 9 ~-. 0,4506 I FEw X F E 73 11," 0 • 3 !.j 11 0 (, ', .. 0 • 4 '15 b ') '.: ·0 , q 11 9 " ;> ·0 , 115 18 1 ,'; '- 0 • 11 '5 !\ ~ 2 ( 5) - 0 • 11 q 0 6 4 ( 5 ) 0- • 11 302 b - 0 • 1 8 S & 7 'c 0, 2 b 73?' '-.. 0 • 11 n 112 8 
<, )(FAM70 11 -0.b533 4(4) '.0.7b6111(2) -0.71989 (3) ';0.7h235 (2) -0.71>762(2) .. O,530n(5), .O~bllb" (4) 0.:\78'50 '",:--.- 0.117820 :c7.0,b3b7t,(4) C-. 
1( ... ·: MUMA70 12 0.17116& -0.113994 -0.3'519 , .. 0.113\14' -0.41150b .. 0.11715" '0.20;7'10 '0,071\311 ---.. , 0.08911--"" . 0,22030' . 
'MAtHA73 9 0.111590 '·0.21780 -0.185'12 ;"-0.217611,. -Q,2 11 '3H -0.03321 O.0'55b9" '0;02?&0-~"~OiI0903 '·-:·---·0,13179 ",--C-: ) 
MARCIV70 14 -0.35156 ·0.1111207 -0.HI78·: -O.IIHOS' -0.1I 1 3?3 -0.31201 ·o'.abOH (5) 0,i?1I3?9'" 0;322bS -. -0,1141127' .. 
MARCtV73 13 -0.3b097 -0.1I5bM -0.111137 ',-0.1.1'52'5;> '-0.1J';fJ27 -0,13360 ... 0,11&779 --: - 0.313111' ~: ... - 0.37107 -" .... O,1I7bIl8(5) 
JDf.PbO 14 0.11>5h2 0.07475 0.015'b 0.07178 '0.07773 .O.0171b -0.391.1'58' -0.1J?140 . "0.40457 -0.1.111')114 
.) 
JDEP70 " 0,26blll.l 0.32605, 0.2tll?11 0.3111113, 0.32517 0.09193 .0.'3113bll(4) .. OjH972 :'~' -0.37120 -------0,5111311(5) _. 
BIRTHS60 " 0.56\112(4) 0.511797(4) 0.4'10"12 (5) 0.57697 (it) 0.5112110(4) 0,28907 .. 0.72[157 (2) -0,1I3t'12" ~o,1170b2(S) "'0,b~I)72(2) 
.- BIRT4SI-03',, 0.117<;5.\(5) 0.5131')(5) 0,112022 :,,0.5067& (5) 0.SII1l7(5) 0,251>44. -0,71'579(2)-OiIl7132(5)-0,1I8079(5) -0.67720(2) 
B I R T H S 73 '" 0 • 11 11 5 FI 8 0 • S I 0'3 R ( 5 ) 0 • 115 0 11 7 . ' '" 0 • '5 0 h I 7 (5) 0 • 5 I 077 ( 5 ) 0 • 34 H 8 ' - 0 ~ 57 t q 2 (4) .. 0 , 11 Cl 9 0 '5( 5 ) - ~ 0 ; Ij 0 S 2:5 ( 5')' - 0 , !> 1\8 q 2 ( 4 ) 
wlFEFT69 ".0,321155 .0,11731 3(5) ,-0.506Q&(S)'·0.47&S3 (S)'''O,1I1\3b4(5) .. 0,43599 0.393H'· 0;2b6Jq .. ·.-':~-Oiljt922-"·-· "O,lIlIb25' '--T,~ 
WIF'EALL' " -0,510111)(5) .. 0.51'1599(4) -0.0;939\ (4) "0.5115 0 2 (4) -O,59~77(4) -0,51159"(4)' 0.S1l317 (4)' O.2/1A9(l .' 0.3460U '",' 0,50374(5) ( 
EDlICII:lbq ,,-0.113021> .. 0.475&1(5) -0.IIHIl9 .. O.llb930'(S) -0. 1172 9 2(5) -O,520fl8(S) 0·.b1lH? (3)' 0.20557 :':O,29111J--, 0,5 11 221(4) 
EDUCF.fC ,5 .. 0,1),/1303 '-0.591f12 -0.677<;7 -0.bObb8 "0,6111111 .0.'5'1155 n, JII7/,& 0.114459-" -'-' O,5Sl)/16 . 0,530211 
FRIG73 14 -0.1.1113 1 0(5)' -0.545 9 7(4) -0.41795 ", .0.5110fiS (4) .. 0.511727(4) -0,08982 0.5~ql3 (4) 0. 1 01'1'10;'''; O.JIl19S 0,506113(5) 
FRtG6q ,,-/).11
'
105 11 -0,110725 -0.319n '''0-,400''17,' -0.11\091 .. O,?1I0/J9 ,0.
'
19\1;\11 (5) O,?t09'\ . 0.22419 0,1I1l11? 
HDF71J ,,-0.519~5(5),-0.52711'5(S) -0.1166711 (S) -0,'5tq~3 (5') -0,5?II?Q(S) .. O,'536??(4) O,&bQ"9 (2) . 0,;:>&5IJII ." 0,26123 :',', O,'51l101 (4).,) 
HDFto9 ,,'-0.57527 "0.33034, -0.2700/1 ',-0.32239.:,,' .. 0,3?1')8 .. 0.'806,1'1 '0,';;7;'1\11(4) 0.lbb05 0.111529' 0.112'11-0') 
( 
( 
) 
VAcn ,,-0,60810(1) -0.81111?'(1) -0,1I12R9 (1) ~0.81<;09 (1) -0.AI715(1) .-0,7'1920(1),0.768011 (1) 0.3'5722 0.4120b 0.67399(2) 
VAC69 ,,-0.1\09011(1) -0.7b23~,,('2) -0.7'\9711(2) -O~7~h3f\ (2)-0.75')"<7(2) -0.71182<;(2) (I.7.\0'5q(2) 0.;>(,07'1 O,2')BS 0.'5111177(4) 
INHGb2 " -0.41:1937(5) -0.S92H7(4) -0.b03(,Q(4) -0.5f\'nl> (4)-0.<;'1;>10(4) -0.50;95''<4) O.~b930 0.01\/1/10 0.115133 ",175f111 
NATOl&? It 0.<;11117\(4) 0."'fl820(2) O,"QSlli (2) 0.1>~/)'23" (2) 0,1,'1\22(2) 0."R507.(2) -0.11110111, (5) "0.29207 .O.3()IIOq -fl.tJ33?4 
INTlG71 11 -0.5'1/)<;0(5) -O.555 Q 3(S) -0.r;9;>II\(S) -0.5<;1101> (5)-0.51>1113(5) -O,b2'11"-5(4) 0._\<;125 0.IIl.i5Q O,I?Hl0 0,?711'52 
. . 
',' 
, ' 
:' ~' 
"'t 
, ~, " 
::,", :,' 
. ,': 
':.\ .
. "~' . 
, .. " 
'-' 
NAT0T71 11 n.b9?1IC;(3). 0."ROH(4) 0.hI.l4511 (4). 0.670"'1 (Il) O.bQ3o;r;(3) 0.7171>1 (3) -0.111>311 11 -n.315 4 1\ -1),21,030 -n.'~OO;1>8 
NAFUO()71 11 0.69/11\1(3)' 0.bIl Q ?3(4)' 0''-1>77<)') (4)'- 0.690.16,(3) 0.70701(3) 0.71.14 1 9(2) -1),",1101>3 -0.,\?211<; .O."IIOb7 -0.370So;, '.: .:, 
INH.C73 14 -0.1-03,>511(3), -0.b Il9 51\(2) -0.b'l7'57 ('2) -O.6RI,QO (2)-0.6A Q 211(2) -1).678311(3) 0.507/1? (5) 0.2211;'111 (I,2hblll\ O,II33A4 ;':::'}":;: 
NATOT73 14 0,bS609(3)' 0~71101l0(2): 0.7 11556 (2) 0.73~IlO',,(2) 0.7113'50(2) 0.70923(2) .. o,~3221 (5)-0,,\1131>3 .0.35011;>., .• 0,1187&6 (5)',;,;: 
SALES£Hf> 13 ·0,112371 -0,57330(4) -0.31.'7 Q '-o.'::i'id<l7·,(4)-O.5I,bHL4) -o.£qqon n.5<)II Q h (4) 'n.1Q Q 7t '(1.7.01112 n,II7~22" '.'\"f.') 
i,.... SAL E s M 7 13 - 0 , 'i 5/102 ( 4) - 0 .5 JQ <; 0 (5) - 0 • 5" 9 0 2 " - 0 , '3;> 0011' ( 5 ) - 0 .51.111 7 <; ( 5) .. I) • Q Cl 8 2 7 0 • ,,11 ~ r; 11 (3) 0 • I b I) ~ A 0 • 20 tll 0,50011 9 (5) :":",';.i:"I'I<;',?".'_,:,:t.;.:.".:,~;""" 
SAL f. src 13 - 0 • '> 7 2 ? t ( 4 ) - 0 • b U 2 1 J ( 3) - (I • 11 1 7 t I> - () • b?, 2 11 7 (4) - 0 • 1>5 323 ( 3) - 0 • 11 tj 2 I> 1 0 • 7 11 bill (2) o. ~ ° 13/\ 0 • 3 4 145 0 • b 3 0 2 7 (4)·j , 
. )":' r(. 
~~----.--7;"'::~·~~~.'C ~-"--...i~-'i*+-;----~.;;-"'-'~~';'-----~~~7'''~;-71''I<~,;'~;;i~;I: 
". 
APPBHDIX 2. REGIONAL ANl.LYSIS 
VARIABLE CODES AIm VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS. 
1) ISH425X. Inhabitants per supermarket 400 2500m2 
(excluding supermarkets in Variety and Department Stores) 1.1.1973. 
2) ISH825X. Inhabitants per supermarket 800 - 2500m2 
(excluding supermarkets in· V and D Stores) 1.1.1973. 
3) ISB102 X. Inhabitants per supermarket 1000 - 250002 
excluding, supermarkets in 'V' and D Stores) 1.1 .1973 
4) ISfol UPX. Inhabitants per self-service unit 400m2 and over 
excluding supermarkets in V and D Stores) 1.1.197i 
5) ISH8UPX. Inhabitants per self-service unit 800m and over 
(excluding supermarkets in V and D Stores) 1.1.1973. 
6) ISH10UPX.· Inhabitants per self-service unit 1000m2 and over 
(excluding supermarkets in V and D Stores) 1 •. 1 .1973. 
7) SSE425X. Selling space per 1000 inhabitants in supermarkets 
400 - 2500m2 . (excluding SIf;S in V and D Stores) 1.1.1973. 
8) SSJ.I825X. Selling space per 1000 inhabitants in SHS 800 -
2500m2 (excluding SHS in V and D"Stores) 1.1.1973. 
9) SSf.'l102 X. Selling space per 1000 inhabitants in Sf.1S 1000 -
2500m2 excluding'SHS in V and D Stores) 1.1.1973. 
10) SSH4UPX. SellinG' space per 1000 inhabitants in self-service 
units 400m2 and over (excluuint; SlIS in V and D. Stores) 1 .1.1973.' 
'11) SSE8UPX. 'Selling space per 1000 inhabitants in self-service' 
. units 800m2 and over (excludin~ Sl:;S in V and·D Stores) 1.1.1973. 
12)- S$:10UPX. Selling space per 1000 inhabitants in self-service 
· units 1000m2 and over (excluding Si'iS in V and D Stores) 1.1.1.973 .. 
13) IHY. Inhabitants per hyperElarket. 1.1.1973. 
14) SHY. Hypermarket selling area per 1000 inhabitants. 1.1.1973. 
15) ISi!A25V. Inhabitants per supermarket 400 - 2500m2 (including 
. :"'- supermarkets iri V and ,D Stor?s) 1.1 • .1973., '.-
.16)' ISr,1825V •. , . Inhabitants' 'per ·supermarket 800 - 2500m~",-' including . 
. ,,:. " .... ~l~S. in v" an~:t· SJores) 1.1:·., 973'. ;::'".:"',:. ';: .. '''--'.'-~"-.~, .. " :,',:_';;',:'~: --:.:',' 
17}' Ism 02 V. ·lp .. he:bita'nts per"supermarket 1600 - 2500ri:l2 . :.'. 
, .. -', .~ includingSli~iri:.V and D Stores)1.L1973~~· ..... ::-
'18) ISH UPV.- 'Inhabitants per self-service. unit 400m2 and-over 
,including SHS-in V'and D S.tores), 1.1 .1 S73~ . 
19)' ISH8UPV. lrihabitants per self-service unit 800m2 and over 
· (including SES in V and D Stores) 1.1 .1973. 
20) ,ISE1 OUPV. . Inhabitants per se lf -service unit 1000m2 and over 
. (including SHS in'V and D Stores) 1.1.1973. 
21) . SSH425V. '. Selling space per 1 OOOinhabi tants in supermarkets . '-
. 400 - 2500m2 (including SHS in V and D Stores) 1.1 .1973.', . -' 
22) SSH325V. Selling space per 1000 inhabitants in supermarkets 
. 800· ~ 2500m2 (including SI·:8· in V and D Stores) 1.1.1973. . 
23) . SSH1 025V ~ , Selling space' per 1000 inhabitants in supermarket.s '. 
1000 - 2500m2 (including SES in VandD Stores) 1.1.1·973. .',: 
24}SSE4UPV. . Selling space per 1000 inhabitants in self-service 
units 400m2 and over \including SI':;S in V and D Stores)'1 .1 .1973. 
25} SSN8UPV. Selling s~ace per 1000 inhabitants in self-service 
· units 800m2 and over \including Sf.1S in V and D Stores) 1.1.1973. 
26) SSN10UPV. Selling space per 1000 inhabitants in self-service 
units 1000m2 and over (including SkS in V and D Stores) 1.1.1973 •.. 
i 
" " ...... 
'.',..,' 
27) POPAGRIC. 
28) - POPDENS. 
29 ) NCIl'REE. 
Inhabitants per km2 agricultural land 1970. 
Inhabitants per km2 total territory 1970. 
Inhabitants ~er km2 total territory minus forested 
30) 
31) 
32) 
33) 
34) 
35) 
36) 
37) 
38) 
40) 
41 ) 
42) 
43) 
44) 
45) 
46) 
47) 
48) 
49) 
50) 
51 ) 
52) 
53) 
54) 
55) 
56) 
57) -
58) 
59) 
60) 
61) 
areas 1970. 
AGRIC/~68. 5'; labour force employed in agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 1968. 
AGRIC5;70. 5£ labour force employed in agriculture etc. 1970 
AGRICj;'73. 5'; 11 11 " 11 11 "1973 
IND70. 7; 11 11 11 " industry 1970 
IHD73. 5£' 11 " " 11 11 1 973 
SERV70. . ~~ 11 11 " " services 1970 
S8RV73. % 11 11 11 11 11 1973 
AGRICGDP. 5~ GDP derived from agriculture etc 1970 
AGRICHOH. 5-~ heads of households employed in agriculture etc. 
1970/1971 • 
TOifi·lS250 5S poyulation living in tOvms of 250,000 inhabitants 
or more 1 970-1 973. . 
TOIHiS100. 5; population living in towns of 100,000 inhabitants 
or more 1970-1973. 
TO\'lNS50. 5~ population living in tmms of 50,000 inhabitants 
or more 1970-1973. 
TOI.'ili340. 7~ population living in tOims of 40,000 inhabitants 
or more 1970-1973. 
TO;,il~S30. 5~ population living in tOi'lnS of 30,000- inhabitants 
or more 1970-1973. 
TO',;HS20. ;;. population living in touns of 20,000 inhabitants 
or more 1970-1973. 
r.l' 01:ilJS10. 50 yo:;mlation living in tOrms of 10-,000 inhabitants 
or more 1970-1973. 
AGG1L250. 5; po;::ulations living in "urban agelolllerations" of 
250,000 inhabitants or more 1970-1973. 
AGGLH1 00. 7~ pODulation living in "urban agglomerations" of 
100,000 inhabita~ts or Bore 1970-1973. 
Cill{S66. Cars yer 1000 population 1966. 
C.L'1.S70. 11 11 11 11 1970. 
C.i\.l{S73. 11 11 11 " 1 973. 
J'wsao . .w. hotor vehicles per km road. (minus minor roads) 1973~ 
f,NSR OADP • " 11 "" 11 (all roads) 1 973. 
RDSQYJ1 Km roads (minus local roads) per km2 of land 1973. 
RDSQ,KHPL. Kn roads· (all roads) per km2 land 1973. 
RDPOPNIH. Km roads (minus local roads) per 1000 population 1973. 
HDPOPPLU.. Km roads (all roads) per 1000 population 1973. 
PCE'OO. ;~ private consumption spent on food, drink and 
tobacco. 1973. 
GVAHAB. GROSS VALUE ADDED .(dollar equivalents) per inhabitant 
1970. 
GVAOCCUP. GROSS VALUE ADDED. (dollar equivalents) per occupied 
person 1970. 
COl-lSl!;XP. Private consumption expenditure (dollar equivalents) 
per capita 1970. 
DISPINC. Gross Disposable Income of households (dollar 
equivalents) per capita 1970. 
ii 
62) 
63) 
64) 
65J 
66) 
67) 
68) 
69) 
70) 
71) 
72) 
73) 
74) 
75) 
76 ) 
77} 
78) 
79) 
§.O) 
, ' 81) 
82) 
83) 
84) 
UhBNPLOY. Unemployed as ?f total labour force. Annual 
Average. 1965-1973. 
}'RIDGB. 5S households mming a refrigerator 1973. 
HDF. "11 "" home deep freezer 1973. 
INDENERG. Industrial energy consumption per capita 
(T. cals. per 1000) 1970. 
INDEL~CT. Industrial electricity consumption (bvh) per 
capita 1970. 
FEIJi'1564. Female labour force as ~'S of all females aged 
15-64, 1973. . 
FELF15UP. Female labour force as % of all females aged 
15 and over 1973. 
PECV1564. Females in civilian employment as ~~ of all females 
aged 15-64. 1973. 
:F'ECV15UP. Females in civilian employment as ~; of all females 
aged 15 and over 1973. 
FECV14UP. Females in civilian employment as 7~ of all females 
aged 14 and over 1968. 
FE5~LF. Females in labour force as 7~ of total labour force. 
1973. 
BIRTHS66. Live births per 1000 population 1966. 
BIRTHS73. " 11 11 11 " 1973. 
HHOLDS. Average number of persons per house!J.old 1970/1'971. 
GVACPPP. Gross Value Added (adjusted for purchasing power) 
per inhabitant 1970. '. . 
GDPCFPP. Gross Domestic Product (adjusted for purchasing power) 
per inhab1tant 1970. 
GVAWCPPP. Gross Value Added (adjusted for purchasing power) per 
'occupied person 1970. 
CONSCPPP. Private consumption expenditure (adjusted for purchasing 
power) per capita 1970. ' 
DINCCPPP. Gross Disposable Income of households (adjusted for 
,purchasing power) per capita 1970. 
'GFK "Purchasing power ll (GFK definition) per capita 1970. 
FErffiI~~. Female workers in industry as % of all workers in 
'industry 1973. 
FEfffiERV. Female workers in services as % of all workers in 
services 1973. 
FEINDSER. Female workers in industry and service~' ,~s % of all 
workers in industry and services 1973. 
iii 
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APPENDIX 2 (CONTINUED) 2 DISTRIBUTION ANAl.YSIS IN EUROPE I RtGIONAL ANALYSIS 
M 
I~H"5X JO 
!SHH:'5X 20 
ISHI0:'~X20 
ISH4tJPX 39 
'~HAUPX 20 
lSHI0UPX 20 
SSH425X JO 
S~HA25X 20 
q!iHJ O~~)( 20 
Sflf'l4tJP)( 30 
R~"HIIPX 20 
S!lHl0IJP)( 20 
IHY ~9 
SHY ~2 
15H4~!iV 54 
HH,n.'~V 28 
ISH10:'5V 28 
JSH4IJPV 6J 
IfiH9tJPV 28 
lfiHIOlWV 28 
B!=;t1.:'~~V 18 
Sfif'lR:'~,V 26 
SSH1()~1~V 28 
SSH4UPV ]8 
fiSHnIJF'V 28 
SSHIOUPV 28 
POPAGRIr 68 
POPO,NS 68 
NCtTRfF 50 
AGRICX68 45 
AnRII't./O 68 
AOkJCX7;l 52 
INn 10 52 
INII-/1 41 
GFf'V70 52 
HE"PV73 42 
f\ORICr,fJP 51 
AGRICHOH 24 
rOWNS"SO 68 
TOWNSIOO 68 
TOWNR~O 32 
ig~~~;~ n 
TOWNS20 J2 
rOwNSIO 18 
AGGl.H250 42 
AGO! HI 00 42 
CARSI>6 6J 
CARS70 68 
CARS7J 68 
HVBROAD 66 
HVRROADP 61 
RDStlKHHI 66 
RPSU~HPL 61 
RDPOPHIN 66 
RVPOPPLU 61 
PC,oo 21 
GVAHAB 68 
flvnocClIP 49 
r.ONSEXP 46 
DISPINC 68 
IJNEHPLOY 52 
FRJOOE 21 
HO, 10 
INVENERO 42 
INl,nECr 51 
,ELFI564 68 
FELF'l5UP 68 
FECVI564 68 
FECV15UP 68 
F'ECVI4UP 41 
FEXLF 68 
BIRTHS66 58 
BIRTHS73 68 
HHOLDS 68 
I~f't425X ISHB25X 
(1) • Slqnitlcant at the .001 significance level 
(J) • at the .02 level (4). at the .05 level 
N.e. • NOT CORrttLAT~O. 
H • NO. OF CASES 
(2) • at the .01 level 
(5) • at the .1 level 
ISHI(l7~X ISH~tJPX ISH8LJPX ISHIOUPX SSH4;t:=;X SSHtO:!5)C' SSH4lfPX 
1.00000 0.76636It) 0.89~04(t) 0.9999911! 0.76925(1) 0.8'1649(1) -O.~9-'H? (1) -0.47~9~41 -0.4?H7(5) -0.4439.1(2) 
g:~~;~: HI ~:~~~~~!1l ~:~~~~~ (1) g:~;~~~!1 ~::i~~~H! ~::~~~;!H =~:~~1~= m =~::~~~;{a =~:~~~~~(SI =g:~;;~~ (SI 
0.999Y9 (1) 0.76631(1) 0.8Y~07(1) 1.00000 ",769n(1) o.a96~~ll) -0.W~14 (1) -0.4/8(914) ·-O.4:'I,t4(5) -0.4460~(2) 
(l.UR''', (1) 0.999~9(1) 0.819"3(1) O.7hH?1 (1) \,O(lOOO o.'lJy~tCl) -0,44,."'(4)-Odl'il .• (S) -0.j~YI7 -0.351/6(5) 
0,89649 (t) 0.81824(1) 0,99977 (1) 0.896~S (1) 0.HI9~7(1) 1.00000 -O.5.'~90 (J) -0.45193(4) -0,40316(S) -("43~\1 (5) 
-0.~.93a7 (1)-0.HI09(4) -0.536HO() -O.59~14 (t)-0.H08/14) -0.:\:l~.901]) 1.00000 0.8761711) 0.8.1094(1) 0.9Q3:,~(1l 
-0.47~YO (4)-0,36168(5) -0,45~87 (4)-0.47809 (4)-0.37973(5) -0.45LH1(4) 0,87617 (1) 1.00000 0.98700(1) 0.9J869(1) 
-0.42371 (5)-0.33058 -0.40661 (5) -0.47614 (5)-0.3~Yl7 -0,40316(S) 0.83094 (1) 0.9A700(1) 1.00000 0.92702(1) 
-0.44393 (2)-0,35403 -0.433JI (5) -0.4460:, (2)-0,35376 -0.43211 (5) 0.YOJ25 (1) 0.9386911) 0.92702(1) 1.00000 
-0,.17042 (5)-0.28529 -0.34747 -0,37~a4 (5) -0.:'1<441, -0.34~.~8 0.80018 (1) 0.9J841(1) 0.94A64(t). 0.96558 (1) 
-0.34562 -0.26716 -0,32341 -0.34R07 -0.76157 -0.:12IS4 0.77560 (1) 0.92195(1) 0.94047(1) 0.95600 (t) 0,~6~,"7 (1) 0.J8200(5) 0.47J06 (4) 0.561l0Y (1) 0.~8"'1(5) 0,4HI6?(4) -0.69264 (1) -0.68525(1) -0.66A~9(2) -0.64()52 (1) 
-0.23422 -0.22952 -0.28355 -0.n670 -O.nnl -().;>H~29 0.66635 (1) 0.87195(1) 0.89182(1) 0.92195 (1) 
0,981"5 (1) 0,6B855(1) 0.86949 (1) 0.98147 (1) O.6Y091(1) O.~'ll,1 (1) -0.67J02 (1) -0.54':!Al(J) -O.4HB09(4) -0,~1413 (2) 
0.4',~44 (2) 0.fl97:14(1) 0.6~;'17 (2) 0.4",!,/o7 (2) O.tI'I1IH(1) O.I,~:'-<l· (2) -O.:I4HO (4) "0.7'19LJ:l -_00.··J·'96~~ .. 47 (S) _--00.'::91l~04 () 
0.A'667 (1) 0.81857(1) O.YY%~ (1) 0,"9","9 (1) O.!1IY8~(1) 0.994/,,(1) -0,53499 (2)-0.44832(4) 0.' ,,_. 
0.93103 (1) 0.68944(1) O.H693~ (t) 0.YB147 (1) 0.6YOB?(t) 0.H7\47(1)-0.674:!6 (l)-0,54M2(]) -0.49062(4) -0.516~8(2) 
0.45682 (2) 0,89765 (1) 0.hS3~6 (2) 0.4~10~ (2) 0.B97M(1) O.6Sl.l4 (2) -0.345IJ (4) -0,29940 -0.26042 -0.27821 
0.A·1730 (1) 0.81835(1) 0.99951 (1) 0.A9H3 (1) 0,HI975(1) 0,99905 (1) -0.53136 (2)-0.H~90(4) -0.J9667(S) -0.4~747 (J) 
-0.47998 (2)-0.40044 (S) -0. 4890!, (2) -0.40127 (2)-0.4003/0(5) -O.4I1A99 (4) 0.93051 (1) 0.111737(1) 0.76959(1) 0,86A30 (1) 
-0.4h7()3 (2)-0.3~970 -0.432JJ (S) -0.469:;6 (2)-0.3~H.'9 -0.431?8 (5) 0.91229 (1) 0.8504"(1) 0.81105(1) 0.86680 (1) 
-0.44IS7 (2)-0.J3014 -0.40372 (5) -0.4<;'08 (3)-0,:,:'957 -0.40.1;'4 (5) ').AOIOI (1) 0.RI';'19(1) 0.7A999(1) 0.8~028 (1) 
-0.41262 (])-0.35890 -0.4397~ (5) -0.414~4 (2)-0':'~H70 -O.41YIJ (5) 0.R9587 (1) 0.91~4y(1) 0.89370(1) 0.97228 (1) 
-0.41511 (J)-0.31563 -0.38402 (5) -0.417.'7 0)-0.31499 -O.:'R?7h (5) 0.A1I527 (1) 0.93150(1) 0.92248(1) 0.97701 (1) 
-0.19640 (4)-O.2Y642 -0.36425 -0.39959 (4)-0.2959A -0.16327 0.06B23 (1) 0.9W70(1) 0.91697(1) 0.97412 (1) 
-0.19299 -O.~49J3 -0.1571:i -O.OA4:t5, -(}.2~&)?:" -O.1~19'3 0.4490('1 (2) o.~'t100B(2) 0.'55005() 011~7hO (4) 
-O.t7R41 -0.24:'19 -0.09795 -{).J;'O;'!A -O.;'374H -(}.i)ytr,~ 0.40004 (4) O.!'iA147(2) O.55~:1'!i(3) O.JJ~9' (5) 
-O.~!'i99A -0.JJ051 -0.1544;- -0.10\0"7 ~1'.,~1All -O.l:=;-Olh ().4,L'9~': 0.57152(5) 0.54099(5) 0.41594 
0.70414 (1) 0.7n:ll,(2) 0.71'.:11 (2) 1>.110007 (1) 0.0'-1(2) 0.71690(2)-0.79735'(1)-0.79826(1) -0.74794(2)-0.72J56(2) 
0.10"72 (1) 0.6:' .... ~(2) O.<hIY:' (2) o./o<n (1) 0.61014(2) 0.65439(2)-0.69611 (1)-0.72441(1) -0.66049(2) -0.54649(2) 
_~::j~;; :;~g:~;~~~ (2) _g:~:~:~ (Z) _g:~~;;~ gLg:~;::;(2) _g:~;~:~ (2) -g:~:;:~((!)rg:~;~;~(2) -g:~~~;: (2) -g:~~~:~ I2l 
-O.49.1l~ (3)-0.4262J -0.452.17 (5)-0.47520 (2)-0.42706 -0.45429 (5) 0.29390 " .•• " 0.18673 0,12298 0.15946 
-0.4".'44 (5)-11 4/?·' (5) -O.~\)MoR (4)--O.4;!44R (4)-0.46851 (5) -0.~0040 (4) 0.63697 (:i) 0.67553(2) 0,66738 (2) 0.~B326 (3) 
·O.40·\/~. (5)·O.~>9ino ·(I.,U'I~1 -0, ((,.'9"' (4)-().~Q:HIJ -O.:iJI:161 0.55716 (2) o,~a505(4) O.605:!O Cl) O.4S4SJ (4) 
0.44'"11"\ (4) O.~447~ ( •. -~&)\fI'''' 1\.4 .. ...,4.\ (2) o. H41"i cL iWbO -O.~79tlJ (2)-0.:')5901 (4) ·~().·il7S5 (4) -0.44'505 (4) 
0.77~09 (2) 0.61,~;'09 (2) "."hH6\ (2) 0.17"" (2) n."."'Y·' (2) (I.Al0o\O (2)-O.774~? (Z)-O"7"270(Z) -().7Ia~2 (2)-0.7028J (Z) 
-0.149,0 -0.2557" -0. 1 ,?9~i' _(I. t ~;-~f,~1 -0 •.• ~:; ''','' - O. t ;''',97 - (\ Of, .... , " - o. 177n~ -0. :!79~,n -0.22:'35 
-0.15636 -0.23'5040 -0.14103 -0.16/41 -o.'qO';il -0.t(41") -().r~'107 ··O·lyO ..... ~, -1l.'}1Itli) ·O.?7J'C; 
H.C N.C. N.C. -O.A9f):l1 (3) N.C'. N.C. N,C. N.C. M.C. N.C. 
N.C. N.C. N.C. -().7~;I~n (2) H.C. H.e. H.C. N.C. H.C. H.C. 
H.C. H.C. H.C. -0,7H491' (2) H.C. H.C. H.C. H.C. H.C. H.C. 
H.C. H.C. N.C. -0.81944 (2) H.C. H.C. N.C. H.C H.C. H.C. 
N.C. N.C. N.C. M.C. M.C. M.C. N.C. N.C. N.C. N.C. 
-0.24066 -0.37915 -0.39021 -0.;'4391 -0.17014 -O.:l7A/,O O.IYA~1 0.2222? 0,1',45:1 O.()191l1 
-0.19679 -0.39417 -O.4071Y -O.?0111 -f'.)f10004 ··0.3':19;'7 0.111:104 0.:14414 0.3047\') O.(U:'194 
-0.66077 (1)-0.576JJ (3)-0.67837 (2)-0.67092(1) -0.5/~;l:l () -O.67h04 (2) 0.5M77(2) 0.~5B83(4) 0.529HI (4) o.36!.o\7(S) 
-0.58~00(t) -O.~IA:ot(3) -0,"?369(2) -0.5981~(1) -0.514.11 (3) -(}.hl77H (2) ","'MI (3) 0,4:?4~:;(S) O.J?:''':' (5) 0.11~'14 (S) 
-0.48734(2) -0.43491(5) -0.~4674(3) -0,5()AI~(2) -0.42957 (5) -O.~38~i1 (3) 0.:'4""14 O.?oIHO 0.?0IlA3 ().!~.:101 
-0.41479(4) -0.3904;.o(S) -0.390?9(5) -O.I~JM -0.~90117 (5) -(I,"jOt?4 (5) 0.409()()(l) \)'3953,)(S) O.J~I1() (,.1/~41 
-OdM81 -0.37.91 -0.24634 -0,09931. -0.37254 (5) -0.~4.117 0.02609 0.305Jl 0.14554 -0,01J44 
0.11.116 (S) 0.13809 0.2~152 0.27847 0.1399J 0,25470 0.019'10 0.~03;'4 (4) 0.544R4 (3) O.J31~0(S) 
-0,4"839 (4) -0.26660 -0.75209 -0.281,74 -0.'6913 -0.?5714 0.66929(1) 0.69221 (1) 0.7:!627 (1) 0.66492(1) 
O.~QI44 (2) 0.6646&2) 0.41760(S) 0.4594U(2) 0,66486 (2) 0.418J2 (5)-0.3524714) -0.J0910 -0.262:;2 -0.14170 
-0.19702 0,OJ412 -0.1"579 -0.06940 0.03065 -0.17103 0,]48S:I(4) 0.26597 0.40492 (5) 0.J7411(5) 
0.01516 t N.C. N.C. -0.('0174 N.C. N.C. -0.2320 7 N.C. N.C. 0.11337 
-0,55796(1) -0.4539614) -0.54511(3) -0.56151 (1) -0.45119 (4) -0.54164 (J) 0."/7'194(1) 0.61024 (2) 0.527';6 () 0.SQ057(t) 
-O.~6053(2) -0.~6a3;>C4) -0.61767(2) -0.52Jn(1) -0.~63B2 (4) -0.6?OJB (2) O.696?:1(1) 0.77616(1) (0,75039 (1) 0.7IH.,o(1) 
-0.68940(1) -0.5061615) -0.64215() .-n.5626.~(1) -0.~0115(S)-0.634:l3 (J) 0.1>2723(2) 0.52154(5) 0,423:'4 0.57760(Z) 
-0.39~08(4) -0.4J89J(~) -0.526J7(]) -0.43249(2) -0.43589 (5) ·-0,52260 (]) 0."~411(1l 0.66124(2) 0.578B5 (2) 0.f.?30"(1) 
0.79684(1) O.477IItS) 0.73951(1) 0.79140(t) 0.47818 (5) 0.740S5 (1)-0.67354(1) -0.6JI8S(3) -0.59609 (]) -11.41'191(3) 
0.16048 H.C. N.C. 0.27221 M.C. H.C. 0.06'140 N.C. N.C. -(),~'o't7"it 
M.C. H.C. I.C. H.C. H.C. H.C. N.C H.C. H.C. H.C. 
-0.42286(5) -0.J2908 -0.4224~ -O.JIOOJ(S) -O.JJ077 -0.42468 0.4H45<1() 0.63829(3) 0.6~5JJ (3) (O.441H7(4) 
-0.48019(4) -0 •• 1172 -0.542JI(4) -0.39958(4) -0.41276 -0.54400 (4) 0.45321(4) 0.4J9J5 0.39537 0.42164(4) 
-0.541l9(2) -0.28142 -0.38167(5) -0.543281.1) -0.28260 -0.3844\ (5) 0.70797(1) 0.40408(5) 0.J2574 0.40J~t>(J) 
-0.529.1(21 -0.27789 -0.J6960 -0.53069(1) -0,27906 -0.J72Jl (5) 0.70092(1) 0.30322(S) 0.JOJ30 0.J9088(4) 
-0.57906(1) -0.JI861 -0.4JJ69(S) -0.58167(1) -0.J2046 -0.43691 (5) 0,6985J(1) 0.48512(4) 0.41532 (S) 0.409 32(3) 
-0.57;>62(1) -0.JI697 -0.42375(5) -0.57612(1) -0.J1871 -0,42692 (5) 0.69619(1) 0.45880(4) 0.J1l641 (S) 0.39878(4) 
-0.24341 -0.01589 -0.11695 -0.35241 (5) -0.01681 -0.11852 0.J520J 0,35944 0.34507 0,2B909 
-0.48987(2) -0.17100 -0.28602 -0.~035J(2) -0.17080 -0.28659 0.69253(1) 0.44477 0.J7630 0.43073() 
0.50486(3) 0.154JJ 0.51668 0.48806(2) 0.15551 0.51781 -0.40850(4) -0.47464 -0.4639~ -0.42270(4) 
0.J0797(5) 0.02648 0.23755 0.37187(4) 0.02205 0.2JOJ9 -0.J5155(4) -0.298J6 -0.28117 -0.31740(5) 
0.46678(2) 0.:11500 0.41116(5) 0.48061(2) 0.31084 0.40581 (5)-0.56210(t) -0.49357(4) -0.41606 (5)-0.44920(2) 
DISTRIBUTION ANALYSIS IN EUROPE REGIONAL ANALYSIS 
APrtNOIX 2 (CONTINUEO) 3 
N. SSH9UPX SSH10UPX IHY SHY lSH425V lSH9~5V ISH1025V ISM4UPV ISM9U~'V ISM10UPV 
ISH425X 30 -0.37042(5) -0.3456;> ,0.!l65B7(1) -O.:tJ422 0.98125 (1) 0.4~544 (2) 0.R9b1>7!t) 0.9Al03!t) 0.45682 (2) 0.897J0! 1) 
ISM825X 20 -0.28579 -O.2621f:. 0.38200(5) -0. :~?qS1 0.6!18~:; (1) 0.99'134 !t) 0.81957(1) 0, hA844 It) 0.8?7t.!I (1) O.ll11l35(1) 
ISM1025X 20 -0.34747 -0.32341 0.47306(4) -0.~8355 0.86949 (1) O.652,P (2) 0.9991>,,(1) 0.fl6Y3? (1) 0.653:'6 (2) 0.9995t< 1) 
ISM4UPX 39 -0.37284(5) -0.34807 0.';6809(1) -O.2~b/l) 0.98147 (1) 0.4551,7 (2) O.fNMyll) 0 .... HI47 (1) O.4"i7(\~ (2) 0.tl9733( 1) 
ISH8UPX 20 -0.2844;; -0.26157 0.38791(5) -0.22921 0.69091 (1) i).H971 A (1) o.RI9<I:>(l) 0.1>9092 (1) 0.997",,(1) ".f<l9l,\( 1) 
ISH10UPX 20 -0.34528 -0.321~4 0.49162(4) -O.2R2~9 0.87161 (1) 0.65236 (2) 0.999"8(1) 0.1:;-1147 (1) 0.65.l.l4 (2) 0.99985(1) 
SSI1425X 30 0.80019(1) 0.7756«( 1) -0.69264(1) 0.1,1,635(1) -0.~730211) -').34470 (4)-0.53499(2) -0.674~/,( 1) -0.34513 (4) -0.~3336C2) 
SSI1825X 20 0.93041 (1) O.Y~ly~l) -0 I f,8~i:I~( 1) 0.1171"'5 (1) -0.54?!!1 (3) -O.?9YA,1 -0.44fl~ '(4) -O.54~t~(3) -0.299.0 -0.44590(4) 
SSH1025X 20 0.94BM (1) 0.94041(1) -0. ""B~9( 2) O.flY\II:'(l) -O.48f101i (4) ·O.~6(),,';7 -0. \(,IB~;4(S) -O.4'/O/J'2(4) -O.:'~()42 -0.,1961>7(5) 
SSI14UPX 30 0.96~58 (1) O. 9~;60o! 1) -0.6405~(1) O.Y?lw;(l) '(l.~1413 (2) -0.;'7flO4 -0. 4')'J"O( 3) -O.~1~2R(2) -O.:'/H21 -0.42741(3) 
SSI18UI'X 20 1.00000 0.9983~1) -0.66519(2) 0.98738 (1) -O.4J310 CS) ,,'.~:",~jl". ··O.,~410·1 -0.4'~1I1 (5) -O.V49h -0. ~~'W19 
SSI110Uf'X 20 0.99635 (1) 1.00000 "0.6530~(2) O. 99?49 (1) -o.40~7~ (5) -0.207?R ·().~H70'j -(\.4()~~jt (5) -O.:'()71Y ·'0. ~q.., v> 
lHY 59 -0.66519 (2) -0.6530:(2) 1.00000 -O.!i r..lS90(1) O.~;70:'1 (1) 0.34R40 (4) O.~2790(2) 0.'1750'1(1) o.:~~,n:, (4) (l.~,11~1(2) 
SHY 52 0.90l3A (1) 0.99249< 1) -0.55'198(1) 1.00000 -0. 1~4'f1 (2) -0.~3611 -0. :\",~,O" (4) -0.30;901 (2) -0.231,0:1 -0. ~'j3"RI 4) 
ISH425V 54 -0.43310 (5) -0.4067:(5) 0.57021(1) -0.:15491 (2) I.OOO(lO 0.424:'8 (3) O.fJtll:1 y (l) 0.9999:! (1) 'J.4')h:!:-! (3) 0.A8~?2(1) 
ISH825V 28 -0.22515 -O.2072A 0.341140 -0.2,lhll O.4~4;'fI (3) 1.0nooO (l.M/d <11) I).4:'4.n (3) .). Y9YYll (1) 1\.~""o:'ll) 
ISHI025V 28 -0.34109 -0.31705 0.~2190(2) -O.~55()Et(4) 0.8813" Cl) O.I,Ml~ (\) 1.0()()()O O.8BI 16 (1) 0.1.1.7:'9 (1) 0.9YQ93(1) 
lSH4IJPV 63 -0.435RI IS) -0.40951(5) 0.~75!J3(1) -(l.35901(2) ().9999;' (1) 0.4:"'411:"' (3) o.nfll1>.ll) 1.00000 0.4:'1.711 (3) O"lll,'O?ll) 
lSI18UPV 28 -0.22496 -0.20719 0.35182(4) -0.236£13 ,O.4?0\;':' (3) O,99YYll (1) o.bllr!Q(1) 0.4:'"ln(3) 1 .OOO()O O.l./~7"!~(1) 
ISI110UI'V 28 -0.33919 -0.31535 0.53121(2) -0.35390(4) (\.1I8n~ It) 0./,6603 (1) 0.Y9'19;,(1). ().A>J:!O:~ (1) O.M7"~, (1) 1."0000 
":'-,."''' ," SSI1425V 38 0.74036 (1) 0.7158;>(1) -0.57048(1) 0.66~10(1) -o.~77~4 (1) -0.3353l (5) -0.~0804 (2) '~-O. 57803 (1) -0.33";11 15) -0.50:';51( 2) 
SSH825V 29 0.77717 (1) 0.75484(1) -0.59362(1) 0.IoA197 (1) ,,0.~";2AI, (2) -0.30453 (5)-0.,44585(3) -0.~,'''':'4 (2) -0·30:1'14 IS) -0.44217(2) 
SSH1025V 20 0.76004 (1) 0.74157(1) -0.56836(1) 0.67256 (1) -0,52578 (2) -0,27906 '~0.417~9(3) -0.526~1 (2) -0.27795 -0.41407(3) 
SSI14UPV 38 0.91804 (1) 0.90460(1) -0.1,3120(1) (\.R905~'(1) -0.5224~ (1) -0.31960 (5)-0.4fl~fl4(2);-0.~;;~497 (1) -0.,1\977 (5) -0.48074(2) 
SSH8UPV 28 0.95793 (1) 0.9492211) -0.71401(1) 0.93169 (1) -0.540~1 (2) -(1.?9144 -0.43?~8(3) ·-O,~.4320 (2), 0.2912R -0.47985(3) 
SSI110UPV 28 0.96101 (1) 0.95537(1) -0.70851(1) 0.94119 (1) 70.52383 (2) -().27I>QQ -O.41~105(4)'·'·().5?671 (2) -0.271097 -0.41338(4) 
POPAGRIC 68 0.46207 (4) 0.43771(5) -0.152~8 0.10210 -0.16152 -0.14419 ,() .10144 -~lf074Q1 -O.14~1"" -0.09842 
POPDENS 68 0.45070 (4) 0.42852(5) -O.~0275 0.04466 ·-:-0.06~53 -0.13530 -O.050n ·11. ()flB60 .() .1:~:.(1 4 -().l)47~1 
NOTREE 50 0.43035 15) 0.40856(5) -0.22944 0.14330 -O.041~O -O,1569A -0.on8l -0. OY4~15 -0. PJh13 -0.07301 
AGRICX68 45 -0.7122:> (2) -0.69064(2) 0.67970(1) -0. 555Bl (1) 0.71>40:, (1) O.53~4J (2) 0.66720(1) 0.750\44 (1) 0.53295 (1) 0.016736(1) 
< AGRICX70 68 -0.59375 (2) -0.56163(2) 0.46827(1) -0.22442 0.64120 (1) 0.441>99 (4) 0.59/,55(1) 0.64137 (1) 0.44606 (3) 0.59317(1) 
AGRICX73 52 -0.63327 (2) -0.61368(2) 0.26978(1) -O.142~2 0.74462 (1) 0.4A0II>3 (4) 0.M194(1) 0.7399:'(1) 0.48740 (') 0.66232(1) 
IND70 52 0.30394 0.27939 -0.40107(3) 0.35848 (4) -0.4:>424 (2) -0.27454 -0.37923(5) -(1.43457 (2) -0.274:10 -0.37771(5) 
IND73 47 0.11487 0.0909? -0.795\1(5) -0.03986 ,-0.39391 (4) -0.21>971 -0.35723 -0.39139 (2) -0.26993 -0.35B33 
SERV70 52 0.58239 (3) 0.57249(3) -0.20159 0.15977 -0.43354 (2) -0.32532 -0.42437(4) -0. 38Y40 (2) -0.32408 -0.42106(4) 
SERV73 47 0.56601 (4) O. 5707s( 4) -0.36474(4) 0.26314 -0,39301 (4) -0.23893 -0.3:1490 -0. 360~2 (3) -0. :!3960 -0.33420 
AGRlCGDP 51 -0.47382 (5) -0.45469(5) 0.32813(4) -0.:.'5889 0.44014 (2) 0.27718 0.3h951(5) 0.41115(1) O.::!7476 (1.36312(5 ) 
AGRICHOH 24 -0.68764 (2) -0.66871(2) 0.68475(1) -0.59878 (2) 0.76979 (1) O.411768 (4) O. <I4~67 (3) 0.76924 (1) 0.48845 (4) (). 640\~'51 2) 
rOWNS250 68 -0.29602 -0.31589 -O.O:!134 -0.11,527 -0.077411 -0.17600 -0.(\9::74 -0.10~16 -0.17'578 -0.OQ285 
TOWNS100 68 -0.30772 -0.32039 0.00687 -0.166:14 -0.061611 -0.16705 -0.07609 -0.09461 -0.lhS66 -0.07482 
TOWNSSO 32 N.e. H.C. -0.30011 0.14691 -0.5:!"11 N.C. H.C. -0.55261 H.C. N.C. 
rOWNS40 32 N.C. N.C. 
-0.35708 0.18983 -0.62522 N.C. N.C. -0.63178 N.C. N.C. 
TOWNS30 32 H.C. N.C. 
-0.42127 0.24290 '-0.70960 N.C. N.C. -0.69643 N.C. N.C. 
TOWNS20 32 N.C. N.C. 
-0.35662 0.~1413 -(\.70566 N.C. N.C. -0.68373 N.C. N.C. 
'faWNS10 19 N.C. N.C. -0.40634 0.28801 -0.79174 N.C. N.C. -0.79086 N.C. N.C. 
AGGLH250 42 0.00975 -0.01332 -0.17322 -0.01894 -0.08524 -0.18651 -0.18816 -0.08226 -0.18649 -O.lB:!36 
~GGL11100 42 0.14807 0.12801 1).25458(5) 0.01950 -0.07767 -0.24588 -0.23917 -0.07760 -0.24967 -0.23802 
CARS66 63 0.49464 (5) 0.4813;>(5) ':0.51894(1) 0.32362(4) -0.56955 (1) -0.41788 (4)-0.63951(1) -0.566~0 (1) -0.41909 (4) -0.63813(1) 
CARS70 68 0.34168 0.31933 -0.31476(3 ) 0.32017(3) -0.51140 (1) -0.38849 (4)-0.0\24"'411) -0.511,67(1) -O.3B84:! (4) -0.62296(1) 
CARS7J 68 0.16234 0.13951 -0.17242 O.2:!209 -0.45760 (1) -0.:1"501 (5)-0.56440(1) -0.46,14h(1) -0.32415 (5) -0.56180(1) 
I1VSROAD 66 0.19509 0.16005 -0.15609 -0.17476 _-0.15752 ·~o. ?O32~ -01~30Al -0.10577 -0.20240 -O.:.'::!'IBt 
HVRSOADP 61 0.09166 -0.04940 -0.06236 -0.03429 -0.02831 -o.! 7l1'l -0.09179 -0.07792 -0.1709:' -0.09000 
RDSOKHI11 66 0.58745 (2) 0.5979412) -0.31149(3) 0.46741 (1) -0.01733 0.00893 0.03146 -0.00177 0.00044 0.0:1087 
RDSOKHPL 61 0.70742 (1) 0.669652) -0.47417(1) 0.13688 -O.:!()149 -0.22195 -0.31,082 -0. 1706:! -0.22446 -0.36275 
RDPOPMIN 66 -0.12855 -0.10190 -0.02388 0.14387 -0.1'::-'36 0.07598 -0.06RIl3 -0.07682 0.07352 -0.07133 
RDPOPPLU 61 0.45250 (2) 0.53350(2) -0.00647 0.14800 -0.23390 -0,05991 -0.26559 -0.15774 -0.00\317 -0.268:12 
PCFOO 21 N.C. . H.C. -0.55471(5) 0.97506(1) -0.54701 (3) -0.77607 (3)-0.77320(3) -0.68016 (1) -0.R0824 (2) -0.82560(2) 
GVAHAB 68 0.45204 (4) 0.41,425(5) -0.36480(2) 0.37256 (2) -0.57157 (1) -0.35586 (4)-0.~4047(2) -0.53257 (1) -0.35508 (4) -0.53748(2) 
GVAOCCUP 49 0.73879 (2) 0.7250712 ) -0.55626(1) 0.65563(1) -0.55140 (1) -0.41900 (5)-0.58337(2) -0.56657 (1) -0.41866 (4) -0.58048(2) 
CONSEXP 46 O.417~O 0.32774 -0.50025(1) 0.5B7R9 (1) -0.59123 (2) "0.33881 -0.55409(2) -0.58163 (1) -0.331175 -0. 55173( 2) 
DISPINC 68 0.51369 (3) 0.47636(4) -0.28669(4) 0.421~;1 (2) -0.44177 (1) -0.13915 (5)-0.51357(2) -0.44059 (1) -0.13715 (5) -O.~0962(2) 
UNEHPLOY 52 -0.53468 (4) -0.5167!(5) 0.75703(1) -0.46192(2),0.86033 (1) 0.36190 (5) 0.75105(1) 0.85705 (1) 0.36365 (5) 0.75230(1) 
FRIDGE 21 N.C. N.C. 0.01153 0.55011 (3) ,-0.12141 -0.92000 (1)-0.99837(2) -O.'214~0 -0.93752 (1) -0.93059(1) 
HDF 10 N.C. N.C. -0.13489 O.::!6JJ9 0.76218 (2) 0.35230 0.21554 0.73607 (2) O.:tfl6111 O.10:'!~9 
INDENERO 47 0.73838(2) 0.7382412 ) -0.41112(2) 0.2B362 IS) -0.30611 (5) -0.16041 
-0.24236 -0.27102 (5) -0.16051> -0.;"4213 
IN['ELECT 51 0.48641 (5) 0.47:522(5) -0.39876(2) 0.30972 (5) -0.39957 (2) -0.28752 
-<\.44287(4) -0.35453(2) -0.28842 -0.44371(4) 
,,-:} ~ FELF1564 68 0.26107 0.22784 -0.38617(2) 0.23994 (5),-0.51920 (1) -0.24464 
-0.44367 (3) -0.51461 (1) -0.24593 -0.44330(3) 
FELFI5UP 68 0.23446 0.20051 -0.38451(2) 0.29R47 (4) '-0.50798 (1) -0.24113 -0.42838(3) -0.50121 (1) -0.24211 -0.4:'788(3) 
FECV1564 68 0.33817 0.30621 -0.53760(1) 0.32736 (3) -0.52378 (1) -0.26770 -0.48220(2) -0. 5~574 (1) -0. :?b957 -0.48258(2) 
FECV15UP 68 0.30447 0.27144 -0.52929(1) 0.320:;7 (3) ~0.51718 (1) -0.26641 -0.47154(2) -0.51768 (1) -0.261:16 -0. 47l?8(2) 
FECV14UP 41 0.27932 0.26928 -0.51818(2) 0.41375 (3) -0.42329 (4) -0016160 
-0.32813 -0.400:!8 (2) -0.16420 -0.33063 
FEXLF 68 0.32690 (5) 0.29775 -0.36986(2) 0.24439 (5) -0.46704 (1) -0.16279 
-0.37473(5) "0.47432 (1) -0.16404 -0.37399(5) 
BIRTHS66 58 -0.44706 -0.44202 0.19508 -0.27030 (5) 0.45932 (2) -0.02775 0.48824(4) 0.45534 (1) -0.02679 0.48Q I1(4) 
BIRTHS73 68 -0.30353 
-0.29674 0.17027 -0.21200 0.34406 (2) -0.08538 0.?0269 0.36129 (2) -0.09678 0.19903 
HHOLDS 68 -0.43639 CS) -0.40857(5) 0.37609(2) -0.31046 (4) 0.48807 (1) 0.26699 0.44481 (3) 0.48905(1) 0.26533 0.44116(3) 
\ :~ ~ 
APPENDIX 2 (CONTIN1JED) 4 : DISTRIB1JTION ANALYSIS IN E1JROPE: REGIONALANALYSIS. 
N S~H42SV SSM825V SSH10~5V SSH4lJPV SSH8LJPV %Hl0Uf'V . POPAGRlr. poprll"tJ~: tmn'rr AI1J>Ir.%AA I 
ISH425X 30 -0.4799A (2) -0.4670;1(2) -0.44157(2) -0.4t~6~(3" -0.4t~11 (3) -O.3?~40 ( 4 ) t (). 1 9298 -O.1lR41 -0. ~1~"'oIQO ,1).7"414 
lSM825X 20 -0.40044 (5) -0. 359~O -0.33014 -0. :15890 -0. :US/,:1 -(\.29/,4 ! L.(}.:'!49J~ ··O.:!4:!t9 -O.lIB';1 O • .I:!:13ft 
ISH1025X 20 -0. 4n905 (4) -0. 43~33( S) -0.4037~(5) -0. n975 (5) -0 I 3840:! (5) ·0. 3b4:'~ -0.15713 ~n.I'97t;~ ··O.I~44':-- 1).7J-)3J 
JSH4UPX 39 -0.41'1:>2 (2) -0.46851.(2) -0.44300(2) -0.41454 (2) -0. 417:?7 (3) -1)·39859 (4)-(1.0fJ4~<; -0.120:'0 -0.1 ~1\97 ().H()O()7 
JSHBIIPX 20 -0.40036 (S) -0. ~58~9 -0. ~?Q'j7 -o. ,i&.~A1() -0.31499 -0.~9~90 -0. :'4C;:1:! -0. :!:{74A -O.~1P1" fl T·)4~,1 
JSHtOIJPX 20 -0.48899 (4) -0.431:·f~5) -0. 403:!4 (~ ) -0.4:19 13(5) -().3f!~7A (5) -0.~63~7 -O.l~~fQ,i -O,09t"3 -(l.l~':lI~h 0.711,90 
SSH42~X 30 0.93051 (1) 0.912~9(1) 0.A9101(1) O.II Q '.B7 (1) o· fI"~:'7 (1) O.fll,n"-" (1) (l. 449(1) O,4flOtJ4 (). 4:~:'"'' -O.797~" 
SStl8~SX 20 0.81737 (1) o .85048( 1) 0.81919(1) 0.91~4') (1) O.9.~'·;0 (1) (\ 'J 1 ~17() (1) O.~FlIHlA t).<=jB147 .) '571"'\7' -I). 7~'B?6 
SSM10~5X 20 0.7b959 (1) 0.Al105(1) 0.7899R(1) 0.89'170 (1) O.9n4fl (1) 0.'0111097 (I) () . ~~~,()O:-:; o .• 'i~,:'.~~, n. ~4(lQfl -0.74'94 
SSM4UPX 30 0.86A30 (1) O.AMBO( 1) 0.R50211(1) 0.97:'~fI (1) 0.97701 (I) 0.9741:~ ( 1) O. 'I97M n, ~,~~?7 1l.41'.94 -0 7'] ("',/. 
SSM8UPX 20 0.740~6(1) 0.77717(1) 0.76004(1 ) .0.91804 (1) 0.95793 (I) O.9i,llll (I) (I. 46~O7 0.4!")O70 (\.43/)~5 -0.11 ;':",',1 
SStll0UPX 20 0.71507 (1) 0.75484(1) 0.741::;7(1) 0.90460 (1) f\.Y49?~! (1) (). 9~·"i~~7 (1) 0.4.1771 O.4:'AS:! 0.4085'" -0.690 .... 
JHY 59 -0.57048 (1) -0.r.936::>(2) -(l.51>1I~6(2) -0.631:'0(1) -1l.71401 (1) -0./1l":.1 (1) -O.15:)~)8 
-0. :"O:!75 -O.2:!944 0.62Y7(\ 
SHY 52 0.61.:'30(1) 0.6019711) 0.672%(1) O. 890~:' (1) 0.9311>9 (1) (\.94319 (1) 0.1021() 0.<'446/. 1).14330 -no ~~51IJ 
lSH4~5V 54 -0.57754 (1) -0.S5~1l{,(1) -0.5~~7U(2) -0. !"j2='4~ (1) ·-0. ~"O~l (2) -0. ~j~:m] (2)-O.I"'t~;;.> -1).06.3:.>:1 -O.04t~O O. 7/.40~j 
IStlO25V 28 -0.33537 (5) -0.3045:1(5) -0.:!790/) -0.31960 (5) -0.;!~144 -().~'7hY9 -0.1441" -0. J .~~,JO 
-0.15"90 O,~~'24 i 
lStll0~5V 28 -0.50804 (2) -0. 44505C 3) -0.417590) - 0.4A204 (2) -1).43;0;'8 (3) -0.415"'5 0)-0.10144 -0. O~j07? -O.073A7 , 0.61,1:")0 
ISH4UPV 63 -0.57A03 (1) -0.553~4(2) -0.~26:!1(2) -().~j~!"Y7(1) -0:54320 (2) -O.5:!671 (2)-0.07491 
-0.onB60 -0.094~S 0.7~M4 
ISH8UPV 28 -0.33511 (5) -0.30334(5) -o.:! 179~, -0.:11977(5): -O.:'91:'1l -1l.D697 
-0,14219 -0.1.1314 -0.151113 0.53:''15 
':::;:'_1 ISM10UPV 28 -0.50551 (2) -0.44227(3) -0.41407(3) -0.48074 (2) -0.4~98~j (3) -0.4133H (3)-0.09B4~ -O.('I47~'il -0.07301 0.""-'36 8SM42SV 38 1.00000 0.97341(1) 0.96~3B(I) 0.9:10/,:' (1) 0.87640 (1) 0.05756 (1) 0.35146 0.~7077 0.'8B::!7 -0.74"47 
SSH825V 28 0.97341 (1) 1.00000 0.99338(1) 0.9~6Ufl (1) O.901()~ (1) 0.HR137 (I)' 0.43~n 0.:19419 O.3~:llIO -0.722-'4 
SSI1102SV 28 0.963311 (1) 0.99338(1) 1.00000 0.91605 (1) o. 119~:>3 (1) 0.HflO;'3 (1) 0.38~51 o. 3~jl')7 0.27556 ~ O.6H~71 
SSt14UF'V 38 0.93062· (1) 0.9268A(I) 0.91/.1)5(1) 1.00000 0.98663 (1) o .?A04~j (1) 0.::'8067 O. ~!O:J97 0.23931 -()."SI79 
nSH8UPV 28 0.87640 (1) 0.90103(1) 0.09:'23(1) 0.9B~6~ (1) 1.00000 0.Q9A03 (1) 0.3,BI7 O.10::!27 0.:.'3771 -O.('657.!6 
SSM10UPV 28 0.85756 (1) 0.8833;>( 1) 0.08023(1) 0.9fl045 (1) O.99f11)3 (1) 1.000flO· -·O.:!9017 0.271110 0.:-'06:"'0 -0.h4'~",,~ 
POPAGRIC 68 0.35146 (4) 0.43593(3) 0.3115St(4) 0.28067(5) O.D:117 (5) O.~9AJ7 (5) 1.00000 0 9499:! 0.9h346 -0.~4n6 
POP DENS 68 0.27077 0.39419(4) 0.351:'7(4) 0.20397 O.lo.'n (5) 1l.271nO O.9499? t,()()OOO ().99IH6 -0.340~4 
NOTREE 50 0.28827 0.3~380 O.275~6 0.;'3931 (). ~I~ J71 O. 2()h~'() O.'1b:l4(. 0.99046 1.000'(10 -0. :l4c ..... ~. 
AGRICX68 45 -0.H247 (1) -0.72274(1) -0.MIS71 (1) -0.611179 (1) -().I.I.~~:!h (1) ··n.h4;'/,:! (2)-0.74436 
-0.34094 -O.:l4?1~ 1.00000 
< ACRICX70 68 -0.46169 (2) -0.60077(1) -0.~496:'(2) -0. 38:'0~ (3) -0.55/00 (2) -I). ~25'l1 (2) -(I .II1BI0 -() • .l2:!~O ··O.J6/J:'4 O.t}07 .. ,~ 
1-" AGRIC%73 52 -0.53169 (3) -0.63653(2) -0.60~74(2) -0.38112 (5) -0.',6HZI1 (2) -O.:=i4/d,6 (2)-0.O27"'~ -().O6~97 -0.34:"):;'8 O. QB4~jO 
IN[070 S2 0.32827 0.28414 ().:16~:1C) (). :~3S()4' 0.3:,014 O. 3J :'~!9 0.04440 0.00075 O.101l00 -o,~, 'A",4 
IND73 47 0.07436 0.05895 0.0344A 0.0:""008 o. (l~, ',/.:) 0 04~1~ <>.009117 0.04009 Q.06226 -().4/'170 
SERV70 52 0.5832~ (2) 0.60629(2) 0.5795f1(2) 0,49~~6 (3) 0.4f1'110 (4) O,ll/·6n4 (4) o.:!I}r;H":i 0.'7710 O.~BO:?3 -O.'!".it'.66t fir::RV73 47 0.51344 (2) 0.61208(2) 0.60U3(2) 0.40"08 (3) O.'54?6~, (2) O.~'11~j~~ (2) ()o19h91 O.:!9499 O.1~·4~6 ~ (). ~t·113 
AGRICGOP Sl -0.47418 (2) -0.52770(3) -0. '50260 (3) -0.3f1\49 (3) -0.48449 (4) -!>.4Anll (4)--0.189",9 -O.~lbfIO -0.39",7", O.921?4 
AGRICHOH 24 -0.74573 (1) -0.71494(1) -0.601:!4(1) -1).60794 (1) -0./.670~ (1) -0.64679 (2)-(\.~77'3 -O,Cj1612 -0.54566 <>.97923 
TOWNS250 68 -0.18176 -0.26038 -0.31109(5) -O.2b49:l 1),31301 (5) --0. '.<190 (5) O.~~\(}44 1)."',4342 O.5nAl -0.27593 
TOlolNS100 68 -0.30200 (5) -0.34259(5) -0.40158(4) -0.38812 (3) -0.40111 (4) - 0.4:<01;' (3) n."'i090:' ().!";IoOl~ 0.59542 -0.33189 
TOWNS50 32 N.C. N.C. N.C. H.C. N.C. N.C. O.S46R4 O.'"iftl,HO O.Alhf;~ :-0.77010 
TOWNS40 32 H.C. H.C. H.C. N.C. H.C. N.C. O. C):~377 O.'5~240 0.6::!O84 -O.H?44A 
TOWNS30 32 N.C. H.C N.C. N.C. N.C. H.C. 0.50391 O.56',!53 0.60544 -().A4368 
TOlolNS20 32 H.C. N.C. H.C. H.C. N.C. N.C. O.4"~71 0.53851 0.~ntJ4 -0.870n 
TOWNS10 18 H.C. N.C. N.C. H.C. H.C. H.C. 0.0;4606 0.24920 O.62J:i9 -0 .. 97548 
AGGLH250 42 0.04980 0.06594 -0.01085 -0.04305 -0.1)4796 -O.onOl 0.71519 0.1,0774 0.1.9538 -0. 6~'454 
AGGLH100 42 0.01533 0.07947 -0.00360 -0.00562 0.07401 0.01194 ().I,AIIOH 0.6063A 0.68591 -().{'S150 
CARS66 63 0.50047 (2) 0.53570( 3) 0.50556(3) 0.39751 (4) 0.S~6BO (3) O,~128t (3)-0.03753 -0.(11879 -0.01:(/4 
-0.571n 
" 
CARS70 68 0.39BOO (3) 0.43366(3) 0.40697(4) 0.3f1797 (3) 0.4~369 (2) 0.44100 (3)-0.0~616 
-0.06:'67 -(l.O700~ -O.4A051 
CARS73 68 0.26546 0.28509 0.25794 0.~4946 0.28154 0.26768 -0.07t:14 -0.07945 -O.09A'50 -0.40674 
HVSROAD 66 0.13474 0.34689(5) O. :!9~~t:)S -0.0:1538 0.12497 0.07976 0.97741 0.971:'7 O. '17873 -0. :'71134 
MVRSOADP 61 -0.04794 -0.05608 -0.13998 -0.14870 -001 991~ -O.2~492 0.99834 0.95640 0.97109 
-0.27306 RDSOKMMI 66 0.21218 0.19956 0.18099 0.4640'" (2) 0.507fJ6 (2) O.~~~217 (2)-1l.09208 0.(10041 -O.0~B95 -0.09900 RDSOKMPL 61 0.45622 (2) 0.63641(1) 0.61321(1) 0.43123 (2) 0.70505 (1) 0.69070 (2)-0.157AS 0.06317 -0.006:'9 -0.14593 
RDPOPMIN 66 0.04086 -0.07930 -0.07540 0.21371 0.13496 O. t~j546 -0.13853 -0.:'0197 -O.:OObO O.lnlO 
RDPOPPLU 61 0.37451 (4) 0.34540(5) 0.38627(5) 0.51286 (2) 0.53052 (2) O.5b370 (2)-0.21010 -0.38:;09 
-0.31898 O.27~O5 PCFOO 21 0.73415 (1) 0',58674(S) 0.61/87(5) 0.93751(1) 0.88416 (2) 0.90"06 (1)-0.:'3317 -O.3(1~63 -0.' ('7~~j 0.51'0111 GVAHAI< 68 0.75228 (1) Q'. 71664( '1) 0.68063(1) 0.64421 (1) 0.~AB61 (1) 0.55102 ( 1) 0.13184 0.15081 O.lS05~ -().7~187 
GVAOCCUP 49 0.70419 (1) 0.67950(1) 0.65743 (1) 0.70331 (1) 0.68015 (1) 0.66807 (1) 0.19948 O. :~7399 0.27579 -0. R66:'H CONSEXP 46 0.75342 (1) 0.78442(1) O. 7S6'n (1) .0.71572 (1) 0.7H140 (1) O.69:l51 ( 1) O. 39:'~j3 O. 4~j400 O.4hS65 -0.79446 
DISPINC 68 0.78998 (1) 0.80027(1) 0.76167(1) 0.69027 (1) 0.619M (1) 0.58188 (1) O.O'I~OB 0.08:'A4 0.09535 -O.6Cj9~2 UNEHPLOY 52 -0.62226 (1) -0.59945(2) -0.57372(2) 
-0.54997 (2) -0.60993 (2) .. 0.598~8 (2)-0.1~6n ··0. tt.02:l -0.15791 0.74959 FRIDGE 21 0.48665 (4) 0.65290(5) 0.61386(5) 0.Snf11 (3) 0.75613 () 0.72923 (4) (I.O"'03U . o. O:~/'~~4 -O.19~~Yl 0.01l145 HDF 10 -O.J~602 -0.40436 -0.30733 -0.OY5A3 
-0.06673 0.0:1411 -0. 34:':'i4 .. ().3U049 -().1~-itY2 O.~411~9 INDENERG 47 0.30289 (5) 0.35411(5) 0.35152(5) 0.30412 (5) 0.39938 (5) 0.400~3 ( 5)-O.I~II~1 -().109~O -0.09071 -0.31>476 INDELECT 51 0.28864 0.29627 0.28692 0.32874 (5) 0.3942'" (5) 0.396511 (5)--O.19;!96 -0.193n -0.20743 -0 .. \~tl34 FELF1564 68 0.61341 (1) 0.63465(1) 0.62136(1) O. 45249 ~ 2) 0.50220 (2) 0.41l17~ (2) O.110AO 0.09024 O.091!'" -0.45058 FELF'15UP 68 0.611:<'4(1) 0.62383(1) 0.61061 (1) 0.438:;2 (2) 0.4747[1 (2) 0.45295 (2) 0.041>40 ().O~~:",51 0.03394 -0.440A4 FECV1564 68 0.55348 (1) 0.60906(1) o • 59:!22 ( 1) 0.43343 (2) 0.5~771 (2) O.~:!O74 (2) O.t;IBn3 0.130611 0.143'/7 -0.491"8 FECV15UP 68 0.55611 (1) 0.60173(1) 0.58488(1) 0.42183 (2) 0.50987 (2) 0.491111 (2 ) 0.1)6<141 O.On:itA (1.011679 -0.49268 FECV14UP 41 0.43272 (5) 0.34670 0.33507 0.40575 (5) 0.31>439 0.1<1037 0.089~3 0.04412 0.0:'1672 -0.32495 FEXLF 68 0.60109 (1) 0.61200(1) 0.59469(2) 0.49509 (2) 0.54823 (2) 0.531A5 (2) O.;!1I64 0.1"544 0.:'OOIl5 -O.4~9Ft~ BIRTHS66 SS -0.40443 (3) -0.41396(5) -0.39942(5) 
-0.39061 (4) -0.4048~ (5) -0.39715 (S)COd6507 -O.J5CJS7 -0.39~12 O.~53:'2 BIRTHS73 68 -0.28:593 -0.35057(4) -0.34634 (4) 
-0.23127 -0.2995~ (5)-0.29093 r·?5961 -0.29347 -0.33537 0.49219 HHOLDS 68 -0.:51599 (1)-0.61851(1) -0.57358 (1) 
-0.44948 (2) :-0.55905 (2)-O.~3066 (2) 0.37732 -,0.4()639 -0.43709 0.6601l6 
.' 
APPENDIX 2 (continued) 5 - DISTRIBU'rION ANALYSIS IN EUROPE: REGIONAL ANALYSrS 
Correlation coefficients: 
ISM425X ISM825X ISM1O'25X ISM4UPX ISM8UPX, ISM1O'UPX SSM425X SSM825X SSM1O'25X SSM4UPX 
I, GVACPPP 52 -0'.62367(1) -0'.49810'(4) -0'.59724(2) -0'.61458(1) -0'.49537(4) -0'.59369(2) '0'.750'80'(1) 0'.59895(2) 0'.51361(3) 0'.54429(2) 
GDPCPPP 52 -0'.610'60(1) -0'.50'570'(4) -0'.60'70'0'(2) -0'.60'20'1(1) -0'.50'320',(4) -0'.60'365(2) 0'.74877(1) 0'.59318(2) 0'.50'995(3) 0'.55124(2) 
GVAWCPPP49 -O'.64572(1)~-O'.64217(2) -0'.71314(1) -O'.5927O'N) -0'.6380'6(2) -0'.70'659(2) 0'.65343(1) 0'.69535(2) 0'.65676(2) 0'.61967(1) 
CO'NSCPPP46 -0'.72112(1) -0'.53637(2) -0'.68130'(2) -0'.630'0'2(1) -0'.53250'(4) -0'.6750'8(2) 0'.66532(1) 0'.60'140'(4) 0'.520'76(5) 0'.61935(2) 
DINCCPPP52 -0'.42285(3) -0'.45915(4) -0'.54858(3) -0'.4510'8(2) -0'.45485(4) -0'.54296(3) 0'.62251 (1) 0'.650'88(2) 0'.56521(2) 0'.55883(2) 
GFK 68 -0'.480'95(2) -0'.39823(5) -0'.49837(4) -0'.48477(2) -0'.39494(5) -0'.49411(4) 0'.73110'(1) 0'.63190'(2) 0'.55452(3) 0'.60'678(1) 
FEMSIND 21 -O'.57621(3j -0'.35451 -0'.43436(5) -0'.57679(3) -0'.35533 -O'.43533(5j 0'.410'83 0'.3940'7 0'.360'29 0'.28179 
.... "~---
FEMSERV 21 -0'.60'223 (3 -0'.24391 -0'.56159(3) -cL 90'372 (3) -0'.24947 -0'. 56828( 4 0'.63463 (2) 0';55426 (4) O'. 5486,6 ( 4) 0'.57229(3) 
FEINDSER21 -0'.64842(2 -0'.30'876 -0'.55619(3)-0'.64957(2) -0'.31327 -0'.56162(4 0'.56594(4) 0'.5170'8(4) 0'.50'085(4) 0'.45482(5) 
SSN8UPX SSM1O'UPX IHY 
GVACPPP 52 0'.42238(5) 0'.38283(5) -0'.490'49(1) 
GDPCPPP 52 ,0'.4170'8(5) 0'.37830'(5) -0'.48324(1) 
GVAWCPPP49 0'.6250'8(2) 0'.60'616(2) -0'.53155(1) 
CO'NSCPPP46 0'.50'814(5) 0'.42758 -0'.49671(1) 
~ DINCCPPP52 '0'.48732(2) 0'.44820'(4) -0'.29322(4) 
~: GFK 68 0'.49991(4) 0'.46528(4) -0'.31216(3) 
FEMSIND 21 '0'.2480'4 0'.22686 -0'.12113 
FEMSERV 21 0'.53210'(4) 0'.52725(4) -0'.58997(2) 
FEINDSER21 0'.41359 0'.40'0'81 -0'.38981(5) 
SSM425V SSM825V SSM1O'25V 
GVACPPP 52 0'.690'71 (1 ) 0'.66932(1) 0'.62727(1) 
GDPCPPP 52 0'.70'188(1 ) 0'.6610'6 (1 ) 0'.620'0'1(1) 
, GVAWCPPP49 0'.65223(1) 0'.61794(2) 0'.58753(2) 
CO'NSCPPP46, 0'.70'170'(1 ) 0'.71420'(1) 0'.670'44(1) 
DINCCPPP52 0'.72594(1 ) 0'.7330'8(1) 0'.68838(1) 
GFK 68 0'.710'74(1) 0'.69286(1) 0'.65644(1) 
FEMSIND 21 0'.37398 0'.3320'8 10.30'335 
FEMSERV 21 0'.59225(3) 0'.51970'(4) 0'.50536(4) 
FEINDSER21 0.53464(4) 0.47927(5) 0.457,45(5) 
,Ai}> ~ 
SHY ISM425V ISM825V ISM1O'25V ISM4UPV ISM8UPV ISM1O'UPV 
0'.29486(5) -0'.63596(1) -0'.37290'(5)-0'.56770'(2)-0'.63314(1)-0'.37215(5)-0'.5650'4(2l 
0'.31158(5) -0'.62645(1) -0'.37677(5)-0'.57438(2)-0'.62415(1)-0'.37631(5)-0'.57198(2 
0'.53873(1) -0'.5760'9(1) -0'.45914(4)-0'.63523(2)-0'.590'0'6(1 )-0'.45872(4)-0'.63260'(2 
0'.42324(2) -0'.65348(1) -0'.35844(5)-0'.59370'(2)-0'.63421 (1)-0'.35826(5)-0'.59154(2) 
0'.35715(3) -0'.47912(2) -0'.33463(5)-0'.50'731(2)-0'.49150'(1)-0'.33218(5)-0'.50'293(2) 
0'.41495(2) -0'.460'15(1) -0'.29497 -0'.47745(3)-0'.47341(1)-0'.29370' -0'.4740'0'(3) 
0'.17315 -0'.37311 -0'.19899 -0'.4360'6(5)-0'.37350' -0'.19982 -0'.43722(5) 
0'.50'70'3(4) -0'.62560'(2) -0'.1190'6 -0'.56387(4)-0'.62721 (2)-0'.12142 -0'.56750'(4) 
0'.3550'8 -0'.54976(3) -0'.15355 -0'.55961 (4)~O'.55O'8O'(4)-O'.15563 -0'.56269(4) 
SSM4UPV SSM8UPV SSM1O'UPV 
0'.56426(1 ) 0'.53211 (2) O'.4973O'(2~ " 
0'.57863(1 ) 0'.52415(2) 0'.48992(2 
0'.61664(1 ) 0'.59280'(2) O'.57559(2~ 
0'.60'40'6(1 ) 0'.61141(2) 0'.57890'(2 
0'.61618(1 )- 0'.5450'5(2) O'.5O'424(2~ 
O'. 62764( 1) 0'.57812(2) 0'.54774(2 . 
0'.28418 0'.2490'9 0'.22911 
0.56135(3) 0'.52442(3) 0.51831(4) 
0'.45764(5) 0.41857 0'.40412 
! " 
\: 
g , 
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APPENDIX 3 
Up to the time of writing, the following have agreed to participate 
in conjunction with ourselves, in a European Marketing Indicators 
Working Party. This will be specifically oriented towards the 
production by sub-national region of comparative indicators relevantly 
affecting retail distribution. Each will work to produce these 
indicators in respect of his own particular country, once the bases 
and methods of compiling these indicators have been mutually agreed. 
Final results will be published. 
Professor Angelmar, Institut European d'Administration des Affaires 
(INSEAD) France 
Professor Juan Farran, Universidad de Navarra, Barcelona, Spain. 
Professor Bjarke Fog, Institute of Managerial Economics, The 
Copenhagen School of Business Administration, Copenhagen. 
Professor Or A Heirman, Economische Hogeschool, Limburg, Belgium. 
Or Lars Lindqvist, Swedish School of Economics & Business Administration, 
Helsinki, Finland. 
Professor Aldo Spranzi, Director, Centro di Studi SuI Commercio, 
University L Bocconi, Milan. 
Professor Bruno Tietz, Director, Handelsinsitut, University of -
Saarbrucken, Germany. 
Jens Vestergaard, Aarhus School of Business Administration & Economics, 
Aarhus ,_ Denmark. 
It is hoped to complete-this list by the addition of representatives 
of the following remaining countries: Sweden, Norway, Netherlands 
(although Professor Heirman has indicated his willingness to research 
all Benelux countries),Austria, Switzerland, Ireland, Portugal. 
- -
--. -'" .~:... ..:. - , - • ::.., • <' 
-/ It is thought ~thatth~-:-wbrk topr6d~ce thi~ :prot£?typ~_:~-~t ~f mark-etin,9/ 
indicators will take two years. -
Long-term Objectives. Once the first set of indicators has been 
constructed and published, this will have highlighted the indicators 
needed to be produced and establish the methods of constructing them. 
It will then be up to the working party to decide whether its work is 
finished or whether to continue in existence to produce these indicators-
as a yearly or two-yearly series. If, at the end of the programme, the 
working party does decide that its role -was exploratory anc1 is now 
finished, it will endeavour to persuade such bodies as the rEC and 
DE CD to produce these indicators for the future, using the methods 
established by ,the working party. 
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